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“The purpose of mathematical programming is insight not numbers” 
Arthur Geoffrion (19876) 
 
Complementarity formulations offer the opportunity to thoroughly investigate and clarify the problem 
of investment in electricity generation capacity.  While complementarity has been traditionally used in 
the sphere of imperfect competition, we demonstrate it also can play a fundamental role in perfectly 
competitive situations.  We demonstrate that our approach offers richer understanding than the 
traditional linear programming approach.  We attempt no judgement as to the practical benefit of our 
approach, as the benefits themselves depend on the data of the specific counter-factual used.  The 
disadvantages of our approach are somewhat clearer.  We acknowledge that the formulations that result 
are computationally challenging and that the various standard solution methods available for 
complementarity problems may not actually represent efficient solution methods for such problems.  
Nevertheless, we adopt the complementarity framework, as ours is a purely theoretical thesis, designed 
to explore the potential of a unique solution approach to an oft-solved problem. Complementarity 
theory provides an environment for developing theoretical formulations that, in many cases, resolve 
directly from an optimisation problem, but it is also free to include other conditions where required. 
After a brief introduction and literature review, Chapter 1 considers the finer detail of 
traditional solution approaches, including the use of screening curves, linear programming, and a 
related complementarity problem.   Screening curves were traditionally used in the times of central 
planning to describe the optimal trade-off between technologies in terms of utilisation, and with the 
addition of a Load Duration Curve, the optimal capacity of each technology. We explore various 
representations of the LDC and discuss how these interact with investment conditions and how market 
clearing procedures are viewed in their context.  We show, with the use of an example, that LP 
approaches are incapable of accurately defining key system performance measures such as the Loss of 
Load Probability, without either “guidance” from the modeller or through the use of a significant 
number of load classes or slices.  Furthermore, we show that supposedly perfectly competitive models 
produce prices that are either inconsistent with the perfect competition they are predicated on, or 
inconsistent with the optimal capacity suggested by the model.   Our investigation identifies the reason 
for this deficiency. 
Optimal trade-offs have a useful theoretical function, but they also emphasise the nature of the 
technological choice, and ultimately when the trade-off is with a notional shortage technology, they 
describe the nature of the total capacity choice.  But the screening curve approach quickly succumbs to 
complexity, and is often replaced by optimisation in the form of linear programming, in which a 
significant number of constraints could be more easily expressed.  Nevertheless, the screening curve 
concept has some conceptual advantages that we can integrate into the analysis, namely the 
determination of utilisation levels corresponding to optimal technological trade-offs.  Knowing that the 
traditional LP approach does not accurately reflect the relative timing of investment and operation 
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decisions, or produce solutions that are independent of the LDC definition, we consider the integration 
of screening curve logic. By way of resolving the downsides of the LP approach, we develop a 
complementarity formulation that combines the LP solution with the logic of screening curves to derive 
a problem representation that enables an accurate and consistent solution to the simple problem.   In 
doing so, we make clear that screening curves, per se, are not the motivation, but the vehicle for 
determining an optimal representation of the system.  
Complicating the investor’s decision processes are several technological issues, the relevance 
of which might vary from market to market, but should be considered.  Chapter 3 describes a non-
exhaustive range of typical problem extensions that would challenge screening curve analysis and how 
our basic approach can be adapted to include these.  This is important for several reasons.  Firstly, it is 
important we demonstrate the overall extensibility of the approach.  Secondly, each extension involves 
discussion of both the extension itself, which in many cases is represented can be accommodated by 
additional constraints or altered objectives in the underlying optimisation problem, but also the way in 
which these extensions impact on the definition of the optimal system representation.  In deriving the 
optimal system representation, we develop duality based pseudo-screening curves to describe optimal 
trade-offs in particular situations or scenarios.  By way of example, we consider the relatively standard 
fare of cost structure generalisation, capacity inflexibility, energy limits and storage, and finally the 
formulation and interpretation of configurable technologies as non-linear notional technologies. 
In Chapter 4 we refocus on load.  We consider demand response in two forms: the short-term 
demand response that typically requires investment and can be written as a technology, and the wider 
type of demand response that comes as a result of adjusting consumption patterns and substitutions.  By 
nature, the latter response is based on longer term considerations and, in the spirit of the investment 
problem, we develop an approach to including this response in a fashion that excludes this form of 
demand response from behaving as a marginal technology in the electricity market.  We then consider 
reliability using an endogenous augmented LDC formulation.  Finally, we present a formulation and 
investment analysis of intermittent generation based on a chronological load and generation pattern. 
This case requires the introduction of an additional level of dynamic LDC generation, and the 
maintenance of a dynamic mapping between the LDC and the chronological load pattern. 
No discussion of investment is complete without consideration of risk and uncertainty, and it 
is therefore important to demonstrate how this can be addressed in our formulation, and what the 
consequences of risk are.  We begin by properly defining these terms before expanding the formulation 
to consider how risk could be implemented.  Our over-arching approach is to develop the framework in 
accordance with the principles of Ralph & Smeers (2011), including contract market, whose clearance 
defines the market price of risk endogenously.  We distinguish between the perspective of portfolio 
optimisation based on investor preferences and the perspective of risk constraints using an objective 
function that combines the expected profits of the firm with a CVaR measure.   Uncertainty is 
presented as a distinct concept.  Our presentation focuses on various conjectures and the implications 
they have for the optimal investment condition. 
Throughout the thesis, we use the structure of complementarity models as this is both 
convenient and the basis of much prior research into similar questions.  However, complementarity 
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solution methods per se are not the focus of this research, and we refer the reader to those texts listed 
for a detailed explanation of the theoretical properties and solution methods associated with 
complementarity problems.  We felt it important to be able to describe the problem within a single 
framework rather than an ad hoc collection of algorithms, and aim to show that, even though 
decomposing the problem and using algorithms may be more effective than standard complementarity 






Restructuring has seen centrally planned industries become competitive industries with operation of 
generation assets on a commercial basis, albeit with government ownership remaining in some cases.  
Investment incentives are forefront in the minds of investors, and those who steward the power system, 
for it is typically no longer publicly funded.   From the widest perspective, the goal of this research is 
to investigate these incentives.  To that end there has been much work conducted.  In the post-
restructured era, understanding strategic interactions, risk and contracting have become the top priority 
for practitioners in this field. 
By far the most common strategic interaction featured in the literature involves spot market 
gaming.  Absent an over-arching discipline, these games necessarily reflect a short term and 
opportunistic set of incentives.  With few exceptions, these models cannot be implemented in a purely 
optimisation framework although in some cases optimisation approaches have been identified 
(Chattopadhyay 2004).  More advanced studies have integrated investment, and in doing so have added 
a significant level of complexity (Murphy & Smeers 2005).  These problems typically require 
complementarity formulations, and depending on the assumptions made MPEC/EPEC formulations 
(Ralph & Smeers 2006).  However, the way these models deal with entry is truncated in the sense that 
they generally involve consideration of a fixed number of participants without investigating or 
specifying the basis for the maintenance of market power amongst the firms modelled at the expense of 
other entrants. 
There have also been many empirical studies of electricity market performance.  These too 
have largely focussed on short term incentives in the spot market.  Typically these studies have 
attempted to fit the behaviour of firms to a particular gaming paradigm, for example Cournot gaming, 
or supply function equilibrium (Wolfram 1999), with the resulting output being the parameters that best 
account for the observed behaviour.  One such example from was the Wolak report (Wolak 2009), into 
the performance of the New Zealand Electricity Market.  Setting aside issues regarding the modelling 
of hydro generation, the Wolak report found that firms in the NZ electricity market possessed 
significant market power.  This conclusion was reached using an ex-post measure of market power, 
implying that while the market power existed, it had not been fully utilised (Evans, Hogan & Jackson 
2012).  This form of modelling is also incomplete, as the lingering challenge arising from the study was 
understanding why firms with market power had not actually exercised it. 
One possible reason is that much of the actual analysis of market behaviour, and the most 
theoretical gaming analysis presented ignores the true structure of the electricity market and 
underestimates the most important strategic aspects of the market.   A wider perspective of the sector is 
presented in Figure 1.  The number of potential strategic interactions is significant, and far too many to 
consider in a single thesis.   Current research is heavily oriented toward inter-firm strategy, but there 
are clearly other “games” worthy of consideration, that could explain aspects of electricity market 




Figure 1: Typical Electricity Market Structure and Interactions 
Given the number of interactions is large, the immediate goal of this research is not even to explore 
these aspects directly, but to develop a framework suitable for doing so.  A priori it seems reasonable to 
assume that the same broad modelling challenges would apply throughout Figure 1, and as inter-firm 
interactions require more advanced techniques than pure optimisation, so it seems will this framework.  
In addition, some of the most recent advancements in the study of risk such as Ralph & Smeers (2015) 
involve the development of stochastic endogenous equilibria, supported by multiple participants.  
Again, pure optimisation will not suffice in such an environment.  Accordingly, complementarity 
theory is the basis for the framework we develop, even if on occasion optimisation would suffice. 
Many of the interactions above exist whether or not the spot market is competitive.  Given the 
relatively large amount of research into spot market gaming, we elect to begin by considering 
interactions in a perfectly competitive spot market.  The first step was to develop a framework that 
would accommodate the basic features that a researcher might want in a model of energy markets: 
• Consistent solutions 
• Energy and Capacity Limits 
• Demand Response 
• Configurable technologies 
• Endogenous intermittent generation 
• Risk measures that align with economic theory 
These requirements necessarily involve detailed application of complementarity methods.  In 
developing an understanding of those approaches, some deficiencies in conventional modelling 
approaches are identified, and opportunities for complementarity theory to be applied to the investment 
problem even under perfect competition were recognised.  A number of other approaches are used 
throughout the thesis.  These include: 
• Optimisation models that were used to derive KKT conditions that can be applied in the 
complementarity framework 
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• Optimisation models that were used to derive KKT conditions for ranking algorithms or 
finding minimum next steps 
• Optimisation models that were used to derive KKT conditions that define CVaR. 
• Screening curve models which are discussed as they represent a different approach that 
(notably) produces a superior solution to conventional optimisation approaches in simple 
cases.   
• Financial Options, which are discussed analogously with capacity values and therefore can be 
used along with the mathematics of screening curves to precisely define utilisation levels in 
scenarios or sub-periods. 
• Algorithmic approaches, which are used to guide solutions to, or away from, values that are 
inappropriate 
The final reason for presenting the thesis in complementarity form is that it enables a 
consistent representation of all of the above approaches in a single model. 
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1 INVESTMENT FUNDAMENTALS 
1.1 Introduction 
We begin by discussing the motivation for the thesis and the choice.  The thesis begins by discussing 
some of the features of electricity markets and the evolution of issues that have led to the use of various 
analysis techniques.  Naturally this topic spans the entire literature and so our discussion is modest, but 
it does include a discussion of the use of screening curves, optimisation and complementarity theory as 
each have been applied to various aspects some of the investment problem.  A number of approaches 
have been suggested and we discuss these briefly before moving to a detailed discussion of screening 
curve analysis, with a particular focus on the suitability of the many assumptions attached to this 
analysis.  For example, in its standard incarnation, screening curve analysis does not address network 
constraints, losses, the possibility of economies of scale in generation, or more subtle issues such as the 
continuity of investment.  The appropriateness or otherwise of these assumptions are discussed in the 
context of perfect competition.   
While screening curve analysis is intuitively successful, it has been largely abandoned in the 
literature as the need for additional complexity has driven analysis beyond its capabilities and has 
typically been supplanted with optimisation based techniques.  Being a relatively vintage approach 
compared to optimisation, screening curve analysis appears dominated, as its ability to practically 
address the types of complexity present in electricity markets decreases as complexity increases, 
whereas the introduction of increasingly sophisticated and data-intensive models has supported 
increased adoption  of optimisation-based techniques to solve complex investment and capacity 
planning problems.  Nevertheless, the original screening curve analysis remains a useful conceptual 
and analytical tool and we introduce it with a view to capturing the relative strengths of the analysis in 
an alternative use of complementarity theory, in Chapter 2.    
In Section 1.5.3, we discuss the relationships between social welfare optimisation, pareto 
efficiency, and competitive markets along with the Fundamental Theorems of Welfare Economics.  
These relationship are necessary to explain which modelled outcomes are, and are not equilibria or 
pareto-optimal.  With these in mind we present a two stage and single stage optimisation formulation in 
of the investment and generation problem in general terms.  In section 1.6, we introduce some of the 
load representation options available when those general optimisations require specialisation.  
Optimisation models require some representation of load, and that representation should be accurate 
and fit for the purpose of the model intended.  In this chapter, we only consider LDC based load 
representations, leaving the implications of chronological load patterns to later chapters.  The method 
by which the LDC is represented and formulated determines the nature and number of products and 
prices that form the output of the investment model.   
We discuss the applicability of these approaches in the context of conventional optimisation 
formulations.  Most importantly, we review the role of the LDC representation in restricting generation 
functions in conventional formulations.  By way of example in Section 1.6.2, we show this either leads 
to pricing that cannot be supported by the spot market clearing process, or where the spot market 
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clearing process is assessed against prescribed capacity, we show that the capacity will not recover 
costs.  The case where the LDC is piecewise constant is a special case and we address that also in 
Section 1.6.3.  We find some comparative advantages in screening curve analysis that motivate further 
research in Chapter 2, in which we introduce complementarity models that are distinct from prior 
applications of complementarity theory.   
 
1.2 Electricity Market Features 
Electricity markets have several properties that, at least partially, inhibit the efficient operation of the 
market (Botterud & Doorman, 2008).  On the demand side, load is highly inelastic in the short term, 
both because of the lack of alternative energy sources available and the lack of ability to respond to, or 
even be aware of, pricing signals from the spot market.   On the supply side there are a myriad of 
complicating factors that do not exist, or are not as prevalent, in other commodity markets.  Some of 
the more notable distinctions between electricity markets and standard commodity markets are: 
• Electricity is non-storable 
• Electrical current cannot be directed or traced and will take the path of least resistance 
• Transmission (delivery) is dependent on line capacities, and there are losses incurred in the 
transmission process 
• Electricity production techniques are not homogeneous and cost structures differ significantly 
between different generation methods. 
• Generation plants are involved in complex scheduling arrangements and may not be flexible 
in the short term. 
• Generation equipment participates in several markets at the same time, supplying power, 
reserve and other ancillary services. 
• Certain types of generation are energy-limited and allocate limited and/or uncertain fuel 
supplies according to opportunity, rather than financial cost. 
• Electricity markets can have acute demand-side flaws as in the short term, at least, price 
signalling is poor and demand is inelastic. 
• Due to the national importance of electricity supply, electricity markets are subject to intense 
political scrutiny.  
Perhaps the most fundamental feature of electricity supply relative to other commodities is that it is 
non-storable in commercial quantities with current technologies (Bushnell, 2003). The lack of 
significant storage options effectively requires demand to be met instantaneously, with no significant 
portion of energy demand being able to be serviced from storage as might occur with other products.   
Beyond the use of stored electricity, the ability to switch to other fuel sources is limited, particularly at 
short notice.   While improving, the ability to respond to price signals in a timescale appropriate to that 
in operation in electricity markets is limited, and in many cases the pricing information that would 
guide such a response is unavailable or cannot be practicably analysed in the frequency necessary to 
respond to highly volatile prices.  Highly volatile spot market prices incentivise demand side 
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participants to contract significant portions of their demand, and in doing so further reduce the 
incentive to respond to spot price signals.  Contract demand is more elastic, however contract prices are 
significantly dependent on spot market prices, and for many users their flexibility at the time of 
contract signing is limited to the choice of provider, and does not extend to alternative energy sources. 
With inflexible demand, the task of instantaneously meeting load falls predominantly on the 
supply or generation side of the market.  Non-storability implies that, rather than using a single “most 
efficient” technology coupled with storage solutions, a range of technologies, each with their own 
operational characteristics, is required. The immediacy of the requirement to serve load also 
necessitates the provision of contingency services such as reserve of various types, as there is no 
possibility of using a buffer stock as might be used to mask delays or malfunctions in the supply chain 
of other products, and the system is physically vulnerable to the effects of outages.   
Although it might already be considered complicated enough, generation to satisfy the 
immediacy of electricity consumption must be transmitted through an electrical network.  In addition to 
increasing the dimensionality of the problem by adding a spatial dimension to generation and 
consumption, the network structure limits transfers between locations and results in losses.   
The nature of the network and the need to instantaneously satisfy load requirements 
necessitates significant coordination and led to the development of optimisation based market clearance 
approaches such as first appeared in Bohn et al (1984).  A standard electricity market design involves 
combining bids from load (demand) where available, and offers from generators (supply) where the 
bids and offers relate to a particular location and time, with the system constraints by a market operator 
to produce an optimal dispatch.  The market clearance optimisation implicitly maximises a de-facto 
measure of consumer surplus and in doing so generates pricing that reflects the real-time production 
and delivery costs of electricity, while satisfying the many constraints that enforce the observance of 
the physical realities and market features that are modelled (Caramanis, Bohn, & Schweppe, 1982), 
(Hogan, Read, & Ring, 1996). 
Having developed the basic mechanics of market clearance and captured the benefits of the 
superior coordination that market pricing signals enabled, the focus of researchers switched to broader 
issues of market design and market structure as the economic implications of the physical 
characteristics of electricity markets were made clearer by formal optimisation.  In particular, 
governments and regulators in many jurisdictions became concerned with the somewhat juxtaposed 
problems of market gaming and capacity adequacy, with the latter being of particular concern as the 
basic competitive market structure does not, by itself, address the “missing money” problem.  
Naturally, the goal was to ensure electricity markets provided efficient allocative signals for 
consumption and dynamic signals for investment, both at the aggregate level and in terms of the 
technological mix.  Among others, Green (2002) provides an excellent review of the economic 
foundations of electricity markets.   
One of the predominant structural issues has been the issue of missing money (Stoft, 2002). 
Missing money refers to income which needs to be recovered, and should be optimally recovered 
during shortage periods, to support the optimal plant mix. The solution to the problem of missing 
money is fraught with the competing objective of the need to control pricing, particularly at times when 
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the market is short and the incentives for gaming are high.  In consideration of this problem, and noting 
the associated risks attached to this portion of revenue, Neuhoff & De Vries (2004) conclude that, in 
the absence of long term contracting, capacity will be lower and skewed towards less capital intensive 
technologies. 
Faced with the issues above, different regulators and governments went about reform with the 
end result being a vast number of market configurations.  Interventions such as price or offer caps and 
adjustments to the market structure itself have been introduced to address this and other efficiency 
issues.  Ultimately though, it is often dynamic efficiency, or inducing the optimal level of investment 
and technology mix that is more important, and in those terms market regulators must consider whether 
moving towards perfect competition in the spot market or developing a contestable market are more 
important.  In this study, we focus on a contestable market, where entry and exit, are uninhibited.  
In many markets the question of capacity adequacy did not come into focus for a number of 
years as many previously centrally planned systems had excessive capacity levels, but eventually 
growth and retirement eroded the overhang of capacity, and the dynamic issues of market design came 
into focus (Botterud, Ilic, & Wangensteen, 2005).  A variety of market structures have been created to 
promote capacity adequacy.  The large number of configurations possible is partly a result of many, 
and varied, attempts to address several distinguishing and complicating features in electricity markets. 
The specific design of capacity markets has been argued at great length.  Each implementation was 
designed in accordance with the particular philosophy and concerns of the body charged with 
implementing a market reform. Stewart (2007) includes a market structure taxonomy that is useful 
when describing many of these possible market structures. 
These market designs, which attempt to simultaneously address revenue associated with 
shortage while promoting capacity adequacy, are a source of significant difference between individual 
electricity markets.  A number of proponents, have weighed in on this fundamental structural issue, 
particularly in the aftermath of the Californian power market failure (Cramton & Stoft, 2005).  Among 
the options suggested were: 
• Energy only – prices are expected to spike during these periods to sufficiently high 
levels to provide revenue adequacy for peaking technologies. 
• Capacity payments – firms receive a capacity payment for having their plant 
available. 
• ICAP systems – firms are incentivised to hold capacity, although not necessarily to 
offer it. 
Summaries of various market structures in operation throughout the world are available from Stridbaek 
(2005), (Oren, 2005).  In both NZ (Layton, 2007) and Australia (AEMO, 2010), the chosen market 
design calls for the energy price to rise to high levels to cover the capital costs and required return of 
investment in peaking capacity.  In the case of Australia, those levels are somewhat sculpted by both a 
price cap and a limitation on the length of time in which shortage pricing can occur, but the parameter 
settings used are derived from precisely the sort of analysis that promotes a balanced trade-off between 
capital costs and returns for peaking plant.  As both local market designs are supported by that 
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fundamental logic, our study is focussed on single payment markets where capital cost recovery 
primarily comes from the energy price. 
The many features of electricity markets are well known, and much has been written about 
them.  However, the literature does not exist in a vacuum and has been responsive to the various 
developmental stages of electricity markets throughout the world.  Beginning with the design of market 
clearance mechanisms, and continuing through various phases of development researchers, market 
regulators and market participants have sought to address the issues of most relevance.  To that end 
complementarity theory has presented itself as an approach with significantly greater flexibility than 
standard optimisation affords, and this is particularly true when examining issues that require 
consideration of more than one objective function.  Many applications of complementarity theory have 
focussed on the behaviour of strategic market participants.  The analysis of perfectly competitive 
situations has been, and continues to be, handled by optimisation techniques such as linear 
programming.  
 
1.3 Investment  
1.3.1 Discounted Cash Flow 
A basic approach to project investment analysis is the maximisation of discounted cash flows.  The 
revenue and expenditure streams associated with a project are forecast and re-valued to a consistent 
time period (usually present day) using a discount rate.  If the net difference is positive the project will 
be of benefit, whereas if negative the project should not go ahead.  Choosing the level of the discount 
rate is in itself a complex decision and different choices may result in different projects being selected 
or mothballed (Baumol, 1968).   
The inclusion of risk aversion in this type of model can be achieved in a variety of ways, such 
as modification of the discount rate, or through some re-allocation of scenario weights.  Both 
approaches can be used to penalise investment however the former method is ill-conceived as it 
concatenates the adjustment for risk and the time value of money by compounding risk along with the 
discount rate, reflecting a particular, and generally unintended, risk structure.  It may be that risk does 
vary over time but if that is the case, it is preferable to make the necessary adjustments independently, 
as risk is unlikely to compound exponentially at the risk-free rate of return.  To avoid issues and 
complications with compounding risk adjustments, it is preferable to use a risk free discount rate and 
then apply additional measures to account for risk (Robichek & Myers, 1966).   
Real Option Theory 
Before discussing real-option theory, we should note Wallace (2010) demonstrates that stochastic 
programming techniques already implicitly incorporate real options and are therefore not only capable 
of representing real options, but also identifying them where they previously may have been 
overlooked.  Although multi-stage stochastic programming approaches have always implicitly 
evaluated real options and potentially identified some options that were previously not well understood, 
the advent of real option theory did benefit the investment literature by clarifying and specifying the 
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concept that there may be value purely in the option to invest, if the investor can control the timing of 
the investment (Dixit, 2012).  Under this approach, the investor does not invest when the discounted 
benefits are merely positive, but waits until the discounted benefits exceed the value of the option to 
invest. 
The dashed line in Figure 2 shows the NPV of the project, which becomes positive when the 
NPV of project returns exceeds the investment cost, I. The solid line shows the expected NPV of the 
investment opportunity.  While the value in investment is positive beyond I, but there remains the value 
of the option to invest.  As the project becomes increasingly in the money, the additional value 
accruing from postponement of investment withers until eventually, at V*, the two lines coincide and 
the value of the project is equal to the value of the option to investment.  At this point, there is no value 
in postponement and the project, with positive NPV, should go ahead.  Under traditional NPV analysis 
this would have occurred earlier, at I, the point at which the NPV of the project became positive.  The 
“real” option is equivalent to an American call option on the right to invest.   
 
 
Figure 2: Real Option Theory 
Competitive and strategic pressure often limits the number of investors that are in a position to choose 
the timing of their investment (Botterud & Korpås, 2007).  Absent entry restrictions, the ability of 
individual investors to determine entry timing is muted, and in the theoretical limit, zero.  While subtle, 
the assumptions required to support entry restrictions have implications for the spot market that remove 
the analysis from the perfectly competitive sphere in many cases.  For this reason, we do not consider 
real options in conjunction with investment decision making, however in an advanced setting real 
options may be useful in consideration of mothballing or reinstatement decisions where the temporary 
“entry” and “exit” decisions are under the control of a single entity. 
1.3.2 Wider Perspectives 
Majumdar & Chattopadhyay (1999) suggest other issues with the basic DCF approach to investment 




:*;*'" 1&(" <*&(0%=" >?@@AB8" +1-" 9$$&" ($,$3/2$(" /,$#" '+$" 31-'" ')/" ($%1($-" -2$%*4*%1330" '/" $,1351'$"
*&,$-'.$&'-" 5&($#" 5&%$#'1*&'06" !%%/#(*&C" '/" '+$" #$13" /2'*/&-" '+$/#08" *&,$-'.$&'" 2#/D$%'-" )*'+"
5&%$#'1*&"45'5#$"%1-+"43/)-"%1&"9$"%/&-*($#$("1-"/2'*/&-8"*4"'+$"*&,$-'.$&'"($%*-*/&"*-"*##$,$#-*93$"1&("
'+$" '*.*&C" /4" '+$" *&,$-'.$&'" *-" 43$;*93$6" E+*-" *-" 5-51330" '+$" %1-$" 4/#" *&,$-'.$&'-" *&" &$)" 2/)$#"
C$&$#1'*/&6"E+$" #$13" /2'*/&-" '+$/#0" %31*.-" '+1'" '+$" /2'*.13" '*.*&C" /4" 1&" *&,$-'.$&'" (/$-" &/'" /%%5#"
5&'*3" '+$" ,135$" /4" '+$" 2#/D$%'" *'-$34" $F513-" '+$" ,135$" /4" '+$" /2'*/&" '/" *&,$-'" *&" '+$" 45'5#$6" E+*-" *-"
*335-'#1'$("*&"G*C5#$"?8")+$#$"*'"*-"&/'"/2'*.13"'/"*&,$-'"5&'*3"'+$"&$'"%1-+"43/)"4#/."'+$"2#/D$%'"#$1%+$-"
!"8"*6$6")+$&"'+$"&$'"2#$-$&'",135$"/4"'+$"2#/D$%'"*'-$348"#>!B8"#$1%+$-"'+$",135$"/4"+1,*&C"'+$"/2'*/&"'/"
*&,$-'8" $>!B6" !" -'1'*%" &$'" 2#$-$&'" ,135$" $,1351'*/&" /4" '+$" 2#/D$%'" *&" G*C5#$" ?" )/53(" #$%/..$&("
*&,$-'*&C"1-"-//&"1-"#>!B"9$%/.$-"2/-*'*,$8"*6$6")+$&"'+$"&$'"2#$-$&'",135$"/4"'+$"%1-+"43/)"4#/."'+$"
2#/D$%'"$;%$$(-"'+$"*&,$-'.$&'"%/-'8"%6"E+$"#$13"/2'*/&-"122#/1%+"C*,$-"1"./#$"#$-'#*%'*,$"*&,$-'.$&'"























I&".1'+$.1'*%13" '$#.-8" #$13" /2'*/&-" ,1351'*/&" *-" 91-$(" /&" -'/%+1-'*%" (0&1.*%" /2'*.*-1'*/&6"
J/.21#$(" '/" 1" -*.23$" -'1'*%" K<L" $,1351'*/&" /4" $;2$%'$(" %1-+" 43/)" 4#/." 1&" *&,$-'.$&'8" '+$" #$13"










#1'$" *&" '+$" ,1351'*/&" /4" 2/)$#" 231&'-" >:$&C" $'" 136" >NPPNBB6"!" (*-1(,1&'1C$" /4" '+*-" 122#/1%+" *-" '+1'"
45'5#$-" %/&'#1%'-" 5-51330" #$2#$-$&'" '+$" 1,$#1C$" -2/'" 2#*%$" /,$#" 1" %$#'1*&" 2$#*/(" /4" '*.$6" Q/&CO'$#."
45'5#$-"2#*%$-"1#$"'+$#$4/#$"&/'",$#0")$33"-5*'$("4/#"%13%531'*&C"'+$",135$"/4"43$;*93$"2/)$#"C$&$#1'*/&"
231&'-8")+*%+" %1&" -)*'%+" /&" 1&(" /44" 2#/(5%'*/&" 1%%/#(*&C" '/" -+/#'O'$#." ,1#*1'*/&-" *&" '+$" $3$%'#*%*'0"
-2/'"2#*%$6"!&/'+$#"2#/93$.")*'+" '+$"5-$"/4"45'5#$-"2#*%$-"4/#",1351'*/&"*-" '+1'" '+$" 3*F5*(*'0" *&" 3/&CO
'$#.".1#=$'-" *-" 5-51330" 3/)6"K*$.$0$#" >NPPPB" #$%/C&*-$-" '+$-$" 2#/93$.-" 1&(" ($-%#*9$-" 1" %/.23$;"
1&130'*%13"4#1.$)/#="4/#"$-'*.1'*&C"'+$"4*&1&%*13"$F5*,13$&'"/4"45'5#$-"2#*%$-"'+1'"%1&"9$"5-$("4/#"#*-=O
 21 
maximisation (for direct stockholder benefit) and also to the actual financial constraints that apply, and 
the implications investment may have on the financial standing or rating of the firm as it may relate to 
future funding costs (Evans & Guthrie, 2005).  Investment schedules may be significantly different 
under different objectives or pressure of financial constraints.  We also note that the public sector 
investor is potentially less concerned about these sorts of issues, and although we do not address the 
potential for crowding out in this research it is an interesting aspect of the problem. 
Where a firm is listed on a stock exchange, the firm has some additional considerations.  The 
question of whether it should manage risk on behalf of shareholders who are free to strike their own 
portfolio for that purpose is one such issue.  The consequence of risk management is lower expected 
profits, and potentially duplication, or inefficient risk management where the options available to the 
firm are different to those of its shareholder.  The alternative view recognises that while shareholdings 
are atomistic and able to be dynamically hedged in theory, in practice they are not, and the transaction 
costs of managing a portfolio are high and volatility is not attractive for that reason.   More 
importantly, shareholders are not the only stakeholders and in practice relationships with financial 
institutions, and the covenants they impose in return for advancing funding, require risk management 
by the firm to ensure basic financial obligations are met. 
1.3.3 Traditional Planning Methods 
One of the first papers on investment in electricity generation systems was Masse & Gibrat (1957).  
They recognised the distinction between different production technologies, their flexibility, and the 
differing capital costs of each technology. Traditional electricity planning methods involved 
minimisation of the cost of supplying electricity, while maintaining a reserve margin in accordance 
with a chosen standard. To reflect risk aversion, this standard would not be an average year, but a dry 
or high demand year, depending on the characteristics of the system under analysis.  Cazalet, Clark, & 
Keelin (1978) investigate the optimal setting of this margin.  They discuss electricity planning in terms 
of cost minimisation with respect to the reserve margin. System cost is expressed as the sum of 
environmental cost, fixed costs, variable costs, and outage costs. All are functions of reserve margin, 
suggesting that there is an optimal level of reserve margin that minimises the total of these costs. 
Turvey & Anderson (1977) provide an overview of investment models in the electricity sector. 
Following a large amount of research on the optimal configuration and operation of power systems 
from a centrally planned perspective, Caramanis et al (1982) showed how appropriately set prices 
could improve signalling relative to standard tariff systems and, in a follow up paper, how spot pricing 
could guide investment decisions (Caramanis, 1982).  From the perspective of actual planning tools, 
Nakamura (1984) reviewed the then current systems for capacity expansion planning including WASP 
(Wien Automatic System expansion Program) and the system developed by EPRI, who built a model 
called the under-over model and incorporated low, medium, and high load growth probabilities. It also 
incorporated three levels of hydro production and breakdown probabilities, and different reserve levels.  
In similar fashion, Read, Culy, Halliburton, & Winter (1988) describes the PRISM simulation model 
that was used for electricity planning in NZ, which represented an advance in the level of detail in 
operational planning relative to existing planning models by simulating operations on a weekly basis.  
In an even wider context the US NEMS system represented a comprehensive equilibrium model 
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extending across the wider energy sector, in which individual components were solved separately in an 
attempt to provide a consistent analysis of the sector (Murphy & Mudrageda, 1998).  Finally, in NZ, 
Bishop (2007) describes GEM, the generation expansion model that replaced PRISM. 
The above approaches were traditional in the sense of their orientation towards planning at the 
system level.  The introduction of new paradigms in ownership and industrial organisation has 
necessitated new approaches that deviate from the traditional planning approaches and are oriented 
towards new technologies and new ownership structures.  For example, Awerbuch (2006) contrasts 
traditional least-cost approaches with portfolio based approaches, and focuses on the integration of new 
renewable technologies such as wind and solar power that must be considered in terms of the portfolio 
of generating plant that will supply electricity when renewable energy sources are not available.   
 
1.4 Screening Curve Analysis 
Screening curve analysis highlights the potential for different technologies, with differing capital and 
operating costs, to serve loads that occur with different frequencies.  Although the analysis may be 
extended, first and foremost the emphasis in screening curve analysis is on the comparison of costs, 
and the definition of optimal trade-offs and marginal operating ranges for each technology. It is 
assumed that load and generation exist at a single node, that technologies are dispatchable, reliable, 
have effectively unlimited fuel supplies, and that their cost structure may be represented with a linear 
total cost function, in which the intercept represents the fixed cost of providing capacity and the slope 
represents the marginal cost of operation.  We now consider the implications of the implicit 
assumptions involved in screening curve analysis. 
1.4.1 Network Structure 
Screening curve analysis assumes all generation and load occurs at a single node.  The reasonableness 
of this assumption rests on whether electricity is being transmitted large distances and whether the 
network topology results in significant bottlenecks in either energy or ancillary service markets that 
might restrict the transmission of electricity.  The geographically smaller the network, and the closer 
load centres are to generation nodes, the more justifiable the assumption of a single node becomes.  
The assumption removes the need to consider complex network structures, but comes at the expense of 
overlooking the impact of transmission losses, or network constraints.  Failing to create a distinction 
between load and generation locations, and thereby ignoring losses, leads to underestimation of the 
combined cost of generation and delivery and fails to account for the impact of network constraints, 
which are potentially significant. 
Network Constraints 
The impact of network constraints on market outcomes is well studied under both competitive and 
gaming conjectures (Joskow, 2000),(Borenstein, Bushnell, & Stoft, 2000).  Where gaming of a network 
constraint was to occur, the situation is complex, and spot market outcomes would depend on the 
nature on the market power of the participants as well as the availability and efficacy of spatial hedging 
arrangements.  But even under perfect competition, network constraints distort prices and profit 
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opportunities in the short run.  Price differentials resulting from binding network constraints should 
ideally provide an investment signal to either investors in generation capacity or transmission capacity.  
Prospective investors with rational expectations will anticipate that wherever entry is free, either 
generators will adjust their locational investment strategy or the system operator will adjust network 
investment decisions to mitigate or eliminate these inefficiencies.  Accordingly, the returns they 
perceive to be available should not include any rent associated with network constraints.  There may be 
specific circumstances that prevent one or other of these adjustment mechanisms from operating, but 
for the purpose of our analysis we assume the omission of network structure does not introduce 
significant long-term bias in a competitive market with free entry. 
Transmission Losses 
The transmission of electricity involves losses which vary throughout time and space in a network, 
with the implication being that what is required to be generated exceeds that which is consumed.  
Transmission incurs losses that increase quadratically with the amount of electricity being transmitted, 
and so are greatest at those times when transmission is greatest.  Ignoring this issue biases the analysis. 
While a fully worked model of the network would account for this issue more precisely, we seek a first 
order approximation to limit the bias in our single node representation.  One option is to adjust 
marginal costs to account for average system losses or, where a relationship between the system loss 
percentage and load can be established, we could enhance the approach by making the system loss 
percentage a function of load. 
   
MCi  = 
FuelCosts i + VariableOperatingCostsi
1− AverageLoss%
      ∀i    (1.1) 
This reflects the difference between the cost of generating load, and the cost of generating and 
transmitting to the point of withdrawal, and while not precise, it is not as imprecise as assuming zero 
losses by using a fuel cost alone.  The primary weakness of that approach, or indeed the standard 
approach of ignoring losses, is that it does not factor the capacity implications of losses.  The 
adjustment above addresses only the generation cost issues, as if generators could produce the 
electricity eventually lost without using capacity.  A preferable treatment involves treating losses 
directly, so that the extra costs of the requirement for additional capacity as well as generation are both 
recognised.  By way of example, we propose adjusting load proportionally by the same proportion as 
we adjusted costs in (1.1).   
   
Lk  = 
Loadk
1−AverageLoss%
        ∀i   (1.2) 
That reflects the assumption that absolute losses are a fixed proportion of load.  This relationship is 
only one possible assumption from among many.  Whether maximum losses occur at the time of peak 
load depends on the system but, a priori, and without any further information, the assumption seems 
reasonable.  In the case where a more definitive relationship between load and losses can be 
established, or the relationship can be specified on a scenario basis such as in terms of hydrological or 
demand conditions, then the adjustment could obviously be specialised to reflect that information. 
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1.4.2 Cost Structures 
Fundamental to screening curve analysis is the comparison of fixed and variable costs. 
Operating Costs 
The marginal cost of a single unit of technology i generating with a 100% utilisation factor is denoted 
 MCi  throughout, and is comprised of two components: 
   MCi  = FuelCosts i + VariableOperatingCostsi       ∀i    (1.3) 
Fuel costs are expressed in as a fixed cost/unit of output, implicitly reflecting the assumption of 
constant generation efficiency.   Variable operating costs are costs other than fuel, such as maintenance 
costs, that are directly associated with usage and, in this simplest case, proportional to the output of the 
plant concerned.   
Capital and Fixed Operating Costs 
Fixed operating costs are those that are incurred irrespective of whether, or how much, the plant 
generates.  The sum of capital and fixed operating costs for a single unit of capacity of technology i is 
expressed as an annuity and is denoted  FCi  throughout. 
   FCi  = CapitalCostsi  + FixedOperatingCostsi      ∀i   (1.4) 
The capital cost, or installation cost, of a power station is significant, and must be amortised over the 
life of the plant.  The amortised capital cost is dependent on several factors, each of which are 
individually difficult to determine. The actual build cost of a specific plant may be susceptible to 
significant variability, as might the cost of maintenance and decommissioning.  Even when standard 
costs are reliably known, or a plant is built as a turnkey development with a guaranteed installation 
cost, amortising that cost over the lifetime of the plant remains a complex task dependent on the 
discount rate used in the calculation, and the assessed economic life of the plant.  
Determining an appropriate discount rate for a particular project is a complex decision and 
different choices may result in different investments being selected.  Discount rates are often chosen to 
mimic commercial assessment of projects, where there is a requirement to accurately estimate both the 
cost of capital and the risks of each project (NZEC, 2007).  The Weighted Average Cost Of Capital 
(WACC) is a commonly used measure of the cost of capital, in which different levels of risk, and 
therefore rate of return requirements, apply to each capital source, and these are weighted according to 
the proportion of project finance arising from each capital source.  As stated earlier, a superior 
approach is to separate the time value from of money from the risk involved and assess risk separately.  
This approach discounts all project cash flow at the same risk free rate before introducing additional 
adjustments to account for risk and/or uncertainty.  To be clear, that is not to say that any financier or 
funding source would assess their involvement in a project at the risk free rate.  The higher the interest 
rate actually charged for finance, the higher the cash outlays will be, and it is these repayments, not the 
upfront cost of installation, that represent the cost of the project and must therefore be discounted at the 
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risk free rate in line with the income stream. Assumptions are also required with respect to the 
economic life span of the plant, which may be significantly different to its physical lifespan. The 
economic life of the plant may depend on salvage costs, technological developments throughout the life 
of the plant and maintenance costs.  
In combination, an assessment of these factors enables the estimation of the annuity period, 
and the fixed cash flow associated with the project, which in turn enables the calculation of an annuity 
that is equivalent to the discounted costs of providing a reliable unit of capacity for a particular plant 
type for the lifespan of the plant.  Detailed analysis should also consider the implication of interest 
costs, taxation and depreciation on the project’s cash-flows, and may well extend to consider the 
dynamic impact of any resulting restrictions on cash-flow or the firm’s ability to borrow, or any other 
bank covenants that might come with funding (Majumdar & Chattopadhyay, 1999).   In that respect, 
neither screening curve analysis or our equilibrium analysis deals with the degree of specificity 
required for a particular investment decision by a particular entity.  Instead, standardised amortised 
capital costs are assumed, and no attempt to model firm balance sheets and banking sector objectives is 
made.  This seemingly limits the analysis however participants seeking to invest may have little, if any, 
more information on which to base their assessments of market equilibrium.  That equilibrium is 
ultimately determined by their collective investment decisions, whether or not those decisions are 
based on complete, or partial information, so from an equilibrium perspective, the lack of accounting 
for the financial structure of current and future investors in generation capacity may not be significant. 
Continuous vs. Discrete Investment 
It is implicitly assumed that investment in any technology is continuously available at a constant cost 
per unit of capacity installed.  However, capacity is unlikely to be available on a continuous basis as 
most technologies are available in discrete installation sizes.  This may be a physical issue, related to 
technological requirements or the installation location, for example.  Alternatively, it may arise as a 
result of construction and installation economies, which suggest that the basic unit of installation for 
each technology is determined by the most efficient configuration of that technology.  
We are interested in investment at the technological level so that the assumption of continuous 
investment is justifiable in markets that are large enough in comparison to individual investment 
opportunities.  In smaller markets, the requirement to choose between discrete installation capacities 
may be significant, as plant sizes prescribed by a continuous model may not be feasible.  As the market 
size grows relative to individual plant sizes the bias or error introduced by this assumption becomes 
less significant, as any amount of capacity in a particular technology can be approximated by some 
combination of available discrete unit sizes with increasing accuracy.  
Nevertheless, even in larger markets there are complications that could be material and should 
be considered.  As discussed, network constraints may fragment a large market into portions in which 
the issue of discrete capacity choices becomes significant once again.  There is also a bias in the 
analysis against those technologies that are scalable, and whose flexibility in installation terms goes 
unrecognised.  Similarly, there is a bias towards those technologies that require large installations, 
whose inflexibility goes unrecognised.  We also note that there is also some additional benefit from the 
perspective of risk management in being able to follow load growth more closely by scaling a flexible 
 26 
technology as load uncertainty reveals itself, rather than more engage in sporadic investment in lumpy 
technologies. 
In the worst case, the assumption of continuous investment could lead to feasible solutions 
that are infeasible.  Where plant size restrictions do not reflect infeasibilities as much as economies of 
scale in construction, solutions may recommend installations of a size for which the installation and/or 
operating costs have been incorrectly assessed.  While discrete investment opportunities have been 
analysed for some time (Levin, Tishler, & Zahavi, 1985), we prefer to rely on the characteristic nature 
of perfect competition and proceed on the assumption the market is large enough relative to investment 
units to justify the assumption of continuity in capacity.   
1.4.3 Optimal Trade-Offs 
The total cost of operation at a given level of utilisation for a particular technology is defined by the 
sum of the two cost components, as shown in (1.5).  This pro-rata total cost function expresses the total 
cost of building and operating a 1 MW plant, as a function of either the number of hours a year the 
plant operates, or alternatively as the fraction of time, u, for which a plant will operate, which we refer 
to as the plant’s utilisation factor, or level.  The associated marginal cost is scaled according to the 
definition of utilisation chosen.    
   TotalCosti = FCi + MCiu      ∀i    (1.5) 
  
 
TotalCost j = FCj + MCju      ∀j    (1.6) 
Considering the fixed and variable cost of two thermal technologies with constant efficiency, we can 
calculate the utilisation level at which one will supplant the other as most efficient technology for a 
given operating role, or utilisation factor.  At its most simple, this trade-off is independent of the load 
duration curve (LDC), and depends only on the relative fixed and variable costs of each available 






         ∀i, j   (1.7) 
The level of utilisation at which one technology becomes preferable to another is defined 
mathematically in equation (1.7), and geometrically in Figure 3, by the intersection of the respective 
cost functions.  Among the set of all such pairwise technological comparisons, the most relevant trade-
offs and utilisation levels are those defined by the intersection of total cost curves on the lower 
envelope of the screening curve diagram, as shown in Figure 3.   
For each operational role, the lower envelope of total cost functions defines the least cost 
method of production, and identifies the technologies best suited to that role. Capital-intensive 
technologies with lower fuel costs are more likely to be appropriate for the satisfaction of loads that 
occur with high frequency, while less capital-intensive technologies with higher fuel costs are more 
likely to be appropriate for satisfying load that occurs with lower frequency.  The screening curve 
framework also provides a graphical interpretation of the situation for technologies that are dominated 





Figure 3: Screening Curve & Price Duration Curve  
As shown in Figure 3, if we additionally assume the market is perfectly competitive, the screening 
curve analysis also defines the underlying price duration curve (PDC), which represents a cumulative 
distribution of prices.  For the utilisation range in which a particular technology defines a segment of 
the lower envelope of cost functions, then that technology is marginal and sets the system price, which 
in the case of perfect competition is equal to its marginal cost.  Because the utilisation range for which 
each technology is marginal is a function of the full set of technological cost structures and not load, 
the price duration curve, which expresses both system prices and price durations does not depend on 
the specification of load in this simplified case.  
1.4.4 Shortage Costs and Frequency 
Screening curve analysis allows for shortage to be viewed as if it were a technology with an associated 
marginal cost.  Although the cost of shortage, or the value of lost load (VOLL), is very difficult to 
define, once defined, this approach allows a straightforward representation of the critical economic 



























trade-off between the cost of shortages and the cost of providing more capacity.  We proceed, assuming 
a single and known shortage cost (VOLL), and that the market price is free to rise to this level.  We 
treat VOLL as the marginal cost of a notional shortage technology, which has a fixed cost of zero.  Just 
as we can determine the optimal trade-off between different generation technologies by comparing the 
cost functions of each technology, we may do the same when treating shortage as a notional 
technology.  As we consider lower and lower utilisation levels, eventually a peaking technology will 
represent the least cost production method for satisfying very infrequent load requirements.  The 
installation and operating costs of the final peaking technology must be weighed against the benefits it 
provides, and the frequency with which those benefits are provided. Eventually, as capacity of the 
peaking technology increases and shortage events become rarer, shortage events will become so rare 
they are no longer worth avoiding with further investment in generation capacity.  
Although in practice the setting of shortage prices is significantly more complex, the shortage 
cost, VOLL, also theoretically translates to the PDC, and defines the system price that, when offered 
for a period of time commensurate with the shortage frequency, provides capital recovery for the 
peaker of last resort.  The determination of the level at which shortage costs should be set is beyond the 
scope of this study but we make the following comments.   
Shortages are unable to be targeted, or allocated, to individual customers, and instead affect a 
range of consumers who will each place different valuations on the interruption of supply.  We 
commence with a single marginal cost of shortage but more elaborate shortage cost functions could be 
employed, using techniques described in Appendix 7.5.  But irrespective of the form of the shortage 
cost function, in the absence of a demand response scheme, economic rationing cannot be implemented 
and the expression of the cost of shortage must reflect the unpredictability of shortage events and the 
inability to ration them.. For that reason, a complete assessment of actual shortage costs, which could 
be used to strike an overall economic trade-off, is of limited use. 
Left to itself, system reliability is generally a public good.  However, in cases where it is 
deemed worthwhile, as assessed by comparison of cost and potential savings in the wholesale or 
contract pricing, some consumers may opt to install technology to enable load response.  Demand 
response technologies reduce allocative inefficiencies in times of shortage and, more generally, at any 
time where the system price exceeds the consumer’s valuation of the energy.  By broadening the 
concept of shortage and shortage costs to include more general concepts of demand side response it is 
possible to incorporate a more sophisticated view of shortage by defining additional notional 
technologies, with non-zero fixed costs, that each represent a particular demand side response 
opportunity and are parameterised by a price, capacity and perhaps a limit on the total energy available 
for response within a defined period of time.   These ideas are developed in Chapter 3. 
1.4.5 Optimal Cost Recovery & Asset Valuation 
We can view the screening curve diagram and the associated equilibrium PDC from either the 
perspective of cost recovery, or asset valuation. 
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Cost Recovery 
As shown in Figure 3, the lower envelope of the screening curve diagram describes the least cost of 
production subject to meeting load occurring with a given utilisation level.   This least cost may be 
arrived at in two ways: 
• The cost of supplying (an incremental MW of) that load is given by the cost of building and 
running the marginal technology used to supply it.  Diagrammatically this involves moving 
along the cost curve of the relevant marginal technology. 
• The financial cost, which must be equal to the cost of actual supply in this equilibrium, may 
be found by tracing around the lower envelope, starting from the origin. This represents the 
marginal cost of buying in this power from other sources, some at marginal production cost, 
some from technology 1, some from technology 2 etc. Equivalently, this represents the 
marginal value of 1 MW of that kind of capacity to the system. 
Accordingly, for an optimally planned system, and every utilisation level, the following are equal: 
• The plant level long run marginal cost (LRMC) of building and operating the specific optimal 
plant (fixed plus variable) best suited to meet load occurring with that frequency in the long 
run (as calculated by the first approach)  
• The system level short run marginal cost (SRMC) of operating the optimal plant mix (variable 
only) required to meet load occurring with that frequency in the short run (as calculated by the 
second approach) 
If the system level SRMC and the plant level LRMC were to differ, then there would be a clear 
preference for switching to a cheaper procurement method, whether that was simply purchasing 
electricity from the system, or constructing a plant.  In terms of the Fundamental Theorems of Welfare 
Economics, which we discuss in detail in Section 1.5.3, any solution for which this system level SRMC 
and the plant level LRMC differed would not represent a Pareto-optimal solution, and therefore could 
not be considered a perfectly competitive equilibrium.  Furthermore, in a perfectly competitive 
economy, energy prices are set by the highest short run marginal cost for any of the stations producing 
at the time so that by the equivalence of the two cost measurements in equilibrium, the costs of 
investing in an optimal plant mix (both fixed and variable), are exactly recovered.  This is reflected in 
the equilibrium price distribution, which provides exact recovery of all fixed and variable costs for all 
plant types, in a fashion consistent with the choice of VOLL/shortage frequency.  This is what should 
be expected in a risk-neutral perfectly competitive market with free entry.  As will be discussed in 
Chapter 5, when investors are risk averse or have an aversion to uncertainty, entry requires more than 
simple cost-recovery. 
Plant Valuation 
As an alternative to the cost recovery perspective, we may consider a financial or valuation based 
perspective.  From this standpoint, thermal plants represent a strip of physical options to “call” on that 
plant when the value of its production, in terms of either avoiding shortage or the need to generate from 
more expensive plant, exceeds its own marginal production cost.  Thus, the value of thermal plant can 
be defined by the value of a strip of call options with the strike price set at the short-run marginal cost 
(SRMC) for that plant.  Where there is also variability in the cost structure of the plant, then rather than 
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considering a strip of call options, the plant could be viewed as a strip of spark spread options.  In a 
perfectly competitive market, the plant earns no contribution to fixed and capital costs when it is the 
marginal generator as it will be offering to the market and consequently defining, and receiving, a 
market price that reflects only its marginal cost.   Instead, plant profitability (and cost recovery) is 
based on those periods when the plant is infra-marginal, at higher load levels, when other technologies 
are called into service, resulting in higher prices.  At these times, we would describe the option as being 
“in the money”. 
Based on the proportion of time each particular technology is marginal, we can calculate the 
time weighted average price (TWAP) received by the plant when it is profitable. The operating value of 
the plant, per MW of capacity, is given by the accumulated profit of the plant, which is the area of the 
price distribution above the option strike price.  In equilibrium, this area will match the capital and 
fixed cost of providing capacity of this type.   
 
 
Figure 4: Call Option Valuation of Thermal Plant 
Figure 4 shows the valuation of a prospective new technology with SRMC=1000.  By construction, this 
particular distribution of returns is entirely deterministic, although very little complication of the model 
will the make the PDC dependent on the LDC which itself is the source of significant variability.  In 
any case, this concept, while theoretically redundant in this simple case, is useful in more realistic 
formulations and enables the owner of this plant to approximate the plant as a strip of call options set 
against a backdrop of whatever scenarios are of interest.  Such a representation is just an approximation 
though, as the valuation of thermal technologies as call-options is complicated by the fact that physical 
generation assets do not behave exactly like financial contracts.  In practice, there are a number of non-
convexities and constraints, such as start-up costs or ramp rate restrictions, that inhibit the free exercise 
of the physical option relative to that of the financial option.  Nevertheless, in our framework, absent 
chronological development as it currently is, the analogy is reasonable and proves very useful as we 
impute the value of capacity in specific sub-periods, or under certain scenarios. 















1.5 Optimal Plant Mix 
1.5.1 Load Duration Curves (LDC’s) 
The preceding section described how, under certain circumstances, we can define the equilibrium 
utilisation ranges for each plant type, without reference to load.  To extend the analysis and prescribe a 
plant mix requires a representation of load.  The most common of such representations is the Load 
Duration Curve (LDC).  Beginning with a chronological load pattern, periods can be re-ordered to form 
an LDC, representing the cumulative distribution of load, with each utilisation level describing the 
fraction of time for which load is at least equal to the corresponding load level.  In the case of our 
investment model, the relevant time period is a year.  From the perspective of investors, the LDC is not 
simply historical load levels as measured, for example, in half hourly, or five minute scheduling 
intervals in a real market.  Instead, it is the convolution of the probability distribution of load in each of 
those time periods.   
While the LDC representation is common, and analytically helpful, we must be mindful of the 
inherent weaknesses of this form of load definition.  The underlying structure of load variation is 
typically the cumulative result of daily, seasonal and annual patterns.  Construction of an LDC destroys 
information about the chronological nature of variations across many different time scales, each of 
which have different drivers, and implications for investors and technological operations.  The 
significance of the bias introduced by this approach depends on the nature of the system under 
consideration.  At one extreme, if the overall load pattern is repeated precisely on a daily basis, then to 
satisfy load requirements each and every day, each plant would have to start-up, perform its role, 
potentially for a very short timeframe, and shut down again.  In practice this would be untenable.  For 
example, a true peaker of last resort for perhaps only a few minutes every day to satisfy the load 
pattern.  Aside from any possible physical constraints further constraining operations, it may also be 
the case that start up and shut down costs alone make certain technologies, which appear to have a role, 
uneconomic in reality.  At the other extreme, if the overall load pattern was representative of a twenty 
or thirty year period with variation dominated by multi-annual cycles, then there would be fewer 
operational issues but instead of load reliably reaching very high, shortage inducing, levels for a small 
portion of time on a regular basis, investors might only earn high prices during a single crisis of 
extended duration occurring every ten or twenty years.  When viewed from the perspective of a risk-
averse investor, these polar investment propositions are clearly different, requiring some careful 
consideration when determining the most significant features to include in an investment model.  
The extent of the bias will be less than that suggested by the polar examples above, although 
in a particular market the implications of these issues should be considered.  To avoid initial 
complications and maintain consistency with a majority of the literature, we adopt an LDC based 
approach before extending our framework to incorporate seasonal patterns in Section 2.3.6, and the 
integration of chronological representations in Section 4.4 in an attempt to minimise the exposure of 




1.5.2 Graphical Optimal Plant Mix  
As shown in Figure 5, in the simple case we have presented, the MW capacity of each plant type that is 
required to meet the range of load requirements can be shown graphically.  The optimal installed 
capacity for each technology is determined by the optimal utilisation range for that technology and can 
be read off the left hand axis of the LDC. The optimal installed capacity of each technology type will 
be affected by changes in the LDC arising from growth and/or load shifting however, in this simple 
case, changes in the LDC do not alter the equilibrium utilisation of each technology, as this is 
independent of the LDC and depends only on the economic trade-off of fixed and variable costs for 
each technology.   
 
  
Figure 5: Graphical Derivation of Optimal Plant Mix 
As shown, and by construction, the graphical approach determines the relevant optimal technological 
trade-offs and then involves reading the LDC to determine the capacity of each technology that is 
required.  As we advance to a general optimisation format, the LDC becomes an exogenous part of the 
optimisation that, in general, will not be defined in terms of the points corresponding to the optimal 

















trade-off between technologies.  Figure 5 shows some such points on the LDC that do not correspond 
to optimal technological trade-offs. 
1.5.3 General Formulations of Optimal Investment 
The graphical solution method shown in Section 1.5.2 is intuitive and remains a useful tool for 
visualising solution but, as assumptions are relaxed, the model is generalised, and additional 
complexity is incorporated, the solution is difficult to depict graphically and the determination of an 
optimal plant mix requires a formal model.  We proceed with the following set of basic assumptions, 
which allow us to focus on the critical issues: 
• All trade is assumed to take place at a single node, 
• There are no economies of scale in generation, 
• Investment and generation are continuous, without non-zero minimums, 
• The spot market is assumed to be behave as a perfectly competitive market and therefore can 
be cleared by an optimisation, 
• Entry to the capacity market is contestable and free of deterrence, and 
• There is no existing capacity 
Noting those assumptions, the goal of a formal optimisation model is to find a perfectly competitive 
equilibrium plant mix where generators build capacity and subsequently sell power in a competitive 
spot market, which is cleared by an optimisation based on generator offers.   
Optimisation, Social Welfare and Perfect Competition 
Before we present a general optimisation to achieve that goal, we review the relationships between 
Pareto optimality, optimisation, the maximisation of social welfare, and competitive equilibrium.   One 
measure of economic efficiency is the concept of Pareto-optimality.  A feasible allocation (𝑥∗, 𝑦∗) is 
Pareto-optimal if there is no other feasible allocation 𝑥, 𝑦  that dominates it, that is one for which one 
player is better off and no other players worse off.  Mathematically the definition is as follows: 
 
Pareto Optimality: The allocation  x *  is Pareto optimal if there exists no allocation  x  such that  
 xi ≻= xi
* ∀i  and 
 
x j ≻ x j




*{ },x = x1 ,x2 ,...xi{ }  with  xn*,xn ∈! j  are 
allocations of j goods to i consumers.  
 
While Pareto efficiency is a useful concept, there are a number of Pareto-optimal allocations and the 
concept does not provide any means for selecting the best, or most preferred allocation. 
In economic analysis, the traditional approach to addressing this objective has been the 
maximisation of social welfare and where certain conditions are satisfied, optimisation models have 
been implemented with this goal in mind.  To represent the welfare of society with a single function 
assumes the adoption of a cardinal utility function, as opposed to a more general ordinal utility 
function.  Here and throughout, we assume that utility can be represented by a cardinal utility function.  
The maximisation of social welfare is then: 
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  Maximise   
B x( )−C y( )        (1.8) 








∑    : λ j   ∀j   (1.9) 
   0 ≤ yi
j ≤ Wi
j, xi
j ≥ 0      ∀i   (1.10) 
Where B(x) and C(y) are respectively the social benefit and cost functions and x is as before, an 
allocation of j goods to i consumers with initial endowments of  Wi
j  of good j.  We assume the goal of 
the market mechanism is the maximisation of social welfare.  This implicitly assumes the existence of 
cardinal utility functions.  The market clearing constraint ensures that the total initial endowment must 
match the allocation, while the restriction prevents agents being trading endowments they do not 
possess.  λ
j  can be considered as the prices of the goods.  All players are assumed price takers.  Using 
vector notation, and assuming an interior solution, the first order conditions for a maximum of the 










− λ = 0        (1.12) 
Where an agent/good combination is not an interior solution, it simply means that it was not worth the 
agent trading the good, or the agents endowment was exhausted while it remains worthwhile to transfer 
goods away from the agent to another.  In equilbrium, the value an additional unit of endowment of a 
good is equal to the net benefit it brings,  Graphically, the marginal change in the social welfare 







       (1.13) 
The maximum surplus is obtained when all positive differences between the marginal benefit (demand) 
function and the marginal cost (supply) function have been exhausted.  
In some cases, where demand is either fixed and genuinely independent of price, or where 
demand responses are included as supply measures, the maximisation of social welfare can be reduced 
to the minimisation of production cost.  This amounts to netting the demand response, if any from the 
supply-side of the more common “supply=demand” equilibrium definition, as well as avoiding the 
complications associated with consumer utility functions.   
In electricity markets in particular, the cost minimisation concept has been extended 
significantly through the inclusion of a large number of network constraints that tie many individual 
markets together to form the basis of the modern system of spot market clearances used in many 
jurisdictions today.  Additionally, the cost minimisation extends to several different types of markets, 
such as reserve provision, that are inter-related with energy markets, and the technological 
characteristics of each individual plant are significantly more detailed than in high level studies such as 
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this.   In this study, we use profit maximisation as an organising principle, but under perfect 
competition, with no control over the market price, the maximisation of profit is equivalent to the 
minimisation of cost as profit and cost are the sole components of a fixed level of revenue. 
In a single commodity case, the maximisation of social welfare corresponds with the more 
commonly understood “supply = demand” criteria of equilibrium.  Under perfect competition, supply 
and demand can be thought as marginal cost and marginal benefit functions.  We can form an 
optimisation directly by integrating the marginal cost and benefit functions to form a total benefit/cost 
function, the difference of which defines the total surplus in a market.  Multi-commodity equilibriums 
result when products are linked, for example as substitutes or complements, or as inputs and outputs for 
one another.  Price changes in one commodity move the supply or demand curve of others.  In general, 
it is not the case that we can integrate inverse supply/demand functions to get a consumer surplus 
function in a multi-commodity case.  Nevertheless, in these cases where we cannot define a consistent 
total surplus function, we can use the KKT conditions to define the equilibrium as it is based on 
marginal conditions and this is the broad approach taken in many planning models of the input-output 
nature. 
Under perfect competition, and given the ability to represent social welfare with a cardinal 
function, the notion of Pareto-optimality is perfectly aligned with the concept of optimisation, taking 
the form of either the maximisation of total surplus, or the minimisation of  the total cost of servicing a 
fixed level of demand.  Whenever the marginal benefit of a transaction (to a consumer) exceeds the 
marginal cost of a transaction (to a supplier), the solution is not Pareto-optimal as there exists a 
transaction that would be mutually beneficial.  Such a transaction would also raise the total surplus, 
which implies a solution cannot be optimal if it is not Pareto optimal.  Alternatively, where the solution 
is Pareto-optimal, no further beneficial trades exist, implying that the surplus as measured by the 
difference between the demand and supply curves is maximised. 
The equivalence of Pareto-optimality and the maximisation of social welfare implies not only 
a matching of consumers to producers, where the marginal benefit of the former exceeds the marginal 
benefit of the latter, but also that the marginal benefit of any consumer trading exceeds the marginal 
cost of any producer that actually produces.  In equilibrium all opportunities for consumers and 
producers to profitably trade between themselves must be exhausted.  Similarly, in a net market, where 
demand is fixed and the cost of supply is minimised, Pareto-optimality requires that the lowest cost 
suppliers, including any demand responses, are used to supply the fixed level of demand.   
We now consider the relationship between Pareto-efficiency/optimality and competitive, or 
Walrasian equilibria.   A competitive equilibrium is a feasible solution in which every player prefers 
their position to any other affordable position.  Affordability is naturally contingent on an initial wealth 
distribution, but given a wealth distribution as an initial allocation of commodities, the equilibrium 
condition for consumers can be stated as: if 𝜆 ∙ 𝑥! < 𝜆 ∙ 𝑥!∗ then 𝑥! ≤! 𝑥!∗. 
This relationship between competitive equilibria and Pareto optimality is summarised by the 
Fundamental Theorems of Welfare Economics (FTWE).  These theorems evolved from ideas promoted 
by Adam Smith, Pareto, and Barone amongst others, however the first rigorous proof of the theorems is 
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attributed to Arrow & Debreu (1954).  They relate the concept of competitive equilibrium to the Pareto 
allocation of resources. The Fundamental Theorems respectively state that: 
Any competitive or Walrasian equilibrium leads to a Pareto-efficient 
allocation of resources; and, 
Any Pareto-efficient allocation can be sustained by a competitive 
equilibrium 
The theorems rely on the assumption of no transaction costs, perfect information, and local non-
satiation of preferences.  These are minimal assumptions and compatible with the problem definition.  
The implications of these theorems for analysis of market status, such as in this thesis, is profound.  In 
what follows, it is critical to note that from the first theorem, if an equilibrium is competitive it must 
feature a Pareto-efficient allocation of resources.  Accordingly, if an equilibrium does not exhibit a 
Pareto-efficient allocation of resources then it must not be a competitive or Walrasian equilibrium.  
This is important in the context of understanding whether or not various modelling implementations in 
this area do, or do not, define competitive equilibria.   The second theorem is also important.  It states 
that a Pareto-efficient allocation can be sustained by a competitive equilibrium.  
The FTWE do not address the case where participants are not price takers.  While we still can 
calculate an equilibrium in these cases and the equilibrium will be Pareto-optimal, an equivalent  
equilibrium may not be able to be sustained on a competitive as implied by the second theorem.  In 
these cases the relationship between the social optimum and Pareto optimality is broken.  In such 
equilibria there exist socially beneficial trades, where the marginal benefit of the transaction exceeds 
the marginal cost of the transaction, but these trades do not take place because the gamed equilibrium is 
Pareto optimal.  
In summary, Pareto-optimality and the optimisation of the appropriate surplus/cost measure 
are analogous under perfect competition.  The link between these two enables us to invoke the FTWE 
in order to consider the status of the equilibriums that are defined by various optimisations.  We now 
turn our attention to the specific situation of investment in generation capacity and the operation of that 
capacity. 
Two-Stage Formulation 
Before we present a single-stage optimisation we consider the actual decision structure, which contains 
two stages. Investment and generation are sequential, and not simultaneous, and this is widely 
acknowledged in the context of research into gaming (Hobbs, Metzler, & Pang, 2000), (Murphy & 
Smeers, 2005).  Under rational expectations, investment decisions are giving consideration to the spot 
market clearances and PDC implied by those investment decisions.  This approach is ultimately not 
necessary in a perfectly competitive environment, but while the problem need not necessarily be 
formulated as an MPEC, the problem has the structure required, it can be formulated in this fashion, 
and it is important to record the precise nature of the problem to clarify all the operations and 
assumptions that lead to more typical modelling approaches.   
When formulated as an MPEC/EPEC problem, the investment decision is parameterised by 








∑ du − FCiCAPi
i
∑     (1.14) 
  Subject to :   
0 ≤ GENi
* u;CAPi( ) ≤ CAPi        ∀i > 0  (1.15) 
The optimality conditions of the lower level or second stage market clearance apply at all levels of u 
and define a market price, 
 
λ u( )  as a function of u: 




∑        (1.16) 
  Subject to :  
 
GENi u( ) = L u( )
i
∑     : λ(u)     (1.17) 
  
 
GENi u( ) ≥ 0, GENi u( )∈F        ∀i  (1.18) 
Where F is the set of integrable functions on [0,1].  Here u corresponds to the utilisation level 
expressed as a proportion of the period concerned,  FCi  represents the fixed cost of technology i, and 
 MCi  is the appropriately scaled constant marginal cost of technology i.  The set of technologies 
includes a notional shortage technology for which capacity is unlimited.  
 
L u( )  is the LDC as a 
function of utilisation levels.  The model variables are: 
•  CAPi , the total capacity of technology i, which is continuous; and  
• 
 




λ u( )  , the spot market price as a function of u and restricted to be an integrable function on 
[0,1]. 
The objective function maximises total profit over the period for which the LDC is defined by choosing 
a capacity,  CAPi , and generation function,  
GENi u( ) , for each technology i, and reaping prices  λ u( ) . 
The fundamental constraint in any electricity investment or market model is the requirement to 
serve load so that total generation must match load in real time.  Recognising the absence of free 
disposal in the electricity system implies forming this constraint as a strict equality, with the 
concomitant implication that the associated dual value, which loosely corresponds to the energy price, 
could be positive or negative in an implementation.  Situations with negative prices do arise in real 
markets for a variety of reasons, such as observed with spring-washer effects around network loops 
(Hogan et al., 1996), or overnight pricing in markets such as Singapore (E.G. Read, personal 
communication, 2013), where unit commitment decisions result in negative valued offers.  Our 
investigation does not contain any  structure that would provoke the occurrence of negative energy 
prices, but in the interests of generality we formulate the market clearing constraint as an equality 
constraint. 
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Single Stage Optimisation 
The following single stage optimisation is equivalent to the two-stage optimisation above.  It follows  
from S. Dye (personal communication, 2014).  Noting the equivalence of profit maximisation and cost 
minimisation under perfect competition and that the solution to the lower level problem above is a sub-
gradient of the upper level problem, we are able to formulate a cost-minimisation.   
The single stage formulation of the problem minimises the total fixed and variable costs 
required to serve a particular load distribution as represented by an LDC.  This formulation is stated in 
very general terms with no specification of the functional form the load duration curve, and the same 
requirement for the generation function as before, that it be integrable over [0,1]. Like other straight 
forward optimisation formulations, this formulation assumes the perspective of a central planner, 
although we note that the solution to this optimisation problem also characterises the equilibrium of a 
similarly defined perfectly competitive and contestable market (Arrow & Debreu, 1954): 
 Minimise 
 
MCiENRGi + FCiCAPi( )
i
∑       (1.19) 
  
 
ENRGi = GENi u( )du0
1
∫        ∀i   (1.20) 
  
 
GENi u( ) = L u( )
i
∑        (1.21) 
   
GENi u( ) ≤ CAPi        ∀i > 0  (1.22) 
  
 
GENi u( ) ≥ 0        ∀i  (1.23) 
Here  ENRGi  corresponds to the total energy produced by technology i.  We did not use this 
intermediate definition in the two-stage problem but include here to improve the exposition of the 
problem in later sections.   
1.6 Conventional Optimisation Formulations 
The optimisations in Section 1.5.3 are conceptual.   Without restricting the function space that applies 
to the generation function, resolving the representation of the load function and defining the set of 
available capacity expansions, there appears to be no way of usefully implementing this formulation.  
This is equally true of the two stage approach and the single stage approach.  Each formulation in 
Section 1.5.3  must be specialised in order to be implemented, and that means selection of LDC 
representation, definition of the generation function forms, and definition of the set of feasible capacity 
expansions.    
As we have shown, we are able to address the problem with a single stage optimisation.  All 
implementations we are aware of can be broadly considered implementations of the single stage 
general optimisation from Section 1.5.3 with the LDC specified and the generation functions restricted 
in form.  For the purpose of our discussion, we denote these broad range of possible implementations 
of the above optimisations as the “conventional optimisation formulations”. Murphy & Smeers (2005) 
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provides a description of this fundamental approach.  Conventional optimisation formulations describe 
a class of optimisation formulations in which: 
• Total investment and operating costs are minimised subject to the requirement to serve load.  
• Load is specified in the form of an LDC that is divided in to load classes (or into load slices, 
although this is significantly less common), where the load class/slice boundaries are fixed.  
• Decisions are modelled as single stage. 
• They share the attribute that they are specialisations of the general formulation from Section 
1.5.3 in which the generation functions are restricted to be, for example, piecewise constant or 
piecewise linear, with the same breakpoints as the LDC.   
The final point is the most significant from the perspective of this thesis.  This restriction is implicit 
and rarely described in the general literature, yet it has potentially serious implications for the solution 
as we shall show.   The enabling assumptions are not without reward.  They transform the general 
formulation of Section 1.5.3 into a problem that can be solved using conventional optimisation 
techniques such as linear, non-linear and mixed integer programming solution algorithms that are 
present in conventional solvers.  In the rest of this section, we consider some of the more common 
options when formulating a conventional optimisation. We also show an example of how the general 
formulation matches a linear programming model when the generation functions are restricted to be 
piecewise constant with fixed breakpoints.   
First, we consider the form of the LDC as well as decide on the most appropriate level of 
granularity to use from the perspective of accurately representing the LDC.  Together, the form which 
may be piecewise linear, piecewise constant or some other functional form, and the granularity interact 
to determine the accuracy of the LDC approximation.  Those issues are issues of approximation, and 
while there are more/less desirable approaches, these issues are unavoidable in the sense that all models 
are approximations of reality.   
There are also a number of issues that arise when implementing a conventional optimisation 
approach that are not associated with approximation, and exist even when we assume the data is a 
precise representation of reality.  In conventional optimisation formulations, the representation of the 
LDC restricts the functional form of generation functions, and thereby also has implications for the 
representation of the PDC.  Naturally the functional form of the generation functions need not match 
the form of the LDC so any such restriction is an artificial imposition on the model solution.  The 
implication is that the solutions found by many conventional optimisation formulations are only 
approximate, even when the data is known and is included in the model with full fidelity.  
Approximation is of present in all models, but this form of approximation is different. The 
nature of the approximation is hidden, and the solutions that result can be internally inconsistent and 
therefore fall short of describing an equilibrium at all.  Inconsistency in an equilibrium model is 
undesirable, because while an equilibrium model can be predicated on the basis of different views, in 
this case the inconsistency is based on arbitrary restrictions of generation functions, for which there is 
no good reason to assume any participant would subscribe, let alone all of them.  In this chapter we 
examine the issue further in the context of perfect competition, but further investigation is required to 
see how this characteristic influences solutions in more complex situations involving gaming.  
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1.6.1 LDC Representations 
In conventional optimisations, LDC representations serve two purposes.  Most obviously, they 
represent the LDC.  Less obviously, they define the LDC load classes or slices that are used in the 
optimisation and implicitly restrict the functional form of the generation curves. In this way, the 
granularity of the LDC representation is also a determinant of the accuracy of the PDC, thereby 
affecting investment and the overall cost of satisfying load.  We now consider some of the various 
options available to modellers.  Throughout this discussion, we maintain a parallel description of the 
formulation in terms of basis functions, and the more conventional load class oriented formulation.  
These approaches are exactly equivalent. 
Piecewise Constant LDC 
The most common form of LDC used is the piecewise constant form, in which the LDC is represented 
as a step function, with load discretised into classes, each having a constant load requirement.   Figure 
6 shows how an LDC can be represented in this form. 
 
 
Figure 6: Piecewise Constant LDC Approximations 
As shown in Figure 6, while a piecewise constant definition of the LDC does represent both the energy 
and the capacity requirement of the load class, in general we must accept an error in one or other, or 
both of these measures.  The energy requirement of a load class is the area under the relevant section of 
the LDC.   The capacity requirement of a load class is the maximum load across it.  In each load class, 
we require enough capacity to service the actual maximum load level.  The energy requirement of the 
load class is the area under the relevant section of the LDC.  If we define load throughout the load class 
as the actual maximum load level, then the energy content of the load class and hence the variable cost 
associated with that generation is over-stated, biasing the optimal choice in favour of higher fixed 
cost/lower variable cost technologies.  Furthermore, when energy limits are considered, perhaps in the 
context of fuel availability or a shortage criteria used by regulators such as in Australia, the mis-
specification of the energy content of the load class will lead to either a misallocation of resources or a 
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solution that is inconsistent with the reality of the constraints.  Conversely, if the energy content of a 
load class is to be represented accurately as shown in Figure 6, the capacity requirements of servicing 
that load class are understated, resulting in a reversal of the previous bias.  As there is no ability to 
simultaneously match load and energy requirements accurately with a piecewise constant form, this 
functional form will be inaccurate in one or both dimensions, resulting in non-optimal technological 
selections as a result of either understating or overstating fixed and variable costs.  
Despite this shortcoming, we proceed to specialise the general formulation of the optimal 
investment problem with a piecewise constant LDC.  To do so, we effectively divide the LDC in the 
fashion shown in Figure 6.  To maintain consistency with future formulations we define each load class 
using utilisation levels  uk , where  k=0…K, giving a total of K load classes, indexed k=0…K-1.  For 
each load class, load is defined as  Lk .  As described earlier, the representative load level for each load 
class can be chosen to accurately reflect the energy content, the maximum capacity requirement of the 
load class, or some intermediate approximation, perhaps designed to minimise a compromise measure 
of the total error from this form of representation.   
We can develop the piecewise constant formulation from the general single stage formulation in 
Section 1.5.3.  We define P(u0,…,uK) to be the set of all piecewise linear functions on [0,1] with 
breakpoints u0,…,uK.  In conventional formulations, these breakpoints are exogenous and those used to 
define the LDC.  We can then replace the very general restriction on generation functions, 𝐺𝐸𝑁! ∈
𝐹,∀𝑖, with the requirement for those generation functions to be piecewise linear, so that 𝐺𝐸𝑁! ∈
𝑃(𝑢!,… , 𝑢!),∀𝑖.   Both the generation functions can be written as a weighted sum of a set of basis 
functions, bk for k=0,…,K-1.  In the case of a piecewise constant representation those are indicator 
functions which take the value of one in the interval (uk,uk+1] and zero elsewhere.   For later analysis, 
we also split the energy variable into parts for each load class. 
Re-writing the single stage formulation with these adjustments we have: 
  Minimise  
 
MCiENRGi + FCiCAPi( )
i
∑        (1.24) 
  Subject to :  
 





∫         ∀i  (1.25) 
  
 








∑        (1.26) 
  
 
0 ≤ GENi,kbk u( ) ≤ CAPi
k=0
K−1
∑        ∀i  (1.27) 
  
 
GENi ∈P u0 ,...,uk( )        ∀i  (1.28) 
 
By considering multipliers of each basis function separately and noting 𝑏! 𝑢 𝑑𝑢
!
! = 𝑢!!! − 𝑢!, we 
can rewrite the general formulation as a linear program in a form that is conventionally used in the 
literature.  As in the general formulation, the objective of the optimal plant mix problem is to minimise 
 42 
total costs subject to the requirement to serve load and some basic non-negativity conditions relating to 
generation and capacity variables.  The plant mix is “optimal” in the sense that it represents the least 
total cost method of meeting the load profile, with a given set of technology choices, i=0,…I, ordered 
in ascending order of fixed cost, where i=0 corresponds to a notional shortage technology but with 
generation profiles restricted to be piecewise constant with a fixed set of breakpoints.  That total cost is 
represented by the objective function, which requires a class based implementation of the energy cost 
term to accommodate the partitioning of the LDC into k load classes.  The objective function is: 
   
Minimise







∑ CAPi      (1.29) 
Here 
 
ENRGi,k  is the total energy generated by technology i in load class k.  Here, and throughout, the 
dual variables corresponding to each constraint are shown on the RHS of each equation, so that 
mirroring the constraints in (1.20) - (1.23), the equivalent constraints and their accompanying duals are: 
  
 
ENRGi,k −GENi,k uk+1 − uk( ) = 0    :ε i,k      ∀i,k < K  (1.30) 
   
GENi,k
i
∑ − Lk = 0    :λk     ∀k < K  (1.31) 
  
 
GENi,k ≥ 0    
:ϕ i,k
−     ∀i,k < K  (1.32) 
  
 
CAPi −GENi,k ≥ 0    
:ϕ i,k
+     ∀i > 0,k < K  (1.33) 
   CAPi ≥ 0     : χ i
−     ∀i > 0  (1.34) 
In each of the load class constraints above, the scope of the constraints is limited to k<K, as k identifies 
a load class with width  uk+1 − uk .  The definition of energy is explicitly stated in (1.30) although in 
practice this could be substituted into the objective function in order to reduce the dimensionality of the 
problem.   We also note that the dual variable  λk , from (1.31), represents the (scaled) market price for 
load class k and remains theoretically free to take positive and negative values.   















= FCi − ϕ i,k
+
k
∑ − χ i− ≥ 0       ∀i > 0  (1.37) 
For those technologies generating in load class k, (1.35) and (1.36) hold with strict equality.  We have 
the following expression relating,  λk , the cost to the system of servicing incremental load in load class 








+ = 0 , implying spare capacity of technology i in load class k, the system cost is the marginal 
cost of the marginal generator multiplied by the duration of the load class.  
   




+ > 0 , technology i is infra-marginal so that: 
   
ϕ i,k
+ = λk − MCi uk+1 − uk-1( ) > 0       ∀i,0 < k < K  (1.40) 
In this case, technology i is inframarginal and earns a profit equal to the difference between the system 
cost and its own marginal cost of generation for that duration.  The final dual constraint collects these 
inframarginal profits and relates them, with an additional term reflecting the influence of the minimum 
capacity constraint, to the capital cost recovery required to support investment. 
Piecewise Linear LDC 
As an alternative to the piecewise constant LDC, we may elect to use a different functional form to 
represent the LDC.  That could involve functions of many forms, but here we restrict our analysis to 
the set of piecewise polynomial functions.  The first, and most obvious, extension of this type is the 
piecewise linear LDC approximation, which permits load and generation to vary linearly, rather than be 
constant, within a load class.  Noting that a piecewise constant LDC is a subset of piecewise linear 
LDC’s, we wish to clarify that in this thesis the term “piecewise linear” should be taken as short-hand 
for a piecewise linear function that spans the entire range of load levels between minimum and 
maximum load.  Figure 7 shows a linear approximation for a typical load class and contrasts this with 
the constant approximation with identical energy content. 
 
 
Figure 7: Comparative LDC Approximations 
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We can adapt the general formulation to the piecewise constant case also.  The piecewise linear LDC 
occasions the inclusion of an additional set of basis functions.  These take the form of being one from 
utilisation of zero to its left hand break point, then decreasing linearly to zero at its right hand 
breakpoint, then continuing as zero up to full utilisation.    
  Minimise  
 
MCiENRGi + FCiCAPi( )
i
∑        (1.41) 
  Subject to :  
 








∫         ∀i  (1.42) 
  
 








∑        ∀b  (1.43) 
  
 






∑        ∀i  (1.44) 
  
 
GENi ∈P u0 ,...,uk( )        ∀i  (1.45) 
Corresponding to the new basis functions are a new set of generation variables.  To define energy and 
total capacity use, we must some over the range of basis functions which, in the case of the piecewise 
linear LDC model, consists of the indices 0 and 1.  As before there is an equivalent optimisation to the 
conventional optimisation formulation in Section 1.5.3. This can be seen in the modification of the load 
definition.  Retaining the load indexing from k=0…K-1, we can specify load with the following 
function, where  uk ≤ u ≤ uk+1  : 
   
Lk (u) = L0,k + L1,k
uk+1 − u
uk+1 − uk
       ∀k < K  (1.46) 
Here we have generalised our notation to accommodate higher order forms of LDC representation by 
specifying by an additional index o=0,1…O, where o reflects the polynomial order of each term in the 
load specification.  In this case 
 
L0,k  represents the constant term or constant basis function, 
corresponding to load, and 
 
L1,k , the additional peak load attributable to the linear load profile in load 
class k at utilisation level  uk , which corresponds to a linear basis function.  
The selection of  
 
L0,k  
and in this case 
 
L1,k  does not necessarily have to coincide with the 
LDC.   The piecewise linear form allows significantly more flexibility in the representation of both 
energy and capacity requirements within a load class but, like all approximations, will in general still 
be subject to error.  If the piecewise linear form is to respect capacity requirements and be continuous, 
then we are led to a natural definition of both the constant term and linear coefficient:   
   
L0,k = Lk+1        ∀k < K  (1.47) 
   
L1,k = Lk − Lk+1        ∀k < K  (1.48) 
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By virtue of the basis functions available, the generation function applicable to each load profile is 
piecewise linear.  To match the load profile within a load class, we require two constraints to define 
total generation for each load class, where 
 
GENo,i,k  defines the generation of technology I, in load 
profile o of load class k:  
   
GEN0,i,k
i
∑ − L0,k = 0    :λ0,k     ∀k < K  (1.49) 
   
GEN1,i,k
i
∑ − L1,k = 0    :λ1,k     ∀k < K  (1.50) 
We do not include more basis functions or profiles than are required to represent the LDC itself.  If we 
did, such profiles would necessarily have to cancel each other out in order to precisely match the LDC 
profile.  It seems unlikely that higher order generation functions would be incentivised in this case and 
therefore their inclusion provides seemingly little advantage for the cost of additional generalisation, 
but this is not an area we have investigated.   The only other limitation on the generation function in 
our model is the bounds introduced in the general formulation. Although the minimum generation level 
may be non-zero or even dynamically dependent on the current system state in reality, in (1.51) we 
define the minimum bound to be zero for each load profile within each load class.  This restriction 
prevents arbitrage of generation between load profiles within a load class. The maximum bound on 
generation by technology i within a load class relates to the sum of generation in each load profile 
contained in that load class.  As defined previously and in (1.52), this bound is the installed capacity of 
technology i.  
   
GENo,i,k ≥ 0   
:ϕo,i,k
−     ∀o,i,k  (1.51) 
   
CAPi − GENo,i,k
o
∑ ≥ 0   :ϕ i,k
+     ∀i > 0,k  (1.52) 
Having settled the functional form of the generation function within each load profile and load class, 
we are able to define the energy use of each technology in each load class by aggregation: 
  
 







uk+1 − uk( ) = 0    :ε i,k      ∀i,k < K   (1.53) 
As we continue to assume each technology has an affine total cost structure, the objective remains as is 
in (1.29).  With the addition of a non-negativity restriction for the capacity of each technology we can 











∑ CAPi        (1.54) 




∑ − L0,k = 0    :λ0,k     ∀k < K  (1.55) 
   
GEN1,i,k
i




GENo,i,k ≥ 0    
:ϕo,i,k





∑ ≥ 0    :ϕ i,k
+     ∀i > 0,k < K  (1.58) 
  
 







uk+1 − uk( ) = 0    :ε i,k      ∀i,k < K  (1.59) 
   CAPi ≥ 0     : χ i
−     ∀i > 0  (1.60) 
Our approach has the same effect,  although we ensure the load function is matched by requiring the 
aggregate of generation functions for each load profile is satisfied at the peak of each load class.   
























= FCi − ϕ i,k
+
k
∑ − χ i− ≥ 0       ∀i > 0  (1.63) 
The application of the dual constraint (1.61) is as before.  For technologies generating in load class k, 
(1.61) holds with strict equality however, unlike the piecewise constant case, there is no longer a 
unique load profile so (1.62) will hold with equality only for those technologies generating to satisfy 
load profile o, in load class k.  For a technology servicing the baseload profile in load class k we have 
the following expression relating, 
 
λ0,k , the cost to the system of servicing incremental baseload in load 
class k to the marginal cost of each technology:    
   
λ0,k = MCi uk+1 − uk( ) +ϕ i,k+ −ϕ0,i,k−       ∀i,k < K  (1.64) 












−       ∀i,k < K  (1.65) 
In each case the marginal cost is scaled by the average utilisation of capacity across for the appropriate 
load profile.  Therefore, when 
 
ϕ i,k
+ = 0 , implying spare capacity of technology i in load class k, the 
system cost is the marginal cost of the marginal generator scaled by the average utilisation of 
technology i which is defined by the width of the load class and the degree of the polynomial term 














λ0,k  and  
λ1,k  correspond to prices for increments in load but relate to different profiles.  The first 
dual variable represents the dual associated with an equal increase in load across the entire load class, 
whereas the second is associated with an increase in load with a linear profile as shown below in Figure 
8: 
 
Figure 8: Piecewise Linear Load Profiles & Pricing 
From the perspective of basis functions, the above profiles represent the constant and linear basis 
functions in the relevant utilisation range.  It follows that the average utilisation of capacity servicing 
the baseload profile is higher than the average utilisation of capacity servicing the peaking, or linear, 
profile.  As a result, this approach can yield two distinct marginal technologies, one for each profile or 
basis function, in the same load class.   As shown in the dual equations, the associated pricing is, within 
a scaling, factor determined for each.  This may suggest some ambiguity in terms of market pricing, but 
in this particular instance we are addressing the piecewise linear load formulation and there is only one 
technology that is marginal across the load class with respect to market pricing, that being the 
technology servicing the linear load profile.  Accordingly, we can determine the market price across the 
load class as: 




= MCi       ∀k < K  (1.67) 
Although the market price can be made clear ex post, the prices are specified in terms of the load class 
duration and therefore still require scaling. While this can be achieved in an ex-post fashion with 
relative ease, the necessity of scaling prices is problematic when modelling extensions such as demand 
response which must be dealt with endogenously to ensure the correct representation of price effects is 
achieved.  The need for scaling is a result of the underlying structure of the formulation, which does 
not deal with individual periods as the market does, and therefore does not easily produce prices for 
commodities that correspond with those normally traded in energy markets.   
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> 0       ∀o,i,k < K  (1.68) 
In this case, technology i earns a profit equal to the difference between the system cost and its own 
marginal cost of generation for that duration. The final dual constraint collects these infra-marginal 
profits and relates them, with an additional term reflecting the influence of the minimum capacity 
constraint, to the capital cost recovery required to support investment.    
Finally, we note the relationship in (1.68) is valid for all load profiles within load class k, 
confirming the following relationship between system prices: 
  
 







      ∀o,i,k < K  (1.69) 
As we would expect, the cost to the system of an increment in the linear profile is less than and, to be 
precise, half the cost to the system of an increase in the baseload profile.  
Higher Order Load Class Formulations 
Where non-linearity exists in individual load classes it may be desirable to gain a better compromise 
between respecting load and energy requirements.  In such cases it may be preferable to define a higher 
order approximation rather than persist with a piecewise linear approach.  A higher order functional 
form, involves the use of additional basis functions in the LDC representation.  The advantage of 
higher order functional forms in this context is the ability to reduce the number of segments required to 
attain a given level of accuracy in the LDC representation (Dye, 1994).  Alternatively, we can state that 
higher order approximations, such as the piecewise linear approximation, are significantly more 
accurate than lower order approximations, such as the piecewise constant approximation, given 
identical levels of granularity.  In the limit, given a polynomial of sufficient order, the entire LDC 
could be well represented in a single load class.  However, despite the advantage of higher order 
representations in this respect, this does not necessarily translate into an overall computational 
advantage, as handling higher order functions may be more computationally intensive. 
Furthermore, we also require accurate representation of the PDC, so that investment incentives 
are correctly assessed and lead to appropriate investment decisions.  If this is not the case, certain 
aspects of the system’s behaviour will be misrepresented or, in the case of a coarse discretisation, may 
not be represented at all.  So while a relatively small subset of utilisation points may result in a 
piecewise linearisation of acceptable accuracy when measured against the actual LDC, that subset may 
not provide a satisfactory solution quality.  This suggests that the benefits of higher order 
representations may not accrue if a significant number of utilisation levels are required for the purposes 
of the overall model anyway.  Ideally, we would like to decompose these twin requirements so that the 
LDC representation could be considered separately from the demands of the model. 
For a given load class the functional form of the LDC can be generalised to: 
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Lk (u) = Lo,k
o=0
O






       ∀k < K  (1.70) 
Similarly, for each active term in the polynomial representation we have a generation constraint 
requiring that load to be met:  
   
GENo,i,k
i
∑ − Lo,k = 0    :λ1,k     ∀o,k < K  (1.71) 
We also have a more general expression for the energy output of technology i, in load profile o, within 
load class k: 









∑ uk+1 − uk( ) = 0    :ε i,k      ∀i,k < K   (1.72) 
As before, for each basis function that is introduced we must also consider an additional marginal 
technology corresponding to that basis function. That is, each basis function could correspond to a 
separate marginal technology.  The example shown in the LHS pane of Figure 9 corresponds to the 
implementation of a quadratic representation in which three distinct marginal technologies have been 
selected to serve the three load profiles in the load class. The nature of the decomposition dictates that 
these are modelled as operating simultaneously, as was the case in the piecewise linear implementation.  
This is inconsistent with dispatch and market clearing principles which suggest that the load would be 




















Figure 9: Generation with Higher Order Load Formulations, Modelled vs Actual generation 
Alternative Formulation 
As we have seen, the load class approach effectively creates a set of load profiles within each load 
class, each with different characteristics relating to the particular basis function to which they 
correspond.   The piecewise constant approach involves a single load profile and yields a unique 
marginal technology and market price.  Unfortunately, this approach is not desirable as it cannot 
simultaneously account for energy and capacity requirements within a load class.  The piecewise linear 
approach resolves two load profiles, and produces two marginal technologies in general but, as one is 
the constant profile with fixed capacity requirements, we are able to resolve a unique market price and 
the solution is consistent with market clearing across the load class.  Higher order forms offer improved 
fitting capability but result in market marginal technologies that have spare capacity.  These outcomes 
that are inconsistent with basic merit order market clearing principles.  We now introduce an 
alternative formulation that defines a single marginal technology for each load class, and thereby frees 
the modeller to use higher order LDC representations if they desire.   
One alternative approach involves the consideration of K+1 utilisation and load levels, 
indexed by k=0,…K, in ascending order of utilisation, which we treat as separate market clearing 
instances.  In the case of adjacent points, these utilisation levels also define the boundary of a 
traditional load class.  As in previous formulations, the objective of the optimal plant mix problem is to 
minimise total costs subject to the requirement to serve load and some basic non-negativity conditions. 
The objective, discretised by load class, remains: 
  
Minimise









∑ CAPi       (1.73) 
The fundamental constraint is the requirement to serve load so that total generation must match load in 





∑ − Lk = 0    :λk     ∀k  (1.74) 
















   
GENi,k ≥ 0   
:ϕ i,k
−     ∀i,k  (1.75) 
   
CAPi −GENi,k ≥ 0   
:ϕ i,k
+     ∀i > 0,k  (1.76) 
The energy generated by each technology i for each load class k is the area of the trapezium formed by 










uk+1 − uk( ) = 0    :ε i,k      ∀i,k < K   (1.77) 
With the addition of a non-negativity restriction for the capacity of each technology we can state the 











∑        (1.78) 




∑ − Lk ≥ 0    :λk     ∀k  (1.79) 
  
 
GENi,k ≥ 0    
:ϕ i,k
−     ∀i,k  (1.80) 
  
 
CAPi −GENi,k ≥ 0    
:ϕ i,k










uk+1 − uk( ) = 0    :ε i,k      
∀i,k < K  (1.82)   
   CAPi ≥ 0     : χ i
−     ∀i > 0  (1.83) 



























= FCi − ϕ i,k
+
k
∑ − χ i− ≥ 0       ∀i > 0  (1.86) 
















− = 0     ∀i,k  (1.87) 
For  k ∈C,k < K  and with  
ϕ i,k
+ = 0  implying spare capacity, we have the following expression relating 







uk+1 − uk-1( )       ∀i,0 < k < K  (1.88) 
Importantly, the marginal price is unique, and barring coincidental equality between cost structures at 
the relevant utilisation level, the marginal technology is also.  The nature of the commodity to which 
this price relates is somewhat unintuitive.  Incremental load at  uk  requires additional generation by the 
marginal technology at that point.  In capacity terms this is costless, as we have spare capacity.  
However, an increase in load creates additional energy requirements in two load classes, which by 
virtue of the assumed linear adjustment of the generation function implies the cost is of the form above.  
This is expressed graphically in Figure 10.  Post solution, we can scale prices by the inverse of the 
utilisation range, to arrive at a market-clearing price for energy.  In the case where spare capacity is 
available this scaling factor is 
 
2 / uk+1 − uk-1( ) .   
 
Figure 10: Pricing in Piecewise Linear Model 
While this formulation is successful in eliminating the issue of multiple marginal technologies and the 
market clearing inconsistencies that accompany these, the downside of this approach is that it forces 
the requirement of a single marginal technology when, in reality, the cost of increasing generation 
according to the pattern shown might involve multiple technologies.  This may confuse adjustment of 
other generation as capacity increases would affect multiple load classes.  Issues such as demand 
response only further complicate consideration as the prices that drive demand response must be dealt 




1.6.2 Conventional Optimisation with Piecewise Linear LDC 
The purpose of the following example is to illustrates the properties and inconsistency of conventional 














to the general model and, by comparison, how these two approaches differ.  The example is based on 
the piecewise linear LDC implementation of the conventional approach. We define load classes or 
basis functions that correspond to the piecewise linear segments of the LDC, so that load varies linearly 
over each load class.  To avoid contaminating the comparison with approximation errors we assume 
that the LDC is actually piecewise linear in reality and precisely represented.  Accordingly, load is 
linearly interpolated between the points in Table 1.  The LDC can be seen later in Figure 11. 
 
Load (MW) 90000 82000 78000 58000 50000 
Utilisation 0.000 0.050 0.100 0.900 1.000 
 
Table 1: Hypothetical LDC Definition 
In addition, we have the following technological options with the accompanying cost structures.  The 
costs are not necessarily realistic, although this matters little as the efficacy of a formulation should not 
be data dependent.  Fixed costs are presented in terms of a per unit charge, while variable costs are 
scaled to reflect the variable cost of operating continuously for the entire time period, in this case a 
year: 
 
Technology Fixed Cost Variable Cost 
Notional Shortage 0 15000 
OCGT 50 3500 
CCGT 220 2000 
Coal 650 500 
Geothermal 1000 0 
 
Table 2: Hypothetical Technological Cost Structure 











∑        (1.89) 




∑ − Lk ≥ 0    :λk     ∀k  (1.90) 
  
 
GENi,k ≥ 0    
:ϕ i,k
−     ∀i,k  (1.91) 
  
 
CAPi −GENi,k ≥ 0    
:ϕ i,k










uk+1 − uk( ) = 0    :ε i,k      ∀i,k < K    (1.93) 
   CAPi ≥ 0     : χ i
−     ∀i > 0  (1.94) 
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The variables are the capacity of each technology,  CAPi   and generation by each technology at each 
utilisation level k, 
 
GENi,k .  The duration of each load class k is  uk+1 − uk  so that for K utilisation levels 
there will be K-1 load classes. 
The optimal capacity mix prescribed by this optimisation is: 
 
Technology Capacity 






Table 3: Optimisation Solution of Conventional Optimisation Formulation 
The total cost of building capacity and servicing load with this plant mix is 78.35M.  
Optimality 
By assumption, we have abstracted away from the specific issues surrounding the degree of 
approximation that is introduced by a functional LDC representation.  It is tempting therefore to think 
the formulation, having a precise representation of reality, will produce an optimal solution.  
Unfortunately, this is not the case.  Naturally the solution is optimal for the formulation specified by 
(1.68)-(1.73), however it is not optimal for the general model, as specified in Section 1.5.3, which 




Thesis / Screening 
Curve Solution 
Notional Shortage 0 696 
OCGT 12000 11637 
CCGT 0 4333 
Coal 20000 10333 
Geothermal 58000 63000 
Optimal Solution Total Cost 78.35M 77.43M 
 
The total cost of capacity and energy generation is 77.43M.    This solution was arrived at using the 
approach detailed in Chapter 2, but in this case the problem collapses to a simpler problem.  As the set 
of generation function breakpoints includes the utilisation levels corresponding to optimal trade-offs, 
the solution is Pareto-optimal. Given generators are price takers by assumption, a Pareto optimal 
solution must also represent cost minimisation of the total cost function.  No generation could 
profitably, or at lower cost, be switched from one technology to another.  In any case, although the 
solution using the screening curve/thesis approach is optimal, for the purpose of this comparison, and 
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to illustrate the solution obtained using the conventional optimisation formulation is non-optimal, it 
suffices to show that the solution was bettered.  The total cost of supply is lower than that obtained by 
the conventional optimisation of 78.35M, proving the conventional approach is sub-optimal and not a 
solution to the general formulation presented in Section 1.5.3.    
Equilibrium status 
We now show the conventional optimisation formulation does not describe a competitive equilibrium.  
The first Fundamental Theorem states that any competitive or Walrasian equilibrium leads to a Pareto-
efficient allocation of resources.  If the conventional formulation describes a competitive equilibrium 
then the FTWE dictates that the solution will also represent a Pareto-efficient allocation of resources.  
To show the solution is not a competitive equilibrium, it suffices to find a single example of a Pareto-
efficient trade that would be mutually beneficial.  
In the solution to the conventional optimisation formulation, the CCGT investor does not build 
any capacity, and therefore has a cost of $0.  The coal generator constructs capacity of 20,000, and 
operates at full capacity with utilisation of 0.1, with generation dropping linearly to zero from that 
utilisation level to a utilisation level of 0.9, beyond which point load occurring with greater frequency 
is serviced by geothermal generation.  The total cost of this operation is 20,000x650 + 
10,000x500=$18M.   
Suppose the coal investor pays the CCGT $0.5M to install 1000 units of CCGT capacity, so 
that the coal investor can reduce capacity by 1000.  The new solution sees coal capacity of 19,000 and 
CCGT capacity of 1,000.  The CCGT investor services the incremental load from L(0.14) = 77,000 to 
L(0.1)=78,000.  This represents the last 1,000 units of capacity required by the coal investor.  The 
CCGT investor performs this operation at a cost of 1,000x200+120*2000=$0.24022M.  Offsetting this, 
they receive $0.5M from the coal investor so they are better off by $0.25978M.  The coal investor now 
has total cost of 19,000x650+9880x500=$17.29M, which represents a saving of $0.71M.  After 
compensating the CCGT investor, the coal investor is better off by $0.21M.   
Since the coal investor and the CCGT are better off, the conventional optimisation formulation 
is not a Pareto optimal solution.  Therefore, by the FTWE, it cannot describe a competitive equilibrium 
of the problem under examination. To be clear, the solution is an equilibrium to a restricted system in 
which all generation is restricted to follow a piecewise linear generation duration curve with the same 
breakpoints as the LDC but that is not the system under study. 
LDC Representation and Generation Restrictions 
From the narrow perspective of seeking to accurately represent the LDC, we have identified the 
relative benefits of various functional forms in their own right.  In particular, we have pointed out the 
need for non-constant representations if the twin requirements of representing capacity and energy 
content within a load class are to be satisfied.  And we noted that, while higher order functional forms 
enable more faithful representation of the LDC, quadratic and higher forms can, if the generation 
function structures are overly restricted, result in outcomes that are inconsistent with market clearing 
principles.  The formulation above uses a piecewise linear LDC form and as a result of the actual LDC 
being piecewise linear, the conventional optimisation above represents the capacity and energy 
requirements of each load class precisely.  In this respect, the conventional optimisation formulation 
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represents the actual LDC perfectly, by assumption.  But even if that assumption were removed there 
would be no advantage gained by any method presented in this thesis, as those methods would use the 
same representation of the LDC. 
However, as we have shown, when implementing a conventional optimisation the LDC 
definition has implications for the structure of the optimal generation functions.  The breakpoints that 
form part of the definition of the optimal generation function are restricted in conventional optimisation 
formulations to those break points that define the LDC.  The generation profiles that are defined by the 
solution to the conventional optimisation formulation are evident in the LDC filling in Figure 11.  
 
  
Figure 11: LDC Filling for Conventional Optimisation Solution 
Note that the breakpoints used in the generation profiles are the same as those that define the LDC.  By 
comparison, the LDC filling of the optimal solution is in Figure 12.  In Figure 12, it is notable that 
unlike the solution to conventional optimisation problem in Figure 11, the generation functions for each 
technology do not have breakpoints that coincide with the breakpoints necessary for definition of the 














Figure 12: LDC Filling for Optimal Solution 
For example, in the solution to conventional optimisation shown in Figure 11, the generation function 
of geothermal peaks at a utilisation level of 0.9, whereas in the generation function corresponding to 
the actual optimal solution as shown in Figure 12, geothermal generation peaks at a utilisation level of 
0.7, which is not a level at which the LDC is defined. 
PDC Representation 
As discussed in Section 1.6.1, the recovery of pricing from models involving more than a single basis 
function for representing load within each load class is more complex than in the piecewise-constant 
case, which involves only a single, constant, basis function for load in each load class.  The optimal 
PDC is based on market clearances arising from the optimal capacity from the actual solution.  In this 
simple case, the PDC corresponds also to the screening curve solution, in which the marginal cost of 
the marginal technology is price setting.  The PDC corresponding to the optimal solution is shown 

















 Figure 13: Optimal PDC 
This PDC provides cost recovery precisely for each technology, and the prices correspond to marginal 
costs that occur naturally as part of the spot market clearing process.  Consider the optimal cost 
recovery of CCGT for example.  CCGT earns a profit of 13,000 during times of shortage which occurs 
with a relative frequency of 0.00435 (5dp).  In addition CCGT earns a profit of 1,500 when OCGT is 
marginal, which occurs with a relative frequency of 0.10899 (5dp).  In total then, cost recovery of 
$56.52 is available from shortage periods, and $163.48 when OCGT is marginal, which equates to a 
total of $220, the fixed cost of CCGT per unit of capacity.  
Solution Consistency 
In this example, the difference between the optimal objective function value of the conventional 
approach and the precise solution is relatively small.   However the solutions are significantly different 
when viewed from the perspective of consistency.    
To examine the consistency of the solution to the conventional optimisation, we consider the 
PDC that corresponds to the market clearances that would result from application of the market 
clearing model using the capacity values determined by the conventional optimisation approach.  This 
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Figure 14: Spot Market Consistent PDC 
This is the PDC that investors with rational expectations believe will result from perfectly competitive 
spot market clearances given the capacity investment prescribed by the conventional approach.  This 
PDC does not provide cost recovery so we have the situation where the capacity level is incompatible 
with the spot market outcome.  For example, this PDC implies that OCGT will be marginal 10% of the 
time, and there will be no shortage.  As a result there is  no opportunity for OCGT investors to recover 
installation costs as while OCGT is the marginal technology, the spot market price is $3,500 which is 
equal to the marginal cost for this technology. 
The spot market clearing process specified in Section 1.5.3 does not provide for the inclusion 
of uplift pricing components, and the PDC which the conventional approach relies upon to support 
investment is not compatible with rational expectations when investors know the structure of the spot 
market.   
In the conventional optimisation formulations, spot market pricing discipline comes explicitly, 
as opposed to implicitly, from the investment constraint.  This is not the case in the problem described 
by the general formulation, in which the cost of capacity installation only influences spot market 
pricing through its influence on market structure.   Although some markets have rules designed to 
support cost recovery of peaking plant, and in general markets are designed to implicitly result in 
recovery of costs, we have yet to find a market clearing procedure in any electricity market that 
accounts for cost recovery when setting the spot market price at all levels of load, in the general course 
of market clearance.  
Accordingly, rational investors will not invest in OCGT technologies given an expectation of 
the PDC shown in Figure 14 because OCGT is never infra-marginal and therefore cannot ever 
contribute to its own cost recovery.  The same is true for every other technology in the “optimal” mix 
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technologies will be aware that their infra-marginal profit opportunities will not necessarily materialise 
as no technology will be built to the capacity predicted by the model.   
As we have stated the reason for this inconsistency is the artificial restriction on generation 
functions in conventional optimisation formulations.  Therefore, in a technical sense, for an investor to 
invest on the basis of the cost recovery PDC from the conventional optimisation formulation, they must 
assume that all other investors, present and future, will perceive the same generation function 
restrictions that they do.  If other investors do not, and they should not if they are rational, their 
investment patterns will differ and cost recovery will not be achieved. 
The requirement for uplift pricing components in conventional optimisation formulations is a 
general phenomenon among conventional formulations rather than specific to the piecewise linear 
formulation. For example, if we examine the dual constraints corresponding to the piecewise-constant 
LDC variant of the optimisation problem: 
      (1.95) 
      (1.96) 
When , we can express  in terms of system prices and marginal costs at utilisation 
levels , where  is the utilisation level at which at technology i enters the optimal plant mix, 
so that , so that: 
  
    (1.97) 
If we consider which technology is best placed to generate with a utilisation level of , then: 
        (1.98) 
This must hold for each technology at , and must hold with equality for the marginal technology i*, 
assuming for the moment that there is only a single marginal technology.  To be clear, we are 
specifically considering the cost recovery of technologies entering the merit order at this utilisation 
level, and not those technologies operating at higher utilisation levels that have additional cost recovery 
opportunities.  Therefore, the energy price, , is the minimum price at which any technology can 
achieve cost recovery while operating at that utilisation level.  We denote that optimal technology i*, 
so that the price is defined in terms of the cost parameters of i* : 
        (1.99) 
In conventional optimisations, this price is determined by the equilibrium investment condition to 
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mirroring the concept of uplift prices discussed in in Sherali (1982).   Were generators to offer this as 
their “marginal” price, the spot market would discover the prices necessary to provide cost recovery.  
This would accord with a dynamic view of efficiency, however such an offer would be incompatible 
with perfect competition in the spot market.  If such pricing were possible, then it could also be 
implemented to recoup investment mistakes, over-investment, or many other myriad reasons.  
Whatever the reason, the ability to charge such prices suggests some market power, and is therefore not 
price-taking behaviour 
1.6.3 Optimisation with Piecewise Constant Load Classes. 
In Section 1.6.2 the restrictions on generation functions are artificial, resulting from the LDC 
definition.  In this section we consider a particular version of the LDC in which the actual LDC 
structure, as opposed to our representation of it, implicitly restricts generation functions even when 
generation functions are free to use any breakpoints in the [0,1] interval.  This distinction is significant 
in terms of the second FTWE.   
The second FTWE states that a Pareto-efficient allocation can be supported by a competitive 
equilibrium. If we do assume the LDC is piecewise constant, then we have a case where the true 
optimal solution of the general formulation, which is also a Pareto allocation, is not supported by the 
competitive equilibrium defined in the spot market.  To be clear, while there is a competitive 
equilibrium capable of supporting that Pareto-efficient allocation of resources, it is not a competitive 
equilibrium that matches the circumstances being analysed.  Specifically, when the LDC is piecewise 
constant, cost recovery does requires some apportionment of capacity costs to provide cost recovery, 
but the pre-determined nature of the spot market clearance mechanism cannot provide that.  
The fundamental reason for this is that the optimal utilisation levels associated with the 
operation of the marginal technology in those load classes are implicitly determined by the structure of 
the LDC so even when utilisation levels corresponding to optimal trade-offs are included in the LDC 
definition, these are not selected.   In this case, the optimal trade-off developed by the screening curve 
does not apply.  As a result, optimal cost recovery is not attained and each technology will need some 
form of uplift for it to achieve cost recovery.  To illustrate the issue, we present a reduced example of 
that used in Section 1.6.2.  In this example, we assume the true LDC is piecewise constant with two 
load classes defined as: 
 
Load (MW) 80,000 68,000 
Maximum Utilisation 0.1 1 
 
There are two generation technologies plus a shortage technology with costs defined as: 
 
Technology Fixed Cost Variable Cost 
Notional Shortage 0 15000 
OCGT 50 3500 
Geothermal 1000 0 
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In terms of capacity, the single stage model has the following optimal solution: 
 
Technology Capacity 




The single stage formulation requires price uplift terms to achieve cost recovery.  In this case, the 
OCGT technology must receive $4,000 when marginal, to recover $50 for each unit of installed 
capacity when operating with a utilisation of 0.1.  The geothermal technology captures $400 towards 
cost recovery while OCGT is marginal and must recoup $600 while marginal, implying a price of 
$666.67.   
Whether or not cost recovery is achievable, depends on whether or not the spot market 
discovers those prices.  The following condition defines the spot market price, which is actually a range 
when at a boundary point. 
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− ≥ 0      (1.100) 
In this example, we are on a boundary in both load classes as the capacity of generating technologies 
coincides with the load requirement of the load class.  Piecewise constant LDC formulations will 
necessarily contain boundary cases, but in general there may also be intermediate load classes for 
which the boundary discussion does not apply, and for which the above price condition is not 
ambiguous.  However, for those load classes where boundary conditions arise, and generation has 
exhausted all capacity of the marginal technology, the price is ambiguous.   The prices required for cost 
recovery are available as solutions to the condition above so the spot market has the flexibility to 
deliver cost recovery if by some chance the correct price was selected.  But, within the range for which 
the above condition is satisfied, there is no mechanism for determining these prices precisely.  We note 
that the same issue arises whenever a boundary values is reached and this happens and this can also 
happen in a model with piecewise linear LDC’s but the price that results in those cases is an 
instantaneous price, and does not span a wide utilisation range. 
The nature of price flexibility at boundary points can be illustrated further by considering the 
marginal benefit of investment function.  The marginal benefit of investment is a representation of the 
call option valuation of the plant.  It is the additional profit that an additional unit of capacity would 
receive.  In Figure 15, which is drawn for a more generic situation than our example, the marginal 
technology in each load class is initially fixed as capacity increases from zero. Eventually, marginal 
generating technologies change in individual load classes causing discrete price movement in the load 
class concerned.  To be clear, as the marginal benefit of investment represents the weighted 
profitability of the technology, discrete reductions in the marginal benefit of investment result.   
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For example, if we consider the possibility of increasing geothermal capacity.  The diagram 
depicts a more nuanced market with more load classes than our simple numerical example, but we 
might of increasing geothermal capacity.  In the above example, this would occur when geothermal 
capacity reaches a level sufficient to change the marginal generating technology in a load class.  In this 
simple example that level would be 68,000 at which point geothermal becomes the marginal generating 
technology.  In addition, that level of capacity would also change the marginal generating technology 
in the other load class.  In this example these occurred simultaneously, but in general they could occur 
separately, and either one would have the same effect on the marginal benefit function.  In terms of the 
diagram, the additional steps reflect the possibility of additional load classes so that, for example if 
there were a load class with load of 74,000, then as soon as geothermal capacity reached 62,000, this 
load class would no longer have shortage as its marginal technology, creating a step in the function 
shown in Figure 15. 
This adjustment is not problematic until we reach the level shown at A.  At A, further 
investment is signalled as being profitable.  Yet if it occurs a discrete drop in pricing will ensure that 
the technology will no longer be able to cover costs.  This is shown at B, where consequently the 
market is signalling a decrease in capacity is desired.   
 
 
Figure 15: Marginal Benefit of Investment: Conventional Optimisation 
As we have seen above, at the capacity level shared by A and B, at least one of the individual spot 
market prices applicable to a load class is at a boundary point.  The corresponding price(s), which are 
the dual variables on which the marginal benefit of investment is based, are only defined as sub-
gradients at these boundary points.    
If we assume a pessimistic investor, we would assume the worst-case prices chosen from the 
sub-gradient range.  If the situation was truly as modelled, one might expect those prices.  If prices 
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were determined at the lower end of the feasible range then no technology would achieve cost 
recovery, and investors would not invest if they believed this was the payoff they would receive.  If 
pricing resolved to these levels it is clear that, as a slight decrease in investment would benefit all 
participants, the solution is not Pareto optimal and therefore cannot be an competitive equilibrium.   
But, for a given market in which the LDC was an approximation, the ‘average’ price in the 
spot market for each load class is not likely to be the pessimistic price. It will be between the most 
pessimistic price and the most optimistic one.  However, when considering reality, it is important to 
realise that all investors will not likely perceive a piecewise constant LDC, as this is only a modelling 
convention.  Rational investors will understand this, and consider that just as other investors not will 
perceive (the same or any) arbitrary restrictions on generation functions, other investors may not 
consider the LDC to have the same piecewise structure. 
If prices were determined at the higher end of the feasible range, then all technologies would 
be profitable, and achieve more than cost recovery.  In this case further investment is incentivised and 
so this is not an optimal solution.  However, any further investment would instantly remove all 
flexibility in the condition above, as there would no longer be an alignment between capacity levels 
and the constant load level within load classes in which the newly invested technology operated.   
The implication is that there is no consistent solution to the piecewise constant LDC 
implementation, even with a general form.  The true nature of the LDC structure, rather than our 
representation of it, restricts the set of possible utilisation levels.   For this reason, for the rest of the 
thesis, we will not consider piecewise linear LDC implementations. 
1.7 Summary and Conclusions  
In this chapter we have reviewed the fundamentals of investment analysis in electricity markets.  The 
assumptions of screening curve analysis are, in the main, acceptable in the context of an investment 
planning model predicated on perfect competition. The atomistic nature of perfect competition provides 
support for the implicit assumptions of continuous investment and the absence of economies of scale in 
generation, whether those are expressed in the form of the actual cost structure, or implied by minimum 
operating levels.  The single node structure of screening curve analysis does eliminate the possibility of 
losses but these can be approximated by a priori modification of load levels that capture both the 
energy cost and the capacity implications of losses.  Under perfect competition with free entry, 
particular locational issues resulting from network congestion could reasonably be assumed to be 
transient. 
One of the primary benefits of screening curve analysis is the expression of optimal trade-offs, 
between generation technologies and more broadly generation and shortage, as defined by a VOLL.  In 
the absence of complications, that analysis extends to a precise definition of the PDC, independent of 
the LDC.  Screening curve analysis also enables a connection to be drawn between the returns of a 
particular technology and its option value.  Other than the stochasticity imbedded in the LDC, the 
models in this chapter are deterministic.  As a result, the concept of option value concept is somewhat 
redundant, however in more general circumstances involving stochasticity the same principles apply 
and the logic of option representation provides a basis for considering investment. 
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As complexity increased, the ability of screening curve analysis to satisfactorily incorporate 
such complexity generally decreased.  This practical realisation has motivated widespread introduction 
of optimisation-based techniques to resolve investment and capacity planning problems.   The problem 
of investment and generation is a two-stage problem although it can be formulated as an optimisation 
under perfect competition.  That general optimisation formulation is presented in this chapter.  As the 
lower level generation problem is a sub-gradient of the upper level generation problem, we are also 
able to define a single stage optimisation that represents the problem.   
These formulations are conceptual and cannot be implemented as written. They contain no 
definition of the LDC, or any definition of the functional form of the generation function, other than the 
requirement that it be integrable over the utilisation range [0,1].  To implement the formulation requires 
specialising it, by defining the LDC and restricting the functional form of the generation function.  
These specialisations are conventional optimisation formulations.    
By way of example we examine implementations of the conventional optimisation formulation 
using piecewise constant LDC’s, piecewise linear LDC’s as well as higher order piecewise 
representations.  In the case of piecewise constant LDC’s we note that within a load class a consistent 
representation of both energy and capacity requirements is elusive.  The piecewise linear LDC 
formulation goes some way to resolving that issue by including two profiles, or basis functions in the 
load representation of a load class.  This creates two prices, one for each profile, but the marginal 
technology is clear in each load class.   Higher order forms offer improved fitting possibilities but their 
introduction results in additional basis functions, which the conventional optimisation formulation does 
not clear in accordance with merit order principles.  For example, there can be a linear and a quadratic 
load profile generating at the same time, both with spare capacity. 
In practice, the functional form of the generation function follows the functional form of the 
LDC, but this is not the problematic restriction.  There is an implicit restriction on the breakpoints of 
the generation function: they must coincide with the breakpoints that define the LDC.  The impact of 
this restriction is significant.  In Section 1.6.2, we demonstrated that this restriction means the solution 
to the conventional optimisation formulation is not a solution to the general optimisation.  We 
demonstrate this in two ways.  Firstly, using an assumed true piecewise linear representation as an 
example  we illustrate the objective function is sub-optimal relative to the actual optimal solution, even 
when the LDC is perfectly defined.  Secondly, by illustrating the solution is not Pareto-efficient, it 
therefore cannot be optimal.  Further, as the solution is not Pareto-optimal, then by the Fundamental 
Theorems of Welfare Economics, the solution cannot be a competitive equilibrium. 
There are also a number of practical implications for conventional optimisation formulations 
that would be of concern to potential investors with rational expectations.  Firstly, as the solution is not 
Pareto-efficient, it cannot be viewed as an equilibrium at all, competitive or otherwise from the 
perspective of investors.  Investors will rationally expect further trading to occur.  Secondly, to provide 
cost recovery, conventional optimisation formulations must in general add uplift payments to the 
marginal cost of the marginal technology.  Rational investors will understand there is no basis for 
discovering these prices in the spot market clearing process.  Furthermore, they will naturally ask the 
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question of what the PDC will look like given the prescribed capacity choices.  Without uplift pricing 
there cannot be cost recovery. 
The underlying cause of these anomalies is the hidden restriction on the structure of 
generation functions in conventional formulations.  We know from Section 1.4 that basic screening 
curve analysis prescribes that generation functions have breakpoints corresponding to optimal 
technological trade-offs.   As load increases, when one technology supplants another, that technology 
begins generating while the other technology maintains output at capacity.  These breakpoints are 
necessary to define the interaction of adjacent technologies and optimal cost recovery through a 
perfectly competitively priced PDC. 
In Section 1.6.3, we describe the important example special case of piecewise constant LDC 
formulations. As a direct result of the piecewise constant structure, the optimal trade-off between 
individual technologies is not respected.   In this case, even if the generation were unrestricted and 
utilisation levels corresponding to optimal trade-offs were introduced to the LDC definition, the issue 
would remain as the generation functions are implicitly restricted by the incentives of the situation, 
over and above the representation of the LDC.  Furthermore, we have a coincidence between the 
generation level in certain load classes and the level of capacity of all generating technologies.   At 
such points, the market clearing price is ambiguous, and investors have no justification in assuming the 
price will gravitate to any particular level within the range defined.  To be clear, the same ambiguity 
results in other formulations, but in those formulations they are only instantaneous prices, rather than 
prices applicable for the width of a load class.    
To our knowledge, the implicit restrictions inherent in conventional optimisation formulations 
have not been described definitively. A lack of evidence to the contrary suggests that it is not widely 
understood that even when the LDC is perfectly represented, the solution to a conventional 
optimisation function will not represent either the optimal solution of the problem, or a competitive 
equilibrium.  Noting this, and the nature of the irregularities in conventional optimisation formulations, 
and utilising the strong logical basis underpinning screening curve analysis, we now develop an 







2 ENDOGENOUS UTILISATION LEVELS 
2.1 Introduction  
In the previous chapter we identified that while conventional optimisation formulations have many 
computational advantages and are readily extended, they produce solutions that are not: 
• Optimal relative to the actual problem even when the LDC is precisely represented 
• Representative of competitive equilibrium 
• Internally consistent 
• Suitable for sensitivity analysis. 
As noted in Section 1.5.3, the actual problem is a two-stage problem.  Conventional optimisation 
formulations produce prices that contain terms related to capacity cost recovery, although there is no 
such mechanism available in the spot-market clearing mechanism to provide discovery of such prices.  
We also know from Section 1.5.3 that there is an optimisation available that is equivalent to the two-
stage problem formulation presented that is equivalent, so there is no apparent issue with the problem 
staging under perfect competition. Chapter 1 also included a discussion of screening curve analysis.  In 
comparison with  optimisation techniques, and the problems identified in the application of 
comparatively simpler optimisation techniques, screening curve analysis is shown to have some 
conceptual advantages, at least in simple problems: 
• The optimal solution represents a perfectly competitive equilibrium that is not in conflict with 
the implications of the spot market clearing system. 
• The utilisation levels of each technology, and their optimal marginal operating ranges are 
easily identified in almost all cases 
• The equilibrium PDC is also readily, and precisely, identified. 
Given the comparative advantages of optimisation and screening curve analysis, and the need to 
consider complementarity for the purpose of generalising future analysis to include risk, for example, 
in this chapter we seek to resolve the methods by developing a complementarity modelling framework 
that does identify the competitive equilibrium and/or optimal solution of the problem at hand, and will 
be relatively extensible when it comes to considering other issues.   
Following a more direct comparison of screening curves and conventional optimisation 
formulations in Section 2.2, we commence the development of a consistent approach in Section 2.3. 
That process begins with a basic complementarity representation of a conventional investment 
formulation and a conventional spot market clearing formulation, each of which are then generalised to 
account for sub-periods.  Utilising the intuition of screening curve analysis, we define the optimal 
trade-offs between technologies using a novel complementarity framework that recognises the bi-
directional nature of trade-offs.  This generalisation is done in a particular fashion in order to facilitate 
the calculation of sub-period trade-offs so that sub-period PDC’s may be optimally defined.  Having 
defined the full set of optimal technological trade-offs, we present two options for pruning the set of 
pairwise optimal trade-offs to define a smaller sub-set of only the critical trade-offs that define the 
screening curve lower envelope.  The first method is simpler and computationally less onerous, 
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offering less than the maximum pruning of the utilisation set, whereas the second is significantly more 
complex and enables pruning of the utilisation set to the degree the modeller chooses. 
Each endogenous utilisation level corresponds to an endogenous load level, and we present a 
set of complementarity conditions to calculate the corresponding load levels in the context of a 
piecewise linear LDC definition.  Finally, we introduce complementarity conditions to order the 
endogenous utilisation levels and integrate these with the exogenous utilisation levels that define the 
LDC representation.   
In totality, the complementarity formulation designed to achieve this is complex, so we 
consider other solution approaches including a nested approach and a decomposition approach.  As the 
complementarity formulation is known to have multiple, albeit practically identical, solutions, the 
decomposition approach provides a useful background for the discussion of solution properties.  
Considering the complexity required to precisely define the solution, we make clear that the 
conventional approach, which is approximate even when data precisely matches reality, may be 
desirable on purely computational grounds. We temper that enthusiasm by noting that for problems that 
require complementarity formulations for structural reasons, the computational cost of significantly 
increasing the problem size will be significantly higher than when the underlying approximation is a 
convex optimisation.  
2.2 Conventional Optimisation & Screening Curves 
In Chapter 1 we considered screening curves before addressing optimisation formulations in some 
detail.  Consideration could be also be given to the adoption of a two stage modelling paradigm such as 
MPEC or EPEC which could clarify the nature of adjustment in optimisation models.  However these 
approaches are not ultimately helpful in resolving the inconsistency as it is not a result of staging but a 
result of an implicit restrictions on generation functions and utilisation levels that follow from the 
definition of the load classes, load slices, or any other points used as a basis for developing interpolated 
solutions.  Therefore, we restrict our focus to conventional optimisation methods and screening curves, 
as it is these two approaches that are most relevant. 
Having identified some of the issues with conventional optimisation formulations, we consider 
the difference between conventional formulations and screening curves in order to devise an approach 
that resolves the issues uncovered and provides a basis for further analysis of the type envisaged at the 
commencement of this research.  As noted earlier, from this point the discussion focusses on piecewise 
linear or higher form LDC representations, and specifically excludes the case of piecewise constant 
LDC’s.  Despite the relative complexity of modern approaches, when compared to screening curve 
analysis, it is the simplicity of the screening curve diagram, being a relatively elementary analysis, 
which avoids many of the deficiencies of the conventional optimisation model.  We compare these two 
broad approaches in terms of utilisation levels, PDC definition, and the nature of equilibration in each. 
2.2.1 Utilisation Levels 
In the process of implementing a conventional optimisation formulation, we also introduce implicit 
restrictions on the solution as we use the LDC approximation not only to define the LDC used in the 
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model, but also the breakpoints of the generation functions.   While the selection of utilisation levels is 
endogenous, the set from which they are selected from is not, as it is determined by the LDC definition. 
In contrast, screening curve analysis does not accept utilisation levels as an input, instead 
producing them as an output.  These, and the marginal operating range for each technology, are 
dependent on the relative cost structures of different technologies.  Critically, at these endogenously 
determined utilisation levels, the cost of building and generating with the two adjoining technologies is 
equal, and therefore Pareto-optimal. 
2.2.2 PDC Definition 
As we have shown, in screening curve analysis, the optimal PDC is determined automatically by the 
optimal utilisation ranges.  By definition cost recovery is achieved.  We can see this by considering the 
shortage technology with zero fixed costs.  It is only replaced when the next technology can cover its 
fixed costs.  The progression of other technologies follows through optimal trade-offs, each recovering 
the incremental fixed costs as the optimal plant mix is defined.  
From the basic logic of underlying optimal technological trade-offs, we know that for a 
conventional optimisation to produce the true optimal solution, it must necessarily include in the LDC 
representation the utilisation levels that correspond to technological trade-offs, or it will not be possible 
to replicate the true optimal PDC, where such a PDC exists. 
Where these utilisation levels are not included, the conventional optimisation formulation 
produces a PDC which incorporates the effects of artificially imposing restrictions on the form of 
generation functions.  We are faced with prices that include cost recovery components that are not 
discoverable by the spot market clearing process.  Taking the example of the ultimate marginal 
technology, we have the following decomposition of the price showing a cost recovery component: 
        (2.1) 
As described in Section 1.6.2, the requirement for an uplift term exists more generally.  It is worth 
noting the difference between a competitive equilibrium that responds to incentives,  and a central 
planner in this context.  The existence of a sub-gradient suffices for a central planner, who can then 
choose a capacity level that maximises the gains of installing capacity and, if they so choose, a set a 
price that results in cost recovery.  Although in slightly different contexts, Rothkopf et al (2004), or 
Bjorndal & Jornsten (Bjorndal & Jornsten, 2008) show that a price is available that supports an 
equilibrium in the presence of non-convexities, and this price is composed of a commodity price and an 
uplift.  As with Sherali et al (1982), they have developed pricing mechanisms that support the optimal 
primal result, which in this case means that cost recovery requirements define pricing.   
But in a decomposed competitive system, it is the other way around.  Pricing must support 
cost recovery, and pricing is determined by a market clearing process in which the mechanism of 
perfect competition determines pricing.  Because there is no mechanism in the problem structure to 
allow for prices in the spot market to provide cost recovery explicitly, this PDC includes prices that 
will not eventuate, leading to the rather decayed PDC in Section 1.6.2 that results from market 
clearances using the capacity implied by the conventional optimisation. 
 




Ideally, we would like to correct the PDC generated by the conventional optimisation by 
removing the unnecessary restrictions that the conventional optimisation approach places on it.   This 
would drive the fixed cost recovery components to zero, as they are in screening curve analysis.  We do 
that in the remaining sections and Chapters of this thesis.  But if we proceed with the conventional 
optimisation formulation, we can mitigate the degree of PDC misrepresentation. 
As shown in the example of Section 1.6.2, even when the objective function of the 
conventional optimisation is relatively close to the true optimal solution, the plant mix is not.  The 
inaccuracy of the solution is directly related to the inaccuracy of the PDC as these mutually determine 
each other.  To optimally define the PDC, we must include utilisation levels from screening curve 
analysis that reflect optimal technological trade-offs. A priori knowledge of these utilisation levels 
implies knowledge of the optimal solution, so simply requiring the addition of some utilisation levels to 
the formulation is unhelpful. 
Nevertheless, the solution accuracy can be improved by selecting more appropriate utilisation 
levels.  To increase the accuracy of the PDC, modellers often appear to make a priori estimates of 
utilisation levels that are close to the optimal levels that might be expected.  For example, in 
Ehrenmann & Smeers (2011), the utilisation levels used to define the LDC coincided closely with the 
optimal trade-offs between technologies in that study.  This is approach is common and reasonable but 
in many instances simply using a utilisation level close to the actual optimal trade-off is not as helpful 
as it might seem.  For example, in the example in Section 1.6.2, the optimal shortage frequency is 
0.00435 (5dp).  Should the modeller have guessed and implemented a utilisation level of 0.005, the 
conventional optimisation would have concluded that there would be no shortage. 
Another approach is to introduce a significant number of utilisation levels.  Instead of 
attempting to define the utilisation levels required, this approach includes an extremely granular 
representation of the LDC in an attempt to capture or approximate the critical levels that are required.  
Revisiting the first order optimality conditions for generation, we see that the price is defined as the 
marginal cost of the marginal technology.  
    (2.2) 
By increasing the number of load classes, through the inclusion of additional utilisation levels, the 
proportion of load classes in which the price is misrepresented decreases, and the width of the load 
classes in which the price is misrepresented also decreases.  Accordingly, the accuracy of the PDC and 
the investment decisions based on it increases.  Whereas the conventional approach effectively 
discretises the utilisation range, as we increase the number of the utilisation levels that are considered 
then, in the limit, we approach a continuous range which we can be assured contains the critical 
utilisation levels required. 
There are some downsides to increasing the granularity of the problem.  Firstly, it is difficult 
to know what level of granularity is required to achieve a given accuracy standard.  Furthermore, 
increasing granularity comes at a computational cost, although in the context of fast convex 
optimisation solvers that cost is likely to be small enough to be tolerable on simple problems.  
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higher.  In those cases an intelligent method that intelligently defines the problem by determining the 
required utilisation levels may be more effective. 
2.2.3 Investment Equilibration 
Equilibration of investment occurs through the marginal benefit of investment function, from which a 
capacity level will be chosen that equates the marginal benefit of investment/capacity with the fixed 
cost of capacity.  For convenience we repeat the relevant investment condition here: 
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∑        (2.3) 
As can be seen from the equation, the adjustment is slightly more nuanced than stated above.  There are 
bounds, including non-negativity, that can prevent the equilibration but we do not concern ourselves 
with those cases until later chapters. 
The structure of the marginal benefit of investment function that results when implementing a 
conventional optimisation approach mirrors the structure of the function when the LDC is piecewise 
linear.  That is, it is stepwise constant, with steps corresponding to capacity levels for which the spot 
market price is constant in load classes.  Although the underlying reason for the implicit restriction of 
utilisation levels is different, the fact that utilisation levels are restricted determines the structure of the 
marginal benefit of investment function in both cases.  We repeat this in Figure 16 
 
 
Figure 16: Marginal Benefit of Investment Function: Conventional Optimisation 
That adjustment process is discrete which is unrealistic.  An illustrative example involves considering a 
change in the cost structure.  As the cost structure of a generation technology there is initially no 
change in the utilisation of the technology as the PDC is constant.  Instead of changes in the 
equilibrium usage of the technology and its neighbours, the slack in cost recovery is taken up by 
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changes in the cost recovery portion of the optimal price.  The implication is that changes in cost are 
initially borne by the market, which is inconsistent within the specified perfectly competitive structure 
of the spot market.  Eventually there is a change in the optimal plant mix, which will be discrete, 
completing an adjustment of technological utilisation that is characterised by general invariance in 
response to cost changes, interspersed with sporadic and discrete changes in utilisation.  We know from 
screening curve analysis that within the available utilisation range [0,1], continuous adjustment of cost 
increases result in continuous adjustment of utilisation. 
If we suppose the modeller is interested in shortages or the revenue that comes from shortages, 
it is easy to see this behaviour is not desirable.  The implication here is that the dynamic adjustment in 
the conventional optimisation formulation is one-dimensional and discrete.  For example, a modeller 
examining the sensitivity of shortage to VOLL estimates would conclude that above a certain limiting 
value for VOLL, there is no shortage implied, while below that value shortage will occur in discrete 
tranches.  It does not represent the two dimensional adjustment of equilibrium capacity and utilisation 
that would happen if, for example, variable costs were to drift upwards.  
In screening curve analysis utilisation levels are endogenous and the equilibration of 
investment is significantly different.  This adjustment assists the equilibration by providing the 
necessary degree of freedom to equate to the marginal benefit of capacity with the fixed cost of 
capacity.  Figure 17 shows an example of such adjustment in terms of the PDC.  In this example we 
consider the addition of capacity of a mid-merit order generation technology, in this case CCGT. As 
adjustment occurs, the PDC to the left of the technology of interest is moved sideways, and in this case 
the additional CCGT capacity entirely crowds out shortage and partially crowds out the OCGT 
technology.   With fixed utilisation levels, the adjustment process would have resulted in no change in 
the PDC until the extra CCGT capacity caused a change in the marginal generating technology in one 





Figure 17: PDC Adjustment 
To understand the mechanics of endogenous utilisation levels, we consider the marginal-benefit of 
investment function when equilibrium utilisation levels are endogenous. There are two separate 
relationships that determine the specific form of the marginal benefit of investment in this framework: 
the rate at which the marginal benefit of investment decreases with respect to changes to the 
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technology ultimately being supplanted, and the rate at which the marginal benefit of investment 
decreases with respect to utilisation of the capacity, which itself is an LDC dependent function of the 
level of capacity.   
Before we consider the first issue, we elaborate on the relationship between changing capacity 
and the utilisation of technologies higher in the merit order.  The rate at which utilisation ranges adjust 
is determined by the slope of the LDC at all levels above those that are served by the technology under 
analysis.  Capacity increases directly induce changes in the utilisation of technologies higher in the 
merit order.  These changes are relatively smaller in ranges in which the LDC is steeper whereas, 
where the LDC is flatter, increases in capacity induce relatively larger changes in utilisation of 
technologies higher in the merit order.  Therefore, as this effect cascades upwards, it is not necessarily 
the case that the marginal operating range of a technology will be monotonically increasing or 
decreasing.  For that to be the case, the slopes of each successive piecewise segment of the LDC would 
also have to  evolve monotonically.   
If we consider the simpler case of a linear LDC representation, then capacity adjustment of 
technology i will, with the exception of the ultimate technology, leave the width of marginal operating 
ranges of each technology higher in the merit order unchanged but will shift them consistently, 
according to the following rate: 






< 0        (2.4) 
By virtue of its utilisation range being bounded by zero, the generator of last resort, or notional 
shortage technology if that is the ultimate technology in use, is the exception.  Rather than maintaining 
a constant marginal operating range, the marginal operating range of these technologies is reduced by 
the same fraction of time as the technology being introduced will operate.  These technologies are 
effectively crowded out.  
Geometrically, the marginal benefit of an additional unit of capacity is given by the option 
value defined the PDC and the marginal cost, or effective strike price, of that technology.  As capacity 
increases, the utilisation of technologies higher in the merit order is reduced with the consequence 
being the marginal benefit of the introduced capacity is reduced. Within each capacity range 
characterised by a single marginal technology, the rate of adjustment of the marginal benefit of 
capacity is given by: 









< 0      (2.5) 
The rate of that reduction depends on which technology or shortage cost represents the technology of 
last resort, as it is this technology that is ultimately supplanted by increasing capacity.  The nature of 
the merit order process dictates that as capacity is increased, the marginal benefit of investment will 
decrease at an increasingly slower rate as initially high cost, and high price, technologies are eliminated 
from the dispatch, and so on down the merit order to lower cost, and price, technologies, whose impact 
on the option value defined by the PDC is lower. 
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In combination, these adjustments result in the piecewise linear marginal benefit function 
shown in Figure 18, in which each linear segment exists over a range of capacity levels, each of which 
correspond to a particular marginal technology in the process of being crowded out.  
 
Figure 18: Marginal Benefit of Investment with Endogenous Utilisation Levels 
Ceterus paribus, the equilibrium level of capacity is defined as shown at A, where the marginal benefit 
function is equal to the fixed cost component of the technology.  The functional form in Figure 18 
applies when the LDC is linear. But where the LDC slope varies from one piecewise segment to 
another, the rate of adjustment in the utilisation level with respect to capacity also changes.  If this case, 
as capacity is introduced, then even while there may be no change in the technology being supplanted, 
the rate of decrease in the marginal benefit function may increase or decrease, depending on whether 
the LDC is becoming flatter or steeper.  This will cause the slope of the marginal benefit function to 
adjust in a non-monotonic fashion. While that is a possibility, the adjustment of the PDC makes clear 
that the marginal benefit function itself retains its monotonically decreasing structure as the option 
value must shrink monotonically when additional capacity is added. 
2.3 Complementarity Formulation 
2.3.1 A Consistent Approach 
In this section we show that, by choosing a particular set of utilisation levels, we can synthesise 
screening curve and optimisation analysis to ensure modelled clearances will be consistent with actual 
spot market clearances and the precepts of perfect competition.  This enables us to precisely solve the 
problem.  
Screening curve analysis identifies the utilisation levels that correspond to optimal trade-offs 
between individual technologies, and these are the utilisation levels we require.  In general, these 
utilisation levels will not be included amongst those chosen to represent the LDC.  However, when 
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utilisation levels corresponding to optimal trade-offs are included in the analysis, the prices that would 
be generated using a simultaneous approach do coincide with those required for fixed cost recovery, in 
addition to being consistent with perfect competition. 
To see this, consider the optimal trade-off between two technologies, A and B, at  where 
technology B is the lower marginal cost technology, and technology A is the higher marginal cost 
technology.   As technology B is at full capacity at , if the market price is to be consistent with 
perfect competition we require .  Equally, there is a price that is consistent with the cost 
recovery of technology B, .  As we have shown in Section 1.6.2 when using 
exogenous utilisation levels, these prices will not generally coincide.  However, they will coincide at 
, if and only if  is defined by the optimal trade-off between technologies A and B expressed 
below:  
  
     (2.6) 
Substituting the equilibrium cost recovery conditions for built technologies into (2.6) we have : 
     (2.7) 
Re-writing the final  in (2.7) as the sum of individual load classes, and grouping terms gives: 
       (2.8) 
But, as  and   we have  , 
implying:   
        (2.9) 
 From the market clearing condition, we have , so that:  
  
     
 (2.10) 
The market-clearing price is equal to the marginal cost of the marginal generator, A, which is 
consistent with perfect competition.  In addition, this is the price implied by the investment condition, 
which guarantees cost recovery for all built technologies at .  
Having established the rationale for including utilisation levels that correspond to optimal 
trade-offs, we turn our attention to the introduction of these particular utilisation levels.  Given the 
longer term goal of the research program embarked upon, and the flexibility of complementarity to 
describe in a uniform fashion optimisation, algorithmic and logical features, we adopt a modified 
complementarity approach, building up the complementarity restrictions from their economic 
foundations.  It is possible that other formulations, such as non-linear programming might suffice but, 
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given the future applications of the framework, this would likely be unhelpful and eventually require a 
complementarity framework also.  Furthermore, it is worth noting that, in many instances, the 
formulation type is only a notational difference given that current solvers may significantly reformulate 
problems to adapt particular problems to existing solution strategies.  In any case, the logic 
underpinning those approaches will have to confront the same issues that we describe.   
2.3.2 Complementarity & Optimisation 
Complementarity problems and optimisation problems are closely related.  One major source of 
complementarity conditions is the KKT conditions of an optimisation problem.  Indeed, in this thesis a 
number of basic investment models provide a subset of complementarity conditions to larger 
formulations.  In addition, there are other optimisations such as ordering or ranking optimisations that 
provide complementarity conditions also.  There are also a significant number of complementarity 
conditions that do not arise from optimisation throughout the thesis.  The advantage of a 
complementarity formulation relative to an optimisation formulation is that many sets of 
complementarity conditions can be considered jointly.   For example, in the gaming literature, 
complementarity formulations are used to combine KKT conditions formed from the individual 
optimisation problems of agents to define an equilibrium.  In electricity markets, an auction is often 
used for price discovery and the KKT conditions corresponding to the optimisation guiding that auction 
are included in this thesis.  From a technical standpoint, one relative strength of complementarity is the 
ability to combine different modelling paradigms in a unified framework. 
Forming a Lagrangian comprising the objective function and penalty terms that reference 
constraints, multiplied by the corresponding dual variables is the first step in discovering the KKT 
conditions of an optimisation problem.  From this point, first order derivatives are formed with respect 
to both primal and dual variables.  Complementarity slackness conditions require the product of each 
derivative with the associated variable to be zero.  In combination, these conditions define the KKT 
conditions for the original optimisation problem. 
For the KKT conditions to be meaningful, so that the solution of the KKT conditions also 
corresponds to the optimal solution of the original optimisation problem, certain constraint 
qualifications must be satisfied at the optimal solution.  There are many constraint qualifications 
available but, in the case of the conventional optimisation formulations described in the thesis, a simple 
constraint qualification LICQ (Linearly Independent Constraint Qualification) suffices. Where 
constraint qualification is not satisfied, there may be solutions to the KKT conditions which are not the 
solution to the original optimisation, and therefore would not be Pareto optimal or correspond to the 
competitive equilibrium we seek. 
In this chapter, complementarity conditions corresponding to the inconsistent optimisation 
example in Chapter 1 are used.  This appears inconsistent as, given constraint qualification is satisfied, 
the solution of each will be identical.  However, the complementarity conditions used in Chapter 2 do 
not exist in isolation.  There are a significant number of other complementarity conditions that have the 
practical effect of optimising the problem representation, and generating a consistent solution.  These 
optimal utilisation levels appear in the KKT conditions used in the complementarity formulation as 
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well as in the KKT conditions of the conventional optimisation, but it is only in the former that they are 
variables.  This will be illustrated further in Section 2.8. 
2.3.3 Market Clearance  
We begin by considering market outcomes with a fixed capital stock of each technology,  CAPi , 
including a notional shortage technology i=0.  Taking the relevant constraints and portion of the 
objective function from the formulation in Section 1.5.3, we can formulate the market clearance 
problem at a utilisation level  uk  as follows:  











∑ − Lk = 0    :λk     ∀k  (2.12) 
   
CAPi −GENi,k ≥ 0    
:ϕ i,k
+     ∀i > 0,k  (2.13) 
   
GENi,k ≥ 0    
:ϕ i,k
−     ∀i,k  (2.14) 
Here we wish to draw the reader’s attention to the dual variables in this formulation.  To be clear, from 
this point on in this thesis, these have been redefined to apply to the context of a single market 
clearance for a single utilisation level.  They no longer correspond to a load class (a range of utilisation 
levels) and have no load class or other scaling built in to their valuation.  The behaviour of these 
variables in intervening periods is addressed later. 
Feasibility of the above problem is guaranteed by the presence of a notional shortage 
technology.  Provided the marginal cost values are distinct, and the load level does not precisely 
coincide with the sum of a subset of the available fixed capacities, then the power price,  λk , may only 
assume a value from the full set of technological marginal costs, including shortage costs, and the 
problem has a unique solution.  Recognising that an instance of this market clearance problem exists at 
each utilisation level,  uk , we present an equivalent complementarity formulation containing the 
equilibrium conditions for all instances of the problem above: 
  
 
−λk + MCi +ϕ i,k
+ ≥ 0   ⊥  
 





∑ − Lk = 0   ⊥   λk free     ∀k  (2.16) 
  
 
CAPi −GENi,k ≥ 0   ⊥   
ϕ i,k
+ ≥ 0     ∀i > 0,k  (2.17) 
In conjunction with (2.16), which requires load be served, and (2.17), which describes maximum 
generation levels,  (2.15) defines a market clearance with fixed capital stocks by relating the market 
price,  λk , to the marginal cost of each technology at each utilisation level,  uk .  When technology i is 
marginal with spare capacity the market price is equal to the marginal cost of technology i.  When 
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technology i is infra marginal, 
 
ϕ i,k
+  reflects the profitability or rate of cost recovery of technology i at 
 uk .  When technology i is not producing then its marginal cost exceeds the market price.  We note that 
under these circumstances, a technology may not be both marginal and at full capacity, as there is no 
scope for increasing capacity, and supplying additional output at that marginal cost.   The assumption 
of inelastic demand implies that, aside from coincidental cases, only the supply-side can be marginal 
and further illustrates that in the short-run, in which there is no opportunity to adjust capacity, then all 
market prices must be from the set of technological marginal costs.    
2.3.4 Incorporating Investment 
To correctly represent investment incentives, we first must understand the particular problem we have 
posed.  In a traditional load class based formulation with a piecewise constant LDC, the price identified 
is applicable across the range of utilisation levels that define the load class.   In effect the interpolation 
of the system occurs in the primal formulation and is achieved by dividing the LDC into load classes, 
each of which are defined by an interpolation of load.  In this point-based formulation that is not the 
case.  Instead, we assess market pricing at selected load levels and interpolate the behaviour of price, 
and therefore profitability between each of these points to develop the PDC.  This amounts to 
interpolation in what would traditionally be considered the dual. 
We must select a method for interpolating earnings that is consistent with a piecewise linear 
or, more generally, a non-piecewise constant LDC.   In our formulation only a single technology will 
be marginal.  Where technology A is that marginal technology at  uk , it will serve the incremental load 
of up to   Lk − Lk+1  with partial use of its capacity across the utilisation range  
uk ,uk+1{ } . In the interior 
of that range, that technology will be price setting and the profitability of technology A will be 
 
ϕa,k+1
+ = 0 .  
There remain several options for defining the equilibrium relationship between fixed costs and 
profits.  Previously, the relationship was expressed in terms of dual variables, which in that formulation 
corresponded to the profitability or cost recovery flowing from a unit of generation across a load class.  
In this complementarity formulation, the dual is scaled differently, and 
 
ϕ i,k
+  refers to the profitability of 
generation by technology i at a utilisation level,  uk .  If we take an operational view and focus on total 
profitability and costs, a natural equilibrium relationship might be:   
 
 







uk+1 − uk( )
k<K
∑ ≥ 0   ⊥   CAPi ≥ 0    ∀i > 0  (2.18) 
Put simply, for technologies that are built, the cost of capital must be precisely covered by the total 
profit from generation, whereas when fixed costs exceed the total profits available, those technologies 
are not built.  The constraint could also be expressed on a more traditional per unit of capacity basis.  
For technologies that are built this yields the following, where the average generation is normalised by 








uk+1 − uk( )
k<K
∑ = 0     ∀i > 0  (2.19) 
Conditions (2.18) and (2.19) can become mathematically problematic when capacity and generation are 
zero, so we are unable to rely on a relationship between total costs and total profitability.  In 
equilibrium, no investment opportunities yielding positive profits should remain unexercised, but 
(2.18) and (2.19) fail to enforce this standard as they are backward looking conditions, that enforce an 
ex-post requirement that investors make at worst zero profit, thereby admitting the possibility of doing 
nothing, even though returns may be sufficient to justify investment.  The underlying economic 
intuition that should motivate this constraint is forward, not backward, looking.  We require a further 
simplification that does not directly depend on capacity and generation choices and relies only on 
system prices, and the distribution of profits that they imply for prospective investors in a particular 
technology.    
As we are only focussed on a perfectly competitive spot market, with no other use for each 
technology and endogenous utilisation levels, such a simplification is available and it arises from the 
call option interpretation of the value of capacity.  In a perfectly competitive market with no additional 
revenue sources available to the technology, whenever technology i is marginal at  uk , its profitability, 
 
ϕ i,k
+ = 0 .  Therefore, its fixed costs must be recovered entirely when the technology is infra marginal.  
We can ignore the need to calculate average generation across those load classes in which capacity is 
partially utilised and instead only consider those load classes in which 
 
CAPi = GENi,k+1 = GENi,k .  
Under these conditions (2.19) simplifies to the form below: 
  
 
FCi − ϕ i,k+1
+ uk+1 − uk( )
k<K
∑ ≥ 0   ⊥   CAPi ≥ 0   ∀i > 0  (2.20) 
This aligns with the option valuation of thermal plant that was discussed earlier, where 
 
ϕ i,k
+  is the 
profitability, bounded by zero from below, that arises from operation in a given utilisation range 
defined by  uk+1 − uk .  Interestingly, the form of the LDC is not important at this stage, provided 
utilisation levels are chosen appropriately.  Where they are not, the simplification above is incorrect, as 
prices will include cost recovery components, resulting in profitable operations while being the 
marginal technology.  In this case, the definition of total profitability is incorrect and would need to 
account for the functional form of the LDC representation. 
Unlike the case with fixed capacity levels, when we consider investment, an additional 
response is available, and in general a particular technology can be both marginal and at full capacity at 
particular load levels.  This provides an additional degree of freedom in (2.15) so that technological 
profitability and market prices are free within a certain range provided they operate in unison.  For all 
technologies other than the notional shortage technology, this degree of freedom is eliminated by the 
additional complementarity condition relating to investment (2.20), which we are happy to use in the 
anticipation that future developments will deliver an optimal set of utilisation levels. Where the 
shortage technology is concerned, (2.20) does not apply and the system of complementarity equations 
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retains that unwelcome degree of freedom.  That degree of freedom arises from the requirement to 
define a price at  u0 , without that price being disciplined by entry through the investment criteria 
specified above.  Mathematically, it follows from (2.15) that both  λ0  and  
ϕ0,0
+  are free, provided they 
move in unison.   
For the sake of future developments and applications, we need to ensure that these variables, 
and in particular,  λ0 , are uniquely determined.  One possible solution is to set the capacity of shortage 
to be higher than the maximum load, thereby ensuring that 
 
ϕ0,0
+ = 0 , which in turn requires  λ0 = MC0  
in times of shortage.  While mathematically effective, the concept of “shortage capacity” is 
inappropriate, at least in this context.  Rather than apply that mathematical workaround, we limit the 
range of technologies to which the complementarity conditions relating to capacity and investment 
apply to technologies  i > 0 .  This distinction between shortage and actual generation technologies is 
conceptually consistent with the fact that shortages are not limited by capacity restrictions or an 
investment/market entry conditions. 
2.3.5 Basic Investment Model 
 
Market Equilibrium Conditions 
  
 
−λk + MCi +ϕ i,k
+
i>0





∑ − Lk = 0   ⊥   λk free     ∀k  (2.22) 
  
 
CAPi −GENi,k ≥ 0   ⊥   
ϕ i,k
+ ≥ 0     ∀i > 0,k  (2.23) 
Investment Equilibrium Conditions 
  
 
FCi − ϕ i,k+1
+ uk+1 − uk( )
k<K
∑ ≥ 0   ⊥   CAPi ≥ 0    ∀i  (2.24) 
To summarise, market clearances generate a unique set of prices that define the price duration curve 
and guide investment decisions that feed back into the market clearance process as capacity levels.   
Because we are only considering a single period, the capacity requirement for each technology can be 
expressed in terms that are precisely defined by the optimal trade-off directly.  In the following section 
we shall see that, in general, the capacity choice is a compromise based on the market outcomes from a 
variety of situations.   
Aside from some basic scaling issues, these complementarity conditions represent the 
optimality conditions to the problem in Section 1.6.1.  As that formulation is a LP, we have, barring the 
possibility of coincidence, a unique solution.  We can also view the problem economically, using 
induction of the price determination argument.  Apart from assisting our economic understanding of 
standard optimisation models in this field, the induction argument is constructive and suggests an 
alternative solution approach, which we discuss later in Section 2.7. 
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That problem contemplates a piecewise constant LDC.  The complementarity conditions 
(2.21) to (2.24) could also contemplate a piecewise constant LDC model.  In fact, where there are no 
further complicating factors, these complementarity conditions are suitable for any well defined LDC 
representation provided endogenous utilisation levels are chosen to define optimal marginal operating 
ranges.  When endogenous utilisation levels are used, each technology is only profitable when 
operating at full capacity and so the intricacies of earnings while following a particular load profile 
corresponding to a basis function of the LDC approximation are given zero weighting.  Conversely, 
whenever utilisation levels are not chosen appropriately, then the definition of plant profitability must 
necessarily be formulated to reflect the various possible load profiles that are feasible according to the 
LDC representation. 
To be clear, while the complementarity formulation above can be written as an equivalent 
linear programming, this is only a subset of the conditions required to resolve the issues identified thus 
far.  So far our exposition has been limited to a discussion of the behaviour of the complementarity 
conditions under circumstance in which utilisation levels have/have not been chosen endogenously.  
We need to add complementarity constraints to assist the setting of these variables.  It is therefore 
meaningless to contemplate solution of the problem as a conventional optimisation as that approach 
would only be valid when paired with optimally chosen utilisation levels and, other than in the most 
trivial cases, those utilisation levels can only be determined by solving the problem itself.  
2.3.6 Sub-Periods & Investment Decisions 
The LDC typically represents the combination of several different processes that are then lost in the 
aggregation process.   Provided that the underlying processes do not generate any other impacts on the 
system that would be correlated with load, this approach suffices.  However, it is unlikely this is the 
case, and this creates a need to decompose the LDC further, in order to reflect more accurately those 
correlations more accurately.  For example, the LDC typically has a strong seasonal structure, 
reflecting shifting power consumption as seasons and temperatures vary.  It might also be the case that 
fuel prices and plant operations differ seasonally, as the role of intermittent and other renewable 
technologies varies across seasons also.  The resulting correlation between load and fuel cost variations 
threatens the legitimacy of the summation of seasonal LDC’s into an annual LDC.   This example 
provides an example of the motivation behind the development of sub-periods in our model.  
We now develop the formulation to incorporate sub-periods.  Other than accommodating the 
potential for the type of correlations already discussed, the introduction of sub-periods at this early 
stage clarifies the different paradigm involved in optimal trade-offs with a single LDC as compared to 
optimal trade-offs over multiple LDC’s.  As we are operating in the context of investment decisions, 
our underlying goal remains the determination of the equilibrium plant mix through accurate and 
consistent development of the PDC, which underpins investment decisions.  Before proceeding, we 
note that the sub-periods referred to need not be contiguous as in our example, and other forms of 
decomposition, such as by time of day, are equally valid where there are underlying variations and 
correlations that are best understood in those terms.    
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The sub-period/time dimension is indexed by t={1,…T}, and each sub-period occupies a 
fraction of the year  w t , where  0 < w t ≤1 .  Each sub-period has its own LDC, defined by 
 
Lk,t ,uk,t{ }∀k,t .  In addition to each sub-period having its own LDC, we allow marginal costs to vary 
between sub-periods, so that these are defined by 
 
MCi,t .  As capacity is assumed to be inflexible 
across the period that defines the full LDC, it must also be inflexible across a subset of that time period.  
For each technology, the decision of how much capacity to install is based on the aggregate returns 
available in each sub-period.  Incorporating sub-periods and recognising the requirement for a single 
capacity choice, the market equilibrium conditions become: 
   
−λk ,t + MCi,t +ϕ i,k ,t
+
i>0
≥ 0   ⊥  
 
GENi,k ,t ≥ 0    





∑ − Lk,t = 0   ⊥   λk ,t free     ∀k,t  (2.26) 
  
 
CAPi −GENi,k ,t ≥ 0   ⊥   
ϕ i,k ,t
+ ≥ 0    ∀i > 0,k,t  (2.27) 




FCi − w t
t
∑ ϕ i,k+1,t+ uk+1,t − uk,t( )
k<K
∑ ≥ 0   ⊥   CAPi ≥ 0    ∀i  (2.28) 
While this formulation is sufficient and represents the basic formulation in complementarity form, it is 
more helpful to adopt a different formulation that explicitly defines sub-period performance.  We begin 
by considering the optimal capacity of each technology as if capacity were perfectly flexible between 
sub-periods.   We introduce the following complementarity conditions: 
  
 
χ i,t − ϕ i,k+1,t
+ uk+1,t − uk,t( )
k<K
∑ = 0  ⊥   CAPi,t free    ∀i,t  (2.29) 
   
CAPi,t −GENi,k ,t ≥ 0   ⊥   
ϕ i,k ,t
+ ≥ 0    ∀i > 0,k,t  (2.30) 
  
 
CAPi −CAPi,t ≥ 0   ⊥   
χ i,t ≥ 0     ∀i > 0,t  (2.31) 
   
FCi − w t
t
∑ χ i,t ≥ 0
 
⊥   CAPi ≥ 0    ∀i > 0  (2.32)  
Respectively, these conditions define: 
• The profitability of technology i in sub-period t;   
• Sub-period generation limits in terms of sub-period capacity;  
• The relationship between the overall capacity selection and sub-period capacity; and 
• The equilibrium investment condition in terms of sub-period profitability. 
The imputed value of technology i in season t, 
 
χ i,t , is defined in (2.29) as the sum of profits weighted 
according to the respective utilisation ranges they are applicable to.  A substitution from (2.26) into 
(2.25) gives (2.29), in which the sub-period weighted sum of 
 
χ i,t  defines the profit available to an 
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increment of capacity of technology i, which is then compared to the fixed costs of installation.  
 
CAPi,t  
is a free variable, however given 
 
GENi,k ,t ≥ 0 , (2.27) implies  
CAPi,t ≥ 0 .  The relationship between 
 
CAPi,t  and  CAPi  implies that  
χ i,t > 0  if and only if  
CAPi,t = CAPi .  Alternatively, we can state that 
 
χ i,t = 0  if and only if technology i is the peaking technology in sub-period t.  In economic terms, we 
are merely confirming that, under the assumption of marginal cost pricing, capacity is profitable in a 
sub-period only when the technology is infra marginal, and not profitable when the technology is 
marginal.  
For a risk neutral investor, (2.29) defines the equilibrium relationship between fixed costs, and 
the imputed technology values, 
 
χ i,t , as well as the nature of equilibration required where the 
complementarity constraints are not satisfied:  
• Where  CAPi = 0  and  
FCi − w t
t
∑ χ i,t ≥ 0  we have attained an equilibrium in which the 
weighted valuation of the technology across all seasons is (weakly) less than the fixed cost of 
installing capacity, and therefore fails to justify investment in that technology.  However, if 
 
FCi − w t
t
∑ χ i,t < 0 , then the weighted valuation of the technology across all seasons is greater 
than the fixed cost of installing capacity, which incentivises further investment in technology i 
until 
 
FCi − w t
t
∑ χ i,t = 0 . 
• In the case where  CAPi > 0  and  
FCi − w t
t
∑ χ i,t > 0 , then the weighted valuation of 
technology i is less than the fixed cost of installing capacity and the installed capacity must be 
reduced.  As capacity is reduced the profitability of the technology increases, until eventually 
either  CAPi = 0  with  
FCi − w t
t
∑ χ i,t > 0 , or until 
 
FCi − w t
t
∑ χ i,t = 0  with  CAPi > 0 .  Each of 
these outcomes represents a legitimate equilibrium. 
  
It is important to emphasise that the aggregate nature of the equilibrium investment decision permits 
each technology, whether built or not, to exhibit different levels of profitability in different seasons.  In 
particular, (2.29) does not imply that for technologies not built 
 
χ i,t = 0 ∀i > 0,t  or  
χ i,t < FCi ∀i > 0,t . 
There may be seasons in which a particular technology i, would be infra-marginal and operating with 
sufficient profitability so that 
 
χ i,t > FCi , although not by enough, or often enough, to justify 
investment. Similarly, (2.29) does not imply that 
 
χ i,t > FCi ∀i > 0,t  for installed technologies, as if that 
is true for any season, it must be the case that 
 
χ i,t < FCi in at least one season or the technology will 
earn supernormal profits, and further investment will be incentivised.   
Were capacity flexible, the following form of investment constraint would be appropriate: 
   
FCi − χ i,t = FCi − ϕ i,k+1,t






CAPi,t ≥ 0   ∀i > 0,t  (2.33) 
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We can measure the value of complete flexibility, or the cost of inflexibility, by assessing the extent to 
which this constraint is violated in individual sub-periods.   Algebraically this is: 
   
w t
t
∑ FCi − ϕ i,k+1,t+ uk+1,t − uk,t( )
k<K
∑
    
 ∀i > 0  (2.34) 
The difference between the weighted average of returns available to each technology in each sub-
period and the average that is required for investment to occur is calculated in (2.31), and is the extent 
to which opportunities are missed by the need for a compromise capacity choice.  
One implication of the inclusion of sub-periods is that, aside from the case where each sub-
period differs only in respect to load conditions, it is no longer possible to summarise the whole period 
in a single screening curve diagram.  This has important implications throughout the rest of the thesis, 
as it implies that the utilisation levels corresponding to optimal trade-offs are not consistent across sub-
periods and that the utilisation of each technology cannot be averaged or assumed to have a single 
characteristic, such as profitability.    
2.3.7 Solution Ambiguity 
In Section 2.3.5, we presented a single period complementarity formulation and we noted that, barring 
coincidence, the solution would be unique.  Coincidence in this context could refer to duplication of 
cost structures but, more relevantly, it refers to the coincidence of total cost between two technologies 
at a particular utilisation level.  As that model is specifically designed to operate in conjunction with 
optimised utilisation levels corresponding to optimal trade-offs, this is no longer a coincidence, and 
instead is a feature of the model. 
Therefore, by construction, there is ambiguity in the single period model as, at utilisation 
levels corresponding to optimal trade-offs, capacity choices can be varied within a certain range 
without affecting the optimal PDC.  Where a pre-determined or optimised utilisation level corresponds 
to the optimal trade-off between two or more technologies then, by definition, each technology can 
operate at that utilisation level with the same total cost, leaving the choice of how much capacity of 
each should be built undetermined by the model.  However, the ambiguity in capacity choices is not 
unlimited as it is constrained by the PDC.  Capacity can only be varied to the extent that it does not 
result in changes in the PDC in any sub-period.  But to the extent it can be varied, incremental load can 
be served by either technology and, according to (2.10), whichever technology or combination of the 
two technologies serves that load, the market price will be unaffected leaving the PDC and, by 
extension, the installed capacity of other technologies unaffected.  This ambiguity does not register in 
the marginal benefit function as this is calculated on the basis that other capacity is constant, without 
consideration of pairwise adjustments. 
Solution ambiguity arises from a practical difference between the model proposed and the 
logic of screening curve analysis.  The very point of screening curve analysis is to define those plant 
roles, or utilisation levels, that correspond to where two technologies can produce at equal total cost.  
The definition of marginal operating ranges, and the PDC, is straight forward in the screening curve 
framework.  While we address those same individual utilisation levels, we must explicitly state the 
means by which our model will interpolate those prices in the optimal investment condition.  That 
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condition, and screening curve analysis, make clear that only one solution is consistent.  The condition 
is valid only on the basis that there is a single marginal technology over an operating range.  While 
interior solutions involving some capacity of each technology are not suitable, they could satisfy 
equilibrium conditions when viewed at a single point, although they would be inconsistent with market 
clearing outcomes between those points.  The screening curve diagram, and our own intuition, make 
clear that the technology that should supply the incremental load at an optimal trade-off is the lower 
marginal cost technology, for it is this technology that is more efficient and operates at lower total cost 
at all utilisation levels,  u > uk . 
One approach to resolving the issue is to approximate the true solution arbitrarily closely by 
perturbing the utilisation level  uk  to  uk' < uk .  At  uk' , the most efficient technology to serve load is 
the lower fixed cost, higher variable cost technology.  The optimal installed capacity of that technology 
will be, within a factor of the perturbation term multiplied by the slope of the LDC between  uk'  and 
 uk , be equal to the optimal installed capacity that would be prescribed by the screening curve analysis.  
A more comprehensive solution that builds on the screening curve approach to force the outcome of the 
market clearance and investment complementarity conditions to comply with the logic of screening 
curve analysis, and generate a unique solution is presented in Appendix 7.2.  The complementarity 
conditions presented therein rely on formulations yet to be presented. 
One reason we have not concern ourselves greatly with a detailed resolution of this issue is 
that we have developed the overall framework to include sub-periods, among other divisions of the 
LDC.   In a multiple period model, the circumstances are somewhat different.  Whereas in a single 
period model the optimal trade-offs are defined by technological cost comparisons, that is only loosely 
true in multiple period formulations as while individual technologies are included in the equilibrium 
plant mix for broadly the same reasons, within each individual period, the PDC is actually determined 
by the capacity of each technology relative to the LDC, and the merit order that applies. 
As we shall show in Section 2.4.2, the optimal trade-offs in each sub-period are defined in 
order to correctly represent the PDC. The adjustment of capacity levels, even between two technologies 
that are adjacent in the merit order, results in adjustments to the sub-period PDC by adjusting the 
utilisation levels that define it.   So while prices may not adjust, the weighting associated with those 
prices will adjust and, in general, those adjustments will not be symmetric across sub-periods.   
Accordingly, there is little scope for ambiguity in capacity levels once the model evolves from being a 
single period model to include multiple periods. 
2.3.8 Summary 
Having established the complementarity formulation of market clearance and investment, we focus on 
the determination and usage of the relevant endogenous utilisation levels.  The introduction of these 
utilisation levels is complicated by the fact that not only are they endogenous, but so are their rankings, 
both relative to one another, and relative to the fixed utilisation levels that we continue to include in 
order to define the LDC. Accordingly, we require the use of five additional sets of complementarity 
constraints to drive the problem representation to its optimal form:  
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• One set to define optimal trade-offs, as discussed in Section 2.4; 
• One set to select the critical optimal trade-offs, as discussed in 2.5; 
• One set to maintain the ordering and integrate endogenous utilisation levels with the 
fixed utilisation levels that describe the LDC, as discussed in section 2.6;  
• One set to determine the load levels that correspond to those utilisation levels as 
discussed in section 2.6.2; and  
• (Optionally) one set to resolve solution ambiguity (see Appendix 7.2) 
 
2.4 Defining Optimal Trade-Offs 
2.4.1 Single Period Trade-Offs 
In the simplest case of a single period model with deterministic cost structures, we could pre-process 
the data and determine optimal trade-offs before beginning other analysis. In such a simple situation, 
the screening curve approach is entirely tractable and no optimisation or more detailed formulation is 
required.   In that situation, the following algorithm demonstrates one approach to defining the 
minimum set of optimal utilisation levels necessary for representing the system:   
1. Sort technologies from highest marginal cost to lowest so that i=0, corresponds to the 
notional shortage technology. 
2. Set i=0. 






















        (2.35) 
4. If 
 
ui, j ≤1  record  
ui, j  as a critical utilisation level and determine the corresponding 
load level, 
 
Li, j  by interpolation.  If  
ui, j >1  go to 6.  
5. Set  i = j , and return to step 3.  
6. Stop.   
This approach supposes a priori knowledge of the merit order to develop the minimum set of optimal 
trade-offs and therefore lacks the ability to adjust to variable merit orders, or even variable cost 
structures when the merit order remains unaffected.  This limitation alone, rules a preparatory 
algorithm out of contention for analysis involving multiple sub-periods, although such an algorithm 
may provide a useful seed solution.  
2.4.2 Multiple Period Trade-Offs 
Even before variable, or endogenous, cost structures are considered, the introduction of sub-periods 
makes imputed sub-period valuations of capacity endogenous, even when the actual cost structure is 
not.   This creates a requirement to calculate those utilisation levels that define the optimal trade-offs 
between technologies in each sub-period.  To that end, we have identified two broad strategies: 
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• Market performance measures such as generation and pricing 
• Pairwise technological comparison using imputed valuations  
The first approach seeks to identify the critical utilisation levels for each technology using 
endogenously determined system performance measures. The marginal operating range for each 
technology is determined using system performance measures, such as profitability and generation to 
define when a technology enters production, or reaches full capacity.  For example, the utilisation level 
at which each technology enters the dispatch can be determined by identifying those utilisation levels at 
which generation is zero and the technology is marginal, as determined by its marginal cost being equal 
to the market price.  
The second approach identifies a superset of utilisation levels from which the critical members 
can be selected. By considering all pairwise trade-offs between technologies, as described in Section 
2.4.4, we create a superset of utilisation levels of which the system-wide critical utilisation levels will 
be a subset.  This approach requires development of more utilisation levels than are strictly necessary 
but is flexible and aligns with the intuition of the underlying economics of the problem.  It could be 
implemented without any further refinement, although in a realistic case a significant number of the 
utilisation levels generated would essentially be redundant data points, for which a full market 
clearance would have to be calculated.  The computational efficiency of the process could be further 
improved by ruling out options that are impossible, although the modeller should be careful not to 
eliminate unlikely but potentially legitimate interactions, as is the case where exogenous utilisation 
levels are chosen.  Finally, we note that while the pairwise trade-offs are a simple function of the 
problem data in this simple incarnation, in more general circumstances these trade-offs will also 
depend on endogenous variables that are determined simultaneously.  In that sense this approach 
shares, with the first approach, some dependence on equilibrium value of endogenous variables. 
While a direct definition of the optimal trade-off between technologies i and j in each sub-
period is available, the very nature of the optimal trade-off between technologies that is described by 
screening curve analysis is different when there are multiple operating environments under 
consideration.  There is no longer an explicit overall utilisation level based on simple relative cost 
structures that corresponds to technology usage in each sub-period.  The overall trade-off is implicit 
and is governed via the investment constraint, which aggregates individual sub-period performances.  
Nevertheless, we remain interested in characterising optimal trade-offs, and the most relevant optimal 
trade-offs are those that define the economic dispatch and correspond to steps in the price duration 
curve in each operating environment.  Determining these utilisation levels amounts to reversing the 
previous logic.  Rather than optimal trade-offs defining capacity, capacity defines the optimal trade-
offs and PDC in each sub-period, from which investors assesses investment opportunities, using some 
form of weighted average of the imputed capacity valuations of each technology in each sub-period, or 
scenario. 
For example, Figure 19 illustrates an investment decision that is based on technology 
performance in two sub-periods, each representing a season.  The optimal capacity for each season 
differs, as the variable cost in each season differs. Accordingly, the desired level of capacity and the 
value of capacity also vary.   The value of the capacity in the season represented in the left-hand pane is 
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lower than that in the right-hand pane, leading investors to a compromise capacity level for which the 
weighted average of returns equate to fixed costs.   
Except for a notional shortage technology, which is entirely flexible from a capacity 
standpoint, all real technologies will be built to a compromise capacity level when viewed from the 
perspective of a single scenario or sub-period. We assume for illustrative purposes we can focus on a 
single technology, and discuss the adjustment of this technology without veering into the feedback 
issues that exist although we acknowledge that this simplification is equivalent to the contradictory 




Figure 19: Investment Compromise 
We now consider the capacity determination of a single technology i, whose marginal operating range 
lies between endogenous utilisation levels  un
e  and  un+1
e .  While the presence of feedback loops that 
associate plant profitability to the capacity selection of other technologies result in a significantly larger 
set of simultaneous equations, we focus on the adjustment of a single technology.  As the LDC is 
linear, with slope 
 
Lk+1 − Lk( ) / uk+1 − uk( ) ,  χ i,t  may be interpreted as providing the solution to the 

















χ i+ − χ i,t
MCi − MCi+
       ∀i > 0,t   (2.37) 
   
un
e =
χ i,t − χ i-
MCi- − MCi
       ∀i > 0,t   (2.38) 

































Here i+, and i- refer to the neighbouring technologies as shown, which are not necessarily the 
technologies i+1, or i-1, from the original problem.  Equation (2.36) defines the relationship between 
capacity and the marginal utilisation range, in terms of the (negative) slope of the LDC.  As 
 
χ i,t  
increases,  un+1
e , the utilisation level corresponding to the load level at which technology i begins to 
generate falls, and  un
e , the utilisation rate at which technology i is utilised at full capacity increases, 
thereby narrowing the width of the marginal utilisation range,  un+1
e − un
e , until it is consistent, given the 
slope of the LDC across that utilisation range, with the capacity built.  At this point the value of 
 
χ i,t  is 
the imputed value of capacity for technology i, in sub-period t, and  χ i+  
and  χ i−  represent imputed 
capacity valuations for neighbouring technologies.   For general, as opposed to linear, LDC forms, the 
intuition remains the same, although the specification of (2.36) requires modification according to the 
applicable functional form.  The solution of this, and the other corresponding equations, generates a set 
of sub-period trade-offs, which define the breakpoints in the sub-period PDC.   
2.4.3 Fixed Merit Order 
To avoid potential computational issues arising from the endogenous nature of those trade-off 
conditions we prefer to define the optimal trade-off implicitly using 
 
DEVi, j ,t , which we define as the 
difference between the cost of using technology i as opposed to technology j at a given utilisation level 
in a given sub-period.  If we consider the simultaneous adjustment of all technologies, then (2.37) and 
(2.38) guide us towards the following definition of 
 
DEVi, j ,t :  
   
DEVi, j ,t = χ i,t − χ j ,t − (MCj,t − MCi,t )ui, j ,t




χ i,t = ϕ i,k+1,t
+ uk+1,t − uk,t( )
k<K
∑       ∀i,t  (2.40) 
 
DEVi, j ,t  
is also an indicator of the degree to which the utilisation level 
 
ui, j ,t
e  is inconsistent with the 
utilisation level corresponding to the optimal trade-off between technologies i and j, where j>i so that 
 
MCj,t < MCi,t .   
Where the merit-order is consistent across all sub-periods, technologies can be ordered from 
highest marginal cost to lowest before commencing analysis.  In this case, the sign of the deviation also 




Figure 20: Complementarity Constraints for Optimal Trade-Offs 
As shown in Figure 20, when 
 
ui, j ,t
e  is too high, 
 
DEVi, j ,t > 0 .  Conversely, when  ui, j ,t
e  is too low, 
 
DEVi, j ,t < 0 . When  0 ≤ ui, j ,t
e ≤1 , then 
 
ui, j ,t
e  represents the optimal trade-off between technology i and 
technology j, when 
 
DEVi, j ,t = 0 . Where technological trade-offs occur outside the permissible 
utilisation range, 
 
0 ≤ ui, j ,t
e ≤1 , the deviation cannot be driven to zero.  The following complementarity 
conditions reflect that logic and force endogenous utilisation levels to their appropriate values where 
possible or, where not possible, as close as the utilisation range permits using the variable 
 
ηi, j ,t  as a 
measure of the deviation between technology i and j at the utilisation level bound in sub-period t. 
   
χ i,t − χ j ,t − (MCj,t − MCi,t )ui, j ,t
e +ηi, j ,t ≥ 0  ⊥   
ui, j ,t
e ≥ 0    ∀i, j > i,t   (2.41) 
  
 
1− ui, j ,t
e ≥ 0   ⊥  
 
ηi, j ,t ≥ 0  
  ∀i, j > i,t   (2.42) 
Figure 20 also shows the direction of feasibility from the perspective of a solution algorithm such as an 
interior point method.  Where 
 
DEVi, j ,t > 0  with  
ui, j ,t
e > 0  then infeasibility, as defined by the product of 
the complementary terms in (2.42), is reduced as 
 
ui, j ,t
e  falls until either term reaches zero, thereby 
satisfying the complementarity condition.  Where 
 
DEVi, j ,t < 0  with  
ui, j ,t
e > 0  then, from (2.42), 
infeasibility is reduced as 
 
ui, j ,t
e  increases until either 
 
DEVi, j ,t = 0  or  
ui, j ,t
e = 1 , at which point 
 
ηi, j ,t > 0  
from (2.42) satisfies the complementarity constraint (2.41). 
2.4.4 Variable Merit Order 
Unfortunately, it is not generally possible to rely on the stability of the merit order, as the very 
phenomena that are often central to the analysis, such as inflows in a hydro setting or the incidence of 
carbon taxation, will typically also drive variation in the merit order.  Ideally, we would only determine 
the utilisation levels corresponding to the “significant” technological trade-offs but, unless some 
Direction of Improvement
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simplifying assumptions can be made, we must consider a wider range of utilisation levels.  Therefore, 
although we can rely on the position of the notional shortage technology, when the merit order is 
variable we must consider all pairwise optimal trade-offs to guarantee all critical points are captured, as 
the set of relevant technologies is not necessarily consistent between scenarios or sub-periods.  In fact, 
we cannot even rely on the consistency of the pairwise ordering of that set, as fuel cost variations and 
energy limits, for example, could swap the merit order position of two technologies.  
The requirement to consider additional utilisation levels presents algorithmic difficulties, in 
addition to the extra computational burden imposed.  The definitions offered in (2.41) and (2.42) no 
longer necessarily characterise the optimal trade-offs required when the merit order is not fixed.  From 
Figure 21, consider technology A, which has a higher marginal cost than technology B, and 
 
DEVA,B > 0  at  uk .  As in Figure 20, satisfaction of the complementarity condition requires an 
adjustment to the utilisation level 
 
uA,B  where  
DEVA,B = 0 .  However, when the relative cost rankings 
are reversed 
 
DEVA,B < 0 , the direction of decreasing infeasibility is reversed and we achieve feasibility 
by adjustment so that 
 
uA,B = 1 , and complementarity is restored with  
ηA,B > 0 .  The cost structure of 
two technologies relative to one another determines the direction of decreasing infeasibility and when it 
switches, so does the utilisation level that satisfies the complementarity conditions (2.41) and (2.42).  
Rectifying the situation requires consideration of all pairwise comparisons in both directions, as 
defined below: 
   
χ i,t − χ j ,t − (MCj,t − MCi,t )ui, j ,t
e +ηi, j ,t ≥ 0  ⊥   
ui, j ,t
e ≥ 0
    
∀i, j ≠ i,t   (2.43) 
  
 
1− ui, j ,t
e ≥ 0   ⊥  
 
ηi, j ,t ≥ 0     ∀i, j ≠ i,t   (2.44) 
 
 
Figure 21: Convergence Directions with Variable Cost Structures 
For each pairwise comparison between technologies i and j, the utilisation level that satisfies the 











trade-off is defined in one direction, (i,j), while in the other direction, (j,i), adjustment to a redundant 
utilisation level at zero or one will be the outcome.  A priori, it is often not possible to determine which 
direction corresponds to the actual orientation of an optimal trade-off, so this procedure requires the 
identification of twice as many utilisation levels as are required when the merit order is fixed.   
Reduction in the number of pairwise trade-offs to be considered could be achieved by a priori 
identification of those trade-offs that can be practically ignored on the basis of system knowledge.  
Among the critical utilisation levels that could be eliminated would be those corresponding to trade-
offs between technologies that could only ever be in one direction, as well as trade-offs that could 
never eventuate in either direction because of the presence of intermediate technologies under all 
(modelled) circumstances.  As the number of pairwise comparisons increases, the temptation to 
eliminate certain possibilities also increases but counter-balancing the temptation of a reduced 
computational burden is the risk that we may pre-suppose the solution, based on a potentially 
prejudiced view of the typical roles and capabilities of various technologies.  In the following section, 
we consider alternative approaches designed to remove the judgement of the modeller from that 
process.  The approaches discussed represent an intermediate step in that they select critical utilisation 
levels from a complete set of optimal trade-offs, which is less desirable that ruling out potential trade-
offs from the outset, but still beneficial as it reduces the number of instances market clearances need to 
be calculated. 
2.5 Selecting Critical Utilisation Levels 
Given any two technologies, one or both technologies may be dominated and not feature in the optimal 
plant mix at all, and even when both technologies do feature, they may not be adjacent to each other in 
the merit order.   Thus, the set of utilisation levels corresponding to all pairwise trade-offs is a superset 
of the critical utilisation levels we require.  When the number of technologies is large, it may result in 
the consideration of a significant number of redundant utilisation levels.  Optionally, we may seek to 
determine only those members of the superset that are the critical utilisation levels that describe the 
screening curve lower envelope. 
2.5.1 Pruning Utilisation Levels 
In Section 2.5, we described how a simple algorithm would choose important utilisation levels by 
effectively navigating the lower envelope of the screening curve. We now explore how we could 
integrate this functionality into a complementarity formulation.  One approach is to prune the set of 
optimal trade-offs by selecting only those utilisation levels at which each technology is superseded by 
the next, more efficient, technology.  This selection process could reflect trade-offs with either the 
immediately higher or lower utilisation technology, and would work if that choice is consistently 
applied.   
Instead of defining the market clearing complementarity conditions relative to the set of all 
 
ui, j ,t
e , we define an intermediate variable 
 
ui,t
e , corresponding to the level at which each technology i is 
superseded in sub-period t, using the following set of complementarity constraints:  
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ψ i, j ,t −1
j
∑ ≥ 0  ⊥   ui,t





e ≥ 0   ⊥  
 




e ≤ ui, j ,t
e ∀i, j,t . (2.45) requires 
 
ψ i, j ,t > 0 , at least once for each technology in each sub-period, 
so by complementarity we require 
 
ui,t
e = ui, j ,t




e ∀i, j , and need not be unique in the case where multiple technologies trade-off at the 
same point with technology i.  By construction, utilisation levels are restricted to the unit interval. 
The result is that the number of constraint instances in the main body of the formulation is 
reduced so that it contains only a single utilisation level corresponding to each technology i.  If we treat 
this simple model as a single scenario case, with I+1 technologies, then for each scenario there are 
 I2 + I  pairwise comparisons to be made, which after processing with (2.45) and (2.46) leads to I+1 
endogenous utilisation levels being calculated and used to enhance the LDC representation, which is 
 I2 −1  fewer than the full set would represent.  We can gauge whether or not the application of 
complementarity conditions for pre-processing constraints such as (2.45) and (2.46) delivers a net 
computational benefit.  To incorporate each of these complementarity conditions adds 
 
I2 + I( ) / 2 sets of 
conditions for a total of  I2 + I  extra conditions.  The benefit is measured in the reduction of instances 
of other complementarity conditions.  For each condition indexed by utilisation levels, there will be 
 I2 −1  multiplied by the dimensionality of the other indices involved fewer instances of those 
conditions.  For example, a market clearing condition such as (2.21) would have 
 
I+1( ) I2 −1( )  fewer 
instances.  For all but a trivial system with a single technology, the additional pre-processing conditions 
represent fewer additional conditions than the reduction in instances of a single condition in the larger 
model.  As there are many conditions linked to utilisation levels, and sometimes with far greater 
dimensionality, it seems clear that the computational benefits of pre-processing are significant.    
This approach is broadly equivalent to the pre-processing algorithm in Section 2.4.1, in that 
fewer utilisation levels,  ui
e , are to be considered by the main optimisation or other complementarity 
conditions.  The number of constraint instances, or critical utilisation levels, for the investment and 
market clearance problem is equal to I+1, the number of technologies, which is weakly greater than the 
number of critical utilisation levels generated by the algorithm, as the algorithm avoids specifying 
redundant utilisation levels by resetting i each step.   
2.5.2 Defining the Screening Curve Lower Envelope 
It is possible to refine the above approach further and more precisely determine endogenous utilisation 
levels.  The approach that follows is unlikely to be computationally beneficial, although in cases where 
market-clearing conditions are sufficiently onerous the addition of additional complementarity 
constraints could be preferable to additional instances of market clearing constraints.  This is 
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particularly so when the problem is solved in a decomposed form, or when technological cost functions 
are not affine. 
Adopting the approach of the algorithm described in Section 2.4.1, this formulation 
determines the lower envelope of the screening curve iteratively and defines the technology optimally 
used for each segment.  Starting with the notional shortage technology, we progress to find the next 
minimum intersection, and the technology that it represents.  We continue to explore the lower 
envelope in the direction of increasing utilisation to find the next intersection.  Each search is an 
optimisation of its own, in which the previous solution is assumed fixed.   
Accordingly, we propose a series of nested optimisation problems, each choosing the next 
utilisation level according to the next available trade-off in an endogenously constructed merit order, 
thereby defining the marginal operating range applicable to each single technology in each sub-period. 
We identify N+1 endogenous utilisation levels, indexed by n=0…N, where N can be problem, or even 
sub-period, specific and can be tuned by the user to correspond to the number of segments required to 
define the lower envelope.  N should be large enough to fully describe that envelope without being so 
large that an excessive number of redundant points corresponding to full utilisation require evaluation.  
With constant marginal costs, N need be no larger than I+1, but could be smaller than the maximum 
number of intersections if redundant technologies exist in certain sub-periods. 
Complementarity conditions are required to incentivise these movements, as well as deal with 
potential degeneracy in the form of technological cycling, and to prevent non-integer, or mixed, 
solutions that would lead to incorrect outcomes.  These complementarity conditions use the 
 
ui, j ,t
e  values 
determined in the optimal trade-off section, to form a minimal set of critical utilisation levels on which 
the market clearance and optimisation of investment may occur.  
We also introduce 
 
zi,n,t ≥ 0 ∀i,n,t  which assumes the value  
zi,n,t = 1  when technology i is 
marginal in lower envelope segment n in sub-period t, as defined by the range 
 
un,t
e  to 
 
un+1,t
e , and 
 




e = 0 ∀t , to signify the first critical utilisation level in each sub-period, and; 
• 
 
z0,0,t = 1∀t  and  
z0,i,t = 0 ∀i ≠ 0,t , signifying the first segment of the lower envelope in 
each sub-period corresponds to the notional shortage technology. 
 
We define n=0…N optimisation problems, with the nth optimisation using the incoming technology 
choice as an input.  In each optimisation, we seek to minimise 
 
un,t
e .  From the set of utilisation levels 
consistent with the incoming technological choice, 
 
z j ,n,t  is chosen to select the next marginal 
technology j and minimise 
 
un,t







identifies a vector of j potential trade-offs 
that can be chosen given the vector 
 
zn-1,t , which defines the incoming technological choice in sub-
period t. We also note (2.48) and 
 
z j ,n,t ≥ 0  collectively define  
un,t
e
 as a convex combination of 
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technological trade-offs that is restricted to the range 
 
0 ≤ un,t
e ≤1  by 
 
0 ≤ ui, j ,t
e ≤1 .  To select the 
minimum positive value 
 
un,t
e , with 
 
0 ≤ un,t
e ≤1 , 
 
z j ,n,t  is naturally integer valued whenever the 









∑    :ψ n,t
0     ∀n > 0,t  (2.47) 




   
:ψ n,t
1     ∀n > 0,t  (2.48) 




e .  Even if we could force 
progression by implementing a strict inequality constraint it would not resolve misspecification of the 




 and, as a result of an arbitrary 
algorithmic decision, the lower marginal cost technology is not chosen, and the wrong trade-offs are 
sought from that point onwards.  As can be seen from that example, the requirement is not to advance 
the utilisation level per se, but also to advance the discovery of the merit order in a systematic fashion 





∑ − z j ,n,tMCj,t
j
∑ ≥ 0    :ψ n,t
2     ∀n > 0,t  (2.49) 
Provided 
 
z j ,n,t  
is integer valued, (2.49) ensures that the selection of the next technology is consistent 
with the merit order position of that technology and, by discerning on the basis of marginal cost, it 
prevents indefinite cycling between two or more technologies that produce at equal total cost at 
 
un,t
e .  
However, as (2.49) is an inequality, it permits the repeated choice of the same technology, or more 
generally any technology with the same marginal cost.  We must not permit that repetition of choice so 
we require the inner product of two adjacent technology selection vectors must also be zero.  
   
− z j,n-1,tz j ,n,t
j
∑ ≥ 0     :ψ n,t
3     ∀n > 0,t   (2.50) 
The exception to this rule is when the utilisation level 
 
un,t
e = 1 .  At such a time, we require the 
algorithm to cycle repeatedly for two reasons.  Firstly, we are not interested in generating utilisation 
levels in excess of unity, and secondly, it may be the case that no technological options with lower 
marginal costs remain.  Given (2.48) requires a selection be made so that 
 
z j ,n,t > 0  for some technology 
j, then under the circumstances the only solution to (2.49) is to select 
 
z j ,n,t = z j ,n−1,t , which is explicitly 
prohibited by (2.50).  To allow this constraint to be broken when 
 
un,t
e = 1  requires the following 
modification to (2.50), along with the addition of a complementarity condition:  
   
− z j,n-1,tz j ,n,t
j
∑ +ψ n,t4 ≥ 0     :ψ n,t
3     ∀n > 0,t   (2.51) 
   
1− un,t
e ≥ 0   ⊥  
 
ψ n,t
4 ≥ 0     ∀n > 0,t   (2.52) 
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The last remaining issue is when two technologies define the next intersection, at the same utilisation 
level.  The condition (2.49) appears to maintain the consistency of the merit order but it is applied 
retrospectively, not prospectively.  Therefore, when two technologies represent equal total cost at the 
next selected critical utilisation level there is no guarantee that the ordering based on marginal cost will 
be selected.  Mathematically we have multiple solutions to the optimisation, which are unique only up 
to the convex combination of those two technologies.  Where 
 
z j ,n,t  is not integer valued, such as when 
more than one technology produces with equal total cost at 
 
un,t
e , an arbitrary convex combination of 




 will then be based on a non-existent technological 
composite of two technologies with a cost structure that is a convex combination of the cost structures 




 and depending on the actual 







e .  The anti-cycling condition (2.49) does not prevent this eventuality and instead, in 
combination with (2.50), compounds potential problems by ruling all technologies involved in that 
convex combination out of further consideration.  The requirement to select only a single technology is 
enforced by the following complementarity condition: 




∑ −1≥ 0     :ψ n,t
5    ∀n > 0,t   (2.53) 
As 
 
0 ≤ z j ,n,t ≤1 , the maximum value of the LHS of (2.53) is 0 when  
z j ,n,t = 1  for a single j.  Where 
more than one technology produce at equal total cost at 
 
un,t
e , the selection of either could satisfy this 
constraint, although it matters little to the formulation. If the higher marginal cost technology is 
selected, it will then be eliminated by (2.50) from further consideration and the next 
 
un,t
e  will take the 
same value, although the selected technology will now be the lower marginal cost technology, which is 
the appropriate choice from which to base a search for 
 
un+1,t
e .  If the lower marginal cost technology is 
chosen first, then the search for a successive 
 
un,t
e  proceeds as normal.  As the formulation must already 
generate several redundant utilisation levels, the only implication for technology choice is where those 
redundant utilisation levels will appear.  The requirement that the successive marginal costs of each 
technology selected must be monotone non-increasing as expressed in (2.49), in combination with a 
restriction on selecting the same technology consecutively, (2.50), provides strong protection against 
the potential issue of cycling.   
Finally, we must ensure that we only select those technologies that are built when forming the 
screening curve envelope.   The definition of optimal trade-offs relies on the imputed capacity value of 
a technology in a sub-period, which suggests individual technologies that are not built may interfere 
with the process, as it is only on average that they are not required.  The following constraint prevents 
the selection of a technology that is not built: 
   
CAPj,t − z j ,n,t ≥ 0     :ψ j ,n,t
6      (2.54) 
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Where the capacity of a candidate technology is zero, then 
 
z j ,n,t = 0 .   Where capacity is positive, and 
very small, there is also no possibility of selecting the technology as 
 
z j ,n,t <1  which is prohibited by 
(2.53).  This results in a slight inaccuracy, albeit a helpful one, as it eliminates from consideration an 
optimal trade-off corresponding to a technology that has an impractical level of capacity, and therefore 
would not be built.  This effect could be enhanced by introducing a scaling factor into (2.54) to regulate 
a minimum capacity level, or more exactly, a minimum step-size in the screening curve lower 
envelope, that might lead to unrealistically small technologies being overlooked on account of the 
system definition.  Finally, we note that where technologies are built but not used in a sub-period, they 
will be considered, although they will cycle through the process defining a section of the envelope with 
zero length.   
Combining the above constraints and complementarity condition we have a series of N 
optimisation problems for each sub-period t, specified as below for a particular (n>0,t) combination: 




 Subject to: 
 
un,t





∑ ≥ 0    :ψ n,t
0     ∀n,t   (2.55) 




   
:ψ n,t
1     ∀n,t  (2.56) 
   
z j,n-1,tMCj,t
j
∑ − z j ,n,tMCj,t
j
∑ ≥ 0    :ψ n,t
2     ∀n,t  (2.57) 
   
− z j,n-1,tz j ,n,t
j
∑ +ψ n,t4 ≥ 0    :ψ n,t
3     ∀n,t  (2.58) 
   1− un,t
e ≥ 0     
:ψ n,t
4     ∀n,t   (2.59) 




∑ −1≥ 0    
 
:ψ n,t
5     ∀n,t  (2.60)   
   
CAPj,t − z j ,n,t ≥ 0     :ψ j ,n,t
6     ∀j,n,t   (2.61) 
   
z j ,n,t ≥ 0
     
 ∀j,n,t  (2.62) 
Combining the constraints (2.55)-(2.61) and first order conditions from all N instances of this problem, 
with the initial conditions specified above, we have the following representation of the lower envelope 
of cost curves in the form of a set of complementarity conditions.  In forming the first order conditions 
for each individual problem, we treat the vector 
 
zn−1,t as a constant, having been optimally determined 
by the previous set of conditions.  As we now define a group of equations 
 
zn−1,t  reverts to being a 
variable, although the cascading nature the optimisation problems remains. 
 
First Order Conditions: 
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   1−ψ n,t
0 ≥ 0   ⊥   
un,t






∑ −ψ n,t1 +ψ n,t2 MCj,t +ψ n,t3 z j ,n-1,t − 2ψ n,t5 z j ,n,t +ψ j ,n,t6 ≥ 0
  
   ⊥  
 
z j ,n,t ≥ 0     ∀j,n > 0,t   (2.64) 
Constraints: 
   
un,t





∑ ≥ 0  ⊥  
 
ψ n,t
0 ≥ 0     ∀n > 0,t  (2.65) 
   
z j ,n,t
j
∑ ≥1  ⊥  
 
ψ n,t
1 ≥ 0     ∀n > 0,t  (2.66) 
   
z j ,n-1,tMCj,t
j
∑ − z j ,n,tMCj,t
j
∑ ≥ 0  ⊥  
 
ψ n,t
2 ≥ 0     ∀n > 0,t  (2.67) 
   
− z j ,n-1,t z j ,n,t
j
∑ +ψ n,t4 ≥ 0   ⊥   ψ n,t3 ≥ 0     ∀n > 0,t   (2.68) 
   1− un,t
e ≥ 0   ⊥  
 
ψ n,t
4 ≥ 0     ∀n > 0,t   (2.69) 




∑ −1≥ 0   ⊥   ψ n,t5 ≥ 0     ∀n > 0,t   (2.70) 
   
CAPj,t − z j ,n,t ≥ 0   ⊥   ψ j ,n,t
6 ≥ 0    ∀j,n > 0,t   (2.71) 





e = 0       ∀t   (2.72) 
  
 
z0,0,t = 1        ∀t   (2.73) 
  
 
z0,i,t = 0       ∀i > 0,t   (2.74) 
By inspection the system is square, having the same number of variables as conditions.  From this point 





as notation for a critical endogenously determined utilisation level, 
however we wish to emphasise that in what follows that utilisation level could have been developed by 
some other means, such as the approach discussed in Section 2.5. 
2.6 LDC Construction 
2.6.1 Ordering Utilisation Levels 
While the solution to the optimal plant mix problem depends on the calculation of the critical 
utilisation levels at which optimal trade-offs are defined, there also remains a need to incorporate 
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exogenous utilisation levels in the model, for the purpose of defining the LDC as input.  The structure 
of the original optimisation problem, and the resulting complementarity conditions detailed by (2.21)-
(2.24), require utilisation levels to be considered in a monotonic fashion if constraints, objectives, and 
first order conditions are to make any sense.  Assuming we have already determined the appropriate 
settings for utilisation levels corresponding to the optimal technological trade-offs, we now need to 
determine the appropriate ordering of the combined set of utilisation levels. 
Fortunately, a simple linear programming solution that provides a naturally integer solution to 
the problem of ordering distinct utilisation levels is available.  For each sub period t, the formulation 
below provides a combined ordering of exogenous (k) and endogenous (n) utilisation levels, indexed 
by r=1….R.  Using a rank based weighting scheme incentivises the optimisation to associate higher 
valued utilisation levels with higher rankings, thereby providing variables 
 
xk ,r ,t  and  xn,r ,t
e  to translate 
between the original indices and the combined ranking: 
  
 
Minimise − r.uk,txk ,r ,t
k





∑       (2.75) 
  Subject to:        
 
1− xk ,r ,t
k
∑ − xn,r ,te
n
∑ ≥ 0     :φr0     ∀r  (2.76) 
  
 
1− xk ,r ,t
r






∑ ≥ 0    :φne     ∀n  (2.78) 
  
 
xk ,r ,t ,xn,r ,t
e ≥ 0       ∀k,n,r  (2.79) 
Here 
 
uk,t  represents a breakpoint in the piecewise linear representation of the LDC, while  un,t
e  
represents the critical utilisation level indexed by n in sub-period t.  The objective function maximises 
the sum of all weighted utilisation levels, where the weightings are given by either 
 
xk ,r ,t  or  xn,r ,t
e .  The 
highest weighting, r=R, is attached to the highest utilisation level, by selecting 
 
xk ,R,t = 1  or  xn,R,t
e = 1  for 
whichever 
 
uk,t  or  un,t
e  corresponds to the maximum utilisation level in either set.  With the exception 
of coincidentally identical utilisation levels, constraints (2.76) to (2.79) ensure a unique transformation 
between the unranked and ranked utilisation levels, as each 
 
uk,t and  un,t
e  is allocated a ranking in the 
combined set, and all rankings in the combined set correspond to a unique 
 
uk,t  or  un,t
e .   In the case 
where there are coincidentally identical utilisation levels, the solution to the ranking problem above is 
not unique, or naturally integer.  But it matters little what weightings are attributed to two identical 
outcomes, as they are required to sum to unity and, as is the case here, the wider problem is only 
concerned with convex combinations of outcomes, both of which are identical in this case.  Casting 
these t sub-period problems as complementarity conditions we have: 
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First Order Conditions: 
   −r.uk,t +φr ,t
0 +φk ,t
f ≥ 0   ⊥  
 
xk ,r ,t ≥ 0     
∀k,r,t   (2.80)  
   −r.un,t
e +φr ,t
0 +φn,t
e ≥ 0   ⊥  
 
xn,r ,t
e ≥ 0     




1− xk ,r ,t
k
∑ − xn,r ,te
n
∑ ≥ 0   ⊥   φr ,t
0 ≥ 0     ∀r,t   (2.82)  
  
 
1− xk ,r ,t
r
∑ ≥ 0  ⊥   φk ,t






∑ ≥ 0  ⊥  
 
φn,t
e ≥ 0     ∀n,t   (2.84) 
The variables 
 
xk ,r ,t  and  xn,r ,t
e  that define the solution to this complementarity problem directly enable 




rank = xk ,r ,tuk,t
k
∑ + xn,r ,te un,te
n
∑       ∀r,t   (2.85) 
  
 
uk,t = xk ,r ,tur ,t
r




e = xn,r ,t
e ur ,t
r
∑       ∀n,t   (2.87) 
Finally, we note that the efficiency of the sorting algorithm could be improved by removing the end 
points 
 
u0,t = 0  and  
uK,t = 1  from this optimisation, and defining them directly in the basic 
formulation.  This ranking scheme is also easily generalised to enable combined rankings of any 
number of indices should an additional set of utilisation levels be of interest for some other reason. 
2.6.2 Defining Load at Critical Utilisation Levels 
For the market clearing and investment conditions to make sense, individual load levels must also be 
ranked consistently according to the ranking of the corresponding utilisation level.  This must occur for 
each sub-period.  As with utilisation levels, the ranked load levels, 
 
Lr ,t , corresponding with  ur ,t
are 
analogously defined by the expression: 
  
 
Lr ,t = xk ,r ,tLk,t
k
∑ + xn,r ,te Ln,te
n
∑       ∀r,t   (2.88) 
The load levels, 
 
Lk,t , corresponding to each fixed utilisation level,  
uk,t , are known, and will be 
correctly ranked by the ranking variables 
 




e , can also be relied upon to correctly rank the endogenous load level, 
 
Ln,t




the load corresponding to 
 
un,t
e , has not yet been defined. 
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Geometrically, we can define intermediate load levels such as 
 
Ln,t
e  by interpolation.  
Mathematically this is represented by the following expression: 
   
Ln,t
e = Lr−1,t − un,t
e − ur−1,t( ) Lr−1,t − Lr+1,tur+1,t − ur−1,t        
∀n,r,t   (2.89) 
Unfortunately, there is no guarantee that the adjacent load levels are known, as they may also 
correspond to endogenous utilisation levels.  Eventually though, any set of interior endogenous load 
levels, for example {B,C}, will be encased by two exogenous load levels, {A,D} even if, in the limit, 
these correspond to load at 
 
u0,t  and  
uK,t .   There is only one possible consistent linear interpolation, 
between the two exogenous load and utilisations levels A and D.  If we assume a load for C then the 
interpolation between A and C will uniquely define B.  Accordingly, C will be uniquely defined by the 
interpolation between B and D, which we know from basic geometry has a single solution.  The only 
consistent interpolation between the two fixed points is a straight line between A and D, which makes 
all interpolations consistent. We can represent this situation with the system of linear equations shown 
below: 
   
LB
e uC
e − uA( )− LCe uBe − uA( ) = LA uCe − uBe( )        (2.90) 
   
LC
e uD − uB
e( )− LBe uD − uCe( ) = LD uCe − uBe( )        (2.91) 
Solving (2.90) for  LB
e  gives: 





e( ) + LCe uBe − uA( )
uC
e − uA( )        (2.92) 
Substituting (2.92) into (2.91) and grouping like terms gives the following equation defining  LC
e : 
   
LC
e uD − uB
e( )− uB
e − uA( ) uD − uCe( )
uC











e( ) + LA
uC
e − uB
e( ) uD − uCe( )
uC
e − uA( )     (2.93) 
This can be simplified to the following form: 
   
LC
e uD − uA( ) uCe − uBe( ) = LD uCe − uBe( ) uCe − uA( ) + LA uCe − uBe( ) uD − uCe( )     (2.94) 






e − uA( )




uD − uA( )






e − uA( )




uD − uA( )
      (2.96) 
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Both  LB
e  and  LC
e  and, more generally, any load levels corresponding to utilisation levels between 
 uA  and  uD , can be expressed as weighted averages of, and therefore linear interpolations between, 
the exogenous endpoints,  LA  and  LD .   
While the definition in (2.89) suffices whenever 
 
ur+1,t − ur−1,t ≠ 0 , when the denominator is zero 
the solution is undefined.  This will only be the case where three or more consecutive utilisation levels 
are identical.  This might be thought unlikely, but in general there will be less than N+1 distinct 
utilisation levels required to determine the screening curve lower envelope implying there is likely to 
be a redundancy at full utilisation.  For example, if E utilisation levels are required to define the lower 
envelope, then barring coincidental intersections in the determination of the screening curve envelope, 
then N+1-E utilisation levels will be set to unity, causing the denominator in (2.89) to equal zero and 
the interpolation method to fail whenever N+1-E>1.   
This realisation also raises a broader issue of algorithm design that requires the correct choice 
of starting and intermediate values to avoid the denominator evaluating at zero at any point in the 
solution process, and not just at the final solution.   With some algorithmic modifications, such as use 
of perturbations, these difficulties may be able to be overcome in a practical sense.  To avoid this 
potential difficulty with certainty, we define load levels without reference to neighbouring load and 
utilisation levels that may be identical.  The solution to this problem provides an example of a useful 
complementarity formulation for a particular type of constraint. Were the LDC convex, a simple 
optimisation such as below would suffice for each sub-period t, as incentives would ensure the ordered 




e = L0,t −
Lk-1,t − Lk,t
uk,t − uk-1,tk
∑ uk ,n,tpart       (2.97) 










e ≥ 0      ∀k,n  (2.99)  
The utilisation level 
 
un,t
e  is allocated amongst the k load classes in quantities 
 
uk ,n,t
part .  Each of these load 
classes has a prevailing linear adjustment as a function of utilisation, with the rate measured by the 
ratio  
Lk-1,t − Lk,t( ) / uk,t − uk-1,t( ) .  Convexity of the LDC implies that load classes would be filled in 
logical order until the total required utilisation level had been satisfied.   
However, our problem amounts to assessing the value of the LDC at a particular utilisation 
level when the LDC is represented by a non-convex piecewise linear function.  As the LDC is non-
convex, incentives alone will not result in the LDC load classes will be filled in an ordered fashion, and 
therefore also do not guarantee that the correct corresponding load level value will be calculated.  To 
rectify this problem, we add the following complementarity constraint, which recursively ensures that 
no load class can be used unless the previous load class has been entirely used: 
  
 
uk,t − uk-1,t − uk ,n,t
part ≥ 0  ⊥    uk+1,n,t
part ≥ 0    ∀0 < k < K ,n  (2.100) 
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Having added this constraint, the problem above contains only one feasible point, and therefore the 
optimisation paradigm is redundant.  Nevertheless, the objective function serves as a useful definition 




e  is defined for a given endogenous 
 
un,t
e .  In aggregate, the definition of endogenous load 




Lr ,t − xk ,r ,tLk,t
k
∑ + xn,r ,te Ln,te
n




e − L0,t +
Lk-1,t − Lk,t
uk,t − uk-1,tk






∑ − un,te = 0       ∀n,t   (2.103) 
  
 
uk,t − uk-1,t − uk ,n,t
part ≥ 0  ⊥    
uk+1,n,t
part ≥ 0    ∀k < K ,n,t  (2.104) 
2.7 Solution Approaches 
2.7.1 Complementarity Solution 
As designed the formulation is a complete complementarity problem.  Several substitutions are 
advisable to reduce the problem to its canonical form, to improve solver performance.  We state the 
complementarity problem, including endogenous utilisation levels, necessary re-ordering conditions, 
and linking equations.  Note that by assumption costs are fixed across all sub-periods and this is 
reflected in the indexation of those variables and constraints where it is appropriate. 
 
Market Equilibrium Conditions: 
  
 
−λr ,t + MCi,t +ϕ i,r ,t
+
i>0
≥ 0   ⊥  
 





∑ − Lr ,t = 0   ⊥   λr ,t free     ∀r,t  (2.106) 
  
 
CAPi,t −GENi,r ,t ≥ 0   ⊥   ϕ i,r ,t
+ ≥ 0    ∀i > 0,r,t  (2.107) 
Optimal Capacity Conditions 
   
χ i,t − ϕ i,r+1,t
+ ur+1,t − ur ,t( )
r<R
∑ = 0  ⊥  
 
CAPi,t free    ∀i,t  (2.108) 
  
 
CAPi −CAPi,t ≥ 0   ⊥   χ i,t ≥ 0     ∀i > 0,t  (2.109) 
  
 
FCi − w t
t
∑ χ i,t ≥ 0  ⊥   CAPi ≥ 0    ∀i > 0  (2.110) 




χ i,t − χ j ,t − (MCj,t − MCi,t )ui, j ,t
e +ηi, j ,t ≥ 0  ⊥   ui, j ,t
e ≥ 0     ∀i, j ≠ i,t   (2.111) 
  
 
1− ui, j ,t
e ≥ 0   ⊥  
 
ηi, j ,t ≥ 0     ∀i, j ≠ i,t   (2.112) 
Selecting Critical Utilisation Levels 
   1−ψ n,t
0 ≥ 0   ⊥  
 
un,t





∑ −ψ n,t1 +ψ n,t2 MCj,t +ψ n,t3 z j ,n-1,t + 2ψ n,t4 z j ,n,t ≥ 0   ⊥   z j ,n,t ≥ 0     ∀j,n > 0,t   (2.114) 
   
un,t





∑ ≥ 0  ⊥  
 
ψ n,t
0 ≥ 0     ∀n > 0,t  (2.115) 
   
z j ,n,t
j
∑ ≥1  ⊥  
 
ψ n,t
1 ≥ 0     ∀n > 0,t  (2.116) 
   
z j ,n-1,tMCj,t
j
∑ − z j ,n,tMCj,t
j
∑ ≥ 0  ⊥  
 
ψ n,t
2 ≥ 0     ∀n > 0,t  (2.117) 
   
− z j ,n-1,t z j ,n,t
j
∑ +ψ n,t5 ≥ 0   ⊥   ψ n,t3 ≥ 0     ∀n > 0,t   (2.118) 




∑ −1≥ 0   ⊥   ψ n,t4 ≥ 0     ∀n > 0,t   (2.119) 
   
1− un,t
e ≥ 0   ⊥  
 
ψ n,t
5 ≥ 0     ∀n > 0,t   (2.120) 





f ≥ 0   ⊥  
 
xk ,r ,t ≥ 0     ∀k,r,t   (2.121)  
   −r.un,t
e +φr ,t
0 +φn,t
e ≥ 0   ⊥  
 
xn,r ,t
e ≥ 0     ∀n,r,t   (2.122) 
  
 
1− xk ,r ,t
k
∑ − xn,r ,te
n
∑ ≥ 0   ⊥  
 
φr ,t
0 ≥ 0     ∀r,t   (2.123)  
  
 
1− xk ,r ,t
r
∑ ≥ 0  ⊥  
 
φk ,t






∑ ≥ 0  ⊥  
 
φn,t
e ≥ 0     ∀n,t   (2.125) 
Defining Variables at Critical Utilisation Levels 
   
ur ,t − xk ,r ,tuk,t
k
∑ + xn,r ,te un,te
n
∑ = 0       ∀r,t   (2.126) 
  
 
Lr ,t − xk ,r ,tLk,t
k
∑ + xn,r ,te Ln,te
n





e − L0,t +
Lk-1,t − Lk,t
uk,t − uk-1,tk






∑ − un,te = 0       ∀n,t   (2.129) 
  
 
uk,t − uk-1,t − uk ,n,t
part ≥ 0  ⊥    uk+1,n,t





e = 0       ∀t   (2.131) 
  
 
z0,0,t = 1        ∀t   (2.132) 
  
 
z0,i,t = 0  
     ∀i > 0,t   (2.133) 
While the complementarity structure is useful for theoretical analysis, it is not, without adjustment, 
always the best solution approach.  Nevertheless, despite the many alternative solution processes, 
complementarity theory provides the only consistent framework we are aware of, which is capable of 
melding and encoding both algorithmic and optimisation approaches, as well as providing an, albeit 
computationally burdensome, pathway to solution with current solvers. 
2.7.2 Nested Solution 
As shown by the algorithm in Section 2.4.1, in its most basic form the problem can be viewed as a 
nested problem.  The first optimal trade-off is with shortage, and in this simplified structure no 
technology operating below the peaker in the merit order can influence that trade-off.  The solution 
approach is therefore to determine the optimal peaking technology, along with the optimal trade-off 
overall, as a function of sub-period performance.   This defines the profitability of the peaker of last 
resort, and forms a fixed portion of the profit or cost recovery available to other technologies. 
We have the following inequality describing the technology i* that is best placed to generate 
with a utilisation level of  u1 , then: 
  
 
λ1 = MCi* +
FCi*
u1
      (2.134) 
An energy price higher than this level will conflict with the equilibrium condition (2.20).   This price 
may correspond to a shortage cost, for which the fixed cost is typically assumed to be zero, or it may be 
a peaking technology with sufficiently low marginal cost and capital recovery factor that it is a more 
economical alternative at  u1 .  Whichever technology is the least cost, and whether or not two or more 
technologies are tied, the price,  λ1 , will be unique.    
We now consider which technology is the least cost technology to generate with the next 




FCj ≥ λ1 − MCi*( )u1 + λ2 − MCj*( ) u2 − u1( )     ∀i > 0   (2.135) 
(2.135) holds for all technologies, and with strict equality for the marginal technology, j*.  Recognising 
the first term 
 
λ1 − MCi*( )u1 = FCi* , we have the following expression for  λ2 , the energy price at  u2
: 
   
 
λ2 = MCj* +
FCj* − FCi*( )
u2 − u1( )       (2.136) 
This is also uniquely defined by the cost parameters of each technology and the utilisation levels used 
to represent the LDC.  
By an induction argument, the PDC is uniquely defined, as the expression relating fixed costs 
results in selecting the next technology in the merit order as a function of the previous optimal choice.  
At each stage the PDC and the technology most efficient at the utilisation level under consideration is 
determined.  By progressing through each utilisation level, we can determine the solution in a nested 
fashion.  Unfortunately, the approach taken here is not robust in situations where technological 
selections lower in the merit order influence those above.  In these cases, the algorithm would require 
additional macro iterations to develop a solution in which high level trade-offs and choices are 
consistent with lower level choices and trade-offs.  
2.7.3 Decomposition 
An alternative, and more general approach, involves dividing the problem between the basic 
investment and market clearance (economic) problem and the utilisation level determination problem.  
The former includes the standard economic complementarity constraints governing market clearing and 
investment, while the latter includes the complementarity constraints that describe the definition, 
ordering and calculation of utilisation levels designed to optimise the representation of the problem. 
The decomposition is seeded with an initial solution to the economic problem using only the 
load and utilisation levels that describe the LDC.  This generates the dual variables that measure 
marginal capacity values and marginal fuel values that determine the optimal technological trade-offs.  
The second stage encompasses the definition of critical optimal trade-offs, the ordering of these trade-
offs, and the load levels corresponding to those trade-offs.  The process then reverts to the initial 
problem, but this time operating on the newly defined LDC.  That problem is re-solved and generates a 
new set of marginal capacity and fuel values.  The process continues until convergence.  
This separation of the problem in this form enables separate choices regarding which of the 
modelling paradigms, such as optimisation, complementarity or algorithms, are most appropriate at 
each level.  For example, in simple cases, a fast algorithm could develop the system representation 
more quickly than a complementarity formulation reconstructing the screening curve lower envelope.  
In other cases, the simple algorithm may require modification or an additional level of iteration to 
achieve this and may be less effective than a direct approach.  Further, in cases of perfect competition, 
a direct optimisation could be used with the correct set of utilisation levels, whereas when the market is 
gamed a complementarity formulation may be desirable.  Our approach is general, in that whether 
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algorithm, optimisation or complementarity formulations are invoked, they can all be unified if desired 
in a single conceptual framework, whether or not that is the desired solution technique. 
2.7.4 Existence and Uniqueness 
The theory of existence and uniqueness of complementarity problems is well surveyed in Harker & 
Pang (1990).   
The existence of a solution to our problem is clearest when viewed in the form of a 
decomposition.   The lower level problem determines a system representation by selecting and ordering 
appropriate utilisation levels as defined by the higher-level problem.  The higher-level problem has a 
solution as was shown in Section 1.5.3, that is independent of the particular specification of the LDC. 
Uniqueness is a more elusive solution property, and technically our framework does not 
provide a unique solution.  The complementarity problem we have formulated is known to have 
multiple solutions, and therefore a priori we know it will not be susceptible to uniqueness analysis via 
complementarity theory.  Nevertheless it is also the case that, while not conforming to the uniqueness 
results defined in complementarity theory, if we modify our definition of a unique solution to 
something more practical, such as a unique set of capacity investment, generation and market clearance 
variables, then a “practically” unique solution property can be demonstrated. 
We can further advance the discussion of practical uniqueness by examining the problem in 
the context of a decomposition.  Given a capacity stock and a system representation, the market 
clearance is unique.  The uniqueness of the market clearance implies that the dual variables that define 
the marginal profitability of each technology are also unique.  In turn, technological profitability 
uniquely defines both the marginal value of additional capacity and the optimal trade-off between 
technologies, which is the system representation.  Not all system representations and capacity stocks 
will correspond to an equilibrium of the system.  Starting from an initial point, the system will 
incentivise alterations in capacity levels and the utilisation levels that correspond to optimal trade-offs 
and define the system representation.  Both adjustments are monotonic in capacity so that, as capacity 
of a technology is added, the earnings of that technology shrink while the marginal utilisation range of 
the technology expands.  As these adjustments occur in unison the system will approach a fixed point 
where there is no incentive to adjust capacity values and/or the system representation. 
2.8 Summary & Conclusions 
In this chapter, we have resolved several issues with the conventional optimisation approach.  Those 
issues are related to the choice of the LDC representation, the implicit restriction on generation 
functions and the use of exogenous utilisation levels.  
Following the lead of Chapter 1, we begin by directly comparing screening curve analysis 
with conventional optimisation formulations.  We identify the relative endogeneity of utilisation levels 
and the compact definition of the PDC in screening curve analysis.  We also note that one alternative to 
the removal of the implicit restrictions within conventional formulations, is to minimise the influence 
of them, and we describe how increasing the granularity of the model both shrinks the size and the 
duration, in utilisation terms, of the error.  The cost of such an approach may be small in the context of 
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linear programming, but the same brute force approach would be less attractive in cases where convex 
optimisation was not capable of representing the model structure.  In any case, a superior solution is to 
remove the effect of the restriction, as opposed to the restriction itself, altogether by combining 
endogenous utilisation levels with the fixed utilisation levels in the optimisation.   
The broad strategy for achieving this integration is as follows: 
• Determine utilisation corresponding to optimal trade-offs 
• Prune the set of optimal trade-offs to those that are relevant 
• Integrate this set of utilisation levels with the exogenous utilisation levels that 
describe the LDC 
• Define load levels corresponding to the endogenous utilisation levels. 
In effect this approach optimises the otherwise sub-optimal conventional optimisation 
formulation. While this is conceptually an optimisation, without optimisation of the formulation, the 
conventional approach can only approximate the solution to the problem. An adaptation of the 
conventional optimisation may be possible, but ultimately any adaptation must address the same issues 
listed immediately above so it is not obvious what form that optimisation would take.  In particular, any 
adaptation must address the defining feature of the problem, which is the endogenous optimal trade-
offs which allow for the definition of optimal generation functions.   So while the problem can be 
conceptually viewed as an optimisation, and with the exception of a technical optimisation based on the 
complementarity pairs we have identified, we are unaware of any optimisation that can address this 
general problem. 
We begin with a set of market clearances, and then develop an investment constraint. We then 
introduce sub-periods and, in doing so, cross a modelling threshold, beyond which the simple screening 
curve diagram can no longer represent the global solution.  In this environment, technologies are 
selected based on their suitability across a range of conditions, perhaps without being absolutely suited 
to any one.  The extension of the model to address sub-periods requires the specific definition of sub-
period profitability.  This enables the precise definition of imputed marginal capacity values, which can 
then be used in an analogous fashion to calculate the critical utilisation levels in each sub-period.  In 
turn, these utilisation levels precisely define the marginal operating ranges of each technology in each 
sub-period as well as the sub-period PDC. 
Having demonstrated the nature of the solution, Sections 2.4 develops the necessary 
complementarity conditions to define the critical utilisation levels.  In the simplest single period 
deterministic example, critical utilisation levels can be determined a priori and inserted as data.  In 
more complex cases, the critical system utilisation levels are not able to be determined a priori and we 
provide a set of complementarity conditions for defining the relevant optimal trade-offs.  Where the 
merit order is not consistent we must define optimal trade-offs in both directions.  This generally 
results in the determination of one interior solution, where the incentive is to adjust utilisation to 
remove the cost differential between two technologies, and one boundary solution in which the limits 
of utilisation are invoked in the complementarity condition. 
That process generates redundant utilisation levels, but even in the case where the merit order 
is fixed we are still only interested in those critical utilisation levels that define operational trade-offs 
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between marginal technologies and in doing so define the PDC.  In section 2.5, we reduce the number 
of utilisation levels under consideration to a smaller set using a simple approach that culls all but one 
optimal trade-off for each technology.  A more advanced, although not necessarily more efficient 
approach is a systematic search along the screening curve envelope.  Sub-period trade-offs are 
ultimately based on global capacity choices and the nature of the LDC.  
These critical utilisation levels are then combined with exogenous utilisation levels, using a 
ranking optimisation in complementarity form.  The ranking optimisation extends beyond the most 
basic implementation of its type to address the joint sorting problem that exists as a result of 
considering an exogenous and endogenous set of utilisation levels.  Once sorted, the load levels 
corresponding to the pruned and sorted set of utilisation levels are endogenously determined by a set of 
complementarity conditions designed with a piecewise, and generally non-convex, LDC in mind. 
Finally, we briefly discuss solution methodology and the existence and uniqueness of the 
solution.  As noted, the complementarity formulation is not the only solution method. Other algorithms 
are no doubt possible, and could be investigated, but in this case the complementarity framework 
provides a succinct view of all the incentives and constraints of interest to investors and operators.  In 
addition, it permits simulation of the motivation of notional or meta-entities, which are invoked to 
define the most useful representation of the problem from a range of possible representations, each of 
which can produce a solution. Furthermore, complementarity theory offers a potentially unifying 
statement of the problem that will also be amenable to the consideration of strategic situations. 
In return for accepting the additional computational burden, the inclusion of endogenous 
utilisation levels corresponding to optimal trade-offs: 
• Clearly defines the optimal utilisation ranges for each technology; 
• Enables generation and investment decisions to be considered simultaneously 
• Correctly identifies market prices consistent with market clearances, and therefore does not 
contaminate any further analysis reliant on price response; 
• Avoids the inclusion of an unknown, but large, number of fixed utilisation points, which must 
be sufficient to represent the solution, and provide useful sensitivity analysis 
• Enables a clearer assessment of risk; and 
• Forces a conceptual focus on what is at the heart of investment and/or optimal plant mix 
problems:  The optimal trade-off between technologies. 
As far as we are aware, our approach is novel and consists of a set of complementarity conditions that 
express the inherent logic of screening curves, along with the traditional principles of market clearing 




3 TECHNOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
3.1 Introduction 
It is important to illustrate that the fundamental approach taken in Chapter 2 is reasonably extensible, 
and this is the goal of Chapters 3,4 and 5.  A common, and valid, criticism of screening curve analysis 
is that relatively minor extensions in complexity make it intractable.  However, the logic of screening 
curve analysis remains valid and we use it as we consider some technological issues that require 
extension of the complementarity model in Chapter 2.  We do so to illustrate how these might be 
implemented, whether the conditions for determination of endogenous utilisation levels require 
adjustment and, in the case adjustment is required, what form that adjustment takes.  
In this chapter, we further generalise the technological generation cost structure in several 
ways.  We begin by generalising the previous linear cost function to a convex piecewise linear cost 
function.  While not novel, we discuss the relevance of non-convexities in cost functions, and the 
reasonableness of assuming these do not exist in our framework.  We then develop a formulation 
treating investment in such technologies as a parcel of technologies bound by a proportionality 
constraint.  Finally, we then examine how complementarity conditions relating to investment and the 
determination of endogenous utilisation levels are affected. 
In the Sections 3.3 and 3.4 of this chapter we discuss technological limitations.  Beginning 
with capacity limitations, we investigate how these can be incorporated into our framework.  We 
extend this to include a stylised model of mothballing and reinstatement.  We then introduce energy 
limits and generalise these by sub-period to illustrate how storage restrictions can be included in the 
framework.   
In Section 3.5 we introduce an entirely novel approach that defines ranges of configurable 
technologies in the screening curve context.  In principle, the introduction of configuration adds a 
further dimension to the investment problem.  Using an assumed quadratic trade off in the cost 
structure, we develop an optimised piece-wise quadratic total cost function that, despite requiring a 
different interpretation to a standard cost function, enables the representation of optimised 
technological configurations.  The introduction of a piece-wise quadratic cost structure into screening 
curve analysis has implications for the number of trade-offs between technologies and the means of 
integration with linear technologies.  To determine endogenous utilisation levels, we address the 
algorithmic requirements of avoiding imaginary roots.  Finally, we re-define the investment condition 
to reflect a PDC comprised of piecewise linear and constant sections.   
3.2 Generalised Cost Structures 
3.2.1 Piecewise Constant Marginal Costs 
Thus far we have assumed that marginal costs are constant and therefore there are no economies, or 
diseconomies, of scale in generation.  As shown by way of example in Figure 22, generation 
technologies may have start-up costs and efficient operating zones, which can be interpreted as 
economies or diseconomies of scale, so that as shown in Figure 22, based on economic incentives the 
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various operating tranches would not be selected in a logically consistent order.  Minimum operating 




Figure 22: Indicative Cost Structures 
At the technological level, as opposed to the plant level, the assumption that there are no minimum 
operating levels will not bias the analysis significantly.  While any minimum operating levels may be 
based on physical requirements, for any reasonably sized system the minimum operating level of a 
single plant is scarcely significant when modelling at a technological level.  Similarly, when considered 
at the technological level, inefficient operating zones are unlikely to feature among equilibrium 
outcomes, as generators will quickly approximate efficient operation using a subset of their own 
available plant to best capture efficient operating ranges.  This provides some comfort that an analysis 
based on the assumption that costs don’t exhibit such features will be accurate even where those 
characteristics are not modelled explicitly. 
The implication of the second assumption, that there are no diseconomies of scale, does 
introduce systematic bias.  Specifically, this assumption implies that generators can use all of the 
available capacity at an efficient cost.  Ultimately though, the efficient generation range of all available 
plants of technology i is exhausted.  Further output, up to the capacity rating of the plant, may be 
relatively inefficient or result in additional maintenance and repair costs if the lifespan of the plant is to 
be maintained.  Ignoring this phenomenon systematically misstates technological profitability to a 
degree that is dependent on the extent, and the range over which, plant efficiency falls.  Unlike the 
issue of increasing returns to scale, the issue is not resolved, or diminished, by adopting a large market 
assumption.   
The cost structure of each technology contemplated so far consists of a constant marginal cost 
per unit of utilisation and a fixed cost, giving a linear total generation cost in terms of utilisation.  We 
now relax this assumption to consider a piecewise linear total generation cost, which in turn implies the 
consideration of step-wise marginal cost curves in which the steps represent several discrete marginal 










cost ranges for each technology i.  To formulate a piecewise linear total cost function in a way that is 
consistent with the overall concept of determining optimal utilisation levels we no longer consider 
technology i as a single technology, but as a group of linked technologies, associated with i, for which 
the fixed costs are incurred collectively and for which the individual capacity of each related 
technology is a function of the installed capacity of technology i and a technological assessment of the 
costs of operating that technology in various modes, i(m). 
We assume there are M operating modes, indexed by m=1…,M, for each technology so that 
i(m) denotes technology i operating in mode m, and corresponds to a single cost tranche.   FCi  
continues to represent the fixed cost of a unit of capacity of technology i, however that unit of capacity 
is broken into M portions, with 
 
MCi(m)  being the marginal cost of technology i operating in mode i(m).   
For their investment, investors effectively receive a portfolio of notional technologies, some of 
which may or may not be profitable, with portfolio share, 
 
α i(m) , defined according to engineering data 
on technological capabilities to be the proportion of capacity of technology i that is applicable to the 
operating range m for technology i: 
   
CAPi(m) −α i(m)CAPi = 0   ⊥   χ i(m) free    ∀ i(m) i>0  (3.1) 
The equilibrium investment condition records sub-period earnings as the sum of earnings for each 
operating mode of technology I in sub-period t, weighted by the fixed proportions that define the cost 
structure.  Total earnings are found by taking the sum of sub-period earnings weighted by the duration 
of the sub-period:  
   
FCi − w t
t




⊥   INVi ≥ 0     ∀i > 0  (3.2) 
Where fixed costs exceed the marginal profitability of additional capacity of technology i, then 
 INVi = 0  in equilibrium.  Where the opposite is true, investment will be incentivised and continue until 
parity is achieved between fixed costs and the marginal profitability of technology i. 
Without (3.1), the inefficient operating modes of a particular technology would be dominated 
by the efficient modes as capacity of either has an identical fixed cost. The imputed value of each 
technological mode, 
 
χ i(m) , adjusts to the point at which the proportionality constraint (3.1) is obeyed.  
This adjustment requires the upward movement of the total cost curve associated with more efficient 
operating modes, reflecting an increase in the marginal capacity value associated with that operating 
mode.  For similar reasons, we also observe downward movement of the cost curve associated with less 
efficient operating modes, reflecting a decrease in the marginal capacity value associated with that 
operating mode.  The adjustment ceases when either the proportionality constraint is satisfied, or when 
the overall technology ceases to be profitable.  The equilibrium setting is one in which the value of 
relatively efficient capacity is higher than its installation cost, and the value of relatively inefficient 
capacity is lower than installation cost.  It is not necessarily the case that investment is justified at all, 
and where the weighted return of all operating modes is negative there will be no capacity built. 
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As each technological operating mode operates with a different marginal cost and we have 
specifically ruled out economies of scale at the technology level then, subject to observing the offer 
rules regarding the number of tranches available to be specified by each plant in a competitive offer, 
they will be offered to the market as individual technologies.  Accordingly, the market clearing 
conditions require generalisation to refer to operating modes i(m), rather than actual technologies.  
  
 
−λr ,t + MCi(m),t +ϕ i(m),r ,t
+
i>0
≥ 0   ⊥  
 
GENi(m),r ,t ≥ 0   





∑ − Lr ,t = 0   ⊥   λr ,t free     ∀r,t  (3.4) 
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,r,t  (3.5) 
The definition of sub-period earnings remains the same but is generalised to include all operating 
modes as if they were separate technologies: 
  
 
χ i(m),t − ϕ i(m),r+1,t
+ ur+1,t − ur ,t( )
r<R
∑ = 0  ⊥  
 
CAPi(m),t free   ∀ i(m) i>0 ,t
 (3.6) 
Finally, the condition defining optimal trade-offs must also be generalised:  
   χ i(m),t − χ j(m),t − (MCj,t − MCi,t )ui, j ,t
e +ηi, j ,t ≥ 0  ⊥   ui, j ,t
e ≥ 0    
∀i(m), j(m) ≠ i(m),t   (3.7) 
For each sub-period, the optimal trade-off is evaluated according to the available capacity of each 
technology and is defined by the interaction between sub-period profitability and the marginal cost of 
each technology.  Therefore, the optimal trade-off between operating modes of the same technology is 
a valid optimal trade-off.  The capacity of each operating mode is required to be consistent with the 
technological cost curve and is defined in (3.1)  
3.3 Capacity Inflexibility 
3.3.1 Introduction 
In the general framework, we have already dealt with capacity inflexibility in the form of ordinary 
capacity, which cannot respond to: 
• Variations in load within a sub-period, as represented by sub-period LDC’s; 
• Variations in load between sub-periods; or 
• Cost and other variations between sub-periods. 
The consideration of additional capacity inflexibility may be motivated by issues such as the limitation 
of opportunities, or the availability of pre-existing capacity, for which the decision is to operate, retire 
or mothball.  Whatever the reason for the inflexibility, the cost of inflexibility or the value of a limited 
opportunity should be assessed in terms of market performance and returns.  These can then be 
compared to the actual cost of creating and/or maintaining that capacity.  In the case of an investment 
decision, the relevant cost would be the total of construction/installation costs and fixed operating and 
maintenance costs, while with a retirement or mothballing decision the firm would wish to ascertain 
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whether fixed operating and maintenance costs are able to be covered, as capacity installation costs are 
sunk. 
3.3.2 Opportunity Limited Technologies 
Opportunity limits arise as a result of the availability of a specific development site, permit or load 
response option. In these cases, the installation options for a particular technology are restricted to a 
limited range of options, each of which is specified by the quantum of capacity available and a cost per 
unit. Where the issue is not global as much as it is site or permit specific, then the representation of 
unique opportunities, such as hydro or wind generation opportunities, that are of significant scale 
relative to the market size may necessitate the description of each such opportunity as individual 
technologies, for which design limitations apply. 
Our discussion primarily considers global limits at the technological rather than plant level, 
and Figure 23 shows a global limit of the capacity of a single technology.  As shown, when a capacity 
limit is introduced for consideration, capacity and the optimal utilisation of the technology are both 
(weakly) lower than they would be in an unconstrained equilibrium.  At the same time, incentives exist 
for increasing the capacity of adjacent technologies to compensate for the limitation on technology i.   
Graphically, it is apparent that at that capacity limit, the marginal earnings and the imputed valuation of 
an additional unit of capacity are higher than in the unrestricted equilibrium, and therefore must also 
exceed  FCi , the fixed cost of capacity. 
If we consider the case presented in Figure 23, the optimal trade-offs between a technology i 
and the adjacent technologies i+ and i- may be interpreted as providing the solution to the following set 
of equations: 
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Figure 23: Capacity Limited Technologies 
The mathematics confirms the graphical relationship.  As the optimal utilisation range for technology i 
shrinks along with the capacity level, the imputed marginal value of capacity of technology i,  χ i
+ , 
rises.  This process continues until the value of capacity has adjusted sufficiently to incentivise a 
capacity level that respects the capacity limit in (3.8). 
To introduce this structure into a complementarity formulation, we begin with a 
complementarity condition to restrict capacity to a maximum level,  CAPi
+ :  
   CAPi
+ −CAPi ≥ 0   ⊥   χ i
+ ≥ 0     ∀i  (3.11) 
The complementarity variable  χ i
+  represents the value of a relaxation in the capacity restriction or, 
alternatively, the value to the system of additional capacity when capacity is at its predefined 
maximum.  When the optimal capacity choice is less than the pre-defined maximum, the constraint is 
not binding and  χ i
+ = 0 . 
















Capacity Limit Desired Capacity Limit
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Barring the opportunity limit, if the capacity of technology i was below its optimal value, then 
 
FCi < w t
t
∑ χ i,t , where  χ i,t  continues to represent the imputed marginal value of capacity in each sub-
period and, where appropriate, adjusts to reflect the higher equilibrium returns that flow from capacity 
restricted to a maximum level.  Normally, investment in such a technology would occur, until the 
marginal benefit of further investment was equal to fixed costs of doing so.  But no such option exists 
when  CAPi = CAPi
+ .  χ i
+  measures the marginal cost to the system of the requirement to maintain the 
capacity of a particular technology at a level no greater than  CAPi
+ .  We know from a basic 
optimisation of the form struck in Chapter 1, that the addition of a capacity constraint would result in 
the first order condition with respect to capacity gaining an additional term.  Accordingly, we introduce 
 χ i
+  into the equilibrium investment condition, where it is quantified as the difference between the 
fixed cost and the weighted marginal profitability of technology i.  The equilibrium investment 
condition now reflects the possibility that constraints on capacity restrict complete adjustment and 
permit individual technologies to be marginally profitable in equilibrium.  
   
FCi − w t
t
∑ χ i,t + χ i+ ≥ 0
 
⊥   CAPi ≥ 0    ∀i > 0,t  (3.12) 
Although the actual optimal trade-offs between technologies will adjust until the capacity limit is 
respected, the impact of the capacity limit is the naturally accounted for in 
 
χ i,t  so that the 




χ i,t − χ j ,t − (MCj,t − MCi,t )ui, j ,t
e +ηi, j ,t ≥ 0  ⊥   ui, j ,t
e ≥ 0    ∀i, j ≠ i,t   (3.13) 
A similar analysis is available for any technology with a mandated minimum capacity:  
   CAPi
− −CAPi ≥ 0   ⊥   χ i
− ≥ 0     ∀i  (3.14) 
If the capacity of technology i was required to be above its optimal value, then 
 
FCi > w t
t
∑ χ i,t .  This 
would reflect over-investment in technology i.  Normally, investment in technology i would be scaled 
down or existing capacity would be retired, until either the marginal benefit of further investment was 
equal to fixed costs of doing so, or capacity reached zero, the de-facto minimum.  But no such option 
exists when  CAPi = CAPi
− .  χ i
−  measures the marginal cost to the system of the requirement to 
maintain the capacity of a particular technology at a level no less than  CAPi
− .  We now introduce  χ i
−
 
into the equilibrium investment condition, where it is quantified as the difference between the fixed 
cost and the weighted marginal profitability of technology i.  The equilibrium investment condition 
now reflects the possibility that constraints on capacity may restrict full equilibration of capacity in 
either direction and through the inclusion of additional variables tied to complementarity conditions 
this condition now permits individual technologies to be marginally profitable or unprofitable in 
equilibrium when capacity constraints are binding.  
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FCi − w t
t




CAPi ≥ 0    ∀i > 0,t  (3.15) 
The marginal value of the opportunity or restriction is given by  χ i
+ − χ i
− .  At most one of these terms 
will be positive, depending on whether the capacity maximum or minimum is binding.  We have 
described opportunity limits in terms of their cost to the system, however we note the owner or 
controller of the opportunity or the restriction, such as site owner or license owner, is effectively the 
owner of those constraints, whether they represent a right or obligation.  If the constraint could be 
traded in a perfectly competitive, and linear, secondary market, the effective owner of the constraint 
should be willing to receive or pay the associated rental in the amount of  χ i
+ − χ i
−  for each unit of the 
restriction traded.   
Discrete Investment Options 
Although we are considering restrictions on the range of available capacity options for opportunity 
limited technologies, that restriction is being applied at a technological level, rather than plant level.  In 
a large market, aggregation to the technological level makes the assumption of continuous investment 
more reasonable, although opportunity limits are often associated with unique or rare opportunities that 
cannot be easily replicated or scaled.  For example, opportunities for investment in technologies such 
as hydroelectric generation are significantly restricted by the natural characteristics of the installation 
location.  In these cases, it may not be possible to build the plant size that is optimally indicated by the 
screening curve analysis.  Instead the capacity choice may be restricted to a set of possible installation 
sizes governed by engineering or other practical considerations.   
From a mathematical perspective, the important feature of this situation is that the options are 
discrete and, for example, include the option to not invest at all. An equilibrium representation of the 
decision to invest with discrete development opportunities requires consideration of non-convexities.  
In particular, the decision of whether to invest in a discrete quantity of a particular technology is one in 
which whatever option is chosen, it may appear to be the wrong decision ex post.  If the investment 
progresses, it may cannibalise the very opportunity it sought to capitalise on.  Yet, if it does not, there 
remains an apparent opportunity for investment or entry.  The ideal capacity level is that which 
captures sufficient returns to recover its capital cost but is not overbuilt and therefore cannibalising its 
own income stream.  This fine-tuning is not possible when only discrete capacity choices are available. 
To evaluate such an opportunity (or obligation), we can reverse our analysis and calculate the 
value of the option for any fixed MW quantity of plant to be built by considering the discrete capacity 
choices through setting the minimum and maximum capacity limits to the desired capacity setting.  
Unfortunately, this procedure must be considered in iterative fashion and separate from the equilibrium 
determination of the complementarity problem.  
3.3.3 Existing Capacity 
Existing capacity is perhaps the most prevalent form of limitation on the capital stock.  The equilibrium 
level of existing capacity is itself dependent on the equilibrium timeframe under consideration.  
Existing capacity does not exist when equilibrium is considered in its ultimate sense. But investors are 
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fundamentally interested in the lifespan of their investment so that, in anything other than the long-term 
concept of equilibrium, existing capacity can be assumed to play some part in the operation of the 
market, and should be significant to investors.  Although the declining performance or outmoded 
specifications of older plant relative to new installations of similar technologies suggest a changing role 
for aging plants, the effect of technological progress is somewhat muted by the sunk costs of existing 
capacity which make the economic justification for inclusion of pre-existing plant in an optimal plant 
mix relatively more favourable than it is for new investment, ceteris paribus.   
We begin by considering the impact of existing capacity without possibility of retirement or 
mothballing.  We can incorporate existing capacity,  CAPi
0 , in the same fashion as the minimum 
capacity constraint of the previous section, noting that  CAPi
0  is to some degree parameterised by the 
timeframe underlying the equilibrium analysis: 
   CAPi −CAPi
0 ≥ 0   ⊥   χ i
0 ≥ 0     ∀i  (3.16) 
in the absence of retirement or mothballing, one or other minimum capacity constraint will be 
redundant. We include both as it is not appropriate to conflate the two constraints, particularly if post-
solution analysis might consider different policy settings, or equilibrium timeframes, thereby 
potentially switching the active constraint.  Because (3.16) is of the same form as the minimum 
capacity constraint, so too is the form of the required alteration to the equilibrium capacity condition: 
   
FCi − w t
t
∑ χ i,t + χ i+ − χ i− − χ i0( ) ≥ 0
 
⊥   CAPi ≥ 0    ∀i > 0,t  (3.17) 
Retiring Capacity 
Capacity and investment are synonymous whenever the timeframe of the equilibrium under 
consideration extends beyond the remaining lifespan of the technology concerned.  However, in shorter 
timeframes, existing capacity may be relevant.  We consider shorter timeframes because investments 
themselves have a finite lifespan. Accompanying this reality is the possibility that retirement is an 
economic option, available to the owners of existing plant.  This option affords the level of capacity 
some downward flexibility. To that end, we separate the capacity decision into its composite parts; an 
investment choice, and a retirement choice.   
We assume that the cost of retirement will be incurred whether the plant is retired for 
economic or age-related reasons, and that the cost of doing so is invariant, in discounted terms, to 
either the timeframe under consideration or the age of the plant when retirement occurs, so that aside 
from spot market returns, no other benefits or costs are relevant.  With existing capacity, the fixed costs 
of installation are sunk.  Therefore, ignoring other benefits and costs, to retain the capacity the owner 
of existing capacity need only ask whether the capacity concerned will at least contribute to the 
recovery of sunk costs, and not whether it will achieve full recovery of those costs.   
Fixed operating costs,  FOCi , are those fixed costs that relate to the operation of the plant 
whether or not electricity is being generated.  Existing capacity can contribute to sunk cost recovery, 






∑ χ i,t − FOCi ≥ 0        ∀i > 0,t  (3.18) 
Conversely, when (3.18) does not hold, existing capacity does not cover fixed operating costs and 
rather than recovering some portion of sunk costs, augments them with further operating losses.  In that 
case, some capacity should be retired.  As capacity is retired, the profitability of remaining capacity 
increases, until eventually earnings rise to the level where fixed operating costs are being covered.  The 
following complementarity condition reflects this logic in the form of an equilibrium retirement 
condition: 
   
w t
t
∑ χ i,t − FOCi ≥ 0
 
⊥   RETi ≥ 0    ∀i > 0,t  (3.19) 
To ensure capacity remains non-negative, retirement is limited to the level of initial capacity available: 
   CAPi
0 − RETi ≥ 0   ⊥   χ i
RET ≥ 0    ∀i  (3.20)  
If existing capacity is only partially retired then  χ i
RET = 0 , implying that, through retirement, capacity 
has adjusted until the marginal profitability of the capacity is equal to the fixed operating costs of 
retaining and operating that capacity.  Where existing capacity is fully retired,  χ i
RET ≥ 0 .   At this point, 
it is possible that the LHS condition of (3.19) does not hold, indicating a desire for further retirement 
which, from (3.20) is not feasible.   Accordingly, (3.19) requires modification to reflect the limitations 
on capacity retirement decisions that restrict the full equilibration of capacity levels, in this case, to 
negative levels. 
   
w t
t
∑ χ i,t − FOCi + χ iRET ≥ 0
 
⊥   RETi ≥ 0    ∀i > 0,t  (3.21) 
Where  FOCi  exceeds the profitability from operating technology i, and all existing capacity has been 
retired we have  RETi > 0  and 
 
χ i
RET = FOCi − w t
t
∑ χ i,t > 0 , which could be interpreted as the subsidy 
necessary to retain the last unit of unretired capacity of technology i.   
Ignoring capacity limitations, we replace the equilibrium capacity condition (2.110), with the 
equilibrium investment condition (3.22), which restates the equilibrium capacity condition in terms of a 
new investment variable,  INVi .  
   
FCi − w t
t
∑ χ i,t ≥ 0
 
⊥   INVi ≥ 0     
∀i > 0  (3.22) 
If  INVi > 0  and  RETi > 0 , then from (3.22) and (3.21) we have  
   
FCi − w t
t
∑ χ i,t + w t
t
∑ χ i,t − FOCi + χ iRET = 0
     
 ∀i > 0  (3.23) 
This simplifies to: 
  
 FCi − FOCi + χ i
RET = 0
     
 ∀i > 0  (3.24) 
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Equation (3.24) is a contradiction, as  χ i
RET ≥ 0  and  FCi − FOCi > 0 .  Unsurprisingly, there is no value 
in investing in capacity, while simultaneously retiring capacity of the same.  Instead, when we consider 
the criteria for new investment alongside the criteria for retirement, we find a profitability range in 
which fixed operating costs are being covered but full cost recovery is not being achieved and, as a 
result, neither investment nor decommissioning will occur: 
    
 
FOCi ≤ w t
t
∑ χ i,t ≤ FCi
 
     
∀i > 0  (3.25) 
Where prices are such that investment in technology i is justified, investment will occur until prices and 
the marginal profitability of technology i fall to equate to  FCi , at which point equilibrium will have 
been attained.  Where prices fall short of justifying investment, but exceed  FOCi , existing capacity 
will be retained, with no retirements or further investment.   Where prices fall short of  FOCi , 
retirement is incentivised.  As retirement is actioned and capacity falls, either retirement is partial and 
profitability increases until the equilibrium returns precisely cover  FOCi , or all existing capacity will 
be retired and  FOCi  will still exceed the marginal profitability for technology i.    
Viewing the situation dynamically, we see that in response to a shock such as a new disruptive 
technology that there are a variety of zones defining the adjustment of each technology.  Each zone is 
defined by complementary slackness and characterised by either capacity adjustment while returns are 
fixed, or return adjustment while capacity is fixed.  As capacity of the new technology is introduced, 
the returns of all technologies fall, although there will be periods of price stability during which 
adjustment will occur through retirement of the capacity of existing technologies.  Naturally, the order 
in which technologies adjust is dependent on the nature and utilisation of the disruptive technology 
being introduced and the impact it has on the full PDC. 
At this point we re-introduce minimum and maximum capacity levels as discussed in Section 
3.3.2. The capacity restrictions and the new definition of capacity are summarised below: 






− ≥ 0     
∀i > 0  (3.26) 
   CAPi
+ −CAPi ≥ 0  ⊥  χ i
+ ≥ 0     ∀i > 0  (3.27) 
   CAPi = CAPi
0 + INVi − RETi       ∀i > 0  (3.28) 
The re-introduction of these constraints potentially impairs the full equilibration of the system through 
investment and retirement alone, and requires modification of (3.21) and (3.22) to: 
   
w t
t
∑ χ i,t − FOCi − χ i+ − χ i−( ) + χ iRET ≥ 0
 
⊥   RETi ≥ 0    
∀i > 0  (3.29) 
   
FCi − w t
t
∑ χ i,t + χ i+ − χ i−( ) ≥ 0
 
⊥   INVi ≥ 0     
∀i > 0  (3.30) 
Capacity bounds could apply impact the feasible range of both investment and retirement decisions and 
this is reflected above. When binding, these restrictions alter sub-period returns and optimal trade-offs, 
 121 
but as before, while the trade-offs will be numerically different, there is no requirement to alter their 
formulation as in (3.13).    
Mothballing Capacity 
Within the context of a particular market, the balance of the mothballing/retirement decision is of 
significance to investors.  Investors in new capacity will see returns suffer if the market and its 
variations are such that, with reasonable accuracy, pre-existing mothballed plant can be returned to 
active operation at times where prices may be generally high.  Conversely, mothballing and re-
instatement may allow investors to eke out additional value.   
Mothballing and reinstatement provide some relief from the hitherto discussed issue of 
capacity inflexibility.  In most standard models, the possibility of adjusting capacity in the short term is 
not considered. Mothballing provides owners of existing plant with an intermediate option, between 
maintaining full operational status and retirement.  Although mothballing is commonly associated with 
older, perhaps inefficient plants, even technologies that are profitable and attractive to investors may be 
candidates for mothballing.  To avoid pre-judgement, rather than being a characteristic limited to plants 
due for retirement, mothballing and reinstatement is an operating strategy which should be considered 
for all plants, including new installations.   
In the limit, and given enough lead-time of the requirement for additional capacity, the 
operating life of a plant could predominantly be spent in a mothballed state, with sporadic 
reinstatement as required.  Although we do not address it here, there is also the possibility that the 
flexibility of a particular installation is a design choice that could be optimised so that the plant 
concerned may be more susceptible to taking advantage of reliable variation in load conditions.  An 
extreme example of this logic would be the case of transportable power stations that service different 
locations at different times of year or assist during extended breakdowns of in situ capacity.  We are 
not suggesting this possibility as the focus of the section, however our formulation does allow for this 
possibility.   
We consider a simplified version of mothballing in which capacity is mothballed and 
reinstated in specific sub-periods. While the actual nature of the decision naturally involves forecasting, 
and recognising the plant owner has a real option to exercise or not, we limit our investigation to the 
possibility of capacity being reinstated for a single sub-period, although we could adapt this to consider 
reinstatement by scenario, or in a more advanced model, reinstatement for multiple periods. We define 
the cost of mothballing capacity as  MCi
MBL .  Whereas retiring existing capacity saves all fixed 
operating costs, to maintain the possibility of reinstatement, mothballed capacity still incurs some fixed 
operating costs, albeit lower than when in full operation, so that  0 < FOCi
MBL < FOCi . 
Before we can weigh the costs and benefits of mothballing we define both the condition under 
which reinstatement will occur and the profitability involved when reinstatement does occur.  
Reinstatement feasibility is governed by: 
   
a i,t





REI ≥ 0    ∀i > 0,t  (3.31) 
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Here  MBLi  is the capacity of technology i that has been mothballed,  
REIi,t  is the quantity of 
technology i that is reinstated for operation in sub-period t, and 
 
0 ≤ ai,t
REI ≤1  is the proportion of 
mothballed capacity of technology i that is feasible to reinstate in sub-period t. When 
 
a i,t
REI = 0 , 
reinstatement is not feasible, while when 
 
a i,t
REI = 1 , reinstatement of all mothballed plant is feasible.  
Feasibility in this context reflects two central aspects of the problem.  Firstly, there is the literal, or 
technical, feasibility of reinstatement of the plant.  Secondly, there is the feasibility associated with 
having sufficient notice of a potential future opportunity.  Without the latter, whether or not 
reinstatement is technically possible, it will not occur.  Therefore, 
 
a i,t
REI  should reflect technical issues 
such as a complete inability to reinstate certain technology types as well as the trade-off between the 
time to reinstate and the notice period associated with a potential future opportunity.  
In the context of sub-periods, a high value of 
 
a i,t
REI  might correspond to systems with strong 
predictable variations, or it might correspond to systems prone to long term variations, such as hydro 
based systems, where the system state changes slowly, and crises, when they occur, are prolonged and 
sustained with significant lead time.   Conversely, where system crises are short term, such as when 
driven by demand spikes associated with extreme heat, there is little possibility of reinstating a plant to 
take advantage of such opportunities.  The second aspect of feasibility could be more comprehensively 
addressed by a detailed modelling of the information structure of the problem.  Ours is a significantly 
simplified approach designed to reflect a less than perfect foresight.  As a result, rather than allowing 
all technically feasible reinstatement in a model in which foresight is not perfect, our model synthesises 
that approach by allowing limited reinstatement but implicitly assuming foresight is perfect.  As 
always, where an issue is significant in a particular context, modelling resources should be reallocated 
towards it, and the case that this is a significant market feature, it would suggest a fuller specification 
of the information structure.  
Given reinstatement is feasible according to (3.31), reinstatement will occur whenever the 
available marginal returns exceed the marginal cost of reinstatement,  MCi
REI , which is assumed 
constant.   MCi
REI  includes the technological costs incurred in reinstating capacity to operational status 
and then returning it to mothballed status, as well as an adjustment that reflects that the operating cost 
savings from mothballed capacity,  FOCi − FOCi
MBL , are not available when the capacity is operating.  
The condition governing reinstatement is: 
    
 
MCi





REIi,t ≥ 0    ∀i > 0,t  (3.32) 
Where the cost of reinstatement exceeds the returns available, reinstatement will not occur.  Where the 
opposite is true, capacity will be reinstated until the marginal profitability in sub-period t falls to parity 
with the marginal cost of reinstatement.  The exception occurs when reinstatement is restricted by the 
feasibility constraint (3.31) and the equilibrium is characterised by a marginal profitability that exceeds 
the marginal cost of reinstatement, 
 
w tχ i,t > MCi
REI , but is unable to be capitalised upon.  
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Notionally, mothballing provides the plant owner with a strip of options to reinstate the plant 
whenever they choose.  The equilibrium marginal value of the option to reinstate technology i in period 
t is given by 
 
χ i,t
REI , however the validity of the equilibrium option valuation requires some 
investigation.  If reinstatement is not constrained by (3.31) then 
 
χ i,t
REI = 0  and 
 
MCi
REI − w tχ i,t ≥ 0 , so 
the option value is captured correctly.  When reinstatement is constrained at a positive level then 
 
χ i,t
REI = w tχ i,t − MCi
REI ≥ 0 , and again the option value is captured correctly.  However, when 
reinstatement is constrained at zero, 
 
a i,t
REI = 0  and the situation is ambiguous.  Either 
 
w tχ i,t − MCi




REI = w tχ i,t − MCi
REI , reflecting that reinstatement is desirable but not feasible, or 
 
MCi
REI − w tχ i,t ≥ 0 , and  χ i,t
REI  is free, reflecting reinstatement is economically undesirable.  In each 
case the option value, 
 
χ i,t
REI , being reported is incorrect because the option to reinstate does not exist. 
Fortunately, this is of little import in our formulation as the weighting attached to the marginal 
profitability in the relevant sub-period is 
 
a i,t
REI = 0 , as shown in (3.33). 
The profit from mothballing comprises reductions in fixed operating costs and the profitability 
from reinstatement.  Given a one-off charge,  FC
MBL , which we express as an annuity on the same basis 
as other fixed costs, and which reflects the cost of configuring a technology to accommodate 
reinstatement, the profitability available from configuring and optimally mothballing and reinstating a 








∑ − FCMBL     ∀i > 0   (3.33) 
The fixed operating cost savings from mothballing apply to all units of capacity, whereas the benefits 
from reinstatement are scaled to reflect the possibility of reinstatement being constrained.  In 
equilibrium, in those periods where reinstatement is not constrained, 
 
χ i,t
REI = 0 , and the scaling factor, 
 
a i,t
REI , is not relevant.  In those sub-periods in which the reinstatement is constrained, 
 
a i,t
REI  reflects the 
proportion of reinstatement available as a result of mothballing an additional unit of capacity and 
 
χ i,t
REI ≥ 0  records the marginal profitability of reinstating capacity. 
We now seek to integrate the mothballing and reinstatement conditions with the rest of the 
framework.  For the purpose of this discussion, mothballed capacity is considered capacity, so that the 
definition of  CAPi  remains as in (3.28). We limit the extent of mothballing, MBLi , with following 
complementarity condition: 
   
CAPi − MBLi ≥ 0
 
⊥  χ i
MBL ≥ 0    
∀i > 0  (3.34) 
Whether or not mothballing and reinstatement are profitable is not the relevant test as plant owners 
have other operational strategies available.  In this case, the profitability of mothballing must be 
assessed against the profitability of normal operations.  Accounting for this and the possibility of 







∑ −π iMBL + χ iMBL ≥ 0  ⊥  MBLi ≥ 0    ∀i > 0  (3.35) 
Where:  
   
π i
MBL = FOCi − FOCi




∑ − MCMBL     ∀i > 0   (3.36) 
When the marginal profitability of normal operations exceeds the marginal profitability of mothballing 
in equilibrium, (3.35) implies that no mothballing of that technology occurs.  Where the opposite is 
true, and providing that the mothballing restriction in (3.34) is not binding, capacity will be mothballed 
until the marginal profitability of doing so equates with the marginal profitability of normal operations.  
If all capacity is mothballed, the marginal profitability of mothballed capacity may remain higher than 
the marginal profitability of normal operations.  The profitability differential defines  χ i
MBL ≥ 0 , to 
satisfy (3.35).  
Mothballing and reinstatement represent the introduction of an additional operational choice 
for each technology.  The equilibrium investment condition, as well as the equilibrium retirement 
condition must account for the most profitable use for each technology and not merely the spot market 




∑ χ i,t + χ iMBL , where  χ i
MBL  measures the marginal value of the option to mothball over and above 
the marginal profitability of spot market operation.   
As with the marginal value of the reinstatement option, we can show this is the case in all but 
one situation, and that this situation represents a self-contained equilibrium that does not contaminate 
the results.  From (3.35), when capacity is only partially mothballed then, from (3.34), 
 
χ i
MBL = π i
MBL − w tχ i,t
t




MBL = π i




, reflecting the marginal option value we desire.  When 
mothballing and the capacity available to mothball are both zero in equilibrium, then although 
mothballing is constrained physically, its economic desirability is undetermined.  In this case, we have 
 
χ i
MBL = π i
MBL − w tχ i,t
t
∑ ≥ 0 , reflecting the option value we desire.  Where it is not 
 
χ i
MBL = π i
MBL − w tχ i,t
t
∑ ≤ 0  and, as far as complementarity conditions (3.34) and (3.35) are concerned, 
the value of  χ i
MBL  is free.   In this case alone,  χ i
MBL  does not define the option value of mothballing.  
However, for capacity to be zero, investment must be zero and retirements must be maximised, in 
which case mothballing is not an available option.  Were  χ i
MBL  to rise to a level where zero capacity of 
the technology concerned was no longer a feature of the equilibrium solution, mothballing would cease 
to be constrained at zero and  χ i
MBL  would again define the option value of mothballing. 




∑ χ i,t + χ iMBL  in the 
knowledge that the only scenario in which this is not strictly the case, is a self-contained solution.  We 
amend (3.29) and (3.30), which are respectively the equilibrium retirement condition and the 
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equilibrium investment condition, as follows to reflect the potential of mothballing and reinstatement to 
adjust earnings: 
   
w t
t
∑ χ i,t + χ iMBL⎛⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
− FOCi − χ i
+ − χ i
−( ) + χ iRET ≥ 0
 
⊥   RETi ≥ 0    ∀i > 0,t  (3.37) 
   
FCi − w t
t




+ − χ i
−( ) ≥ 0
 
⊥   INVi ≥ 0     (3.38) 
The logic supporting these conditions remains unaltered although the definition of profit in each case 
has been altered.  From (3.37), the effect of (weakly) greater profits is to (weakly) reduce the amount of 
capacity retired, while from (3.38) investment will be (weakly) higher than in a model in which 
mothballing is not considered. Unsurprisingly, the net result of the identification of an additional 
operational option, in this case mothballing and reinstatement, is weakly greater investment supported 
by the potential of further profit that encourages capacity to be retained or invested in for that purpose. 
Overall, the level of actual capacity installed is ambiguous because of the potential mothballing of pre-
existing, economically justifiable, plants.  When viewed at an individual technological level, the ability 
of competing technologies to do the same, or exhibit even greater flexibility, may counteract this effect 
for an individual technology.  
Turning to the spot market implications of mothballing and reinstatement, the level of capacity 
available for generation is dependent on the level of mothballing and reinstatements within a particular 
sub-period, so that condition (3.29) becomes: 
   
CAPi,t − MBLi + REIi,t −GENi,r ,t ≥ 0
 
⊥   
ϕ i,r ,t
+ ≥ 0
   ∀i > 0,r,t   (3.39) 
This change permits reinstated capacity to augment the underlying capacity and be used for generation.   
As before no change is required in the definition of sub-period optimal trade-offs. 
Ours has been a simplified evaluation of mothballing and retirement.  Mothballing provides an 
additional operating mode for each technology.  Once a plant is mothballed, the owner of the plant has, 
in effect, a strip of options to reinstate their capacity whenever it is profitable and feasible to do so.  
The cumulative value of these opportunities defines the marginal profitability of mothballing, and by 
comparison with the profitability of spot market operations, the marginal value of mothballing as an 
option.  Most importantly, while the optimal trade-offs that define the equilibrium will adjust, that 
adjustment is accommodated in the definition of the sub-period profitability, so no further adjustment 
to the optimal trade-off condition is required. 
The evaluation of mothballing decisions rests significantly on the evaluation of future 
profitability, which is not certain.  Whether a future circumstance is profitable depends on the 
suitability of mothballed plants to respond in a practical, as well as economic, sense.  To be captured, 
future opportunities must be reliably forecasted with a lead-time sufficient for the operator to mobilise 
the plant, and of sufficient duration for the generator to recover any fixed costs of reinstatement.  A 
detailed examination of operator forecasting would require a representation of the evolution of 
uncertainty in the system, perhaps through a Markov chain or decision process, and recognition of the 
nature of the decision as being that of a real option.  This requirement stems from the need for 
 ∀i > 0,t
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operational decisions to be made about mothballing and reinstating plant, which in turn are based on 
the distribution of future system states, the lead time to feasibly complete those actions and the length 
of time the system will remain in that desirable/undesirable state. 
Finally, an even more sophisticated view of mothballing and/or retirement might also attribute 
other value to an existing plant.  For example, it may provide risk reduction, or deterrence value in a 
future state.  We have not addressed this but it is certainly an issue of interest to any investors who 
foresee a significant portion of equilibrium cost recovery occurring in times of system stress, and who 
would not want to see that disrupted by the reinstatement of older plants that might prevent pricing 
from reaching shortage pricing levels.  This is particularly relevant in systems where load is falling, 
creating an overhang of capacity.  
3.4 Energy Limits & Storage 
3.4.1 Introduction 
Energy limits may apply at the plant level, such as for hydro-generation, where individual hydro plants 
may have their own energy limits, or at a technological level, or even across a range of technologies 
that share the same fuel.  To accommodate this range of possibilities, unique technological 
opportunities could be formulated as distinct technologies, and/or joint constraints could be applied to 
those technologies that share the same fuel.  We focus on the intermediate case, and assume each 
technology has a distinct fuel, subject to its own energy limit. 
Depending on the reason for the limit, energy limits can be deterministic, arising from 
contractual arrangements such as those defined by take or pay fuel contracts, or stochastic, arising from 
the interaction between nature and generation technologies, such as water inflows into hydro-electric 
generation schemes.  Whatever the source of limitation, energy limits create an opportunity cost for the 
limited energy source or fuel.  Depending on one’s perspective, fuel should be used when electricity 
prices are highest to reap maximum profit, or equivalently fuel should be used to reduce usage of more 
expensive alternatives.  Although fuel allocation decisions are more complex in the stochastic case, the 
allocation of fuel depends on the capacity of the technology using the fuel and the ability of firms to 
store fuel for use in those periods that in which it is most valuable, whether energy arrivals are 
stochastic or deterministic.   
Figure 24 makes clear that if fuel was available in whatever quantity was desired, a 
comparable technology without energy limits would operate over a wider utilisation range, supply a 
greater portion of total energy, and have a greater installed capacity in the optimal plant mix relative to 
an equivalent energy limited technology.  Calculation of optimal energy use requires a well-defined 
LDC, and the interaction between the energy limit and the LDC implies an equilibrium fuel value,  ε i . 
In a deterministic setting,  ε i  adjusts until the available fuel is exactly used, at which point the capacity 
requirement is defined as shown in Figure 24.  The optimal value of such fuel is set so that 
consumption will exactly equal the amount available.   If the opportunity cost of fuel were assessed at 
too high a level, fuel would be left over, whereas if it were set too low, fuel would run out having not 
necessarily been used in an optimal fashion.   
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Figure 24: Energy Limited Technologies 
The value of installed capacity, and the return it can generate, is dependent on the amount of energy 
that can be produced, which is limited not only by the rated capacity of the plant but the amount of fuel 
that is available for the period under consideration (Bernard & Chatel, 1984).  Slightly generalising that 
result, if a technology were available in any quantity, but had a known energy limit per MW of 
capacity, the optimal energy/capacity ratio (or plant output factor) for that technology could be 
determined by re-valuing the fuel resource until the optimal plant mix would use the fuel available, and 
no more.   
In terms of a single technology, i, that has a marginal operating range in the interior of the 
linear LDC section defined by 
 
uk ,uk+1{ } , the above adjustment process may be interpreted as the 
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MCi- − ε i  
        (3.42) 
Once again, i+, and i- refer to the neighbouring technologies as shown, which are not necessarily the 
technologies i+1, or i-1, as indexed in the original problem.  Equation (3.40) defines the relationship 
between the energy limit and the marginal utilisation range of technology i, in terms of the (negative) 
slope of the LDC.  We take this opportunity to reiterate the form of (3.40) reflects a linear, or piecewise 
linear, LDC and enables the calculation of the energy content of the LDC without compromising the 
definition of the capacity requirement as is necessary when modelling a piecewise constant LDC. This 
defines the width of the marginal utilisation range which, in conjunction with (3.41) and (3.42) implies 
 ε i , the opportunity cost of fuel.  
To get both the optimal capacity/energy ratio and the optimal capacity investment when 
energy is limited and capacity is flexible, we must solve for the opportunity cost of the fuel and the 
development option simultaneously. As shown in Figure 25, when capacity is fixed and energy is 
limited, then both the opportunity cost of fuel,  ε i , and the opportunity cost of existing capacity,  χ i , 
will adjust.   
In terms of a single technology, i, whose marginal operating range lies in the interior of the 
range , then in a particular period, that adjustment process may be interpreted as the solution 
to the following simultaneous equations: 
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Figure 25: Energy & Capacity Limited Technologies 
The boundaries of the marginal utilisation range, in which it is more cost effective to use technology i 
rather than neighbouring technologies, are defined by (3.45) and (3.46).   
Technologies with the same capital:energy ratio will have the same marginal fuel value, 
provided that: 
• Generators are risk neutral.  This is a sufficient condition. A necessary condition would be that 
there is no difference in marginal fuel values between periods due to risk. 
• Storage is not constrained.  If storage is constrained then the energy limit for the entire period 
will not necessarily be able to be allocated optimally across all sub-periods.  The result of this 
is diverging marginal fuel values between sub-periods. 
These results are unsurprising, as for two technologies sharing a capacity:energy ratio to precisely 
exhaust a limited fuel supply, they must have the same average utilisation level.  We can demonstrate 
this by considering the capacity:energy ratio from (3.43) and (3.44), which simplifies to: 
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= AvgUtilisation       (3.47) 
As two technologies with the same average utilisation must have overlapping utilisation ranges, it is 
clear from screening curve analysis that they must also share a marginal fuel value. 
3.4.2 Deterministic Energy Limits 
Annual Fuel Arrival 
We begin by considering fuel that arrives annually in a deterministic quantity, albeit possibly chosen 
by the plant operator.  We assume that fuel and energy are related by a constant scaling factor, 
reflecting a constant conversion rate between each.  This enables fuel limits to be considered as energy 
limits.  To address conversion rates, another set of equations would be required in the model to provide 
translation between fuel limits and energy limits.   Given a maximum available fuel quantity of  Ei
+ , 
the feasibility of an energy use pattern, consisting of distributing 
 
Ei,t ≥ 0  to each sub-period t for use 
by technology i, is governed by the simple constraint: 







⊥   ε i ≥ 0     ∀i   (3.48) 
Implicit in the single arrival assumption is that sufficient storage exists, and therefore no restrictions on 
transfer are applicable.  We also assume that there is free disposal so that whenever fuel is available in 
abundance, the opportunity cost of fuel has a floor,  ε i = 0 .  At other times, when fuel availability is 
limited below freely desired levels,  ε i > 0  which reflects the opportunity cost of that fuel in terms of 
its energy value. 
The energy use definition (3.40) applies within an LDC section or when the LDC is linear and 
therefore has a constant slope.  That range spans only one set of endogenous utilisation levels, but our 
framework incorporates a more general LDC which is piecewise linear, requiring an updated definition 
of energy use, that correctly identifies energy use over operating ranges potentially spanning several 
slices of the LDC.  We define each LDC slice by its marginal utilisation range 
 
ur ,ur+1{ } .  For each 
slice of the LDC, the total energy use for the slice is: 




Lr ,t − Lr+1,t( ) ur+1,t + ur ,t( )     ∀r,t   (3.49)  
The energy use for each technology in each slice of the LDC can be defined directly using generation 
variables, 
 
GENi,r ,t , instead of load variables: 




GENi,r ,t −GENi,r+1,t( ) ur+1,t + ur ,t( )
 
   ∀i > 0,r,t   (3.50) 
The substitution of load, which is a parameter, with generation, which is a decision variable, introduces 
a second degree of freedom into this equation.  The energy limit should be satisfied by adjustment in 
the opportunity cost of energy.  However, this change appears to enable the energy constraint to be 
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satisfied by changes in generation, rather than the intended adjustment of the energy price.  
Fortunately, the framework is robust to this possibility.  The inclusion of sub-periods in the model re-
orients the definition of marginal trade-offs so that when the total cost of supplying an increment of 
load is equal between two technologies, as it is at an optimal trade-off such as , potential ambiguity 
is resolved by preventing higher marginal cost technologies from generating at 
 
ur ,t . In combination 
with the standard market clearing constraint, this implies that generation is not free at the optimal trade-
off 
 
ur ,t .  
Summing over LDC slices and restating as an equilibrium complementarity condition we 
have: 









⊥   ε i,t ≥ 0     ∀i > 0,t   (3.51) 
While it is possible to substitute (3.51) into (3.48) we prefer to leave the intermediate variable in the 
model.		 
We have defined  ε i  as the opportunity cost of fuel which values fuel at whatever level is 
necessary to use all available fuel, but we must define the maximum energy limit,  Ei
+ , in such a way 
that it comports with potential rationales for an energy limit, such as take or pay contracts.  Fuels that 
arrive naturally such as hydro inflows have  MCi = 0 , but others with  MCi > 0  may also be limited.  
For such fuels, it is possible that the opportunity cost  ε i < MCi , so that where fuel has  MCi > 0  
the 
energy limit is contingent on the opportunity cost of fuel,  ε i , being at or above the fuel price.   
We assume that the energy limit,  Ei , is variable in a single step between zero and the 
maximum energy limit,  Ei
+ .  This could be generalised to include further tranches where various fuel 
contract options, or extensions are available.  The following set of complementarity conditions reflect 
the nature of a simple take or pay contract, and in doing so mirror the basic structure of market clearing 
conditions, as they would be with a single technology: 
   MCi − ε i,t +η i
f ≥ 0
 
⊥   Ei ≥ 0     ∀i > 0,t   (3.52) 
   
Ei
+ − Ei ≥ 0
 
⊥   η i
f ≥ 0     ∀i > 0   (3.53) 
Where 
 
ε i,t < MCi , then energy availability,  Ei = 0 , as no fuel will be purchased at a cost greater than 
its value.  Where 
 
ε i,t > MCi , notably including cases where the fuel has limited availability but is 
available at no cost, then  Ei = Ei
+  as 
 
η i
f = ε i,t − MCi,t > 0 , implying fuel purchases or arrivals are 
weakly profitable.  Where 
 
ε i,t = MCi , the firm can adjust fuel purchases freely up to the maximum 
energy limit  Ei
+ , after which point the adjustment reverts to the opportunity cost of fuel so that 
 




The optimal allocation of energy between sub-periods requires that the global opportunity cost 
of fuel, representing the most valuable use of fuel, is at least the opportunity cost of fuel in each sub-
period: 
   
 
ε i − ε i,t ≥ 0
 
⊥   Ei,t ≥ 0     
∀i > 0   (3.54) 
When 
 
ε i > ε i,t , the opportunity cost of fuel to the system is greater than in sub-period t, implying that 
there should not be an allocation of limited fuel for use in that sub-period.  If there were, fuel could 
profitably be reallocated from sub-period t to whichever sub-period provides support for the global 
opportunity cost of fuel.  Accordingly, where there is an allocation in a sub-period, it must be the case 
that the opportunity cost of fuel in that sub-period equates with the global opportunity cost, 
 
ε i = ε i,t .  
From the perspective of the market clearance process, the consideration of energy limits 
renders the marginal cost of fuel an intermediate variable, internal to the firm concerned.  The fuel user 
values the fuel according to its opportunity cost.  We recognise this in a perfectly competitive market 
clearance by substituting marginal cost,  MCi , for the opportunity cost of fuel,  
ε i,t , as it is this price 
that sets the market price whenever the technology concerned is marginal.  
   
−λr ,t + ε i,t +ϕ i,r ,t
+
i>0
≥ 0   ⊥  
 
GENi,r ,t ≥ 0   ∀i,r,t  (3.55) 
The optimal trade-off conditions must also be amended to reflect the opportunity costs of fuel:  
  
 
χ i,t − χ j ,t − (ε j ,t − ε i,t )ui, j ,t
e +ηi, j ,t ≥ 0  ⊥   ui, j ,t
e ≥ 0     ∀i, j ≠ i,t   (3.56) 
As shown in (3.57) and (3.58), the equilibrium investment condition remains the same.  There is no 
need to adjust the formulation with respect to the definition of 
 
χ i,t , as the implications of energy limits 
in each sub-period are recorded through changes in profitability arising from adjusted market prices 
and utilisation ranges.  
   
FCi − w t
t
∑ χ i,t + χ i+ − χ i−( ) ≥ 0
 
⊥   INVi ≥ 0     ∀i > 0  (3.57) 
   
w t
t
∑ χ i,t − FOCi − χ i+ − χ i−( ) ≥ 0
 
⊥   RETi ≥ 0    ∀i > 0  (3.58) 
While the investment and retirement conditions (3.57) and (3.58) remain the same, we note that we are 
implicitly assuming that the capacity choice for each generation technology, along with its storage or 
means of acquiring the limited fuel, are able to be treated separately.  In such a case, the value of an 
additional unit of storage is measured by the weighted difference between the opportunity and marginal 
cost of the fuel.  In equilibrium, barring the imposition of any limits, this should be equal to the cost of 
an incremental unit of storage.  In some cases, such as hydroelectric generation capacity, capacity and 
storage capacity may be entwined.  This implies constraints relating capacity and storage choices and 
results in the introduction of additional variables into the optimal investment condition for each.  
Where capacity and storage capacity must move in lock step, we could modify the investment 
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condition to reflect the combined cost of installation and the additional fuel value created by the 
existence of storage. 
The equilibration process exhibits a series of capacity and marginal capacity value 
adjustments, taken in succession, reflecting the mutually exclusive zones in which capacity and 
marginal capacity values are flexible.  It is helpful to view the process of equilibration as a function of 
the opportunity cost of fuel.  When an energy limit is applied, the adjustment is a function of the 
opportunity cost of fuel, 
 
ε i,t , which adjusts until the limited fuel is exactly used.   Ceteris paribus, a 
lower/higher maximum energy limit,  Ei
+ , implies a higher/lower  ε i , and either a lower/higher 




∑ χ i,t , or a lower/higher capacity,  CAPi .   Where 
 INVi > 0  in the absence of an energy limit, lower energy limits results in less equilibrium investment 
and therefore total capacity until either  CAPi = CAPi
−  or  INVi = 0 , leaving only pre-existing capacity.  
In the first case,  CAPi = CAPi
− , and capacity can no longer adjust downwards, resulting in a differential 
between fixed costs and marginal capacity values, as explained in Section 3.3.2.   In the second case, in 
which  INVi = 0 , only existing capacity remains.  The process of marginal capacity value adjustment 
continues until eventually the marginal capacity value will reach the level of fixed operating costs, 
 FOCi , and capacity retirement will be incentivised.  When capacity retirements occur, the marginal 
value of capacity remains constant, as the required adjustment to accommodate the energy limit is 
offset by adjustments in the capital stock. Eventually, if a strict enough energy limit is applied, all 




∑ χ i,t , will remain.  That differential 
will define the marginal subsidy that would be required to prevent the retirement of the last unit of 
capacity of technology i.   
Many technologies may be limited, and the energy limits of one technology will interact with 
those of others.  We could imagine the case of a thermal plant with a contractually limited fuel supply 
looking to take advantage of lower than usual hydro inflows, or a hydro generator in one region 
looking to take advantage of low inflows in another region.  Because the opportunity cost of one fuel is 
pegged to the next best alternative use, changing the energy limit for one technology implies a re-
assessment of the value of other limited resources and simultaneous determination of the opportunity 
costs of all limited fuels.  It follows from (3.56) that this dynamic will impact optimal trade-offs and 
investment, with the overall effect on the optimal utilisation of each technology dependent on which 
opportunity cost effects are stronger.   
 
Sub-Period Fuel Arrival 
We now consider the arrival of energy in each sub-period.  This could reflect the delivery structure 
embedded in take or pay arrangements, or natural considerations such as seasonal inflow patterns, for 
example.   It is implicit that single fuel deliveries can be stored.  Our focus here is demonstrating the 
impact of storage on the structure of fuel allocation, and how that can be incorporated into our 
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structure.  To illustrate the nature of the decision we assume future fuel availability is known with 
certainty.  In Appendix 7.3 we briefly describe how stochastic fuel availability could be considered. 
Irrespective of whether inflows are limited by a natural process or contractual terms, we define 
a maximum inflow of fuel for technology i in period t of 
 
INFi,t
+ .  As before, we generalise the definition 
of energy inflows to reflect the reality of non-zero fuel costs, such as in a take or pay contract, this time 
recognising the potential for different, perhaps seasonal, fuel costs in each sub-period: 
   
MCi,t − ε i,t +ηi,t ≥ 0
 
⊥   RELi,t ≥ 0    ∀i > 0,t   (3.59) 
   INFi,t
+ − INFi,t ≥ 0
 
⊥   ηi,t ≥ 0     ∀i > 0,t   (3.60) 
The nature of (3.60) depends on the precise situation being considered. As written this constraint 
envisages a fuel supply contract with the purchaser having the option to purchase fuel in a quantity up 
to the maximum specified per period at a scheduled cost.  Certain contracts may allow a certain degree 
of swing between periods and they would require modification of the constraint.  However, in the case 
described, where 
 
ε i,t < MCi,t , energy availability,  
INFi,t = 0 , as no fuel will be purchased at a cost 
greater than its value.  Where 
 




+  as 
 
ηi,t = ε i,t − MCi,t > 0 , implying fuel purchases are profitable.  Where 
 
ε i,t = MCi,t , the firm can adjust fuel purchases freely up to the maximum energy limit  INFi,t
+ , after 
which point the opportunity cost of fuel 
 
ε i,t > MCi,t .  
The release in sub-period t must obey (3.61), the left hand condition of which will hold with 
equality whenever fuel has value, and will permit spillage or wastage only when fuel has no value.  









⊥   ε i,t ≥ 0     ∀i > 0,t    (3.61) 
The ability to store multiple periods of fuel arrivals is no longer implicitly guaranteed, and therefore 
neither is the ability to freely transfer fuel between sub-periods.  Instead of a global constraint 
associated with a single delivery of a limited energy source, the following inequality defines the fuel 
storage at the end of sub-period t, 
 
STORi,t , in terms of energy inflows,  
INFi,t , energy outflows,  
RELi,t
, and opening storage, 
 
STORi,0 .  
   
STORi,0 + INFi,t − RELi,t = STORi,t     ∀i > 0,t  (3.62) 
We note that until the introduction of inter-temporal constraints like (3.62), other sub-period 
decompositions, such as by time of day, or weekday and weekend, are also possible.  The introduction 
of inter-temporal constraints such as (3.62) implicitly requires the sub-periods chosen to be contiguous 
to ensure intertemporal restrictions are meaningful.    
With an initial storage level at the start of sub-period 1, 
 
STORi,0 , the storage balance 
equation (3.62) can be expressed as a complementarity condition: 
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STORi,0 t=1 + STORi,t−1 t>1 + INFi,t − RELi,t − STORi,t = 0  
⊥  
 
γ i,t free     ∀i > 0,t  (3.63) 
Here 
 
γ i,t represents the marginal value of stored fuel at the end of sub-period t, or equivalently at the 
beginning of sub-period t+1.  At the beginning of each sub-period, the operator chooses the quantity of 
fuel, 
 
RELi,t , to consume during the sub-period.  This amounts to a choice between using fuel in the 
current period and conserving it for future use.  In the absence of discounting and with unlimited 
storage, the marginal value of stored fuel will equalise across all sub-periods. The marginal value of 
release will typically equate to the marginal value of stored fuel although will whenever there is no 
release in a sub-period, a disparity between the marginal value of release and the marginal value of 
storage will be observed.  Therefore, we can no longer claim that the marginal value of release should 
equalise across all sub-periods.  The following complementarity condition describes the various 
scenarios: 
   
γ i,t − ε i,t ≥ 0  ⊥   RELi,t ≥ 0    ∀i > 0,t  (3.64) 
Where 
 
γ i,t > ε i,t , the release of fuel for generation in the current period,  
RELi,t = 0  in equilibrium, as 
the marginal value of stored fuel at the end of the sub-period exceeds the marginal value of releasing 
fuel during the current period.   When fuel is released, then 
 
γ i,t = ε i,t , so the marginal value of storing 
fuel equates with the marginal value of release in the current period.  If 
 
γ i,t < ε i,t , then the marginal 
value of stored fuel is lower than the marginal value of release, incentivising more fuel to be released in 
the current period rather than saved for a less valuable future use.  




+  and 
 
STORi,t
−  respectively.  Where storage limits are constant across sub-periods we could 
define storage in net terms, deducting that lower bound.  But as seasonal implications or storage buffer 
zones at either the top or the bottom of the storage system might be significant, we adopt a more 




− ≤ STORi,t ≤ STORi,t
+
    
 ∀i > 0,t   (3.65) 
In complementarity terms, we have: 
   STORi,t −STORi,t
− ≥ 0  ⊥  
 
γ i,t
− ≥ 0     
∀i > 0,t  (3.66) 
   STORi,t
+ − STORi,t ≥ 0  ⊥   γ i,t
+ ≥ 0     
∀i > 0,t  (3.67) 
We can describe the inter-temporal linkages between optimal marginal stored fuel values with the 
following condition:  
   γ i,t −γ i,t+1 + γ i,t
+ −γ i,t
− = 0  ⊥   
 
STORi,t free   ∀i > 0,t  (3.68) 
Where storage limits are not binding we have 
 
γ i,t = γ i,t+1 , so that (3.68) describes the equalisation of 
marginal stored fuel values across contiguous sub-periods that are unaffected by storage limits. Where 
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γ i,t > γ i,t+1  in equilibrium, the marginal value of fuel stored at the end of period t exceeds the value of 
fuel stored at the end of period t+1.  That state can only represent equilibrium when storage is at its 
minimum bound, with 
 
γ i,t
− = γ i,t −γ i,t+1 > 0 .  Conversely, where  
γ i,t < γ i,t+1  in equilibrium, the marginal 
value of stored fuel at the end of sub-period t is lower than the marginal value of stored fuel at the end 




+ = γ i,t+1 −γ i,t > 0 .  Binding storage limits prevent the unfettered transfer of energy between 
periods, and impair the optimal redistribution of fuel between sub-periods.  In the limit, the absence of 
storage affords the generator no ability to maximise the value of the fuel source, and requires them to 
use fuel deliveries or inflows entirely within the sub-period they arrive, or waste them.   
Finally, without an obligation to preserve the opening resource in some way, the resource will 
not be consumed in a fashion that is sustainable, which it must be in equilibrium if the solution is to be 
consistent.  There are several ways to require the resource to be used sustainably.  Perhaps the most 
basic approach is to restrict the end storage to the same value as beginning storage. A more adaptable 
approach is to generalise the storage requirement and use a value function to ascribe value to the 
resource at the end of the period.  Without ascribing any particular motivation for doing so, we define 
 
Vi STORi,T( )  as that value function and  Vi / STORi,T( )  as the marginal value function associated with it.   
The complementarity condition (3.68) governing the progression of fuel values becomes: 
   
γ i,t −γ i,t+1 t<T −Vi
/ STORi,T( ) t=T + γ i,t+ −γ i,t− = 0  ⊥   STORi,t free   ∀i > 0,t  (3.69) 
The market clearing conditions define the marginal value of release in conjunction with market 
clearing conditions and technological cost structures, but the relativity of sub-period marginal stored 
fuel values is disciplined by (3.69), with the end of period value function ultimately anchoring the 
overall value.  In practice this value function may also be based on optimal resource usage, and 
therefore be endogenous.   Further iterations of the model could be conducted to ensure the end of 
period fuel value function is consistent with the implied start of period fuel value. 
3.5 Configurable Technologies 
3.5.1 Introduction 
Typical competitive screening curve analysis suggests that certain technologies will be marginal across 
a wide range of utilisation levels.  At the time of investment, firms have the opportunity to optimise the 
specific technology they are purchasing.  Later in the lifespan of the plant, they may make maintenance 
choices that have implications for generation efficiency.  In terms of the screening curve diagram, this 
means that there is no longer a single, well defined, “capital cost” for each technology, but a range of 
capital costs corresponding to more or less efficient variations of that technology.  In principle, this 
introduces another dimension into the analysis, in which more expensive technological configurations 
with higher capital costs per installed MW are more efficient and are rewarded with lower marginal 
costs.   
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As with any range of technologies an investor, or a market full of investors, will potentially 
select a combination of technologies to service a particular load distribution.   This is also true when 
considering individual variations of a single underlying technology.  All variations that are not 
dominated across the relevant utilisation range will be selected as part of the optimal plant mix.  To be 
clear, we are not considering the optimisation of a single investment, in which we choose, perhaps for 
reasons of decision discreteness, the configuration we most desire.  Instead, we are considering an 
equilibrium in which investors select from a range of possible technologies. As with screening curve 
analysis all non-dominated technologies will have a place in the equilibrium plant mix, and in this case, 
this means all non-dominated configurations will have a place in the equilibrium plant mix.  
Accordingly, investors will observe a more nuanced PDC. 
Our approach calls for the integration of non-linear and linear cost structures and effects the 
definition and number of optimal trade-offs and critical utilisation levels.  In addition to the standard 
piecewise constant structure of the PDC, the PDC features linear segments which reflect the cost for a 
continuum of different configurations.  This in turn results in a more detailed definition of returns for 
conventional technologies and each of the individual incarnations of each configurable technology.  As 
a result, the modelling process is rather arduous, and we do not expect what follows to be implemented.  
However, the development provides several insights for market structure as well as showing a rarely 
seen extension of the capability of complementarity constraints. 
3.5.2 Defining a Class of Configurable Technologies   
For some technologies, the configuration options may be limited and discrete. In these cases the 
various configurations can be viewed as separate technologies in our analysis.  But for other 
technologies, or where technological progress will occur, the full range of configuration permutations 
may be large or uncertain and investors seeking to assess the equilibrium role of a broad technological 
category will almost certainly not be in a position to specify all options available at the time of 
investment, let alone those available in the relevant future.  We therefore introduce a pseudo-
technology that summarises the spectrum of available options with an optimised total cost curve.  This 
implicitly assumes investment in infinitesimal increments of efficiency are possible, so that the 
configuration options can be summarised by a continuous relationship between higher capital costs and 
lower marginal costs.  Capacity of the pseudo-technology does not have the same interpretation as 
standard capacity in this framework.  Rather than quantifying the extent of installation of a particular 
homogeneous capacity, the capacity of the pseudo-technology defines the total installation across an 
optimised and feasible range of configurations. 
To simplify exposition, we address this issue at a global level, rather than a sub-period or 
scenario level. The approach taken highlights some of the inherent logic of configuration choices as 
well as further use of complementarity conditions to enforce logical conditions.  We begin by 
partitioning available technologies into configurable and non-configurable technologies.  Each 
configurable technology is specified defined by two limiting configurations, the most efficient 
configuration defined by ( FC
+ , MC
− ) and the least efficient configuration, defined by ( FC
− , MC
+ ).  
In turn, we further partition each configurable technology into two new technologies; one with a non-
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linear cost structure to represent a pseudo cost function in regions where configuration is possible, and 
the other, a linear cost structure, to representing the limiting, and most capital intensive configuration 
of that technology.  The limiting technology is parameterised by ( FC
+ , MC
− ).  Technologies with 
linear cost structures, whether they are the limiting case of a configurable technology, or non-
configurable, are identified by  a i
cfg =0 , whereas non-linear cost structures are identified with  a i
cfg =1 .  
Ultimately all technologies are formulated as a single set so non-configurable technologies are 
presented as a special case of quadratic technologies with  MCi = MCi
+ = MCi
− , and  FCi = FCi
+ = FCi
− .   
For each configurable technology, we define the nature of the trade-off between higher 
investment and higher efficiency.  To do so we define a configuration variable,  CFGi , that defines the 
degree of configuration in the range  0 ≤ CFGi ≤1 .  The relative adjustment of fixed and marginal costs 
is determined by the actual economies, or diseconomies, of investment in production efficiency.  For 
the purpose of our exposition, we assume the following adjustment rates: 




−( )      ∀i > 0   (3.70) 





−( )     ∀i > 0   (3.71) 
The relationship ensures that the cost in terms of fixed cost of achieving linear improvements in 
efficiency increases quadratically.  Both marginal and fixed costs span the range of configuration 
options available so, provided investment in greater efficiency exhibits decreasing returns to scale, the 
solution will be a series of continuous trade-offs between incrementally different technologies.  Where 
the opposite is true, the plant will either be fully configured or not at all.  Formulations with 
configuration “sweet-spots” will require a more complex approach. 
The total cost of operating at a utilisation level, u, is: 
 
 




−( ) + MCi+ −CFGi MCi+ − MCi−( )( )u    ∀i > 0  (3.72) 
To find the optimal configuration for a given utilisation level, u, we minimise  TCi (u)  subject to the 
restriction on the configuration: 
    1−CFGi ≥ 0  ⊥   ζ i
cfg ≥ 0     ∀i > 0  (3.73) 
Subject to  CFGi ≥ 0 , we have the following first order conditions defining the optimal configuration 





−( )CFGi − MCi+ − MCi−( )u +ζ icfg ≥ 0
 
⊥   CFGi ≥ 0    ∀i > 0  (3.74) 
  
 1−CFGi ≥ 0  ⊥   ζ i
cfg ≥ 0     ∀i > 0  (3.75) 







−( )u −ζ icfg
2 FCi
+ − FCi
−( )       ∀i > 0  (3.76) 
Where the optimal configuration is at an interior level,  CFGi <1  and: 







−( )       ∀i > 0  (3.77) 
Confirming intuition, and in agreement with analysis for other technologies, the higher the target 
utilisation level, the greater the degree of configuration or investment in operating efficiency is 
justified, and can be supported.  Returning to (3.76), we can re-arrange and solve for u, while 
substituting  CFGi = 1  to identify the utilisation levels at which the limiting technology is the most 
efficient:  




−( ) +ζ icfg
MCi
+ − MCi
−( )       ∀i > 0  (3.78) 
In (3.78) there are a number of utilisation levels that support the limiting configuration, each of which 
is supported in (3.78) by varying values of the dual variable  ζ i
cfg .	 	We are interested in the lowest 
utilisation level that supports the limiting configuration, at which  ζ i
cfg = 0  so that the lowest utilisation 
level at which the limiting configuration is most efficient is: 








−( )       ∀i > 0  (3.79)  
The optimised cost function is: 
 
 








































   ∀i > 0  (3.80) 
As defined in (3.79), the optimised total cost at each utilisation level up to  ui
* , can be viewed as a 
combination of the cost of the least configured technology and a discount relative to that cost, that 
grows quadratically with the utilisation level being targeted.  As described earlier, the interpretation of 
this total cost function is different to the normal interpretation of a cost function.  It does not represent 
a single technology with quadratic costs, but rather an optimised continuum of infinitesimally different 
technologies, each with linear costs.  Although the interpretation is different, the derivative of this 
function remains the marginal cost of the marginal plant, and therefore the system price at each 
utilisation level under perfect competition.   
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Beyond  ui
* , the limiting configuration is most efficient, as no further configuration is 
available.  Where  ui
* >1  is guaranteed, we would not need to consider the configurable version of the 
technology in our analysis.  However, where  ui
* <1  we must consider both the limiting configuration 
and the quadratic technology, whose possible application must be restricted to utilisation levels  u < ui
* .   
Failure to impose this restriction ignores the limits of configuration and admits the possibility of 
negative marginal costs as a result of implicitly assuming a never-ending and, in this case, linear ability 
to improve plant efficiency.   Accordingly, the two cost functions that are necessary to describe the 
optimised total cost of a configurable technology i are: 
  
 









2      ∀i > 0,u < ui
*  (3.81) 
   TCi+ (u) = FCi
+ + MCi
−u      ∀i > 0,u ≥ ui
*  (3.82) 
3.5.3 Optimal Trade-Offs 
Whereas, there is only a single optimal trade-off between two fixed technologies with linear cost 
structures, interactions between technologies that are in general quadratic, imply the possibility of the 
total production cost being equal at two utilisation levels in each pairwise comparison. We have 
partitioned the cost structure of each individual technology, so that those technologies that are 
configurable are represented as two technologies, unless the configurable portion dominates the 
limiting version over the utilisation range,  0 ≤ u ≤1 .  The utilisation levels corresponding to optimal 
trade-offs can be inferred by defining the cost difference between two cost functions as a slightly 
perturbed quadratic and solving for its real roots.  We begin by considering the interaction between two 
quadratic cost functions: 
  
 





















2 + bi,ju + ci,j
   ∀i, j ≠ i  (3.83) 
Where:
   
ci,j = FCi
− − FCj

































      ∀i, j ≠ i   (3.86)  
The roots of this quadratic define the optimal trade-offs between technologies but there are several 
pitfalls in the direct implementation of the quadratic formula in this case.  We need to consider: 
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• Linear cost structures, for which  FCi
+ = FCi
− ; 
• Complex quadratic roots (non-intersection); 
• Linear trade-offs, as well as coincidental cases for which 
 
a i,j= 0 ; and 
• Limiting optimal trade-offs to allowable ranges 
 
The first such issue we encounter is the definition of the quadratic coefficient in each individual cost 
expression, the difference of which gives us 
 
a i,j .   To avoid numerical difficulties when technology i 
has a linear cost structure we define  a i as follows:  







− + 1− ai
cfg( )ε( )
   
 ∀i   (3.87) 
Where the cost structure is linear, although the denominator is perturbed the expression evaluates as 
zero, which is the desired outcome.  Similarly, when the cost structure is quadratic, the denominator is 
not perturbed, and the expression evaluates correctly on this occasion also.  We define 
 




a i,j = a j − ai       ∀i, j ≠ i  (3.88) 
To reflect the multiplicity of roots, we define 
 
ui,j,1
e  and 
 
ui,j,2
e  to be the roots of (3.83), corresponding to 








      (3.89) 
As shown in (3.89), the roots are exogenous and can be precompiled from exogenous cost data.  These 
could be used directly as candidates for system-wide critical utilisation levels however due to capacity 
inflexibility and energy limits, cost structures or more likely the values of imputed costs, are often 
redefined endogenously.  Therefore, without specifying any particular source or cause for endogeneity, 
or addressing the particular formulation adjustments required to specify capacity or energy limits in 
this context, we proceed to develop the formulation on the basis that 
 
ai, j ,  
bi, j , and  
ci, j are endogenous. 
The second issue arising from this approach is the need to avoid complex roots.  The roots of 
(3.83) are real whenever 
 
bi, j
2 − 4ai, jci, j ≥ 0 , however whenever  
bi, j
2 − 4ai, jci, j < 0  they are complex and 
reflect complete dominance of one technology over another, thereby depriving our approach of an 




2 − 4ai, jci, j  into two non-negative ranges, and applies asymmetric penalties to force any 
complex roots to values outside the utilisation range under consideration,  0 ≤ u ≤1.   The following 
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1 ≥ 0     ∀i, j ≠ i   (3.90) 
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2 − 4ai, jci, j −ζ i, j










2 − 4ai, jci, j > 0  then, from (3.90) we have  
ζ i, j
1 = bi, j
2 − 4ai, jci, j .  From (3.91), as a result of 
terms cancelling, we have 
 
ζ i, j
2 = 0 .  Where 
 
bi, j
2 − 4ai, jci, j < 0  then, from (3.90),  
ζ i, j
1 = 0 , and 
 
ζ i, j
2 = 4ai, jci, j − bi, j
2 , from (3.91).  Finally, if we consider the case where 
 
bi, j
2 − 4ai, jci, j = 0 , we have 
 
ζ i, j
1 = ζ i, j
2 = 0 . By implication we have 
 
ζ i, j
1 ≥ 0 ⊥ ζ i, j
2 ≥ 0 , so that in each case 
 
ζ i, j
1 +ζ i, j
2 = bi, j
2 − 4ai, jci, j
, a sum that would suffice as a surrogate for 
 
bi, j
2 − 4ai, jci, j  except that where  
bi, j
2 − 4ai, jci, j < 0 , simply 
reversing the sign would create optimal trade-offs that do not exist.  To be clear, this would not be 
injurious to the prospect of a solution being found as it would merely result in the calculation of 
additional market clearance corresponding to the additional utilisation level.  Depending on the 
complexity of the market clearance, it may well be computationally advantageous to perform that 
calculation, relative to applying the scaling factor approach we discuss next.     
As an alternative, we can apply a scaling factor when undesirable situations such as 
 
bi, j
2 − 4ai, jci, j < 0  arise.  This is a general approach that can be used in a variety of situations to create 
measures that avoid numerical problems, or to reflect logical stipulations.  We replace 
 
bi, j
2 − 4ai, jci, j  
with the following: 
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2 − 4ai, jci, j ≥ 0 we have  
ζ i, j




1 = bi, j
2 − 4ai, jci, j       




2 − 4ai, jci, j < 0  we have  
ζ i, j
1 = 0 , and (3.92) yields:  






2 − 4ai, jci, j( )
ε      
 ∀i, j ≠ i  (3.94) 
Provided ε  is chosen to be sufficiently small, any non-trivial complex roots will be transformed into 
real, and large, utilisation levels that will be ignored in the same fashion as other optimal trade-offs 
outside the appropriate range 
 
0 ≤ ui, j
e,(1,2) ≤1 .  Where ε  is not chosen appropriately, successful 
numerical evaluation will still occur, however the expression will generate spurious optimal trade-offs 
in these cases.  The error resulting from the introduction of scaling factors into the selection of 
technologies can be made arbitrarily small by selecting progressively smaller values for ε , so that the 
only technologies capable of being confused by the complementarity conditions are practically 
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identical in terms of their cost structure, and could legitimately be considered a single technology.   We 
can substitute (3.92) into (3.89): 
   
ui, j ,(1,2)
e =






     ∀i, j ≠ i  (3.95) 
From (3.89), whenever the denominator is zero the optimal trade-offs are undefined.  Therefore, we 
require a strategy to further modify (3.89) to avoid computational issues when 
 
ai, j = 0 .  This situation 
arises when either when the comparison is between linear cost structures, or by coincidence where two 
technologies share the same quadratic cost coefficient.   It is tempting to simply perturb the 
denominator in a simple fashion so that 
 
2ai, j  becomes  
2ai, j ± ε .  But this would not resolve the 
general numerical issue, as zero valued denominators would still be possible.  To ensure the 
denominator is non-zero, we adopt a similar approach as before and partition the variable 
 
ai, j  into two 
non-negative complementary components, 
 
ζ i, j
3  and 
 
ζ i, j
4 , although this time our goal is to exclude zero, 
rather than rule out the negative half-space as before: 
   
ζ i, j




3 ≥ 0      ∀i, j ≠ i   (3.96) 
   
ai, j −ζ i, j






4 ≥ 0      ∀i, j ≠ i   (3.97) 
Where 
 
ai, j > 0 , then from (3.96) we have  
ζ i, j




4 = 0 .  Where 
 
ai, j < 0  then, from (3.96),  
ζ i, j
3 = 0  and 
 
ζ i, j
4 = −ai, j  from (3.97).  Finally, if we 
consider the case where 
 
ai, j = 0 , we have  
ζ i, j
1 = ζ i, j
2 = 0 .   
Although we could utilise separate perturbation variables and there could be specific reasons 
related to problem scaling and numerical efficiency guiding that choice, the setting of ε  to a 
sufficiently low level is the relevant requirement.  We abuse notation and re-use ε  as a perturbation 
term noting that, in whichever context it is used, a lower value represents an improvement in solution 
accuracy.  The following expression produces a perturbed denominator that can be made arbitrarily 
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⎟ ε      ∀i, j ≠ i  (3.98) 
Where 
 









ε →ε as ε → 0        (3.99) 
Where 
 
ai, j > 0 , or  















⎟ ε →ζ i, j














⎟ ε → −ζ i, j
4 = ai, j as ε → 0     ∀i, j ≠ i  (3.101) 
Whereas a simple perturbation of the denominator merely shifts the problem of a zero denominator 
along the axis, this approach drives the estimates of 
 
ai, j  away from zero in the appropriate direction.  
As a consequence of the expression defined in (3.98) being close to zero, the root will be defined but 
the utilisation level corresponding to it will be outside the desired range.   Substituting (3.98) into 
(3.95) we have (3.102), an expression that, given an appropriate choice of perturbation, defines the 
utilisation levels corresponding to technological trade-offs as defined by the roots of the quadratic 
(3.83): 
   
ui, j ,(1,2)
e =





2 ζ i, j
3 +ζ i, j
4 + 1−
ζ i, j
3 +ζ i, j
4
ζ i, j














      ∀i, j ≠ i   (3.102) 
Whenever those quadratic roots they are real, they are evaluated.  Where they are not, the evaluation of 
(3.102) yields utilisation levels outside the range of utilisation levels we are interested in.  This resolves 
the numerical issue where 
 
ai, j = 0  as a result of quadratic cost structures coinciding. Unfortunately, 
when we consider the optimal trade-off between linear cost structures, this approach is not appropriate  
as it will not determine the correct optimal trade-off between linear technologies, which is given by 
 
ui, j
e = −c / b .  To see this, consider (3.89) as 
 





−bi, j ± bi, j
2 − 4ai, jci, j
2ai, j + ε
=










    ∀i, j ≠ i  (3.103) 
The non-zero solution of (3.103) is a value unrelated to the desired optimal trade-off between linear 
cost structures.  The reverse is also true, as 
 
ui, j
e = −c / b  will not generate the correct solution in the 
case of coincident quadratic cost-coefficients.   Given the expression of roots in (3.102) and 
 
ui, j
e = −c / b , a selection must be made, depending on whether the original cost structures being 
compared were both linear or not.  We must choose between these expressions and, where the 
quadratic interaction is appropriate, identify both potential roots. The following expressions define the 
optimal trade-off between technologies i and j,  ∀i, j ≠ i  that we desire by developing an appropriately 
weighted convex combination of each possibility, using weights assigned by functions of the variable 
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Where at least one technology has a quadratic cost structure, then either  a i
cfg = 1  or 
 
a j
cfg = 1 , or both.  
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    ∀i, j ≠ i  (3.106) 
As already described, this expression has been adjusted to accommodate the situation where 
 




2 − 4ai, jci, j < 0 .  Where each technology has a linear cost structure, then  
a i
cfg = a j
cfg = 0  and no 




e =ui, j ,2
e = −c
b
        (3.107) 
There is a duplication of optimal trade-offs in this case, but these definitions only seed values to the 
complementarity constraints that define critical system-wide utilisation levels so that, beyond the 
unnecessary computation involved, the duplication of optimal trade-offs is not a problem in this 
structure.    
In Chapter 2, we defined optimal trade-offs as follows: 
   
FCi − FC j − (MC j − MCi )ui, j
e +ηi, j ≥ 0  ⊥   
ui, j




e ≥ 0   ⊥  
 
ηi, j ≥ 0      ∀i, j ≠ i   (3.109) 
(3.108) and (3.109) implicitly defined optimal trade-offs.  To accommodate investment in configurable 
technologies, we replace (3.108) with an explicit definition of the optimal technological trade-offs, 
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+η i, j ,v ≥ 0
  
   ⊥  
 
ui, j ,v
e ≥ 0     ∀i, j ≠ i,v   (3.110) 
As discussed earlier, in a pairwise comparison between the configurable and limiting versions of a 
particular technology, the quadratic technology, which by definition represents the efficient frontier of 
configuration options, will match all individual expressions of that particular technology within the 
allowable range, and dominate them outside of that range.  But it is clear that outside the range defined 
for it, the imputed quadratic cost structure is not defined as, if unchecked, the quadratic portion of the 
cost structure may generate further invalid optimal trade-offs with other technologies, and eventually 
dominate all technologies.  To restrict the bounds of validity, the roots must also be limited to the 
appropriate utilisation range, which in general is 
 
0 ≤ ui, j ,(1,2)
e ≤1 .  We must restrict each notionally 
quadratic technology to a maximum utilisation range corresponding to the most capital-intensive 











   
     ∀i  (3.111) 
We can state a general bound whose value depends on the technology under consideration: 
























   
  ∀i  (3.112) 
Accordingly, we replace (3.109) with the following complementarity condition which sets the upper 
limit on utilisation for technology i to either unity, in the case where technology is linear technology, or 
the limit described in (3.111), in the case where technology i represents the range in which an 
























cfg( )− ui, je ≥ 0   ⊥   ηi, j ≥ 0      ∀i, j ≠ i   (3.113) 
3.5.4 Critical Utilisation Levels 
The approach described in Chapter 2 sequentially examines a set of optimal trade-offs to determine the 
critical trade-offs.  In that case, the interaction between two linear cost functions yields a maximum of 
one intersection.  While the interaction between two linear technologies generates a single trade-off, 
when a pairwise comparison involves consideration of a set of technological configurations with 
quadratic trade-offs, we must contemplate the possibility of two optimal trade-offs.  Dual optimal 
trade-offs reflect the reality that, at least in a pairwise sense and ignoring utilisation bounds, the more 
configurable technology will have discrete operational niches or efficient operating zones, while the 
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less configurable technology will be most efficient only in intermediate roles.  Naturally that 
relationship is potentially spoiled by utilisation bounds, and cannot be extended beyond pairwise 
comparison as one or other set of configurations may be dominated by other technologies. 
Several adjustments to the process of selecting critical utilisation levels must be made to 
accommodate the dual intersections and non-constant marginal costs that come with quadratic cost 
structures.  Most fundamentally, we must adjust the selection variable 
 
z j ,n  itself.  We require the 
selection variable to include a further dimension, indexed by v={1,2} to reference the two possible 
intersections between the current technology i, and a candidate for selection, technology j.  With 
 
z j ,n  
becoming 
 









∑ = 0    :ψ n
0     ∀n > 0  (3.114) 
The following set of amended original constraints collectively ensure that a single choice is made at 
each stage n, and require no further adjustment other than to extend the dimensionality to incorporate 
multiple optimal trade-offs per technology: 
   
z j ,n,v
j ,v
∑ −1≥ 0     :ψ n
1     ∀n  (3.115) 




∑ −1≥ 0     :ψ n
5     ∀n   (3.116) 
   
z j ,n,v ≥ 0
     
 ∀j,n,v  (3.117) 
We have noted that when we allow quadratic technologies, each may intersect twice with another 
technology.  However, it does not follow that these technologies may have a limit of two intersections 
with the screening curve lower envelope.  In general, they may have many, which suggests that highly 
configurable technologies might be capable of filling several niche generation roles.   Nevertheless, the 
determination of critical utilisation levels is based on selecting from intersections with a particular 
technology, enabling us to limit our exploration of critical utilisation levels to just two intersections per 
pairwise technological combination. 
3.5.5 Deriving the PDC 
The optimal PDC can be constructed by interpolating the marginal cost between the beginning and end 
of each critical utilisation.  We have indexed each segment of the PDC by n=1,..N, where n=1 
corresponds to shortage events and prices, and n=N corresponds to base load operations.  Using the 
derivative of the optimised total cost function (3.80), the marginal cost as defined at the start of PDC 


































    ∀n > 0  (3.118) 
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(3.118) defines the marginal cost of the marginal technology at  un
e .  At stage n-1 this (perhaps 
configurable) technology enters the algorithm to define the lower envelope of the screening curve at 




e{ } .  The marginal cost 
corresponding to the initial operation is therefore evaluated at  un
e , which corresponds to the load level 




ensures that numerical difficulties are avoided when considering limiting or non-configurable 
technologies.   
We can analogously define marginal costs at the other end of the marginal operating range in 


































    ∀n > 0  (3.119) 
The same determination is made in (3.119), although this time it is evaluated at  un−1
e , which 
corresponds to the point where technology j reaches full capacity and becomes inframarginal.  
When the technology has a linear cost structure then we have  MCn
start = MCn
end .  For pseudo-
technologies with linearly varying marginal costs, the assumption of linear adjustment in utilisation 








e( ) . 
 
Figure 26: PDC with Configurable Technologies  
As shown in Figure 26, the PDC may have several possible features.  Where technologies are linear we 
have the standard case of constant segments in the PDC, corresponding to a series of technologies 
offering at a constant marginal cost.  Where a non-linear technology is configurable its cost structure is 
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quadratic, which corresponds to linear marginal costs that, under perfect competition, translate to linear 
prices across that utilisation range.  In Figure 26, the configurable technologies shown are OCGT and 
CCGT.  Note that with discrete capital cost ranges there still remains discrete changes in pricing 
between technologies.  Where capital cost ranges overlap one optimised technology will merge into 
another, and if they are both marginal, the adjustment in pricing will be continuous, albeit at different 
rates when viewed from the perspective of utilisation.  The PDC is therefore potentially a succession of 
non-linear technologies being price setting, each of which are eventually superseded by either a linear  
technology or another non-linear technology and vice versa, resulting in linear and piecewise constant 
segments.   
The derivation of the PDC suggests a number of alterations to the market and investment 
equilibrium conditions.  By defining utilisation levels to correspond to optimal trade-offs we generate 
operating ranges in which configurable technologies are marginal in the same fashion as with 
conventional technologies.  However, by virtue of the fact capacity of a configurable technology is not 
homogeneous, these technologies are not readily interpreted as conventional technologies.  To clarify 
the performance of individual tranches of configuration, we must consider the capacity of each 
configuration range separately.  Sometimes these tranches may be contiguous but other times they will 
not, as it is possible for a configurable technology i to be employed in a number of distinct roles.  
Accordingly, for each operating range, r, there is a distinct technology i(r), with a total capacity  
 
CAPi(r ) .   At this point we need to clarify that we still maintain the broader technological 
characteristics for each configurable technology so that the optimal trade-offs involving these 
technologies are able to be determined, but we are using “sub-technologies”, indexed by i(r), to 
correspond to the tranches that are actually installed.  Accordingly, in what follows, several constraints 
will not apply to the broader configurable technology, and instead relate to the sub-technologies 
defined by actual installation.  
The efficiency of the market clearing process is governed by the basic dual relationship 
between market prices and the marginal cost of generation.  The standard formulation of this condition 





+ ≥ 0   ⊥   GENi ≥ 0     ∀i ∉C,r  (3.120) 
These technologies are accounted for explicitly. As shown below the form of marginal cost is 






























⎟ +ϕ i(r ),r
+ ≥ 0   ⊥   
GENi(r ) ≥ 0   ∀i(r),r  (3.121) 
Because the cost structure of each configurable technology is optimised, then by definition the merit 
order as it relates to specific configurations of a particular technology is respected across any utilisation 
range in which such a technology is marginal.   
The standard generation constraint for conventional technologies remains the same and we 
add an equivalent constraint that applies to all configurable technologies i(r): 
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CAPi −GENi,r ≥ 0   ⊥   
ϕ i,r
+ ≥ 0     ∀i > 0,i ∉C,r  (3.122) 
   
CAPi(r ) −GENi(r ),r ≥ 0   ⊥   
ϕ i(r ),r
+ ≥ 0    ∀i(r),r  (3.123) 
The market clearing condition is given by: 
   
GENi,r
i∉C
∑ + GENi(r )
i(r )
∑ − Lr = 0   ⊥   λr ,t free     ∀r,t  (3.124) 
Finally, we turn to the investment condition. We note that the profitability of each configuration of the 
technology i(r) is identical by construction, as the optimisation of the total cost function explicitly 
balances the rate of change in fixed costs and variable costs.  Returning to the PDC definition, it is 
clear that the profitability of each technology involves a combination of linear and constant pricing 
segments, and therefore the profitability defined in (2.21) does not describe the profitability of each 
technology across all utilisation ranges.   Whether a technology is configurable or not, we must define 
the profitability of each technology in the operating range defined by 
 
ur ,ur+1{ } .   
The profitability at  ur+1  is given by the variable  
ϕ i,r+1
+ , or 
 
ϕ i(r ),r+1
+ .  As we have optimised the 
utilisation levels corresponding to operating ranges, each operating range has a single marginal 
technology.  Where that technology exhibits constant marginal costs, the profitability of the technology 
is given by multiplying 
 
ϕ i,r+1
+  by the width of the utilisation range,  ur+1 − ur .  Where the marginal 
technology is actually a configurable technology and represents a continuously adjusting marginal cost 
this definition is not appropriate.  It is also clear from Figure 26 that we cannot simply use the next 
level of profitability, 
 
ϕ i,r
+ , to determined average profitability over the operating range, as this in 
general this will not reflect the price adjustment over a configuration range.  We might actually define 
the PDC directly using the variables  MCn
start  and  MCn
end  from (3.118) and (3.119) but instead we elect 
to define it using perturbed market clearances. 
Re-using the perturbation term ε  we define utilisation levels,  ur
ε = ur + ε , and construct 
alternative market clearances using identical constraint structures as shown from (3.120) to (3.124).  
The load corresponding to the utilisation level  ur
ε  is given by: 
   
Lr
ε = Lr −
Lr − Lr+1
ur+1 − ur
ε        ∀r   (3.125) 




ε{ }  we capture market prices and profitability, 
respectively  λr
ε  and 
 
ϕ i,r
ε .+ , 
 
ϕ i(r )
ε ,+ .  We can then define the average profitability within a utilisation range 
using the perturbed market clearances.  Without loss of generality, and adjusting for the perturbed 
operating range length, the average profitability of a conventional technology within an operating range 
is defined as: 
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    ∀i   (3.126) 
Accordingly, the investment constraint for a conventional technology is: 
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u r +1 − u r( )
r<R
∑ ≥ 0 ⊥   CAPi ≥ 0   ∀i ∉C  (3.127) 
For a configurable technology, it is not the case that fixed costs are constant.  Optimised fixed costs 
depend on the utilisation level of the technology concerned.  We have: 
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u r +1 − u r( )
r<R
∑ ≥ 0 ⊥   CAPi(r ) ≥ 0  ∀i(r)  (3.128) 
Where: 



















2     ∀i   (3.129) 
Although the investment constraint only contemplates a single incarnation of each configurable 
technology within a tranche, it is the case that if this technology returns a profit of precisely zero, then 
as these are optimised so will all of the other configurations available in that operating range.   As we 
have stated, traditional technologies make no profit while they are marginal generator.  When viewed 
as a single technology, it appears that configurable technologies are profitable while marginal, however 
the apparent contradiction is based entirely on an incorrect interpretation of the cost curve and the 
technology.  For each atomistic incarnation of a particular technology, the technology will make zero 
profit while it is the marginal generator.  
3.6 Summary 
In this chapter, we have endeavoured to provide a sample of some extensions to the framework.  Given 
the number of possible avenues that could be explored a comprehensive treatment of all is not possible.  
Generalising technological cost structures enables consideration of more realistic plant 
economics, and makes clear the nature of investment in a technology is akin to purchasing a portfolio 
of plants, where the portfolio weightings are defined by the engineered capability of the technology.  
Other possibilities for linked investments are no doubt possible, and would exhibit similar forms of 
trade-off using imputed values of the individual components of the decision. 
Sections 3.3.2 and 3.3.3 were devoted to capacity flexibility; first in general and then 
specifically addressing mothballing and retirement of existing capacity.  We showed the nature of 
capacity of restrictions was to change the optimal trade-off away from that which would naturally 
occur, with the difference in capacity value summarising the cost of the restriction, or the value of the 
permit or right that would release the investor from the restriction. We clarified the status of 
mothballing and reinstatement as operational choices, which offer the capacity investor the possibility, 
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of improving their returns. In individual periods, the reinstatement of mothballed capacity can 
significantly affect returns and utilisation of other technologies.  This is a particularly relevant issue in 
markets where older technologies traditionally used in peaking roles are being disrupted by mainly 
renewable technologies, with less reliability. By diminishing the opportunity to earn profits at these key 
times, the economic justification for retaining that capacity, and the system reliability may also be 
diminished.  In terms of the framework we present, the additional operating strategy modifies the 
investment constraint.  While sub-period profitability is affected, the definitions are not, and no change 
is needed to the framework in respect of these. 
Energy limits were explored in both the deterministic and stochastic cases.  The basic 
principle of valuing energy according to its opportunity cost is well known.  In both cases, optimal 
trade-offs are modified by adjustments in imputed fuel costs.  This requires the substitution of fuel 
costs with a dual variable representing the opportunity cost of fuel, to ensure that optimal trade-offs are 
struck using an economic valuation of marginal cost.   That opportunity cost is restricted in several 
ways in our framework.  Firstly, we considered endogenous energy limits, as we envisage an operator 
acquiring take or pay contracts.  The value of these contracts is assumed exogenous and that implies a 
lower bound on the opportunity cost of fuel.  As we graduate from single fuel arrivals, to sub-period 
fuel arrivals we reiterate the work of others in describing the influence of storage constraints.   These 
prevent the unfettered allocation of fuel across sub-periods and result in diverging opportunity costs 
between periods separated by a binding storage constraint. 
Finally, we presented a novel, if not easily formulated, approach to extending the screening 
curve analysis to address configurable technologies. Our approach was not simply a matter of 
optimising the configuration of a single technology choice.  Instead, we contemplated the optimal 
configuration range for a particular technology.  The effect is to introduce non-linearity into the 
screening curve diagram but also to fundamentally change what is meant by a technology and capacity 
in that context.   
We define technologies by their limiting fixed and variable costs pairs, and the rate of relative 
adjustment between them.  There must be decreasing returns to scale for investment in efficiency if 
there is to be a range of interior trade-offs within the variants of the technology.  Otherwise the solution 
would only involve one or other limiting variant of the technology.  The assumption of decreasing 
returns to scale for higher specification configurations allows us to define  a piecewise non-linear cost 
structure that represents the optimised cost structure for that technology. 
Having optimised the intra-technology cost structure, we introduce this to the screening curve 
analysis as a notional quadratic technology, which by virtue of its non-linearity and the potential non-
linearity of other technologies leads us to consider multiple optimal trade-offs. The economic 
implications of this are clear.  As opposed to linear cost structures, non-linear cost structures permit the 
existence of more than one distinct operating range or niche for a single technology.   
In this particular example, we hypothesise quadratic adjustment of fixed costs in response to 
linear improvements in efficiency, so that the PDC contains piecewise constant and linear segments.  
The definition of profitability for configurable technologies differs from that of conventional 
technologies.  While more complicated, once it is understood that as all configurations in the same 
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operating range share represent equal total cost on account of the prior optimisation of cost structures, 
we can define the investment constraint in terms of a single version of the technology, which in this 
case was the least efficient in terms of variable cost.  
This proved to be a highly technical and original exercise that we do not expect to be 
implemented but nevertheless yields some insight into the extensibility of complementarity 
formulations.  The complementarity formulation involved significant changes to the definition of 
optimal trade-offs, as there are now two pairwise trade-offs possible between each technology.  This 
involved the development of complementarity conditions to remove imaginary roots, that correspond to 
non-intersection of technologies from consideration.  Independently of our framework, the 
generalisation of cost structures, and the introduction of capacity and energy limits is standard fare and 
can be included in a conventional optimisation formulation.  However, our contribution was to 
integrate them with our framework, and to our knowledge that approach is new.  In the case of the 
configurable technologies, we are unaware of a similar approach in the context of screening curve 
analysis, even without considering the wider framework we develop.  Certainly, the full integration of 
configurable technologies in our framework is novel.  We are also unaware of the application of 
complementarity conditions to filter complex solutions to quadratic equations. 
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4 ENDOGENOUS LOAD & RELIABILITY 
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter we continue to illustrate the extensibility of the framework.  We do so in this case by 
revisiting variability that can be represented proportionally within the LDC.  We introduce endogeneity 
to the LDC directly, in the form of demand response, and indirectly, in the form of reliability and 
intermittent generation.   
In Section 4.2, we begin by considering modelling options for demand response in our 
framework with a view to developing a more consistent view of demand response that is typical in the 
literature.   Demand response is divided into short term demand response of the kind that is physically 
feasible on the timescale of an electricity market clearance, and long term demand response.  The latter 
addresses the complementary or substitutive nature of electricity consumption with other technologies 
according to price, as well as load shifting, and the consumers ability to modify load profiles to take 
advantage of persistently lower prices during periods of lower overall load.   
Building on the same fundamental principles stated when addressing load, we develop an 
endogenous representation of reliability in Section 4.3.  This can be incorporated into the wider 
framework and enables the parameterisation of the reliability of each technology and results in an 
equilibrium that is internally consistent with satisfying load requirements, reflecting both the imperfect 
reliability of additional capacity scheduled to buffer reliability issues, as well as the relevance of 
reliability issues of the marginal technology for the PDC.  Our approach could be extended, and we 
discuss where it sits amongst the spectrum of possible approaches to modelling reliability. 
Finally, we return to the foundation of the LDC, which is a chronological load pattern (CLP) 
as observed each day in electricity markets around the world.  The broader focus is the incorporation of 
the impact of intermittent technologies, such as wind and solar generation, on the LDC in the model.  
To ensure the correct correlations are captured we use a daily chronological pattern and develop a set 
of complementarity conditions to transform between the LDC and the CLP.  This enables realistic 
interpolation of pricing, which if done at an LDC level would not have been possible.  We retain an 
adjustment function to capture the additional variability in the LDC relative to the fitted CLP. 
  
4.2 Demand Response 
4.2.1 Introduction 
The demand for electricity is multi-faceted. In the short-run, electricity spot markets face several 
demand-side challenges that make electricity markets susceptible to inefficient economic outcomes: 
• Electricity prices are highly volatile relative to many other commodities or energy sources. 
• Electricity spot prices are frequently updated and difficult to monitor.   
• Electricity consumption is often difficult to adjust in response to changes in electricity spot 
prices.  
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• Electricity contracts often mute the incentive to adjust consumption according to electricity 
prices, even when that is possible.    
Spot price volatility is the result of several factors and is exacerbated by significant demand-side 
correlations so that rather than many consumers, using electricity in an independent fashion, there are 
daily, seasonal and possibly annual patterns which are common to many participants.  The fact that 
spot prices are produced as frequently as every five minutes requires that consumers must invest 
significant effort or expense if these prices are to be monitored.  Even when prices can be monitored, 
electricity use is often part of a larger economic process, which cannot be easily halted or even 
adjusted.  Nevertheless, there will be occasions when specific demand response opportunities, 
parameterised by an electricity price and facility cost, are available and we discuss these in Section 
4.2.2. 
As a direct consequence of the high price volatility, a lack of ability to monitor prices and a 
lack of ability to adjust consumption, there is also a significant degree of retail contracting. Among a 
wide spectrum of contracts available, some contractual forms preserve the possibility of price response 
by including price-based triggers for reducing load, while other contracts, such as those that may fall 
under the oversight of governmental or regulatory authorities that are favourable to consumers and may 
not even specify the maximum consumption available at the contract price.  These contracts may 
completely negate any price based incentive for demand response.  Depending on the overall mix of 
contractual forms and the level of uptake of each type of contract, consumers, in aggregate, may have 
negligible incentives to adjust their own demand in response to spot market prices.   
The factors identified above lead to the standard and reasonable assumption that the spot 
market demand for electricity is inelastic in the short term.  Our approach is slightly more nuanced, in 
that we assume the demand for electricity is inelastic in the short term, except for the various demand 
response technologies or initiatives specifically installed or designed for the purpose.  Although the 
capability to respond to electricity prices is limited in the short term, over longer timeframes pricing 
patterns will emerge and will influence consumers planning electricity consumption, and in the plans 
that retailers offer.   Our approach maintains the clear decision structure already established in our 
framework, namely that the investment and operational actions are distinct in time, and not 
simultaneous.  Accordingly, in our framework, investors must invest in demand response technologies, 
and/or adjust consumption patterns in advance.  As far as the latter is concerned we investigate two 
forms of equilibrium response to spot market prices; overall shifts in demand, perhaps to alternative 
fuels, and demand shifting to other periods throughout the season.  Only then, having determined 
demand and the short term means of adjusting it, can the spot market be cleared. 
4.2.2 Short Term Demand Response 
With current technologies, the ability of demand-side participants to respond to pricing in the spot 
market typically requires prior planning and technological installations that are able to adapt in real 
time.   Of paramount importance to demand response of any kind is the availability of actionable price 
information.  The extent of the response that is desired depends on the circumstances of the consumer. 
However, irrespective of the desired response, the actual response of the consumer is largely influenced 
by the flexibility of the fixed stock of energy consumption devices being used and the method by which 
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actionable price information is discovered and translated into changes in energy consumption.  
Obtaining, actioning and ensuring enough flexibility exists to adapt represents an investment on the 
part of the consumer for which the returns must justify the outlay. 
The load response options we envisage may literally be a technology or device, or it could be 
something as nebulous as a government initiated advertising campaign to reduce usage during a period 
of crisis.  It is clearer in the former context that an actual demand response technology requires 
investment, but even the example of a government conservation campaign can be represented as a 
demand response option with a fixed and marginal cost.  We can view such installations or programs as 
being analogous to a technology, with a cost of installation and a strike price, corresponding to the 
marginal cost component of a thermal technology, at which the demand response occurs, and is “in the 
money”.  
Once the investment decision has been made, the capacity of each demand response 
technology represents the fixed amount of demand that can be withdrawn when electricity prices reach 
a certain level, as defined by the marginal cost we associate with that technology.  Once built, each 
demand response technology is treated as an individual technology with a fixed capacity in each sub-
period.  Accordingly, demand response technologies are subject to the same market clearance process 
as other generation technologies.   
   
−λr ,t + MCi,t +ϕ i,r ,t
+
i>0
≥ 0   ⊥  
 
GENi,r ,t ≥ 0    
∀i ∈D,r,t  (4.1) 
While the introduction of demand response options will alter the equilibrium plant mix, the value of the 
demand response technology in each sub-period is still defined by 
 
χ i,t  so that the optimal trade-offs 
between demand response technologies and generation technologies are also defined as before: 
   
χ i,t − χ j ,t − (MCj,t − MCi,t )ui, j ,t
e +ηi, j ,t ≥ 0  ⊥   
ui, j ,t
e ≥ 0     ∀i ∈D, j ≠ i,t   (4.2) 
Where, in each sub-period, we have the following valuation of the demand response technology: 
   
χ i,t − ϕ i,r+1,t
+ ur+1,t − ur ,t( )
r<R
∑ = 0  ⊥   CAPi,t free    ∀i ∈D,t  (4.3) 
As with other technologies, there may be limits to the opportunities available.  These might arise from 
production schedules, technical requirements, or safety issues, that limit the maximum quantum of the 
response associated with a particular opportunity.   





− ≥ 0     ∀i ∈D > 0  (4.4) 
   
CAPi




+ ≥ 0     ∀i ∈D > 0  (4.5) 
The overall opportunity limit,  CAPi
+ , relates to the level of available demand response for each type of 
demand response and is implicit in the nature and level of the load.  This limit is determined by a broad 
range of factors, and so is “fixed” from an electricity sector planning perspective.  Although somewhat 
redundant, for consistency we maintain the theoretical possibility of a minimum bound, so that, subject 
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to the bounds on demand response opportunities sites, the equilibrium capacity condition for each 
demand response technology is as for any other technology: 
   
FCi − w t
t
∑ χ i,t + χ i+ − χ i− ≥ 0
 
⊥   CAPi ≥ 0    ∀i ∈D,t  (4.6) 
It may also be the case that the availability of demand response is not simply a capacity issue.  Certain 
processes may be able to be abandoned for a length of time, but not indefinitely.  In these cases, the use 
of the demand response opportunity must be husbanded to those periods when the savings from 
reducing consumption are greatest.  In such a case, additional opportunities will exist at the margin, but 
will not be exercised because of an over-riding constraint that provide a floor for the aggregate 
consumption of the consumer.  Section 3.4 detailed the formulation of technologies with both energy 
and capacity limits, and those formulations apply analogously here. 
The underlying LDC remains unaltered as we treat notional (or actual) demand response 
technologies as generation technologies. Where economically viable, the inclusion of these 
technologies alters the set of critical utilisation levels and defines an intermediate price at which 
increases in load are absorbed by demand response technologies, up to the installed capability to do so.  
At the same time, the installed capacity of adjacent physical generation technologies reduces until 
equilibrium between the profitability and costs of those other technologies is restored.   
Notwithstanding the above, we can also net the load response off the underlying LDC to determine the 
observed and endogenous net LDC, and the level of generation capacity required from standard 
generation technologies.   
   
Lr ,t
net = Lr ,t − GENi,r ,t
i∈D
∑       ∀r,t   (4.7) 
The PDC is defined as before, although it may include prices relating to the strike price of demand 
response opportunities.  
Demand side bidding schemes generalise the demand response discussed above and offer the 
opportunity for demand side participants to shut down various processes in a graduated fashion in 
response to a range of different electricity prices.  Just as a single consumer might have identified 
several critical electricity price points, each corresponding to a load response opportunity in the context 
of their individual economic circumstances, the market as a whole may present a continuum of such 
points.  One approach to accommodating this extension is by adapting the configurable technology 
theory presented in Section 3.5.  When viewed as a simple technology, the quadratic technology 
corresponds to a technology with a linearly decreasing marginal cost, as it becomes more efficient.  
4.2.3 Long Term Demand Response 
In the long run consumers can deduce pricing patterns and have far greater ability to adjust their 
consumption patterns.  To the extent they can do so, that phenomenon represents a long term response, 
requiring both analysis and planning, which we discuss in this section.  Changes in the general level of 
electricity prices can modify consumption by incentivising consumers to switch to, or away from, 
alternative fuels, or invest more or less in energy saving appliances.  Although we do not deal with a 
general equilibrium model, electricity price levels naturally interact with other markets, causing, for 
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example, substitution between energy sources or adjustments in final good costings and output, which 
lead back to electricity demand.  From a theoretical point of view, defining those relationships does not 
pose a problem, although in practice it requires development and calibration of a model that estimates 
the set of parameters most likely to generate the observed load pattern.   For our purposes, it suffices to 
assume that a significant portion of those effects can be neatly summarised by own-price effects.  
Therefore we focus solely on consumption patterns and own-price effects on the demand for electricity 
and we decompose demand response into that which is due to movement in the overall level of 
electricity prices and that which is due to inter-temporal price effects, based on the relative price of 
electricity across different periods.    
The response of load to the general level of prices can be characterised as a decision to 
reduce/increase consumption based on the bundle of prices corresponding to the consumers LWAP 
(Load Weighted Average Price).  LWAP is particular to each user, or at least each distinct consumption 
pattern.  We proceed assuming a single load profile although our approach could be generalised to 
include many load profiles.  We also note that, primarily because of transaction costs, the contract 
market in most electricity markets provides for the consideration of a limited number of load profiles, 
and consumers must choose a less than perfect representation of their individual profile when 
contracting.  Importantly, whether the long term demand response mechanism is through the contract 
market and based on load profiles built into contracts, or whether it is based simply on consumers 
observing the general level of prices, the resulting change in the load pattern will be identical, absent 
other differences which exist between spot and contract markets. 
The second type of response we consider is the re-scheduling of consumption to less 
expensive periods or seasons.  This is a response to relative prices by consumers who are exposed to 
multiple prices according to the period of use.  These incentives are often expressed in a variety of 
contractual forms, ranging from household level incentives such as cheaper overnight rates, through to 
more complex contracts for industrial and manufacturing users, with TOU (Time of Use) pricing 
structures designed to incentivise the orientation of production towards less expensive periods of 
electricity generation.  Unfortunately, electricity demand is often not inter-temporally transferrable as, 
for example, households are often unable to shift heating and/or cooling needs to other times of the 
day.  Similarly, industrial users have significant scheduling, operational and institutional issues that 
restrict them from adjusting consumption even over longer timeframes. Nevertheless, the fact that such 
contractual options do exist, and have persisted, suggests that consumers do have some, albeit limited, 
ability to shift their load. 
Over longer timeframes, the potential for both types of demand response are greatly increased, 
and this demand response is by nature an adjustment of underlying load, which we have assumed to be 
exogenous until now and which we define without loss of generality to be the load level that would 
occur if the price of electricity were zero.  The possibility of long term demand response through 
changes in consumption patterns affects the viability and equilibrium role of other technologies, 
including demand response technologies as discussed in Section 4.2.2, for which longer term load 
adjustment is a direct substitute. 
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For illustrative purposes, we introduce a linear demand function where overall adjustment of 
the base level of demand 
 
L λr ,λ
avg( )  is in response to average prices,  λ avg , while demand shifting 
occurs linearly according to relative prices,  λr − λ
avg .  The coefficients  a
shift > 0  and  a
avg > 0  
respectively determine the strength of these effects.  The functional form need not be linear and other 
forms, such as a constant elasticity form, may have desirable properties that a researcher may wish to 
pursue.  The demand shifting capability in this case is defined within a season or sub-period, so that 
load will transfer from high price periods within a season to lower price periods within that season.  
That might reflect shifts from high price periods in a day, to lower price periods in a day, but might 
also reflect a shift from one week to another, for example.  Where load shifting is contemplated, the 
adjustment can equally be applied to a chronological load pattern as shown in Section 4.4.2, enabling 
the implications of demand shifting on daily operations to be better reflected. 
The demand function has the following form: 
  
 
Lr ,t = L λr ,t ,λ
avg( )
= Lr ,t
0 − ashift λr ,t − λ
avg( )− aavgλ avg      ∀r  (4.8) 
Analogously, we could be analogously discussing the price response in terms of contract prices in a 
risk neutral setting.  Therefore, whether consumers are reacting to contract prices or directly to general 










∑       (4.9) 
Substituting the definition of average prices and generalising the demand response parameters to a sub-
period level, perhaps to reflect varying degrees of demand elasticity, we have: 
  
 
Lr ,t = Lr ,t
0 − a t
shift λr ,t −






















    
 ∀r,t  (4.10) 
Each price change induces two effects; a global effect based on the impact of average or general price 
levels, and a substitution effect based on the shifting of load away from high price periods to low price 
periods.  For example, an increase in the equilibrium spot market price 
 
λ r ,t  results in a demand shift 
from the period corresponding to r away to other relatively cheaper periods.  There is also an overall 
reduction in load on account of the general increase in prices.  In other periods, the increase in 
 
λr ,t  has 
an ambiguous effect.  Load shifts to other periods may or may not dominate the overall load reducing 
effect of higher prices.  Working backwards from the observed LDC, if we unwind both the overall and 
substitution effect, the underlying LDC must not only reflect higher load, but also peakier load.  
Manipulating (4.10), we have: 
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Lr ,t = Lr ,t
0 − at
shiftλr ,t − at
cont − at
shift( )






   
 ∀r,t  (4.11) 
Given a specification of the relationship between market prices and load, the most common approach 
to modelling demand response is to substitute the definition into the market clearing constraint.  In our 





∑ − Lr ,t0 − atshiftλr ,t − atcont − atshift( )














= 0  ⊥  
 
λr ,t free    ∀r,t  (4.12) 
The implication of this transformed complementarity condition is that as the market price increases the 
level of load required to be serviced decreases.  It may or may not be the case that this load response is 
marginal and therefore price setting, but it is certainly a possibility.  It is possible that the modeller 
intends to model a near instantaneous price response in electricity markets, and in the case where that 
response can occur in the timeframe of the market clearance, without requiring investment.  In this 
case, then the modeller is justified in introducing the definition of load into the market clearing 
constraint shown in (4.12).  Unfortunately, for load response of the same genesis as we have discussed 
here, this approach is inconsistent: long-term demand responses cannot directly influence market 
clearing prices.  The inconsistency mirrors the inconsistency identified in Chapter 1.  
Ideally, we would like to incorporate this load response by treating it as a technology.  This 
preserves the analogy of the previous section.  The fundamental difference though, is this is an 
unresponsive technology in the short term, and therefore we must define the load response in such a 
fashion that the capacity of the response is registered against the underlying load without being price 
sensitive in the short term.  Accordingly, we define a new notional technology with capacity equal to 
the physical quantity of load response, but with a marginal cost of zero, so that in the absence of 
negative prices, it is always included and never marginal.  The capacity of the technology is defined as 
follows: 
   
CAPLR,r ,t − at
shiftλr ,t − at
cont − at
shift( )





∑ = 0  
   
 ∀r,t  (4.13) 
Where 
 
MCLR,r,t = 0 .  The model now includes I conventional technologies along with a notional 
shortage technology, for which i=0, and a notional load response technology, which we denote as LR, 
but index with i=I+1.  The market equilibrium conditions remain unchanged barring the extension to 
the technology index.  The market clearing constraint reflects the reduction in load as a result of price 
by the inclusion of the notional load response technology in all market clearances on account of its 
marginal cost. 
Unlike other technologies the capacity of load response is not fixed as it is determined 
endogenously.  Accordingly, it is unnecessary to constrain the capacity of load response to some 
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consistent value as is the case with conventional technologies.  It is also not subject to investment cost, 
within the context of the problem. 
The inclusion of load response will naturally reduce investment in other generation 
technologies. Of particular interest is that long term load response is a substitute for short term load 
response.  While the two approaches to load response deliver consumers similar benefits, they are not 
identical.  Neither are they from the perspective of the market.  Long term load response is directed at 
those technologies involved in supply of all of the consumer’s load profile, whereas the short term 
technological response is directed primarily at high price periods and so represents a relatively direct 
alternative to peaking technologies.   
4.3 Plant Reliability 
4.3.1 Calculating Reliability  
We begin by clarifying the nature of reliability that we investigate.  At one end of the spectrum, we are 
not considering the response of the system to breakdowns.  Those outages will be compensated for in 
an economically efficient fashion with contingency services.  When a plant breaks down, the extent to 
which a breakdown requires response from the market is somewhat dependent on the nature of the 
offer process or whether there is a day-ahead market operating in which the plant has been offered for 
generation.  Beyond the immediate periods following a breakdown contingency responses no longer 
apply and additional capacity from some other source is required to satisfy load.  At the other end of 
the spectrum, we are not considering plant outages that persist for multiple periods, such as might 
occur for reasons of safety after a nuclear, or other, accident.  Reliability issues of this sort are better 
assessed in an explicit stochastic framework.  Instead of these polar issues, we consider reliability 
issues such as planned shut downs for maintenance where it is known in advance that the capacity will 
not be available.  
A comprehensive approach to reliability, or any other insertion of variability into the load 
duration curve, properly requires a full convolution of the distribution of reliability with the distribution 
of load.   Such a convolution would, in theory, contemplate both the limiting cases; when all capacity 
was available, along with the case when no capacity was available.  An intermediate approach might 
assign reliability factors at the plant level and, based on typical plant sizes, create a binomial 
approximation of the reliability distribution which through convolution could be incorporated in the 
LDC.   
For each technology i, we define its reliability as , so that  is the proportion of time 
the capacity of technology i is unavailable for generation.  Our approach stops short of convolution, but 
does address the endogeneity of the reliability by calculating the expected reliability of the plant mix at 
each utilisation level based on the composition of the generation mix at each utilisation level.  In 
support of our approach, we note that the LDC will typically dominate any convolution with the 
reliability distribution.  In any case, we adopt a point estimate of the capacity of technology i available 
for generation.  That estimate is equal to the expected available capacity of technology i, with installed 
 ρi  1− ρi
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capacity  CAPi , and is given by , so that expected quantity of capacity of technology I 
unavailable for generation is given by 
 
1− ρi( )CAPi . 
We do not concern ourselves with impaired capacity, in which the plant is operating but its 
efficiency is reduced.  Instead, the quoted availability of the plant,  ρi , is an assessment of reliability 
that represents the equivalent availability of the full plant, appropriately factoring both full breakdowns 
and partial impairment situations.  We also do not consider the optimisation of scheduled outages on 
the basis of pricing.  Those wishing to formalise this aspect of operations could explore an explicit 
model of outages or the adjustment of the reliability of each technology to reflect the sub-periods in 
which scheduled outages are most likely. 
In the spirit of Baldick (2009), we propose augmenting the LDC by the expected outages 
given the generation mix for the corresponding load level, and allowing the standard market clearance 
procedures to define the response to outages.  In adopting this approach, we treat all existing capacity 
as reliable for the purpose of the market clearing process and augment load, rather than reduce the 
available capacity of each technology to account for outages.  To do so, we need to identify the average 
level of material, or relevant, outages, as distinct from the expected level of outages for a given level of 
capacity.  Where a technology is supramarginal, its availability or otherwise is not relevant.  With 
respect to that technology, relevant outages are zero.  This contrasts with the case where of infra-
marginal technologies, where all outages are relevant, and alternative generation from higher marginal 
cost technologies is required to satisfy load.   
The relevance of outages of the marginal technology is dependent on the balance between the 
level of generation required of that technology and the level of outages experienced by that technology.  
To define material outages as a function of generation, we could scale expected outages by 
 GENi / CAPi  so that they are defined as  
1− ρi( )GENi , in terms of generation, but while this scaling 
correctly assesses the relevance of outages in the polar cases of infra-marginal and supra-marginal 
technologies, it is not the case that the relevant outage level for the marginal technology is a proportion 
of generation.  The scaling approach implies that even when a small fraction of available capacity is 
required for generation the unavailability of certain plants of technology i proportionally impacts the 
aggregate generation capabilities of technology i.  But when faced with a schedule of unavailable 
plants, operators will not schedule those plants.  Therefore, those outages are not relevant until that 
capacity is actually required.  When 
 
0 < GENi,r ,t ≤ ρiCAPi , then technology i is marginal and there is 
sufficient unused capacity available to compensate for outages of technology i, so that those outages 
are able to be accommodated and are not relevant.  Conversely, when 
 
GENi,r ,t > ρ iCAPi  
 outages 
prevent technology i from servicing any additional load.   We remind the reader that while this scenario 
appears to be infeasible it is not, as we have elected to augment load rather than penalise capacity in 
our formulation.  
We define expected outages, 
 
OUTi,r ,t , of technology i as: 
   
OUTi,r ,t + ρiCAPi −GENi,r ,t ≥ 0  ⊥   
OUTi,r ,t ≥ 0   ∀i,r,t   (4.14) 
 ρiCAPi
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When technology is supramarginal or marginal with comparatively low generation, then 
 
GENi,r ,t < ρ iCAPi , so that the complementarity condition (4.14) requires that  
OUTi,r ,t = 0 .  Conversely, 
when technology i is inframarginal or marginal with comparatively high generation, then  
 
GENi,r ,t > ρ iCAPi , the complementarity condition (4.14) records outages correctly as  
 
OUTi,r ,t =GENi,r ,t − ρ iCAPi > 0 .  
At a given load level we define total relevant outages, 
 
OUTr ,t  by summing the outages of 
individual generation technologies as defined above: 
   
OUTr ,t = OUTi,r ,t
i
∑      ∀r,t   (4.15) 
4.3.2 Market Clearance 
To define an equivalent perfectly reliable market clearance we augment load to account for outages.  





∑ − Lr ,t +OUTr ,t( ) = 0   ⊥   λr ,t free    ∀r,t  (4.16) 
This approach recognises that the generation required to service the augmented load also must be 
included in the calculation of outages.  In doing so, we recognise the possibility that capacity being 
used to cover the breakdowns of other plants is itself less than perfectly reliable.  No restriction is 
placed on additional capacity of a technology compensating for outages of the same technology.    
The other market clearing conditions require no further adjustment.  Neither do the optimal 
trade-off definitions, although the actual optimal trade-offs will adjust according to the implications of 
reliability on the capacity of each technology.  
   
 
χ i,t − χ j ,t − (MCj,t − MCi,t )ui, j ,t
e +ηi, j ,t ≥ 0  ⊥   
ui, j ,t
e ≥ 0    ∀i, j ≠ i,t   (4.17) 
4.3.3 Investment 
The expected direct costs associated with any breakdown or maintenance are assumed to be included in 
the fixed operating costs for each technology, perhaps representing a contract price for maintenance or 
the cost of a life time guarantee, and these are amortised over the operational lifetime of the plant, 
leaving the investment implications of plant breakdowns limited to three areas. 
The first implication of reliability is in the spot market itself.  Each technology benefits from 
the unreliability of others.   These benefits accrue naturally in our framework, through changes in 
market clearances.  The adjustment of market clearances is driven by (4.16), which respectively 
requires the satisfaction of a greater “equivalent” load, and (4.17), which reflects the change in the 
imputed optimal trade-off in each sub-period arising from that.  The sub-period earnings condition 
implicitly incorporates the implications of less than perfect reliability in the spot market: 
  
 
χ i,t − ϕ i,r+1,t
+ ur+1,t − ur ,t( )
r<R
∑ = 0  ⊥   CAPi,t free   ∀i > 0,t  (4.18) 
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Secondly, we must account for the outages of each plant from the perspective of its owner.  In (4.18), 
the imputed value of capacity of technology i in sub-period t is assessed on the basis that the 
technology is perfectly reliable, in accordance with the augmentation of the LDC to account for 
outages.  Therefore, the investor, while observing the PDC and the returns available, will note that the 
earnings of each technology must be scaled by its reliability factor as those market-based earnings will 
be forgone for the proportion of time that the technology is unavailable.   
  
 
FCi − ρi w t
t
∑ χ i,t ≥ 0  ⊥   CAPi ≥ 0   ∀i > 0  (4.19) 
The scaling in (4.19) could be developed significantly if the reliability of the plant could be 
demonstrated to be seasonal, or perhaps related to heat or cold.  It could further be used as a device for 
recognising the nature of planned or regular schedulable maintenance, by setting the factor to an 
appropriate fraction in those seasons it is most advantageous to shut down and carry out maintenance. 
An alternative, but equivalent, interpretation of (4.19) is to cast the adjustment in terms of 
costs.  By adjusting fixed costs, we can reflect the imputed cost of supplying a reliable unit of capacity 







∑ χ i,t ≥ 0  ⊥   CAPi ≥ 0   ∀i > 0  (4.20) 
Depending on the interpretation chosen, the greater the reliability of a technology, the less the 
adjustment to fixed costs, or the discount to earnings.   
As the reliability of a technology worsens, its involvement in the equilibrium plant mix will 
reduce.  Relative to the counterfactual of perfect reliability, global optimal trade-offs tend to swing in 
favour of low capital intensity technologies as less than perfect reliability represents a tax, or additional 
rate of return requirement, on the fixed costs of each technology.  However, it is not necessarily the 
case that an unreliable technology will fare worse than it does in the perfectly reliable counterfactual.  
Given equal rates of reliability, the burden of the adjustment is unambiguously on more capital-
intensive technologies.  In the limit, a relatively reliable baseload technology could be eliminated from 
the equilibrium plant mix, while a relatively unreliable peaking technology might expand its utilisation.  
When viewed in terms of cost adjustment, the underlying reason is that the fuel or operating component 
of the cost structure is fully “reliable”, whereas the capacity component is not.  The former comprises a 
significant portion of the peaking technology’s cost structure, while it is a smaller portion of the total 
cost of a baseload technology, making the issue of reliability more important to high capital cost 
technologies.  
Unsurprisingly, it is typically the case that more capital intensive technologies are more 
reliable than low capital intensity technologies.  Apart from the operating characteristics being 
suggestive of more consistent, and presumably beneficial, usage patterns, if we consider the case of a 
single technology, the reliability factor could be optimised based on the trade-off between different 
configurations or installation options, presumably at a cost.   By the above logic, such an adjustment 
would be more valuable for more capital intensive technologies, ceteris paribus, and so we should 
expect to see highly capital intensive technologies installed with higher optimised reliability levels.   
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The change in the equilibrium role of a single technology is dependent on the characteristics 
of all other technologies and is therefore somewhat ambiguous.  The exceptions are the notional 
shortage technology and, if it is included, the notional demand response technology, which we can 
assume to be perfectly “reliable”.  When viewed from a technological perspective, the implication of 
recognising the less than perfect reliability of conventional technologies is unambiguous; the shortage 
frequency will increase as the notional shortage technology is both perfect reliability and has zero fixed 
costs. 
Finally, we have assumed the duration of outages is relatively short.  However, it may be the 
case that certain outages are significant and could spread beyond the sub-period structure of the model.  
We do not address these prolonged outages but note the scope of response depends significantly on the 
timeframe of the outage so that, in a system with specific concerns in this respect, other decision-
making processes would be influenced whenever prolonged outages were anticipated.  In the limit, 
prolonged outages, such as those associated with the Japanese tsunami of 2011 can remove plants, or 
even entire technologies, from availability for years or possibly even permanently, thereby requiring 
further assessment of not only contract positions, but also investment plans.  Where the nature of the 
reliability issue is such, our approach is inappropriate as it assumes the reliability of a technology can 
be treated deterministically as a proportion, in precisely the same way the framework treats load in less 
than a fully stochastic basis.  In those cases, scenario development would be preferable, as would the 
likely development of risk measures surrounding those possibilities.  
4.4 Intermittent Generation  
4.4.1 Introduction 
So far we have discussed technologies that are dispatchable but, in the case of intermittent generators, 
the energy that enables generation of electricity arrives according to a random natural process.  Without 
supporting storage, the critical distinguishing feature of these technologies from the perspective of the 
market and investors, is the relative lack of control over generation.  The most prominent intermittent 
technologies are wind, solar, and run of river hydro, and the integration of these technologies into 
electricity markets poses challenges of a technical and economic, nature (Macgill, 2010).  Investors in 
these technology and site combinations are focussed on selecting sites and technologies whose 
generation is highly correlated with higher price periods.  When this is the case, the random process 
that drives generation mimics the sort of intertemporal allocations they might make if storage was 
available. 
A thorough approach for calculating the net load duration curve would take account of the 
potential correlation between load and intermittent generation, as well as the variability of intermittent 
generation which depends greatly on the correlation between different intermittent producers.  To 
achieve this fully requires a full convolution, but this computationally challenging in light of the rest of 
the structure and given the individual characteristics of different technologies.  
We could consider formulation of a model in terms of the correlation between the generation 
of each intermittent technology and load. But a single measure cannot satisfactorily portray the 
underlying relationships.  In any case, the relevant correlation is not the correlation between the output 
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of a technology and load, but between the output of the intermittent technology and net load, which if 
we are to continue the finance analogy represents the performance of the rest of the market.  While this 
definition could be accommodated, a larger problem exists.  Correlation itself can be poorly estimated 
and understood where the functional form of the relationship is poorly specified or not accurately 
characterised.  For example, it is well known that a relationship that is precisely quadratic in nature can 
produce zero correlation when the correlation is assessed on a linear basis.  Ideally, any approach to 
modelling intermittent generation should address the underlying features of the system such as the 
daily patterns that typically drive the correlation between load and the output of individual 
technologies, rather than rely on a summary measure of correlation that is clouded by other effects.    
Our analysis of intermittent generation focusses on the correct representation of the correlation 
between intermittent generation and net load on an intra-day basis.  We do not consider the full 
distribution of intermittent generation, just its pattern.  The reasonableness of this approach rests on the 
size of load, the variation of which is included in the LDC, relative to the size of variations around the 
average output of intermittent generation at each time of day.  It follows that as market penetration of 
intermittent generation increases, the requirement to address the full distribution of intermittent 
generation does also, and the output of the model we propose should be subjected to post-solution 
scrutiny to either ensure the approximation is suitably accurate, or possibly to investigate an 
endogenous version of the adjustment function. 
To capture the chronological correlations that exist, we adapt our framework to address the 
modelling of intermittent generation technologies that exhibit strong intra-day generation patterns.  We 
begin by determining chronological generation functions and a chronological load pattern to enable 
more detailed assessment of the relationship between generation and load, and other generation 
technologies if required.  In doing so we deconstruct the LDC into two components; an LDC equivalent 
to the chronological load pattern, which itself is endogenous and an adjustment function that enables 
translation between each load representation.  As investment in intermittent technologies occurs, the 
net chronological load function is formed and converted to an estimated net LDC that is serviced by 
conventional generation technologies   
4.4.2 Chronological Load and Generation 
Because the LDC is a convolution of various load determinants, a given load level might correspond to 
a cold morning, or a warm afternoon, or some other combination of load determinants. That 
combination of influences obscures the relationship between intermittent generation and load.  As the 
seasonal granularity is increased, the variation within the LDC that is associated with seasonal effects 
is reduced, so that the proportion of variation that is associated with daily variations increases. 
Increasing the model granularity successively removes an increasing quantity of seasonal variation, so 
that in the limit the resulting LDC contains only daily variations.  To clarify the nature of correlation 
between intermittent generation and load, or net load, we need a chronological representation of each.  
To that end, we introduce a representative chronological load pattern (CLP), which describes the 
pattern of load throughout the day, and can be defined either globally or on a sub-period or seasonal 
basis.  A similar intermittent generation pattern can be developed for each individual intermittent 
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technology so that in combination with the CLP, the actual relationship between load and individual 
intermittent generation technologies is defined.   
As shown in Figure 27 a representative, or average, piecewise linear chronological load and 
generation pattern can be formed. 
 
Figure 27: Chronological Load Pattern & Intermittent Generation 
As with thermal technologies, some judgement is necessary when grouping individual technologies.  
While two installations of the same underlying technology may be ostensibly similar, they may vary 
significantly in performance.  Intermittent technologies require more acute attention to be given to this 
issue, as intermittent technologies are not installed in a homogenous fashion, as their output typically 
depends significantly on location.  Accordingly, to preserve any differences in the typical generation 
profile, we would ideally maintain the distinction between different installations of the same 
technology, as these should only be aggregated only when individual installations are highly correlated 
with each other, as assessed on an intra-day basis.  Naturally that ideal must be balanced with 
computational feasibility.    
Unlike the LDC, the CLP does not represent the full distribution of load levels occurring 
within a season, so to ensure the most accurate representation we utilise a CLP in conjunction with the 
LDC.  The CLP represents the average, or best fit, chronological load.  Where the intra-day pattern is 
most relevant, the average load profile as expressed by the CLP provides a useful basis for analysis of 
daily correlations, but where aggregate load and energy levels are more relevant, we reference an LDC. 
Genuinely different CLP’s, such as for weekdays and weekends, might exist in some markets, 
and, as CLP’s are not intertemporally linked in this framework, our approach is readily generalised to 
accommodate more than one CLP when distinct load patterns are deemed significant, even when those 
CLPs apply to non-contiguous time periods.  
4.4.3 Formulation 











Decomposing the LDC 
From a CLP, an equivalent LDC can be formed.  We normally transform the initial chronological load 
pattern into an LDC.  Conceptually we are re-ordering the CLP to get an LDC consistent with that 
average chronological pattern. The dynamic approach detailed below could also be invoked to perform 
this task although it is rather cumbersome for a one-off calculation when the data required to seed the 
problem is exogenous. 
Whereas the LDC implicitly incorporates all observations, the CLP, estimated using those 
same observations is, depending on the chosen estimation criteria, a “best-fit” with estimation errors.  
Even setting aside issues of estimation, the CLP equivalent LDC,  LCLP , is inconsistent with the actual 
LDC, from a purely conceptual perspective.  Unless all of the intra-season variation in load is present 
in the chronological pattern represented in the CLP, the LDC will be peakier than  LCLP , as shown in 
Figure 28.  For given utilisation levels, the load levels implied by the chronological pattern will not 
precisely coincide with the LDC, which represents the full distribution of load levels throughout a 
season.  The difference will be due to variability not explained by the estimation of the CLP.  
 
Figure 28: Original LDC vs. CLP Equivalent LDC 
To at least preserve the variability incorporated into the LDC and enable conversion between the two 
load descriptions, we define an adjustment function that describes the difference between the two load 
measures in a form that may be re-applied to adjusted load patterns within the model.  To guarantee 
consistency between a piecewise linear CLP equivalent LDC and the original LDC, the adjustment 
function must also be piecewise linear, with interpolation occurring between the complete set of K+1 
utilisation levels and H+1 intra-day markers that respectively define the LDC and the CLP.   As shown 
in Figure 28, these sets will generally not have common elements.  In addition, the load levels 
associated with the chosen utilisation levels and intra-day markers will also not correspond with one 
another.  
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Using l=1… L as an index of the combined set of points used to define the LDC and CLP 
equivalent LDC. Adopting a proportional scaling method rather than an absolute difference, we define 







CLP        ∀h   (4.21) 
Here  Ll  is the load level on the piecewise linear LDC corresponding to  ul  and  Ll
CLP  is the load level 
corresponding to  ul  on the piecewise linear LDC formed from the chronological load pattern.   We 
define the scale factor at other utilisation levels in similar fashion. 
 
 
Figure 29: Adjustment Function 
As shown by way of example in Figure 29, the adjustment function is not consistently greater than or 
less than unity, although it should tend to be decreasing in utilisation as the LDC represents a wider 
distribution than a set of averages based on unordered load levels would, and so is more extreme in the 
tails of the load distribution, which correspond to zero and full utilisation.  As some of the utilisation 
levels in the model are determined endogenously, we seek a mathematical representation of the 
adjustment function shown in Figure 29 so that we can calculate a scale factor and apply it to an 
endogenously calculated CLP equivalent LDC.   
One approach is to estimate a function that describes the scale factor as a function of 
utilisation levels as in (4.22) to (4.25).  For the same reason as above, this function must also be 
monotonically decreasing.  Several functional forms could be used but for illustrative purposes we 
propose a cubic function, as it can reasonably approximate the characteristics of scale factor divergence 











S(ul )− a + bul + cul
2 + dul
3( ) = 0        ∀l  (4.23) 
   
b+ 2cul + 3dul
2 ≤ 0        ∀l  (4.24) 
  
 a,b,c,d free        (4.25) 
In the above optimisation the objective is rather arbitrarily defined as the sum of the squared errors 
from estimation, that being a relatively standard criteria.  The estimation function is a general cubic 
form and the optimisation is over the coefficients of the function.  The gradient is restricted to be 
weakly negative at all utilisation points in the set L.  This approach does admit the possibility that the 
function could exhibit a positive gradient between two points being interpolated so it may not be 
strictly monotonically decreasing at all utilisation levels.  In addition, the choice of a non-linear scale 
factor does suggest a potential inconsistency with the rest of the development, which is generally 
piecewise linear.   
A second approach is to define a piecewise linear function, interpolating between the points as 
shown in Figure 29, and using an approach similar to Section 2.6, define the adjustment factor 
according to the utilisation range of interest.  To ensure this approach works, we must ensure that the 
scale factor is decreasing in utilisation so that the process of reconstruction does not lead to a non-
monotonic, or partially ordered, LDC.   A simple but ad hoc solution to the problem of ensuring 
monotonicity involves combining any segments where the behaviour is not monotonic until the average 
behaviour is.  This is also a rather imprecise approach, and could be replaced with a dynamic 
determination of whether this is even necessary, as it is not the monotonicity of the adjustment function 
itself that is required, it is the monotonicity of the combined adjustment function and CLP consistent 
LDC that is relevant.  The choice of the functional form of the adjustment function, is not critical, 
particularly when the underlying load is not endogenous as a result of demand response, for example.  
For the purpose of our discussion we designate that function S(u), without specifying its exact nature.   
We have decomposed the underlying LDC into an alternative LDC, consistent with the CLP, 
and a set of scale factors.  From those scale factors we have then developed an adjustment function, 
S(u), that approximates the scale factor as a function of the utilisation level.  This procedure can be 
used once or, for example, in the case where we also wish to combine analysis of intermittent 
generation with price response, the estimation procedure that defines S(u) can be endogenous and 
rather than be calculated a priori, it can be included using the complementarity conditions 
corresponding to the optimisation that defines it.  
Determining the Net CLP 
To determine the net chronological load pattern we must first aggregate the output of intermittent 
technologies.  There will be many such technologies, each with a different degree of correlation to load 
and different endogenous capacity, which together form a portfolio of intermittent generation that we 
must deduct from load.  Our focus is on the intra-day relationship so we perform this task with the 
CLP, and leave seasonal variations to be addressed at the sub-period timeframe.  We define the 
generation pattern by the capacity factor of each intermittent technology at each time of day, 
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ICFi,h ∀i ∈INT .  Given a capacity of  CAPi , the total average generation at time h is given by  GENh
INT
: 





∑       ∀h  (4.26) 
Accordingly, where  Lh
CLP  is the chronological load measurement at h, then  NLh
CLP , the net load at a 







∑       ∀h  (4.27) 
Re-constructing the Net LDC 
Whereas plant outages augment the load duration curve monotonically, the same is not true for 
intermittent generation.  As a result of intra-day generation patterns, intermittent generation can alter 
the rank correlation between the time of day and the corresponding net load level.  Therefore, applying 
the definition in (4.27) with the same ordering as for  Lh
CLP  does not suffice and we must dynamically 
construct a monotonic net LDC from the net chronological pattern and the adjustment function S(u) 
defined earlier. 
To define a net LDC consistent with any given net CLP, we identify the net load levels,  NLh , 
and intra-day times,  th , that define the CLP, where  th  is expressed as the fraction of the day that has 
elapsed.  Taking each net load level,  NLh , as a reference level, we then determine the proportion of 
that section of the net CLP that is above or below that load level.  There are six possibilities, comprised 
of the permutations of net load increasing/decreasing with whether net load is always above, always 
below, or intersecting the reference net load level we are concerned with.    
We begin by considering the cases in which the reference net load does intersect the net CLP 
within a particular time segment.  When net load is increasing over the segment defined  th−1  and  th  
then, using  h*∈H  as an alias for h to index reference net load levels, we have the following 
expression that defines the utilisation factor, 
 
uh*,h
CLP , corresponding to the reference net load level  NLh*
CLP  
such that  NLh−1 ≤ NLh*













th − th−1( )
    !h,h* > 0  (4.28) 
A similar expression is available when net load is decreasing over the segment defined  th−1  and  th .  
The following expression defines the utilisation, 
 
uh*,h
CLP  within that segment for a reference net load level 
 NLh*
CLP  such that NLh ≤ NLh*














th − th−1( )
    !h,h* > 0  (4.29) 
To combine expressions (4.28) and (4.29), we introduce two complementarity conditions that 
determine whether or not a particular segment exhibits increasing or decreasing net load.  These 
conditions enable the selection of the correct numerator and denominator in the ratio of relative net 
load in the expressions (4.28) and (4.29). 
   NLh − NLh−1 + γ h
1 ≥ 0  ⊥   γ h
1 ≥ 0   
!h > 0  (4.30) 
   NLh−1 − NLh + γ h
2 ≥ 0  ⊥   γ h
2 ≥ 0   
!h > 0  (4.31) 
When net load is increasing  NLh > NLh−1  so from (4.30),  γ h
1 = 0  and  γ h
2 = Lh − Lh−1 .  Similarly, when 
net load is decreasing we have  NLh−1 > NLh  and  γ h
1 = Lh−1 − Lh , and  γ h
2 = 0 .  Accordingly, the 
denominator in the above expressions can be recorded as  γ h
1 + γ h
2 , giving (4.28) when net load is 
increasing and (4.29) when net load is decreasing.  We can also define the numerator using the 
definitions of  γ h
1
 and  γ h
2 .  When net load is increasing, we require  NLh − NLh*
CLP  and when net load is 
decreasing we require  NLh−1 − NLh*




















CLP     !h,h* > 0  (4.32) 
Combining (4.32) and the denominator,  γ h
1 + γ h

































1 + γ h
2 th − th−1( )  !h,h* > 0  (4.33) 
To verify this expression, we consider the example where net load is decreasing.  The denominator 
reduces to  γ h
1 + γ h
2 = NLh−1 − NLh .  As  γ h
1 = NLh−1 − NLh , and  γ h
2 = 0 , the numerator becomes 
 NLh−1 − NLh*
CLP








th − th−1( )      !h,h* > 0  (4.34) 
The development of the definition in (4.33) only considered the cases where either 
 NLh ≤ NLh*
CLP ≤ NLh−1  or  NLh−1 ≤ NLh*
CLP ≤ NLh , however we must also consider those cases where the net 
load level of interest is entirely above or below the range we are considering.  If we consider the case 
of decreasing net load, then when  NLh*
CLP < NLh , the definition (4.34) yields  
uh*,h
CLP > th − th−1 , so that 
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utilisation within the segment exceeds the total duration of the segment.  Similarly, when 
 NLh*
CLP < NLh−1 , the expression for utilisation across a segment evaluates as negative.   In the former 
case, we wish to record a correspondence with full utilisation to reflect  NLh*
CLP ≤ NLh ≤ NLh−1 so that the 
reference net load  NLh*
CLP  is exceeded for the entire duration of that segment.  In the second case, we 
wish to record a zero utilisation, as  NLh*
CLP ≥ NLh ≥ NLh−1 so that the reference net load,  Lh*
CLP , is not 
attained within the segment.  To bound the evaluation of 
 
uh*,h
CLP  in this fashion we adapt (4.33) into the 





























1 + γ h
2 th − th−1( ) + γ h*,h3 ≥ 0 ⊥  uh*,h
CLP ≥ 0  
        
!h*,h > 0  (4.35) 
  
 
th − th−1 − uh*,h
CLP ≥ 0  ⊥  
 
γ h*,h
3 ≥ 0     !h*,h > 0  (4.36) 
Where the raw utilisation level exceeds the duration of the segment h, (4.35) requires that 
 
γ h*,h
3 > 0 , 
which by (4.36) implies 
 
uh*,h
CLP = th − th−1 .  Where the raw utilisation level is negative, then from (4.35), 
 
uh*,h
CLP = 0 .  Finally, where  NLh*
CLP  exceeds load only partially within a segment, we have 
 
0 ≤ uh*,h




3 = 0 .  In this case, 
 
uh*,h
CLP  must be equal to the calculated or interpolated value 
or we have a contradiction with 
 
uh*,h
CLP > 0  in which the left side of (4.35) is either negative, which is 
infeasible, or strictly positive, in which case the complementarity condition is not satisfied.  
Having calculated the utilisation contained within each individual segment, then as  th − th−1  
amount to fractions of the day, we must simply sum the utilisation level associated with each reference 









∑        !h*   (4.37) 
The set of points { uh*
CLP ,  NLh*
CLP } define a net LDC consistent with the net CLP, and with application of 
the scaling factor defined by S(u), they define a point on the estimated endogenous net LDC.    
   
NLh* = NLh*
CLPS uh*
CLP( )       !h*  (4.38) 
This endogenous net LDC takes the place of the exogenous load and utilisation levels used in the 
standard formulation.  It remains the case that optimal trade-offs, and their corresponding net load 
levels need to be determined, and then subjected to the same ordering as detailed in Section 2.6. As 
before, the ranking procedure integrates and jointly ranks each set of utilisation level, thereby ensuring 
that the constraints of the model are sensible, while also providing a way to trace between the sorted 
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ranking and the unsorted ranking of each set of utilisation levels.  In this case, this ability is critical, as 
we must link prices and outcomes with the original generation quantities.   
The ordering conditions are: 








    
∀h*,r   (4.39)  
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∑ ≥ 0  ⊥   φn
e ≥ 0     ∀n   (4.43) 
The equivalent translation functions are: 
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part ≥ 0  ⊥    uk+1,n,t
part ≥ 0    ∀0 < h* < H ,n  (4.48) 
The piecewise linear structure that describes the LDC has been replaced with an endogenous piecewise 
linear net LDC comprise of a chronological net load profile and accompanying adjustment.  In this 
case, the influence of the original LDC specification is limited to assisting the definition of the 
adjustment function, so that the basic shape of underlying load is preserved as accurately as possible, 
although as described earlier the original LDC may also be endogenous for reasons such as demand 
response as discussed in Section 4.2.3.  In such cases, the scaling factor function will also be 
endogenous, to reflect the implications of issues such as demand shifting between periods, for example.   
The endogenous utilisation and net load levels have replaced the exogenous utilisation and load levels 
and the value of net load at each optimal trade-off between conventional technologies is interpolated 
between these endogenous load levels, as it once was between exogenous load levels. 
4.4.4 Market Clearing 
We have decomposed load into a chronological pattern and a scale factor to measure idiosyncrasies in 
the gross load pattern that are not captured by the chronological pattern.  We have then deducted total 
intermittent generation, which is modelled chronologically, reformed the CLP equivalent LDC, and 
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applied the estimated scale factor to form a new net load duration curve.  Nevertheless, other than 
modelling the chronological generation pattern and incorporating the necessary adjustments to maintain 
the integrity of the problem structure, the approach is conceptually the same as the standard deduction 
approach used to form net LDC’s. 
Substituting net load for load, and noting that we only consider generation of conventional 





∑ − NLr = 0   ⊥   λr free     ∀r,t  (4.49) 
Depending on the correlations involved, if there is sufficient capacity of intermittent technologies it is 
possible that  NLr < 0 .  This implies energy spillage and zero load for conventional technologies to 
service.  This situation is depicted in Figure 30. 
 
Figure 30: Energy Spillage 
To accommodate this possibility, we introduce a notional spillage technology with zero fixed cost. 
Aside from being a wasted resource, we assume that spillage is costless so that the marginal cost of the 
spillage technology is also zero, thereby providing a floor on the energy price,  λ r .  The market 





∑ − NLr − SPLr = 0    ⊥   λr free      ∀r  (4.50) 
   λr ≥ 0  ⊥  SPLr ≥ 0     ∀r  (4.51) 
   
−λr + MCi +ϕ i,r
+
i>0
≥ 0   ⊥  
 
GENi,r ≥ 0    
∀i ∉INT ,t  (4.52) 
  
 
CAPi −GENi,r ≥ 0   ⊥   
ϕ i,r
+ ≥ 0     ∀i > 0,i ∉INT ,r  (4.53) 
When  NLr < 0 , then since  
GENi,r
i∉INT
∑ ≥ 0 , (4.50) implies  SPLr > 0 , signifying spillage is occurring.  
When  SPLr > 0  then from (4.51) we have  λr = 0 .  Conversely, when  NLr > 0  we have  
GENi,r
i∉INT
∑ > 0  
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implying  λr > 0  when standard generation technologies have positive marginal costs.  From (4.51) we 




∑ = SPLr = 0  implying  λr = 0 . 
The market clearing prices generated by the above complementarity conditions are not 
necessarily chronologically adjacent.  For example, two market clearances based on adjacent load 
levels in the LDC could refer to a morning and an evening output on the chronological load profile.  
We can determine the pricing pattern in chronological terms by reversing the ranking transformation:   




∑       ∀h*   (4.54) 
Similarly, we could estimate the generation of intermittent technology i at a particular point in the 
chronological load profile as: 




∑       ∀i,h*   (4.55) 
4.4.5 Investment 
The assessment of any particular intermittent development option can be undertaken by assuming that 
its decremental impact on the net LDC is sold at the price determined by the corresponding equilibrium 
PDC.  As more intermittent capacity is added to the (hypothetical) plant mix, the shape of the residual 
LDC will slowly shift, as residual load becomes more sensitive to whether the wind blows, or not.  
However, in the absence of energy spillage, the shifting of the LDC should not change the equilibrium 
PDC, which is still based on optimal trade-offs between standard generation technologies.  
Accordingly, the equilibrium profitability of incremental intermittent investment is not altered.  When 
spillage is possible, investors must consider there is effectively a new technology in the plant mix, 
which has zero marginal cost, and therefore disrupts the equilibrium PDC.  But even when spillage is 
not an issue, in the presence of existing capacity, investors in intermittent generation technologies must 
contrast this long run equilibrium perspective with short run analyses, which suggest that increasing 
intermittent penetration will produce lower returns because prices will be depressed when intermittent 
generation is high.  
We can define equilibrium intermittent generator income using prices defined by the PDC 
which in turn is defined by conventional technologies servicing the net LDC.  Conventional 
technologies have their profitability determined at each utilisation level and interpolated across 
operating ranges expressed in terms of those utilisation levels.  Assuming marginal costs are zero, in 
the case of intermittent generation the relevant measure of profitability is the GWAP.  To calculate 
GWAP we need to link the generation of individual technologies with pricing and operating ranges 
from the PDC.  For a single unit of capacity the relevant measure of generation at h* is 
 
ICFi,h* .  Using 
the intermittent capacity factor and adapting the ranking equation (4.44), we can calculate the 
generation of technology i at utilisation level  ur  using ranking variables:   
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∑       ∀i,r   (4.56) 
Accordingly, for each of the r utilisation ranges defined by 
 
ur ,ur+1{ } , we have the following expression 
for estimating the profitability of intermittent generator, which is based on the average capacity factor 
of the intermittent technology in each utilisation range: 
  
 









      ∀i ∈INT  (4.57) 
Alternatively, we can define the income for each period using the chronological description of the 
problem, by translating prices from the PDC back to this timescale.   The advantage of this approach is 
that the chronological ordering of generation and prices provides stronger support for the assumption 
that system performance can be interpolated linearly between adjacent performance measurements.  
That assumption is more reasonable when the adjacency between measurement points is based on time 
of day rather than aggregate system conditions, which could result in similar load and price levels at 
opposite ends of the day which leaves no basis for interpolating outcomes.  From (2.86) we can 
calculate the price corresponding to the boundary of the interval  
 
th*,th*+1{ } :  




∑       ∀h*   (4.58) 




∑       ∀h*   (4.59) 
If we assume that both generation and prices adjust linearly across the relevant time period, we can 
define a price and generation function that describe their value over the interval
 
th*,th*+1{ } : 
   







t − th*( )      ∀h*   (4.60) 
   







t − th*( )     ∀i ∈INT ,h*   (4.61) 
Given both the generation and price functions are piecewise linear by assumption, the revenue 
attributable to a single unit of intermittent generation capacity of technology i increases quadratically 
over the interval 
 
th*,th*+1{ } : 
 

























⎟   ∀i ∈INT ,h*   (4.62) 
The average revenue attributable is therefore: 





th*+1∫     ∀i ∈INT ,h*   (4.63) 
 178 
The equilibrium investment condition for intermittent generation technologies is therefore:  




∑ ≥ 0  ⊥   CAPi ≥ 0    ∀i ∈INT  (4.64) 
As with other technologies, investment in a particular intermittent technology cannibalises its own 
earnings.  As the penetration of intermittent technologies increases, the equilibrium PDC decays, with 
returns to all technologies, including intermittent technologies, being reduced. If the output of 
intermittent generation technologies is heavily correlated with periods of high net load then this effect 
is exacerbated.  The returns available to the investor critically depend on not only on the output of the 
generation unit, but also the timing of that output, which cannot be controlled.  Preference is therefore 
given to technologies and locations whose output is strongly skewed towards generating when prices 
are high, so that the generation weighted price (GWAP) is higher than the time weighted price 
(TWAP), which would be earned by a generator whose output has zero correlation with system prices.  
From the perspective of an investor in a particular intermittent technology, the worst case is that the 
generation is negatively correlated with system prices so that the GWAP is lower than the TWAP. 
Although we have not progressed the matter in this work, the possibility of including and 
analysing the value of storage in partnership with intermittent technologies is an obvious next step. In 
the limit, where all of the load variation was intra-day, storage devices need only support a fraction of 
daily output to enable a perfect re-allocation of energy to the times of highest prices.   
4.5 Summary and Conclusions  
Satisfying load is the fundamental constraint in an electricity market.  In this chapter we demonstrated 
how the framework could adapt to endogenous load.  In doing so, we considered load response, 
reliability and intermittent generation. 
In Section 4.2.2., we address short term demand response addresses the practical issue of 
monitoring, and reacting to electricity market prices in the dispatch.  We conjecture that this capability 
is not widespread and generally it requires investment to gain that capability.  Accordingly, the 
response can be treated as any other technology, in that it is limited in capacity once constructed, and 
may also be limited in energy, if the response is unable to be sustained, for example.  In Section 4.2.3, 
we progress to long term load response of the kind characterised by load shifting and substitution, 
either through other fuels or through investment in efficient appliances, for example.  By separating the 
two we confine the role of long term demand response to setting the underlying LDC, which is 
modelled as being completely inelastic in the short term as short term responses are considered 
technologies.   Under this approach, the underlying LDC is endogenous and dependent on average and 
relative prices.  In market clearing, this demand response cannot be marginal, as market clearing 
operates on the endogenous LDC, not the original LDC.   We achieve this by adding complementarity 
conditions to define a further technology, whose capacity is equal to the demand response, and whose 
marginal cost is set to ensure it will always be utilised.  
In Section 4.3, we adopted the conventional augmented load approach to addressing 
reliability.  Given a capacity mix at any particular generation level we can calculate the expected 
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impact of less than perfect reliability, in terms of the additional capacity required, and add that to the 
LDC.  From that point we assume capacity is perfectly reliable.  In that respect, we calculate material 
outages only, noting that the marginal generating technology may itself have sufficient idle capacity to 
cover losses.  Whether the reliability of each technology results in increased capacity relative to other 
technologies depends on the relative reliability of those technologies.  However, low capital cost 
technologies will fare relatively better than high cost technologies, although we note there is probably a 
more fundamental relationship between cost and reliability that makes skews that comparison.  In the 
limiting case, the notional shortage technology is completely reliable, and therefore shortages will be 
more prevalent when technologies are unreliable.  In terms of our framework, the redefinition of the 
LDC naturally changes the numerical solutions obtained, but the definition of optimal trade-offs 
requires no adaptation.  The complementarity constraint governing investment is adjusted for reliability 
so that depending on the perspective, returns are diminished to account for periods where a unit is 
offline, or the cost of perfectly reliable capacity is higher. 
Finally, we investigate the inclusion of intermittent generation in the framework.  Our 
particular motivation was capturing the chronological correlations between intermittent generation and 
load directly.  Our approach is conceptually straightforward.  We begin with three sets of data: the 
LDC, a chronological load pattern, and a chronological generation pattern for each intermittent 
technology.  We define the relationship between the chronological load and the LDC and develop a 
scaling factor to reflect the additional variability present in the LDC.   We are then able to determine 
net load by deducting intermittent generation sources form the chronological load pattern, taking 
account of the potential for energy spillage as we go.  In doing so, we create the need to define a 
representation of net chronological load in the form of a LDC. The resulting net LDC is then rescaled 
and used as the basis of market clearance and generation by conventional technologies.  In equilibrium, 
the pricing that results is also paid to intermittent generators and this disciplines investment.   
The complementarity constraints that perform this task are complex.  While the scale factor 
will be decreasing, it may not be precisely monotonically decreasing.  To define a monotonically 
decreasing scale factor we propose a constrained cubic curve fitting based on a least squares objective, 
the parameters of which are restricted to ensure the curve is monotonically decreasing.  The KKT 
conditions from this optimisation form part of the complementarity formulation.  Next, we must 
consider the basic construction of an LDC from a chronological load pattern.  To do so requires 
determination of the utilisation level of load from that pattern.  Given a load level, we introduce 
complementarity conditions to define across a segment the extent to which load is above or under the 
load level of interest.  This procedure is applied to net load, which must account for spillage of energy 
in the case when intermittent generation exceeds underlying load.  To achieve this we introduce an 
additional costless technology.   Finally, it is necessary to determine the earnings of intermittent 
technologies, and for this we determine the market clearing price at a series of points along the 
chronological load profile, and interpolate the generation between points to get an average capacity 
factor across the intervening segment.  
The contribution of our approach to reliability, while slightly nuanced on account of 
addressing only material outages, limited to demonstration of the inclusiveness of our framework.  
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With respect to demand response, while we have seen models augmenting load, and other models 
considering demand response as a technology, we are unaware of any implementation of a specific 
approach such as ours, that separates long term and short term response in a conventional optimisation 
formulation of electricity markets.  As with the basic model, these models can certainly be 
conceptualised as optimisation formulations, but the determination of optimal trade-offs and consistent 
solutions means these problems cannot be solved with a conventional optimisation formulation.  We 
are also unaware of any investment model that incorporates both and chronological load patterns with 
an LDC representation.  We do this and go beyond by considering the above relationship in the context 
of net load, constructing a net LDC dynamically, that is then incorporated into our wider framework to 
ensure the solutions are consistent. The complementarity conditions that define the relationships 





5 RISK & UNCERTAINTY 
5.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 4 we considered several forms of variability, such as intermittent generation and reliability.  
In these cases the variability in the system is material, particularly when supported by correlations, but 
ultimately the influence of variability for risk neutral investors is limited to its influence on expected 
returns.   In this chapter we introduce risk and uncertainty to the framework, after which investors are 
no longer interested in expected returns alone, but also the distribution of returns.  Our goal is to 
explore how risk and uncertainty can be implemented in the framework we develop.   
We begin by reviewing the definition of risk, uncertainty and other related concepts.  In 
particular, we reiterate a long known, but often overlooked, distinction between risk and uncertainty.  
The former is defined as variability with known probabilities, while the latter is variability with 
unknown probabilities.  After detailing some of the evolution of risk measures and the advantages and 
disadvantages of each we elect to implement CVaR, it being a coherent and mathematically tractable 
risk measure.  A number of paradigms have been used in risk management.  Perhaps the most famous 
is the portfolio construction approach, and the CAPM model that followed it.  In more recent times, the 
concept of portfolio replication has become popular, particularly in financial markets where the 
replication and therefore hedging of a portfolio is efficiently achieved because the large number of 
financial assets available.  Finally, in this respect, we consider a new paradigm in risk modelling: the 
stochastic endogenous equilibrium, in which the price of risk is also a variable. 
The optimisation of CVaR is well documented but less so when in convex combination with 
expected returns.  While a definition based on the exclusion of some proportion of the best scenarios 
can simulate the convex combination, we choose a definition of CVaR that is oriented to the risky end 
of the distribution of outcomes that we combine with expected returns. Our direct formulation of CVaR 
is consistent with other formulations, but our direct implementation of the dual of the traditional 
formulation in a complementarity framework is efficient and, to our knowledge, original.  As others 
have done (Ehrenmann & Smeers, 2011), we show that our risk measure generates a set of risk adjusted 
weightings that provide an alternative to the objective scenario weightings in the model.   The inclusion 
of risk necessarily affects the marginal benefit of investment and we explore those impacts in general 
and with some examples.  The approach taken is extended to include nuanced CVaR preferences and 
CVaR constraints, which can be defined at multiple significance levels, or with respect to subsets of the 
scenario tree.  
While the above addressed a portfolio approach to capacity investment, contracts are also 
available.  We consider the formulation of contracts and the integration of contracts with the CVaR risk 
measure.  We do so in the context of a simple forward contract, designed to protect the contract holder 
from price risk.  Rather than have contract prices fixed, we consider the structure of contract supply 
and demand directly, and then implement market clearing conditions.  In doing so we are able to 
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explore the results of the model in the context of a stochastic endogenous equilibria where risk is priced 
in the contract market endogenously (Ralph & Smeers, 2011). 
Our formulation of uncertainty is exploratory.  Uncertainty is used to describe those forms of 
stochastic variability for which no probability distribution can be formed.  We posit an approach to 
modelling uncertainty based on the concept of utilisation and consider the effect of uncertainty on the 
framework developed so far. 
5.2 Conceptual Framework 
5.2.1 Variability  
Variability does not, of itself, indicate the presence of risk or even stochasticity or randomness, as it 
can be deterministic, stochastic, or both.  There are many examples, such as in seasonal industries, 
where a great deal of variability is present, most of which is in large part predictable and does not 
represent risk.  The most important characteristic of variability in our modelling context is the nature of 
correlation between different forms of variability, its relationship to risk, and how it is best 
incorporated in an investment model.    
In the first instance, variability is important because of correlation.  Even when predictable 
variations occur, it is important to understand the correlation between those variations, or alternatively 
the conditional proportions associated with each.  It may be, for example, that the fuel cost and the 
level of demand are correlated seasonally, magnifying the effect of each on profitability.    
From the perspective of a modeller, the distinction between variability and risk is important, 
as a risk measure should not penalise any portion of an outcome that is due to predictable variations in 
the model.  For example, the predictable portion of the seasonal load variation does not reflect risk, 
although the distribution around that predictable fluctuation might do.  So, for example, typical high 
prices in a summer peaking market should not have risk implications, whereas high seasonally adjusted 
prices might well do.  
Finally, in a modelling environment with all of the standard foibles, the relevant practical 
distinction may be whether variability or randomness is modelled deterministically or stochastically, 
rather than whether the variability is actually predictable or stochastic.  In this framework, the LDC 
represents the stochastic variability of load in the form of the LDC, which is a proportional form.  The 
implication of the LDC is that for the period to which it relates we assume that all load levels 
represented will be experienced in the proportion shown.  This is subtly different from considering the 
continuous sampling from a load distribution, that might well coincide with the LDC.  We then 
considered other forms of variability that can be described through adjustment or amendment to the 
LDC.  These included reliability, and through a somewhat more detailed process, the impact of 
intermittent generation.  In this chapter, we explicitly consider scenarios with associated probabilities, 
the outcomes of which are subject to inclusion in risk measures designed to represent investor 
preferences. 
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Variability in Electricity Markets 
Electricity markets contain many sources of variability.  A survey on risk management in electricity 
markets is available from Liu et al (2006) and includes many sources of variability as motivation. 
Weber (2011) also offers a comprehensive treatment.  Other than the issues discussed explicitly (plant 
reliability, intermittent generation, and hydrology or more generally fuel inflows, the following non-
exhaustive list notes some of the more significant examples of variability that has implications for risk 
and uncertainty: 
• Demand Growth.  While a source of variability and of relevance to investment timing (Bean, 
Higle, & Smith, 1992), this is not something we have focussed on.  In an equilibrium model, 
the effects of reduced demand growth, for example, should be as fleeting as the equilibration 
adjustment.  We note that the efficacy of the adjustment process is not beyond doubt, and that 
the most prevalent issue facing investors is typically net demand growth, after accounting for 
renewables. 
• Fuel cost and fuel supply. This is a significant issue, particularly when connected when 
worldwide fuel markets are interconnected and fuel prices have the potential to vary 
significantly on the basis of global adjustments in fuel markets.  In areas where energy 
markets and fuel supplies are prone to disruption there are a number of fuel supply concerns 
(Boucher & Smeers, 2012), and there can be significant merit order risk, with potential for 
cycling (Bell, 2010).  
• Taxation and Climate Policy.  Taxation is an important consideration for all investors as it 
reduces returns.  In recent times, taxation has also become a mechanism for adjusting relative 
fuel prices to achieve environmental goals.  Other forms of climate policy based interventions, 
such as the introduction of carbon trading, are also possible and the uncertainty surrounding 
their introduction or evolution is an important factor in the investment decision (Blyth, 2007), 
(Kettunen, 2008).    
• Market Intervention.  Electricity markets are both young and technologically dynamic, and 
this has created a tendency for regulators and governments to intervene from time to time to 
right perceived faults in market designs.    
• Competitor Strategy.  As strategy, such as spot market gaming, alters returns, it also directly 
modifies risk or uncertainty adjusted returns. Variability in strategy also leads to strategic risk 
and uncertainty.  In the case of risk, the strategy may be known up to a distribution 
surrounding some parameter values such as costs, whereas in the case of uncertainty, the 
competitor strategy is unknown.    
The relative importance of each aspect of variability is market dependent and modellers should reflect 
the typical concerns of an individual market by prioritising those items requiring the most focus. 
5.2.2 Risk 
Several definitions of risk exist.  There is a colloquial definition of risk, which defines risk as 
“exposure to detrimental outcomes”.  The colloquial definition is not without informal support in the 
academic literature (Fishburn, 1984), although this support is often not as much a specific endorsement 
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of the colloquial definition as it is the use of a convenient term used to describe a commonly 
understood principle.   
For the purpose of analysing the concept of risk, the distinction is not important, but when the 
analysis turns to the specific and distinct concept of uncertainty, that definition is unsatisfactory.  The 
colloquial definition of risk actually coincides more precisely with terms such as “Downside Risk”, 
which are also in common use, and in which the term “Downside” would be redundant if it were used 
in conjunction with the colloquial definition.  In all but the case of symmetric payoff distributions, this 
definition also conflicts with long-standing technical measures of risk such as variance, which also 
reflect the possibility of exposure to superlative outcomes.  However, from the perspective of this 
research, the most unsatisfactory feature of the colloquial definition of risk is that it does not lend itself 
to a useful distinction between risk and uncertainty. 
We adopt a precise and analytically useful definition of risk, originally offered by Frank H. 
Knight (1921), in which risk was defined as “randomness with knowable probabilities” and uncertainty 
was clearly distinguished as “randomness with unknowable probabilities”.  Much of the literature 
comports with this definition of risk (Farrar, 1964), (Alessandri, Ford, Lander, Leggio, & Taylor, 
2004), insofar as agreeing that risk measures are defined over distributions.  However, few authors 
distinguish between risk and uncertainty and many, for example (Genc, Reynolds, & Sen, 2007), 
(Shanbhag, Infanger, & Glynn, 2011), (Conejo, Carrión, & Morales, 2010), use the terms 
interchangeably. 
5.2.3 Risk Aversion 
In an equilibrium model, we should only be interested in risk if investors are themselves interested.  
Investors may be either risk seeking, risk neutral, risk averse, or a combination of these, adjustment 
their attitude on the basis of wealth or the size of the gamble they face, for example.  Risk aversion 
describes what is typically assumed to be the first order reaction to risk; that being we do not like it.  
The degree to which investors are risk averse describes how far they would go to avoid risk or, 
alternatively, the rate at which they are prepared to sacrifice expected outcomes in order to increase 
certainty.  Risk neutral agents are only in the expected outcomes, while risk seeking agents actively 
seek riskier portfolios at the expense of expected outcomes.  
 185 
 
Figure 31: Risk Aversion and Risk Premiums 
Source: Wolfram Demonstrations Projects, John Horton 
To the extent that an investor is risk averse, they will be happy to trade off a portion of the expected 
value of their profits, asset value or other objective, as consideration for facing less risk.  The value at 
which the investor is indifferent to the gamble on offer is known as a certainty equivalent.  The 
relationship between expected returns, the certainty equivalent, and the risk premium is shown in 
Figure 31, in which E(x) represents the expected value of outcomes, CE is the certainty equivalent, and 
RP is the risk premium. 
Risk aversion can be decomposed further, into increasing, constant, or decreasing, absolute or 
relative risk aversion.  We do not address the implications of risk aversion being a function of firm 
size, but we note that when risk aversion is a decreasing function of firm size, an economy of scale 
exists, which has implications for the industry structure.  
5.2.4 Uncertainty  
From Knight (1921), the definition of uncertainty is “randomness with unknowable probabilities”.  
Risk and uncertainty are distinguished by whether the distribution of the variability is known, as is the 
case with risk, or not, as is the case with uncertainty.  A strict interpretation suggests there is only 
uncertainty, as no distribution of interest to investors is known with certainty.  However, in many cases 
the distribution of certain forms of variability are well, if not perfectly, understood and it would not be 
appropriate to overlook this information on the basis it was not absolutely definitive (Farrar, 1964).  In 
such cases the variability can be decomposed into the systematic which can be addressed as risk, and 
the esoteric, which remains uncertainty. 
We also note that investors are not simply concerned with the accuracy of input distributions 
such as for hydrological conditions, demand forecasts or solar energy availability.  Investment 









decisions are fundamentally based on output distributions such as the equilibrium PDC, and this brings 
issues such as the validity of the model specification or structure, or even whether the equilibrium PDC 
is the appropriate basis for decision making into consideration.  So, the difference between risk and 
uncertainty is more than a theoretical demarcation along a continuum of descriptions of variability 
bounded by pure risk and pure uncertainty at its extreme.  The reason for the distinction is to separate 
risk and uncertainty, as investors do in their decision processes. 
By its very nature, risk requires the knowledge of distributions, and that in turn requires either 
theoretical justification of distributions based on probabilities, or the accumulation of sufficient data so 
that the sample distribution may be relied upon as a population distribution. In order to accumulate 
sufficient knowledge of a distribution, the sample size must generally be large, and therefore 
observations must occur with high frequency.  Where theoretical distributions do not exist or 
observations are too infrequent to establish an empirical distribution, the variability must be classified 
as uncertainty.  In the context of electricity markets this suggests that variability on a daily basis in the 
spot market can be treated as risk at worst, but questions of government policy, or the long term rate of 
climate change, are best described as uncertain, given the underlying model driving each is not clear, 
and the availability of data is limited.  
This conclusion is also supported by the structure of contract markets in many electricity 
markets.  Contracts are generally based on a sound understanding of the risks involved. Contract 
markets are not likely to develop in response to uncertainty.  A lack of knowledge of relative 
probabilities makes it difficult for a counter-party to assess uncertainty and value contracts. In the limit, 
it is difficult to satisfactorily assess the likelihood or impact of an event that has never occurred, let 
alone one that has not even been considered.  Where long term contracts that are subject to significant 
uncertainty are offered, these might be justified by strategic interests and are likely to be struck 
bilaterally by parties wishing to neutralise the impact of uncertainty.  Consequently, we are not aware 
of these types of contracts being exchange traded in a form that a more diversified independent party, 
such as a financial institution, could trade in.  
5.3 Risk & Uncertainty Management  
5.3.1 Introduction 
Risk management refers to the method used to control risk.  These methods extend to identifying risk, 
assessing risk, measurement of risk, and mitigating risk.  This can occur at many levels of the firm, and 
can be rule based, or more flexible.  Risk management occurs at a variety of levels within a firm, and 
address different timeframes. A typical view of the time and decision structure applicable in electricity 
markets is provided, along with an assessment of the relative balance between risk and uncertainty is 
provided:  
 
Horizon Timeframe Risk/Uncertainty 
Balance 
Investment 20-30 years Mostly uncertainty 
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Medium Term 2-3 years Balanced 
Seasonal Season Length More risk 
Trading 1-2 months Mostly risk 
Spot Market 48 hours Completely risk 
Regulation 1-2 hours Completely risk 
 
Table 4: Decision Timeframes in Electricity Sector 
The length and nature of these horizons depend on the specifics of the system under consideration.  Our 
focus is on the investment horizon corresponding directly to the lifespan of the investment, and the 
medium term which corresponding to timeframes ranging from seasonal periods through to several 
years depending on the duration of underlying variability, as decisions on these timeframes materially 
impact the distribution of annual returns. 
5.3.2 Flexibility 
Flexibility underlies risk management.  The concept of flexibility, which may be thought of as a 
capability to react and respond to unforeseen events in a variety of ways, determines the need, or extent 
to which a firm or investor need go to manage risk (Ku, 1995).  Flexibility can be a function of the 
firms portfolio as well as the decision making process itself, which, depending on the relative 
importance attached to flexibility, can prioritise strategies that promote more or less flexibility, 
ultimately at the expense of other objectives.   
Flexibility can also be a source of competitive advantage, and is subject to valuation in a 
portfolio context (Doege, Schiltknecht, & Lüthi, 2006).  The implication of flexibility and the time it 
will take a firm to respond to a particular eventuality, is that, ceteris paribus, investors will value 
options with greater flexibility higher than those with less.  This suggests that firms may be prepared to 
contemplate accepting larger levels of short term risk, provided the available recourse actions and 
means of mitigation enable the risk taken to be easily hedged at a future date.  An example of 
flexibility in this work exists on the demand side, where the flexibility to respond to electricity prices in 
close to real time may or may be cost prohibitive, but is nevertheless valued and impacts on the 
desirability of contractual protection. 
From the supply side, a most notable example of the value of flexibility in electricity markets 
is the operational risk management conducted by hydroelectric producers with storage.  Risk aversion 
further complicates hydro scheduling, as does the interaction with contracts (Barroso, Granville, & 
Trinkenreich, 2003), (Wallace, 2009). As the hydrological conditions for a particular season unfold, 
hydro producers continuously hedge their position based on a re-assessment of future prospects. 
5.3.3 Measuring Risk 
Variance 
The most commonly statistic used to summarise the spread or risk of a distribution is the variance of 
the distribution.   Unfortunately, where the distribution of outcomes is not symmetric, the applicability 
of variance as a risk measure is questionable (Francis & Archer, 1979).  When the return distribution is 
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asymmetric the minimisation of variance as the objective function can lead to selection of 
stochastically dominated investments simply because they have lower variance (Blavatskyy, 2010).  
Appendix 7.6 describes stochastic dominance.  
This is precisely the case in electricity markets, where return distributions are not symmetric.  
For example, if we consider investment in a peaking technology in a hydro dominated system, the 
return distribution will be significantly skewed, reflecting a predominance of years with little or no 
return in which hydro inflows were sufficient enough to enable the effective management of storage to 
avoid the need for peaking plant to be used.  In the odd year, when hydro inflows fall short, the energy 
shortage will necessitate generation by the peaking technology.  These events will be relatively rare, 
although the technology will be highly profitable, and a significant proportion of lifetime profits will be 
earned, at these times.   
VaR 
In response to the shortcomings of variance and in concert with increased computational ability, 
additional and more complex risk measures have been developed.  Many firms and investors are not 
concerned with variability on the upside of the return distribution as they are with variability on the 
downside.  Therefore, in terms of the distribution of returns they face, their interest lies in the tail 
containing the worst outcomes.   
Value at Risk (VaR) provides an alternative risk measure (Charnes, Cooper, & Symonds, 
1958), (Prékopa, 1973).   In our context, VaR represents the minimum loss, or best outcome, incurred 
in the worst  of scenario outcomes.  The downside of this approach is that it does not consider the 
nature and size of the losses that lie beyond the threshold.  Those scenario outcomes could represent 
incrementally larger losses, or they could represent losses that would pose an existential risk to the 
firm.  VaR provides no way of distinguishing between these cases, so that given two return 
distributions with equal losses at the 5% level, where one distribution has catastrophic losses at the 1% 
level and the other does not, the VaR measure is indifferent.   
Although we do not consider such examples, there are occasions when the nature of a 
particular risk might be non-convex and therefore suitable for a VaR type approach.  In the context of 
investment, outcomes worse than VaR might apply to company failure, for example, beyond which 
there are no meaningful degrees of failure.   
The definition of VaR was helpful in that it focussed attention on a subset of the distribution 
that aligned with our colloquial understanding of risk.   However the failings of VaR as a risk measure 
are significant. As Artzner (1998) notes, perhaps the most aggregious issue with VaR is that it fails a 
basic sub-additivity test, so that the risk of a combination of risks may be greater than the sum of the 
individual risks.  As they note, the implication is that an investor in equities, for example, would be 
incentivised to operate two accounts, carrying out a single investment in each.  In doing so they could 
end up with less risk than the counterparty who may hold the risks together.  The implication is that 
when using VaR as a risk measure, diversification could be relatively discouraged. 
α%
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Coherent Risk Measures 
To improve the conceptual basis of risk measures, Artzner (1998) defines the properties of “coherent” 
risk measures.  Here r is a coherent risk measure, and X is a portfolio       
• Translation invariance.  When a is a deterministic portfolio:  
  
 
r X + a( ) = r X( )− a  
Adding a riskless asset to your portfolio reduces your risk by the value of that riskless asset. 
• Subadditivity.  Where X1 and X2 are two portfolios, we have: 
  
 
r X1 + X2( ) ≤ r X1( ) + r X2( )  
The risk of two portfolios added together cannot be greater than the risk of each portfolio 
added.  This principle underpins portfolio theory, and is otherwise known as the 
diversification principle.  The degree to which the risk of the combined portfolio is less than 
the sum of the risk of each separate portfolio is determined by the correlation of the portfolios. 
VaR fails the sub-additivity test. 
• Positive Homogeneity:  
  
 
If α ≥ 0 then r α X( ) =αr X( )  
Multiples of a portfolio, multiply the risk of the portfolio, implying the risk of a portfolio is 
proportional to its size.  This also follows from the diversification principle, as it applies to the 
specific case of perfectly correlated portfolios being added.  
• Monotonicity.  Where X1 and X2 are two portfolios we have:  
  
 
If X1 ≤ X2 then r X1( ) ≥ r X2( )  
Where one portfolio (weakly) dominates another in all scenarios, then that portfolio should 
have lower risk on account of having higher returns.  This is not the case with variance based 
measures where a portfolio with higher returns might also have higher variance and be 
considered riskier. 
The top three properties define convex risk measures, and in combination with the last we have a 
definition of the properties of coherent risk measures. 
CVaR & Downside Risk 
Conditional Value at Risk (CVaR) was introduced in Rockafellar & Uryasev (2000) which also details 
the evolution of risk optimisation from VaR to CVaR.  In addition to the theoretical issues noted by 
Artzner (1998), they also note that VaR is non-convex and difficult to optimise.  CVaR has many 
desirable properties, especially when compared to VaR. Most importantly, CVaR is a coherent risk 
measure (Pflug, 2000).  VaR can be coherent Unlike VaR, CVaR also satisfies second order stochastic 
dominance (Ogryczak & Ruszczyński, 2002) giving it a degree of credibility that variance based 
measures, for example, do not have.   
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Sarykalin (2008) provides an excellent summary of the comparative advantages of CVaR and 
VaR.  They conclude that VaR is computationally difficult to optimise, as it is a non-convex measure.  
In contrast, CVaR has significantly easier mathematical properties and, by virtue of considering all 
scenarios in the relevant tail of the distribution, CVaR controls scenarios beyond the level of VaR.  
Although Pang and Leyffer (2004) provided a complementarity based VaR minimisation formulation, 
Rockafellar and Uryasev (2000) had already presented a CVaR optimisation that can be formulated as a 
much simpler linear program.   
CVaR represents the expected losses in the worst  of scenario outcomes and therefore 
captures information about the distribution beyond the threshold of VaR.   
 
 
Figure 32: VaR, CVaR & Downside Risk 
Source: Sarykalin et al (2008) 
Figure 32 also shows some alternative deviation measures that are based on VaR or CVaR and the 
deviation from either the mean or the maximum loss.  Downside Risk is an example of a deviation 
measure, as it is the difference between a specified profit level and an actual profit level, as achieved in 
adverse conditions.  Where it is defined with respect to the expected profit, downside risk coincides 
with CVaR deviation as shown, but downside risk need not be defined relative to the expected profit, as 
there may be some other profit level, such as the profit level corresponding to zero net cash flow, that 
could define the point at which adversity might begin to create compounding losses.   
α%
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Suitability of CVaR 
The profitability distribution will not likely approximate the normal distribution, or any other 
symmetric distribution, so the applicability of variance as a risk measure in this case is questionable.   
As noted, variance is a far less precise measure of risk with asymmetric distributions as it encompasses 
information from the whole distribution, equally weighting the sensitivities that are associated with 
each tail of the return distribution, despite one of the tails being more relevant from a risk perspective.  
In contrast, CVaR can be focussed on the most relevant parts of the distribution, where risk is 
concentrated, and it is for this reason, and because of its theoretical properties of convexity and 
consistency, we choose CVaR as a risk measure.  The downside of the relative responsiveness of CVaR 
to changes in the tail of a distribution of outcomes is the magnification of the error that results when 
that distribution is poorly specified.  There are two issues of concern here; the degree to which relevant 
input distributions and any potential correlations are understood, and the degree to which the 
formulation translates these inputs into modelled outcomes on which risk measures can be reliably 
based. 
We expect that those items that are identified as risks will, by definition, have well understood 
distributions and joint distributions, on which analysis can be based.  Indeed, where the nature of 
random variations cannot be represented reliably with a distribution we have a prima facie case against 
the application of a risk measure at all, and might suggest that an approach based on uncertainty may 
be more appropriate.  For example, a modeller, with limited powers of investigation, is unlikely to 
ascertain the probability distribution of a competitor’s strategic response or government action either 
now or at some time in the relevant future. 
Whereas a modeller may not be in a position to accurately define an input distribution, the 
accurate solution of the model lies within the modeller’s sphere of influence to a much greater extent.  
As CVaR is assessed on the distribution of returns, it is particularly sensitive to errors in the 
specification of the PDC.  Unfortunately, as was shown in Chapter 1, conventional optimisation 
formulations are potentially flawed in this area.  These models require the contradictory assumption of 
non-competitive pricing to establish an equilibrium, and the arbitrary restriction of generation functions 
based on the LDC definition results in unquantified errors in the assessment of prices and price 
durations.    
The proportion of time in which the system is short of capacity, in which prices typically rise 
to very high levels, is often key to the definition of the tail of the profit distribution in investment 
problems.  Our approach, outlined in Chapter 2, determines the fraction of time the system experiences 
shortage endogenously.  By extension, and by virtue of defining market clearances at endogenously 
defined points, the PDC is also determined so that, given the input data, not only are expected earnings 
precisely defined, no additional error is introduced to the calculation of CVaR as individual sub-period 
PDC’s are precisely defined and therefore the tail of the return distribution is also precisely defined.    
Targeted increases of the granularity of the model may be a possible solution strategy in a 
simple single scenario case, but increasing modelling granularity is far more problematic in a multiple 
scenario case, as to ensure an accurate result the modeller must assess the utilisation levels 
corresponding to optimal trade-offs in not just a single scenario, but in all scenarios.  With respect to 
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the conventional optimisation formulations, it is unclear a priori how many utilisation levels need be 
considered to approach an acceptable, or indeed any, accuracy level.  It is also difficult to target such 
utilisation levels at the zone applicable to the shortage calculation, as this varies significantly by 
scenario, or by sub-period, and to a degree that is a function of the overall equilibrium and therefore is 
difficult to understand without first solving the problem.   
By failing to correctly define the PDC, standard investment models mis-report earnings in 
each scenario and therefore mis-report the distribution of earnings.  In addition, the sensitivity of those 
earnings estimates is increased by the focus on risk.  Juxtaposing the inaccuracy introduced by 
restricted generation functions with the sensitivity of CVaR to specification of the tail of return 
distributions, a modeller using a conventional optimisation formulation might well reasonably decide to 
adopt variance as a risk measure.  By being less focussed on the tail of the return distribution, variance 
minimises the extent to which outcomes could be subverted by an incorrectly specification of that 
distribution due to a modelling anomaly.  In contrast, our approach, which is based on the use of 
endogenous utilisation levels, improves the definition of the PDC and makes the use of CVaR less 
susceptible to error.    
CVaR Implementation 
When implementing CVaR, the modeller has some choices, including which portion of the distribution 
to focus on, and whether CVaR is to be used in conjunction with a measure of expected outcomes.  We 
first consider the use of a lone risk measure as an objective. Ehrenmann & Smeers (2011) details this 
exact approach, in which CVaR is defined by calculating the expected measure across all but the most 
favourable scenario’s, suggesting a “negative upside risk” approach, rather than a downside risk 
approach.  The inversion of the CVaR intuition is designed to address a wider range of outcomes, in an 
effort to give positive weighting to these.  By orienting the formulation in that fashion, the mean-risk 
decision is simulated, albeit coarsely.  In contrast, maximisation of a similar CVaR measure focussed 
on actual risk management concerns such as wet/dry years or cashflow management would lead to an 
outcome with investment supported only to the level at which it is profitable, even the worst scenarios.  
Unfortunately, this approach has two disadvantages.  Firstly, while the approach implicitly 
recognises the role of central or median outcomes in the investment decision in a model, it ignores a 
portion of the distribution altogether, in defiance of economic and financial logic.  The implication 
being that, for example, two otherwise equal bets with different windfall payoffs, are valued identically 
by investors. 
Secondly, ex ante, the risk measure has no intuitive link to actual risk management or the 
underlying principle of downside risk.  While this approach can potentially be tuned to give a 
numerically equivalent result, it is unclear how one would select which portion of the distribution to 
focus on, in order to achieve the appropriate relative avoidance of certain critical downside risk 
demarcation points.  The problem with a lack of linkage to ex ante risk management is that this is the 
basis on which preferences are likely to be defined.  The approach taken would require iterative 
solution and adjustment of the CVaR measure in order to attain consistency with the actual risk 
management objective of the firm.  
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As the authors note, further investigation would involve combining risk measures with 
expected earnings, and that is the approach we have taken.  Our application of CVaR aligns naturally 
with the conceptual basis of risk aversion by calculating the CVaR measure across only unfavourable 
scenarios.  The creation of a convex combination of returns and risk measures enables the specification 
of risk measures that align with the risk management issues being faced while preserving consideration 
of the entire return distribution, making the result sensitive to all scenario outcomes. This, more 
consistent, approach facilitates the consideration of multiple risk measures, which can be designed to 
specifically address different levels of sensitivity or particular subsets of the scenario tree.   
5.3.4 Risk Management Paradigms 
Portfolio Theory 
Markowitz (1952) introduced a portfolio approach to investment analysis in which exploration of the 
possibilities of risk and return combinations were central.  Motivated by the observation that investors 
held diversified stock portfolios that were not explainable by the risk-neutral maximisation of expected 
returns, this seminal paper shows how consideration of the co-variance of returns between individual 
assets leads to portfolio diversification.  Depending on how implemented, Markowitz’s approach 
minimises return variance subject to a return constraint, or vice versa.  Solving this optimisation 
parametrically by varying the rate of return requirement produces an efficient frontier that describes the 
Pareto-efficient options available to the firm.  Based on their preferences, the investor can then select 
from this set of non-dominated options the most desirable portfolio.  Conceived with equity and 
financial markets in mind, the concept of variance and co-variance between returns of different types of 
assets was primarily a statistical concept, reflecting issues such as the counter or pro-cyclical nature of 
certain industries or firms within industries.   The use of variance has often been the subject of criticism 
as it implies symmetry in the distribution of asset returns that is not necessarily realistic.  The 
assumption of symmetric returns is particularly difficult to support when considering electricity 
generation technologies, and becomes increasingly untenable in single payment markets as we consider 
technologies operating higher in the merit order. 
CAPM 
Sharpe (1964) extended the basic approach of Markowitz and developed the Capital Asset Pricing 
Model, or CAPM as it is commonly known. The CAPM is based around a risk measure known as beta, 
which measures the contribution of an individual asset to portfolio risk.  Marginal risk is measured by 
the increase in risk to the whole portfolio, and is not a simple function of the riskiness or variance of 
returns for that particular investment.  The effect on the portfolio is of central importance as a 
significant portion of research into investment decisions treats investment decisions as standalone 
decisions.  Importantly, beta is exogenous for investors in this framework. 
Consideration of the entire portfolio is very important in the context of electricity investment.  
In the electricity industry. Investors face a different issue to equity investors as contracts, existing 
plants and new investments will have complex interactions under a variety of different scenarios.  The 
interaction of investments within a portfolio of generating assets is dependent on some random 
variability, but there is also an element of control that can be exerted in terms of operational strategy 
 194 
that will modify the relationship between asset returns, that is not available to investors in equity 
markets.   While the CAPM model has a number of detractors based on, for example, its reliance on 
variance, it remains widely used as it is convenient and has the benefits of familiar consensus in 
financial markets (Jagannathan & McGrattan, 1995) 
The implied diversification of assets in the Markowitz/CAPM models is not based on the 
traditional but naive mantras of “not putting your eggs in one basket”, or in “playing it safe”.  
Markowitz/CAPM diversification chooses specific diversifications, which may, if negatively 
correlated, be based on just two assets, both of which are individually assessed as “risky”. Both the 
position of the generator and the market value of a contract written on spot prices are individually risky 
propositions, heavily reliant on several factors.  They are also negatively correlated, making each an 
ideal risk management tool for owners of the other.  This diversification of risk forms part of the basis 
of contracting markets, but even when contract markets are ill formed or incomplete, vertical 
integration provides another form of diversification that reduces portfolio risk. 
Portfolio Replication 
Portfolio replication refers to matching the returns of a particular investment with other financial 
instruments.  The replicated portfolio can be either sold or bought to hedge the value of the original 
investment by precisely cancelling out the variability of returns that flow from the original asset.  
Accordingly, portfolio replication is a useful risk management paradigm.  Portfolio replication is 
seldom perfect although the quality of the replication will improve with the number of traded assets.  
There is also the question of transactions costs, particularly where the number of traded instruments 
required to hedge the portfolio is large, or where the portfolio is dynamically hedged and requires 
frequent updating.  Nevertheless, if the market is a complete market, portfolio replication provides the 
investor with a way to end up in a risk free position (Ralph & Smeers, 2011). 
Stochastic Endogenous Equilibrium 
Statistical diversification and portfolio replication are the two classical methods for managing risk 
(Ralph & Smeers, 2011).  In each case, the prices of all instruments are known.  In the case of portfolio 
replication, the PDF describing future asset price movements is assumed to be known as is the variance 
of future price movements in the case of Markowitz portfolio theory.  These data are derived from 
empirical studies and not from the clearance of an endogenous market.  Accordingly, the actions of 
investors in these markets have no influence on prices, and therefore no influence on each other, and 
are able to solve their own optimisation problem independently. 
In a complete risk market, there is a risk neutral PDF in which the price of every asset is the 
expectation of its payoff.   The basic complementarity formulation that represents the investment and 
generation problem and that runs throughout the thesis is an example of a risk-neutral Nash game based 
on risk-neutral probabilities.   The actions of each participant impact the other and the equilibrium is 
found at a point where no participant has an incentive to adjust.   
If we assume that agents are risk averse we can incorporate a risk penalty into their objective 
function, and given a fixed price of contracts, we can also optimise the contractual protection they seek.  
We do this in Sections 5.4 and 5.6.  Again, an equilibrium can be found using the set of adjusted 
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objective functions however we do not follow that approach other than for the purpose of developing 
the objective function of the market participants. 
Instead we follow the approach of Ralph & Smeers (2011,2015).  They add to the model 
structure above by determining the price of risk endogenously, defining clearance of the contract, or 
more broadly, the risk market.  The risky design equilibrium problem adds market clearance of a 
complete risk market to the set of individual risk-averse objective functions.   This represents a risk 
averse Nash game with risk market explicitly modelled. 
Each participant has a risk set, D, which describes the risky scenarios or events that they may 
experience.  Where the agent uses a coherent risk measure we can describe the risk measure as being 
the worst value of the objective function over that set, where the objective function is usually cast in 
terms of expected profit or loss.  In the case of cost minimisation, the coherent risk measure would 
define the highest expected cost over D, while in the case of profit maximisation it would define the 
lowest expected profit over D.  This is directly analogous to the direct definition of CVaR that we 
employ in Section 5.4.2. 
In order to bridge between the risk neutral design game and the risky design equilibrium 
game, Ralph & Smeers introduce an additional agent, the system risk agent.  The risk set of this agent 
is the intersection of all individual risk sets and is known as the system risk set.  The agent’s objective 
is based on the sum of all agent costs, or profits, as the case may be.  The objective is to define the risk 
measure over the set of probability densities that is the system risk set.  As all agents risks sets are 
included, the price of risk, which is the PDF that solves their optimisation, defines the payoff for the 
system agent.  We could imagine other participants trading risk with the system agent on this basis.  
The system agent is risk neutral with respect to all risks in its risk set, so that in equilibrium all agents 
must also face that same price, or marginal view, of risk (probability density function).  They can then 
trade as if they were risk neutral with respect to the PDF defined by the system risk agent.  Unlike in 
the case of portfolio optimisation, the PDF that prices risk is determined by equilibrium in the risk 
market.  Ralph & Smeers (2015) continue by generalising their result in the case of incomplete 
markets. 
With respect to this approach, the objective functions of the agents are defined in Section 5.5. 
and Section 5.6.  Risk market clearance is also defined in Section 5.6 and, albeit in a much narrower 
setting, we confirm that the most risk neutral participant sets the price of risk in this setting.  To 
simplify discussion throughout, we define the CVaR set to be the “optimal” risk set, representing the 
actual selection from D, the wider risk set, that represents the worst case.  Finally, in our example we 
assume a perfect overlap between the individual risk sets of participants so that they only differ by risk 
aversion.  Accordingly, we do not need to explicitly introduce a system risk agent. 
5.4 Formulation of Risk 
Our analysis follows an albeit simplified approach modelled on the stochastic endogenous equilibrium 
approach by Smeers & Ralph (2011).  We explicitly consider the equilibrium and price determination 
in contract markets, and within the narrow confines of our example generate results that align with the 
more general theory illustrated in that seminal paper.  Within that framework, we consider two 
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approaches for modelling risk management by individual firms.  The first, which we assess as being 
more suitable for use in complex situations such as the investment problem, is preference based risk 
management in which the investor actively weighs risk and returns based on their relative preference 
for each.  This aligns with portfolio management which we discuss in Section 5.5.2.  The second is the 
constraint based approach to risk management.  This suggests, without necessarily requiring, the 
involvement of external entities such as financiers in setting the risk profile of the firm.  We discuss 
risk constraints further in Section 5.5.5. 
5.4.1 Profit Distributions 
Before we consider risk measures, we review a generic variability hierarchy as shown in Figure 33.  
This illustrates the different layers of variability that might exist for the purpose of discussing which 
modelling paradigm, for example risk or uncertainty, is suitable for variability occurring on a particular 
time scale. 
 
Figure 33: Hierarchy of Variability 
Beginning with the shortest timeframes, the most fundamental sub-period variability in the investment 
model is represented by the LDC itself.  We have implicitly assumed that we can treat load or net load 
as a deterministic set of proportions rather than a random variable continually being sampled.  This 
implies a belief that the entire distribution will be observed in the timeframe of interest.   The validity 
of treating net load as deterministic rests on how well the net LDC represents outcomes within 
individual periods.  To ensure this, the sub-period structure must be defined with suitable granularity so 
that the distribution of net load within a sub-period is not unduly contaminated by seasonal influences, 
for example, that would lead to correlated results that would tend not to support the realisation of all 
load levels identified by the LDC.  Sub-period modelling also enables the description of operational 
decisions and more frequent information revelation, such as is required to express storage and energy 
release decision when fuels are limited in supply.  In our case, except for stochastic energy limits as 
discussed in Appendix 7.3, we do not model stochasticity at this level.  
At the period level, which is annual in this case, we give consideration to variability in the 






motivation for this level of variability.  The process remains the same as for sub-period modelling.  By 
identifying different scenarios, the variability within each sub-period is refined by removing sources of 
intra-period correlation out of the sub-period structure and placing it into the scenario structure.  A 
scenario-based approach allows explicit specification of those correlations through a scenario tree.  For 
example, we include scenarios for both hydrology and climate and assume that they are correlated with 
each other. The resulting profit distribution can be represented by a multiple level index reflecting the 
tree, or as we do, a distribution of flattened scenarios, indexed by s.  
The longer the timeframe and more significant the variability is, the more important multiple 
the difference between a proportional treatment and a full expansion of the decision tree becomes as 
entire periods become correlated.  For example, when we consider correlations that apply over a 
longer, such as a supra-annual climate cycle, several periods will have correlated results.  A Markov 
chain, with an associated transition matrix as shown in (5.1) can represent the behaviour of such a 
climate cycle or more general evolution of the system state and by doing so capture the nature of 
correlation between periods: 






    ∀f ,0 ≤ x ≤1  (5.1) 
Where x is close to unity, the system state is highly correlated with the previous state, whereas when x 
is zero, the state switches from one state to another.  When x is 0.5, the system state is independent of 
previous system states.  In all cases the long run proportion of time spent in each state is equal, but the 
correlation between performance in one period with performance in the next is dependent on the value 
of x in this case.  So while we could accurately model a proportion, that would not reflect the dynamic 
structure of state development.   
Ultimately, we might consider a risk that corresponds to a single eventuality.  Once 
determined, certain eventualities are likely to be permanent, or at least prevail for a significant time in 
comparison to the life of an investment.  This also is beyond our scope but we note that outcome of 
variability of this nature may be inherently difficult to characterise with a distribution and therefore the 
situation may be better aligned with uncertainty than risk. 
The first step in a mathematical formulation of risk is the definition of the distribution of 
outcomes.  We define the profit distribution using s, an index of the flattened set of possible scenario 
combinations at the annual level in the decision tree in Figure 33.  We assume that we can quantify the 
relative probability of each scenario s, and therefore we are able to treat the variability as risk rather 
than uncertainty.  The evaluation of risk requires an assessment of the distribution of outcomes.  Either 
preferences or constraints can be used to guide behaviour and these are stated in terms of risk 
measures, which define a particular characteristic in the distribution of outcomes that investors do not 
desire.  
Although heterogeneous generators with different initial holdings of each generation 
technology and/or different preferences with respect to risk can be considered, we envisage G 
symmetric generation firms operating under competitive circumstances, indexed by g=1…G,.  
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Naturally generators do not “invest” in the notional shortage technology.  The total annualised 
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Where 
 
ws,t  represents the weighting of sub-period t in scenario s, and  
χ i,s,t  represents the earnings per 
unit of capacity of technology i in sub-period t of scenario s.  After allowing for the amortisation of 
fixed costs, the generator’s total annualised profit is given by: 
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This can also be expressed as the distribution of percentage returns across the scenarios s, where the 
percentage return for scenario s is given by: 
  
 







∑ −1       ∀g,s   (5.4) 
Figure 34 shows a hypothetical profit distribution, expressed as an annualised percentage return, across 
a range of scenarios for a single generation firm.  The definition of profitability as an annual percentage 
return aligns with basic equity market valuation approaches and is independent of market or firm size.  
It is also invariant with respect to intra-year variations in profitability that might arise from seasonal 
influences, and therefore do not reflect risk.   
 
Figure 34: Distribution of Annual Percentage Returns  
The rate of return of each technology in each individual scenario, s, is:  














−1       ∀i   (5.5) 
In the absence of capacity restrictions and risk aversion, the mean rate of return on investment is 
identical across all built technologies, reflecting a single return on investment requirement. In a 
standard risk neutral analysis this single rate of return is zero in equilibrium.  We must be careful to 
note that in this context, the rate of return requirement is in excess of the risk-free rate of return, which 
is used purely as a measure of the time value of money in the development of the amortised fixed costs 
of investment.  Absent investment or capacity restrictions, any deviation from the single rate of return 
would imply a misallocation of capital between individual technologies.  To maximise portfolio returns 
and achieve equilibrium, investor funds would move from lower return investments towards higher 
return investments.  Which restrictions of the form discussed in Chapter 3, the equalisation of returns 
across all technologies may not be possible. 
Whereas the risk neutral investor is concerned only with expected returns, the risk averse 
investor is concerned with the distribution of returns.  The mean return for the portfolio and each 
individual technology is identical under the assumption of investor risk neutrality. The same cannot be 
said under risk aversion.  In this case, the distribution of returns for each individual technology varies 
so that ceterus paribus, risk averse investors will evaluate each technology differently, preferring an 
investment exhibiting less return volatility to one with greater return volatility.  Investors are equally 
interested in the correlation between the return distributions of individual technologies.  Ranking the 
returns of each individual technology by scenario produces a ordering of scenario outcomes that need 
not correspond with the ranking of the representative market portfolio across scenarios.  
 
5.4.2 CVaR Calculation 
We have adopted a different approach to defining CVaR, choosing instead to adopt a direct 
optimisation in which the conditional probabilities that we seek are the primal, as opposed to dual 
variables.  From the optimisation, complementarity conditions are formed for the purpose of integrating 
with the rest of the framework.  The definition of CVaR is only a subset of the conditions responsible 
for investment decisions.  Unlike models with a purely CVaR objective, it is separate, and feeds into 
the overall trade-off between risk and return.  The expression of CVaR as a separate optimisation, 
intuitively based at the risk end of the distribution, gives rise to the possibility or possible interpretation 
of the CVaR optimiser as a separate agent, specifically concerned with risk, that penalises investors for 
assuming risk. This possibility can assist in clarifying the nature of the motivation to control risk.  
In accordance with the reporting structure and valuation methodology of the financial 
industry, our assessment of CVaR relates to the annual timescale. While this assumption is not 
technically necessary, it does facilitate further analogy with finance and therefore is a front-running 
candidate to describe how investors might financial performance in evolved electricity markets, in 
which generators are often publicly listed companies judged by the market.  From (5.2), the annualised 
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Where π i ,s  is the operating profit of technology i in scenario s: 
  
π i ,s = ws,tχ i ,s,t
t
∑     ∀i,s  (5.7) 
These losses, together with the weighting of each scenario, ws , define the distribution of losses, from 
which the expected loss can be determined.     
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CVaR represents the expected value of losses greater than VaR, where VaR is defined as a tail loss 
where the size of the tail is defined by αVaR .  It can be defined directly by selecting an alternative 
weighting scheme α s  that maximises the weighted average of losses in the tail, subject to the weight of 
each scenario not exceeding the objectively determined probability of each scenario and the total 
weight matching the pre-defined VaR level.  This approach is essentially the dual perspective of the 
approach taken in Rockafellar & Uryasev (2000) and Ehrenmann & Smeers (2011). The formulation is 
tailored to the discrete scenarios we contemplate in this structure and is in that sense less general than 
the formulation in Rockafellar & Uryasev (2000), but it aligns more directly with our future purposes 
than the aforementioned formulations, which ultimately need to resort to the dual to extract the desired 
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∑ =α VaR  :κ VaR     (5.10)  
  0 ≤α s ≤ ws  :κ s
−,+    ∀s  (5.11) 
As would a separate agent tasked with assessing risk, this optimisation maximises the weighted average 
of losses in the tail of the loss distribution defined by αVaR . Were (5.10) to be omitted from the 
formulation, the optimisation would apply the maximum weighting to all positive scenario losses, 
which may or may not exceed the proportion of scenarios, αVaR , that we are concerned with.  The 
inclusion of (5.10) not only prevents the optimisation from selecting all positive losses, but also may 
force it to select some negative losses, or low profits, in the event these outcomes fall within the 
portion of the loss distribution CVaR is concerned with.  The final constraint guarantees that no loss 
can be negatively weighted, or weighted more than the actual likelihood of the loss occurring.  This 
bounds the problem and prevents an effective arbitrage in which profitable scenarios would be assigned 
negative weightings to enable increased weightings for loss scenarios.  When expressed as an 
equivalent complementarity problem, the complementarity conditions are:  
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CAPi π i,s − FCi( ) +κ VaR
i
∑ +κ s+ ≥ 0   ⊥  α s ≥ 0    ∀s  (5.12) 
  
 
α VaR − α s
s
∑ = 0   ⊥  κ VaR free     (5.13) 
   ws −α s ≥ 0   ⊥  κ s
+ ≥ 0    ∀s  (5.14) 
From (5.12), where the scenario loss exceeds VaR, then κ s
+ > 0  so that from (5.14), the weighting of 
that scenario is set to its maximum, α s = ws .   Similarly, where the scenario loss is less than VaR, it 
must be the case that α s = 0 .  Finally, where the scenario loss is equal to VaR, it may take an 
intermediate value, which will be disciplined by complementarity condition (5.13), requiring the sum 
of assigned probabilities to equate with the level at which the VaR is defined.   The combined effect of 
these constraints is to define VaR and the weightings, α s , that can be used to define CVaR.   In our 
formulation, the distribution of scenario outcomes is discrete, which allows the possibility of  α
VaR  
coinciding precisely with the sum of relevant scenario probabilities.  In this case, the boundary 
scenario, α s = ws , with κ s
+ ≥ 0 from (5.14) leaves κ VaR  free to assume any value between the losses 
associated with the boundary scenario s, and the next more profitable/lower loss scenario.  While κ VaR  
is free and can define a multiplicity of solutions, the value of CVaR in each of the possible solutions is 
unaffected as the probabilities, α s , are defined uniquely and identical across all solutions.  By way of 
analogy to the definition of risk sets, and to aid the exposition, throughout the rest of this thesis we 
define the set of scenarios that play an active part,  α s > 0 , in the definition of CVaR as the CVaR set. 
Complementarity conditions (5.12) - (5.14) enable the calculation of CVaR, the expected 












     (5.15) 
The scaling factor 
 
1/α VaR = 1/ α s
s
∑  normalises the weighting scheme to ensure the weights sum to 
unity, thereby creating a conditional probability for the CVaR set.   
5.5 Equilibrium with Risk Aversion  
5.5.1 Introduction 
We begin by assuming that there are no meaningful long term contracting options available.  In some 
markets this is precisely the case, while in others specific market structures and contract forms are able 
to support investment, the analysis of which is highly dependent on the specific opportunities and 
challenges present.  In a number of cases, long term contracting options are plagued by poor 
specification of risks and doubts over the ultimate value of the instruments in climates where regulators 
and governments have incentives to intervene in the market (Boucher & Smeers, 2012), (Finon, 2008). 
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Nevertheless, even in an environment without long term contracting or structural options, 
generators still have long term risk management strategies available to them.  In the case of electricity 
generators, the long term decisions that pertain to the management of risk are typically investment 
decisions and as a result of considering risk aversion the equilibrium plant mix is altered.  
Investment decisions are viewed in the context of the overall portfolio of existing generation 
assets, so that the problem of investment under risk is essentially a portfolio optimisation problem.  
While it is certainly not exclusively the case, a preference based or at least preference aligned decision 
structure suggests decision making by upper management or the board of directors, whose remit 
loosely entails the long term management and strategic positioning of the firm.  We therefore consider 
the portfolio optimisation of generation assets as an example of risk management supported by a 
preference based trade-off between risk and return. 
In our framework, the trade-off between risk and return is assumed to be represented by a 
constant parameter, but in principle there could be a set of parameters, or the parameter could itself be 
a variable that reflects risk aversion as a function of risk size relative to firm size, for example.   
Although decision makers are unlikely to have formally identified the risk aversion parameter, or 
parameters, that describe their preferences, from the perspective of our analysis the relevant assumption 
is just that decision makers do have such a preference structure and that this structure describes the 
trade-off between risk and return.  Those preferences may be revealed by actions, or implied by equity 
market valuation models where the firm is publicly traded.  
5.5.2 Resolving Risk & Return 
The introduction of risk and risk aversion gives each economic agent a second criteria by which to 
evaluate decisions and therefore we require a mechanism to balance the typically competing objectives 
of risk and return.  In some cases this can be achieved by a dominance relationship when comparing 
prospective investment projects but typically a range of non-dominated options exists. Stochastic 
dominance is detailed in Appendix 7.6.   
To strike the preferred trade-off between risk and return, we would ideally optimise a utility 
function objective.  Utility functions are theoretical constructs designed to represent preferences.  The 
difficulty with a utility function approach is that the function for a particular firm is possibly 
unknowable, but definitely unknown and likely to exhibit significant complexity, making the 
econometric estimation of such a function problematic. Nevertheless, there are a number of standard 
functional forms that exhibit “sensible” properties when used to represent utility.  Once a utility 
function has been selected for a particular analysis, the utility function replaces the traditional profit 
maximisation function.  For investment problems, the utility function is typically a measure of future 
profits, or asset value. 
The approach developed by Markowitz yields efficient frontiers but there remains the question 
of how to choose between different Pareto-combinations of mean and variance.  To resolve the issue, 
we are required to balance expected returns with a risk measure.  Having made the decision to proceed 
in that direction, we must then ask which of the risk-return objectives should be used to make that 
choice, and which parameter(s) describe the trade-off between the twin objectives.   Several risk 
measures could be considered.  For example, in the extreme, the combination of the expected outcome 
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and the worst case outcome was suggested in Ziemba (2001).  But more intermediate options are 
typical and by way of example we consider the most common enactment of this trade-off (Huang & 
Wu, 2008), the mean-variance objective: 
  
 
R( X ) = 1−θ( )E( X )−θVar( X )        (5.16) 
Here θ  is a parameter that describes the relative importance of expected returns and the variance of 
returns.  The higher the value of θ  the more the investor is interested in minimising risk and the less 
they are interested in expected returns.  There is an estimation issue with respect to the determination 
of the parameter θ .  This is a difficulty present in any preference based regime where the parameter is 
used to identify risk aversion (Kallberg & Ziemba, 1983).  In the polar cases the investor is only 
interested in one objective or the other but this can lead to unrealistic results as the other objective is no 
longer relevant, implying ambivalence to either risk or return.  While this example used variance, a 
variety of other risk measures such as CVaR or single-sided variances can also be combined with the 
expected return.  
Kunzi-Bay & Mayer (2006) discuss the solution of a convex combination of expected returns 
and a CVaR risk measure.  Their approach casts the problem as a two-stage recourse problem, in which 
the first stage is to maximise the objective, with the risk measure defined in the recourse sub-problem.  
Our implementation also contemplates a firm that wishes to minimise a convex combination of 
expected losses and a single CVaR which is assessed at the firm, and not technological, level.  As we 
have adopted a complementarity formulation for the purpose of achieving other objectives, the risk 
measure of the equivalent sub-problem is represented by the conditions defining CVaR in Section 



















  (5.17)    
Here θ  represents the risk aversion of the investor.  When  θ = 1  the investor is only interested in risk, 
whereas when  θ = 0 , the investor is risk neutral.  Ignoring capacity limitations, the equilibrium 
investment conditions consistent with this objective represent a convex combination of the investment 




∑ FCi −π i,s⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ +θ
α s
αVaRs
∑ FCi −π i,s⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ ≥ 0
  
⊥   CAPi ≥ 0   ∀i  (5.18) 
There are several possible further interpretations available.  We can express (5.18) in a form that 
highlights the relationship between fixed costs, expected earnings and a marginal risk penalty: 
   
















⊥   CAPi ≥ 0   ∀i  (5.19)  
  
 
FCi − 1−θ( ) ws
s









⎥ ≥ 0   ⊥   CAPi ≥ 0   ∀i  (5.20) 
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Whereas the conventional equilibrium investment constraint is based on the difference between fixed 
costs and the marginal profitability of additional capacity, the introduction of a CVaR risk penalty 
replaces marginal profitability with a convex combination of the marginal profitability and marginal 
impact on the CVaR constraint.  The marginal CVaR penalty, which is a weighted average of the 
marginal profitability of technology i in the CVaR set, reflects the marginal impact on CVaR resulting 
from an increase in the capacity of technology i.   
The difference between the CVaR adjusted marginal profitability and the risk neutral marginal 
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   ∀i   (5.21) 
Technologies can be grouped based on the relationship between the expected or risk neutral earnings 
and the expected profitability amongst only the CVaR set.  This relationship determines the sign of the 




∑ π i ,s − ws
s
∑ π i ,s < 0        
For these technologies, expected profitability in the CVaR set is less than the risk neutral assessment of 
profitability, implying further investment in technology i would increase overall risk and suggesting 
positive correlation between the performance of these technologies and the overall portfolio.   The 
overall correlation is only suggestive because the relevant correlation considers only that portion of the 
distribution used to define the risk measure.  We have: 
  
 
FCi − 1−θ( ) ws
s









⎥ > FCi − ws
s
∑ π i,s     (5.22) 
Assuming the risk neutral level of capacity for each of these technologies is installed we have: 
  
 
FCi − 1−θ( ) ws
s









⎥ > 0        (5.23) 
To restore equilibrium as defined by (5.20), the installed capacity of each technology in this category 
must be reduced relative to their respective risk neutral levels, until expected overall earnings and/or 
expected CVaR set earnings increase to achieve parity with fixed costs.  Ceteris paribus, the largest risk 
penalty, and therefore the largest deviation from the risk neutral position in this direction, will occur 
when the rank correlation of portfolio profitability and the profitability of technology i in the CVaR set 




∑ π i ,s − ws
s
∑ π i ,s > 0      
For these technologies, expected profitability in the CVaR set is greater than the risk neutral 
assessment of profitability, implying further investment in technology i would decrease overall risk and 
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suggesting a negative correlation between the performance of these technologies and the overall 
portfolio.  We have: 
   
 
FCi − 1−θ( ) ws
s









⎥ < FCi − ws
s
∑ π i,s     (5.24) 
Assuming the risk neutral level of capacity for each of these technologies is installed we have: 
  
 
FCi − 1−θ( ) ws
s









⎥ < 0        (5.25) 
To restore equilibrium as defined by (5.20), the installed capacity of each technology in this category 
must be increased relative to their respective risk neutral levels, until expected overall and/or expected 
CVaR set earnings decrease to achieve parity with fixed costs.  Ceteris paribus, the largest hedging 
benefit, and therefore the largest deviation from the risk neutral position in this direction, will occur 
when the rank correlation of portfolio profitability and the profitability of technology i in the CVaR set 




∑ π i ,s − ws
s
∑ π i ,s = 0       
In this case risk adjusted profitability and risk neutral profitability are identical.  At the margin, there is 
no additional risk or hedging value associated with investment in these technologies, and the risk 
neutral level of capacity is appropriate for these technologies. 
It is important to clarify precisely what these conditions actually do, and do not, mean.   The 
introduction of risk aversion may lead to all technologies having reduced investment, relative to the 
risk neutral position.  As per the underlying mathematics, the conditions reflect the change in the 
objective function as a result of an increase in capacity of a particular technology.  They do not reflect 
a portfolio adjustment, in which the weighting applied to one asset swings to another, as would be more 
typical in the context of finance.  The difference is attributable to the absence of a budget constraint. In 
our framework there is no relativity to the investment process, and investment in individual 
technologies will occur whenever it can be justified.  However, given a requirement to invest a fixed 
amount, the optimisation procedure would also ensure that this occurs where net benefits are available.  
In such a model, the dual on the budget constraint would normalise these marginal benefits around the 
portfolio return, and of necessity create relative hedges.  
A further interpretation of the equilibrium investment condition is available with some minor 
re-arranging of (5.20): 
  
 





∑ π i,s ≥ 0
 
⊥  CAPi ≥ 0   ∀i  (5.26) 
By taking the same convex combination of the scenario probabilities and CVaR set conditional 
probabilities, we define the equilibrium investment condition in terms of risk-adjusted probabilities.  
Those risk-adjusted probabilities are endogenous and defined as: 
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ω s = 1−θ( )ws +θ α sαVaR      
∀s  (5.27) 
Taking advantage of this interpretation, and dividing throughout by FCi > 0 , the investment condition 









⊥  CAPi ≥ 0   ∀i > 0  (5.28) 
Risk-averse investors will equate the certainty equivalent of profits, and not the expected value of 
profits, with the fixed costs of investing.  The difference between the certainty equivalent and the 
expected return is referred to as a risk premium and, ceteris paribus, the premium is greater the more 
risk averse the investor is, as confirmed by (5.27).  The risk-adjusted probabilities are therefore specific 
to a particular risk attitude, and moreover, they are specific to individual firms whenever firms differ, 
for example, in cost structures, risk preferences or energy and capacity limitations.  It is clear from 
(5.27) that an increase in risk aversion, as measured by an increase in θ , increases the emphasis placed 
on poor results so that from (5.28) a reduction in investment will be necessary to regain parity with cost 
recovery on a risk adjusted basis.  Risk aversion leads to a relative decrease in the capacity of those 
technologies whose profitability within the CVaR set is positively correlated with the profitability of 
the overall portfolio, and a relative increase in the capacity of those whose profitability within the 
CVaR set is negatively correlated with the profitability of the overall portfolio and therefore provide 
some hedging benefits.   
The imposition of capacity constraints and opportunity limits will also affect the equilibration 
process and where those limits bind full equilibration will not be possible.  Whereas in the risk neutral 
case, capacity limits created a disparity in returns between those technologies that were limited and 
those that were not, in this case there is already a disparity in the returns of individual technologies that 
is supported by the risk/hedging properties of those technologies.  Absent capacity constraints, those 
differences between technologies are eliminated when we view the returns of each technology in risk 
adjusted terms.  Under risk aversion, capacity limits prevent this equilibration and imply an equilibrium 
capacity mix that features disparity between not only observed returns on account of risk adjustments, 
but also a disparity between risk-adjusted returns as a result of capacity limitations. 
5.5.3 Sculpting the Loss Distribution 
Our framework can readily consider a number of different risk measures. The firm may be concerned 
about risk at a variety of different levels, and in a variety of different dimensions and may wish to 
control risks with more than a single constraint. For example, a firm may be relatively aggressive in 
assuming risk provided existential risks are avoided.  Or they may be unconcerned about eventualities 
caused by natural occurrences, confident that the market valuation mechanisms underpinning their 
valuation will be relatively forgiving of poor results in circumstances that can be explained by 
unexpected natural variation.  In general, the return distribution, representing the entire of spectrum of 
risk, can be sculpted by applying varying degrees of risk aversion to varying levels of risk, or to 
different subsets of the scenario tree. We do not consider the latter motivation here, and instead 
 207 
consider a firm with a set of risk preferences that describes their attitude to a variety of different risk 
levels.  CVaR can be assessed at a variety of different levels, which we denote by α c
VaR , so that 
collectively a set of CVaR preferences will effectively sculpt the profit distribution.  As in Section 














⎥      (5.29) 
Each CVaR definition is represented in the model by a set of complementarity conditions that define 
the optimal CVaR for each risk level, c: 
  CAPi π i ,s − FCi( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ +κ cVaRi∑ +κ s,c
+ ≥ 0   ⊥  α s,c ≥ 0    ∀s,c  (5.30) 
  α c
VaR − α s,c
s
∑ = 0   ⊥  κ cVaR free    ∀c  (5.31) 
  ws −α s,c ≥ 0   ⊥  κ s,c
+ ≥ 0    ∀s,c  (5.32) 
The set of optimisations above can readily be identified as preferences held by an investor.  They could 
equally be interpreted as relating to several entities, each with different concerns.  Taking the first 
interpretation, the generator assigns weightings to each of the CVaR values so that a convex 

















∑ FCi −π i,s⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ ≥ 0 ⊥ CAPi ≥ 0  ∀i  (5.33) 












    ∀i  (5.34) 
Following the same process as before we can develop the risk neutral probabilities associated with this 
preference structure.  From (5.33): 
   




















⎥ ≥ 0   ⊥   CAPi ≥ 0   ∀i  (5.35) 
Taking the difference between the CVaR adjusted marginal profitability and the risk neutral marginal 




































  ∀i   (5.36) 
 208 
In the case where only a single CVaR penalty is considered,  θc = θ , leaving the same expression as 
(5.21).  The relationship between risk averse earnings and risk neutral earnings depends as before on 
whether technology i is correlated with the overall portfolio.  In this case, the assessment is more 
detailed, as more CVaR constraints are involved, potentially leading to the consideration of a wider 
range of CVaR sets and more complex correlations in the CVaR calculation.  The weighted difference 
between the earnings of technology i in the portfolio and each set of scenarios that correspond to each 
CVaR preference defines the objective so that the correlation is more nuanced than the case of a single 
CVaR measure.  Nevertheless, it remains the case that in the presence of risk aversion, the composition 
of the optimal plant mix will swing towards having a relatively smaller share of those technologies 
whose profitability over the range of CVaR sets is generally positively correlated with the profitability 
of the overall portfolio, and a relatively larger share of those technologies whose profitability over the 
range of CVaR sets is generally negatively correlated with the profitability of the overall portfolio, and 
therefore provide some hedging benefits. 
A further interpretation of the equilibrium investment condition is available with some minor 
re-arranging of (5.35): 
  
 















∑ π i,s ≥ 0   ⊥   CAPi ≥ 0  ∀i  (5.37) 
The risk neutral probabilities are defined as follows: 
   












   ∀s  (5.38) 
We can express (5.35) in terms of rates of return and risk neutral probabilities as follows: 






≥ 0  ⊥   CAPi ≥ 0   ∀i > 0  (5.39) 
5.5.4 Equilibration of Investment 
When we introduce risk aversion in the form we have, the investor is concerned about a convex 
combination of two or more return distributions; the distribution of returns across all scenarios, and, for 
each of the CVaR measures considered, the conditional distribution of returns across the relevant 
CVaR sets. The derivation in Section 5.5.2 illustrates how the basic convex combination of earnings 
can be rearranged to an alternatively weighted form.  For each scenario, the scenario PDC and, by 
extension, profitability is combined using alternative endogenously determined risk adjusted weights 
based on investor preferences.    
We wish to re-examine the marginal benefit function for an individual technologies in order to 
observe the implications of risk aversion.  The introduction of scenarios, per se, does not impact the 
basic form of the marginal benefit function other than to further fragment the piecewise structure.  
Accordingly, as utilisation levels are endogenous in our framework, the option value or weighted 
profitability of an incremental unit of capacity also shrinks in a piecewise linear fashion.  The 
 209 
additional fragmentation results from the increased potential for incremental capacity to cause a 
discrete change to the maximum marginal cost in an increasing number of scenarios and sub-periods.  
To avoid unnecessary complication, we assume the LDC is linear throughout this section, and 
the merit order is constant across sub-periods and scenarios.   Where this is not the case, there may be 
variations in the rate of change in utilisation that have direct implications for the marginal benefit 
function and, depending on the shape of the LDC, the result will be a non-monotonic change in the 
gradient of the marginal benefit function.  To be clear, it is the gradient of that function that adjusts 
non-monotonically, not the benefit function itself, which remains (weakly) monotonically decreasing. 
Our assumption is only for illustrative purposes, so that we may clarify the two separate 
effects that are introduced when risk aversion is considered. 
Stable CVaR Sets 
The assumption of a stable CVaR set means that the set of scenarios that define CVaR and, more 
specifically, the set of weightings that define the CVaR measure, is constant.  In a local sense this 
assumption is generally true.  When considering more significant adjustments, increasing the capacity 
of a particular technology may make the firms portfolio susceptible to new risks, while potentially 
eliminating others, leading to a re-assessment of which scenarios pose the greater risk to the firm. 
Ultimately the assumption is implausible as eventually the addition of enough capacity of a particular 
technology will completely dominate the expected portfolio performance, and radically adjust the 
CVaR set.  Nevertheless, we now consider the adjustment of the marginal benefit function using two 
examples for which CVaR scenarios are stable. 
 
Example 1: Load Risk 
In the specific case of load risk we can anticipate the CVaR set.  Depending on the contract position of 
the firm, either high load or low load will be problematic, and in this example we assume that low load 
levels are the risk the firm is focussing on.  Figure 35 shows the PDC based on objective weightings, 
and a similar construction using conditional probabilities or weightings based only on the CVaR set. 
 
 
Figure 35: Expected and CVaR PDC's with Load Risk 
As shown, the conditional PDC for the CVaR set, shown on the right, has shifted left on account of 
available capacity being higher than these scenarios alone would support.  In relative terms, high price 
periods are truncated and low price periods are extended.  Figure 36 shows the marginal benefit 
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function implied by a weighted average of these PDC’s alongside the marginal benefit function for a 
risk neutral investor.   
 
Figure 36: Marginal Benefit Function with Load Risk 
Naturally, the influence of CVaR is to reduce the optimal level of capacity.  The nature of risk aversion 
is to lower the marginal benefit of investment and decrease optimal investment.  As capacity is added, 
then according to both the expected or CVaR measure, other technologies are displaced and the 
marginal benefit of additional capacity decreases at a rate determined by the marginal profitability of 
the peak technology.  As result the functional form of the marginal benefit function remains piecewise 
linear, with the rate of decrease based on a combination of expected and CVaR scenario returns 
weighted by the risk aversion coefficient. When sufficient capacity is accumulated in either the overall 
or CVaR set to change the marginal technology, then the slope of the marginal benefit function will 
also change. The change is discrete and is measurable by the decrease in the market price during 
peaking periods under whichever scenario set initiates the change.  Under perfect competition that 
difference will also equal the difference in cost price between the old and the new peaking technology.  
Our approach, using endogenous utilisation levels based on optimal trade-offs will display this effect, 
whereas the conventional optimisation formulation with uplift components will distort this effect 
somewhat. As before, the marginal benefit function is derived by varying the capacity of a single 
technology from zero upwards while maintaining fixed capacity of other technologies.  In the case of 
risk neutrality, these capacity levels could readily be interpreted as equilibrium capacity levels but, 
when comparing risk neutral marginal benefit functions and risk averse marginal benefit functions, the 
issue is more complicated as the relevant equilibrium capacity level for other technologies is different 
in each case.   
Our presentation treats the PDC’s as if they were merged or averaged, with a relative 
weighting defined by the risk aversion parameter.  This leads to a minor misunderstanding of the form 
of the marginal benefit function.  Separate consideration of each PDC would ensure recognition of the 
fact that the expected marginal benefit available and conditional marginal benefit applicable to the 
CVaR set adjusts at a different pace and individually experience discrete changes in the rate of the 
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adjustment at different load levels.  In contrast, the combined viewpoint effectively re-orders the 
returns so that equal returns in the overall and CVaR scenarios are grouped together even though they 
correspond to different capacity levels of the technology under consideration.  The final equilibrium 
remains a weighted average of the returns and so is unaffected by the manner of the decomposition 
used. 
 
Example 2: Fuel Price Risk  
We consider the example of a non-dominant technology whose profitability within the CVaR set is, at 
least initially, negatively correlated with the profitability of the portfolio, so that it provides some 
hedging benefits and has a higher marginal benefit that its spot market returns suggest.  For simplicity 
we assume that there is only one such technology.  In this example, the CVaR set correspond to 
scenarios in which there are large increases in the cost price of fuel for the dominant technology in the 
portfolio.  In those scenarios, this hedging technology supplants the technology with significant fuel 
risk in the merit order and has a higher utilisation and profitability than is normally the case. 
 
Figure 37: Marginal Benefit Function with Fuel Price Risk 
Figure 37 shows the technology has a higher marginal benefit under risk aversion on account of its 
hedging properties.  This is a direct result of the risk weighted average of profitability being higher 
than the objectively weighted profitability.  The adjustment of the marginal benefit function is identical 
under risk aversion and risk neutrality until we reach capacity levels at which the technology subject to 
fuel risk begins to be supplanted.  The slope of the marginal benefit function diverges at this point, 
becoming flatter, and remains flatter until either sufficient capacity has been built to eliminate the risky 
technology entirely from the plant mix, or the optimal level of installed capacity of the hedging 
technology is reached.   
Unstable CVaR Sets 
There is likely to be interaction between different risks, or risks that correlate more strongly with 
specific technologies, and in so in general we need to consider each scenario separately as they cannot 
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be combined using an objective scenario weighting or probability.  Therefore, at least in the form we 
have used, the introduction of CVaR as a risk measure creates a further complication in the derivation 
of the marginal benefit of investment function.   In principle, the CVaR optimisation chooses the best 
description of risk from amongst all possible combinations that satisfy the significance level constraint.  
Each potential combination of scenarios satisfying the constraint on significance represents a feasible 
solution to the CVaR optimisation problem described in Section 5.4.2.  Figure 38 presents a simplified 
but indicative view of possible CVaR sets and the value of CVaR in each as capacity is adjusted.   Each 
possible CVaR set is denoted a CVaR combination.  Precisely drawn, the functions shown should be 
piecewise linear rather than linear, for the same reasons as discussed before, however this complication 
is not significant in this discussion. 
 
Figure 38: CVaR Set Combinations and Capacity Choice 
For some CVaR combinations, additional capacity increase the associated conditional expected profit 
of that combination of scenarios, while for others it decreases.  The actual CVaR measure for a given 
capacity choice is represented by the supremum of all such functions, which defines the worst 
performing, or highest loss, CVaR combination at each level of capacity and satisfies the 
complementarity conditions (5.30)-(5.32).   In the case shown, the technology under consideration 
initially provides a hedge against those outcomes that are worst for the overall portfolio.   
As capacity increases from zero towards A, conditional losses for CVaR combination 2 are 
decreasing at a lower rate than the actual CVaR set, defined by CVaR combination 1.  At the same time 
losses in CVaR combination 3 are increasing.  In general, there could be any combination of CVaR 
combinations, adjusting relative to the actual CVaR set.  At A, the CVaR set is on the verge of 
changing from CVaR combination 1 to CVaR combination 2 as at this point CVaR combination 2 
becomes the marginal combination and defines the supremum of all CVaR scenario combinations.  
This change represents the focus of risk changing from one scenario to another.  Moving beyond A 
represents a discrete change in the scenario weightings defined by the complementarity conditions 
(5.30)-(5.32), or in linear programming terms, movement to a new basis as one scenario is removed 
and another added to the optimal set.  As there is no restriction on the number of scenarios that may 
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participate in the definition of the CVaR set, then at A we have a range of solutions to the CVaR 
defining problem.  These represent all of the feasible convex combinations of the weightings associated 
with scenario entering focus and the scenario leaving focus.  The two basic solutions corresponding to 
the boundary of that set of solutions are equal in terms of the measure they define, so although the 
conditional PDC describing the CVaR set is discretely adjusted by the revision of scenario weights, the 
marginal benefit of investment remains the same, implying continuity of that function.  As the 
functions above are monotonic, it must also be the case at each intersection that the gradient of the 
conditional profitability function of the CVaR combination entering the CVaR definition is greater 
(less negative) than that for the existing CVaR set, so the slope of the marginal benefit function 
changes discretely at this capacity level. 
Eventually, as shown in Figure 38 at the point B, the level of capacity for this technology 
reaches a level at which the overall performance of the portfolio becomes correlated with its own 
performance.   At this point, additional investment will worsen CVaR so that the technology no longer 
provides a hedge, and becomes risk enhancing.  We discuss this issue further in Section 5.6 in the 
context of contracting. 
Conventional Optimisation Formulations 
As discussed in Section 1.6.2, when adopting the conventional optimisation formulation, the 
adjustment in marginal benefits is restricted to price adjustment alone as utilisation levels are fixed.   
When investment results in a particular technology being marginal and at full capacity, the traditional 
approach relies on non-competitive prices, including a capacity uplift or cost recovery component to 
support investment.  
When risk is introduced the same problem remains.  By virtue of the risk premium introduced, 
whether directly or implicitly through the use of risk adjusted weightings, the capacity uplift that is 
required by the investment constraint is increased.  In the risk neutral model, spot market prices were 
defined by capacity cost recovery post investment.  With the introduction of risk, we have an even 
more inconsistent situation in which spot market prices are also, to some degree, determined by the risk 
premium on investment.  Investors would have to assume that once built, the market operator would 
respect their own assessment of the required risk adjustment in spot market pricing, or if viewed 
dynamically, that the spot market pricing would support the required risk adjustment of future 
investors.   
Given the components of the spot market price now include a cost recovery component and a 
risk premium on that, the question for investors becomes which part of the observed price is which.  
The situation is further muddied when we consider that the risk of other technologies directly 
influences the spot market pricing of all other technologies as other technologies capture the benefits of 
risk premiums associated with other technologies while inframarginal.  
While unpalatable in a theoretical model such as this, this type of logic is factored into the 
determination of price caps in Australia, for example.  Where that occurs though, we prefer to model 
that explicitly to ensure the form of consideration is correctly anticipated rather than being 
indiscriminately applied to the PDC in general. 
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5.5.5 Risk Constraints 
When viewed from the perspective of the preference system that they imply, risk constraints appear to 
have weak conceptual foundations.  Risk constraints imply that no amount of additional profit could 
persuade the firm to assume incrementally more risk than allowed by the risk constraint.  This is 
unlikely to be true, but in a wider context, risk constraints may not represent preferences alone.  They 
may arise as a result the transaction costs of managing risk, including the need to benchmark risk, as 
well as the direct costs of managing risk.  That aside, constraints are the conceptual basis of the original 
approach of Markowitz, although that form of portfolio optimisation envisaged more than a single 
interpretation of the constraint. Instead, that approach involved the parametric consideration of either 
risk or return constraints, while optimising the other to produce a Pareto-efficient frontier from which 
investors could choose.   
The Markowitz approach can be extended with addition of preferences to develop a solution 
on the Pareto efficient risk-return frontier.  Krokhmal et al (2002) were first to integrate CVaR 
constraints into optimisation problems.  Their approach is based on forming an estimate of the efficient 
frontier, perhaps of a linear form, for consideration in the objective.  Others such as Fabian (2008) also 
consider the problem of integrating risk constraints into a stochastic programming framework, 
focussing on algorithmic issues surrounding the development of an approximately efficient frontier 
from which a representation of CVaR is established.  Both of these approaches are amenable to the 
definition of several CVaR constraints.  These decompositions provide a useful conceptual basis with 
which to consider the means by which investment choices are made from among the alternatives 
available.  However, in an equilibrium model the position of those frontiers is endogenous, which adds 
some complication to the issue.  
Our implementation proceeds on the same basis as before. CVaR preferences are formulated 
utilising the definition of CVaR provided by the complementarity conditions in Section 5.4.2.  In order 
to comply with external requirements such as financing covenants, the firm must operate within limits 
and therefore must implement a constraint of the following form that limits CVaR to  CVaR
+ , with the 
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⊥    CAPi ≥ 0    ∀i  (5.42) 
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Where the CVaR constraint is slack, then from (5.40), we have  κ CON = 0  so that the risk adjusted and 
risk neutral equilibrium capacity conditions coincide.  Where the CVaR constraint is binding, we have 
a risk-based adjustment to the profitability of technology i: 
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∀i  (5.43) 
As before, the sign and magnitude of the risk adjustment is determined by the correlation between the 
profitability of technology i, and the overall portfolio.  To the extent that technology i is correlated to 





∑ π i,s  will be greater for technology i than for those other technologies where the 
correlation is less positive.  As  κ CON > 0 , technology i attracts a greater risk penalty, thereby requiring 
a reduction in the capacity of technology i relative to the risk neutral capacity that would be selected.   
The reverse holds for those technologies whose profitability is negatively correlated to the overall 






∑ π i,s = 0 , technology i attracts no risk premium or discount. 
We are also able to view the equilibrium investment constraint in terms of risk neutral 
probabilities.  From (5.42) we have:	
  
 









⊥    CAPi ≥ 0    ∀i  (5.44) 
Normalising by a factor of 
 



















⊥    CAPi ≥ 0    ∀i  (5.45)	
We confirm that the weights sum to unity: 
























= 1  
 (5.46) 
The risk constraint also coincides with the convex combination interpretation noted earlier.  We define 
the risk neutral probability as 









   ∀s   (5.47) 
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Risk adjustments are implied by preferences and/or constraints, so that for every binding risk constraint 
there is an implied risk preference, and vice versa.  In this case, the preference and constraint based risk 





Substituting the risk neutral probabilities and dividing all terms by  FCi , we arrive at the same 
equilibrium investment condition as in (5.28), albeit with a different definition of the endogenous risk 
neutral probabilities:   






≥ 0 ⊥   CAPi ≥ 0     ∀i > 0   (5.48) 
From the risk measure we have developed, we are able to define an optimal portfolio frontier in risk-
return space by varying the CVaR constraint.  To cast the problem in more identifiable terms, 
consistent with the usual presentation, we normalise the constraint and the model output to percentage 
returns.  To do this we rely on the positive homogeneity of CVaR as a coherent risk measure.  If 
investors wish to elicit some preference information, parametrically varying the CVaR constraint will 
allow them to construct an efficient risk return frontier so that the sensitivity of profit to risk taking can 
be understood in terms that coincide with standard business practice. 
 
5.6 Contracting 
5.6.1 Introduction  
The primary source of risk management in electricity markets is through contracting.  Contracting 
redefines and reassigns risk between participants.  That said, risk, or contract, markets are unlikely to 
be complete.  Contracts designed to eliminate long-term project risk, either for a major consumer, for 
the investor, or the investor’s financier, are often hard to find in many markets (Deng & Oren, 2006).  
These sorts of contract may be required to secure funding for a significant capital project and in many 
countries this surety may have to be provided by the government.  In the absence of such sureties, 
vertical integration represents a de facto strategy where markets are not performing well or are thin, 
and where risk premiums are high (Meade & O'Connor, 2009).   The nature of the availability of these 
contracts and/or the possibility of vertical integration is specific to individual markets and we do not 
focus on these in this research. 
Although there are typically a range of contracting options, transaction costs prevent the 
identification, development and trading of a definitive range of contracts to cover every conceivable 
risk.  Contracts are typically written on the basis of outcomes rather than the underlying reasons for a 
particular market eventuality, although exotic options that are directly related to specific causal 
eventualities, such as temperature or weather, have been created (Lee & Oren, 2009) and, at least in 
principle, these offer the promise of inter-sector trading of risk between entities who share no common 
outputs.  Within a sector, a contract focussed on outcomes rather than causes is not necessarily 
problematic, as investors ultimately care about the distribution of market outcomes and not the 
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underlying reason for them.  Problems can arise with standardised contracts when they fail to account 
for timeframes and for certain types of risk, or when parties lack a counter party, or the counter party is 
asymmetric and has alternative risk management tools available to them in the medium or longer term.  
There are many different contracts that might be applied to a given risk position, but a few are 
particularly relevant to electricity markets, in which a core of standard contract forms are commonly 
traded, in addition to a much smaller cohort of specialised contract forms offering protection against 
specific types of risk. Among the basic contractual forms, we see some that are applicable to different 
technology types.  For example, a theoretically fully reliable base load plant could significantly reduce 
market risk if it were to sign a CFD for its entire output.  Similarly, a peaker could significantly reduce 
market risk by selling an option on its output with a strike price equal to its marginal cost.  Such a 
combination would leave the owner indifferent as to whether the plant operated or not, as the revenue 
would come from subscription to the option.  Below is a very brief summary of common contract 
forms: 
• An option gives the right but not the obligation to buy or sell (call or put) an underlying asset 
at a pre-determined price.   
• Forward Contracts specify a price and quantity at a specific future date, time and locations 
• Futures Contracts are similar to forward contracts but, by virtue of being exchanged traded 
and therefore standardised, they contain some basis risk.  Forward markets are promoted as an 
appropriate measure to improve electricity market design (Cramton, 2010) 
• Swaps/Contracts for Difference allow two parties to agree a price, with one party 
compensating the other depending on whether the market price is above or below the agreed 
price.   A swap can be thought of as a strip of forwards.  
• FTR’s are designed to allow participants to hedge locational risks that arise from the nature of 
the transmission system.  While transmission losses cannot be hedged effectively, FTR or 
similar markets do allow hedging of the price differentials that arise from transmission 
constraints, and provide some protection from network related gaming. 
A more detailed review of commonly traded contract forms is presented in Deng & Oren (2006), and 
Eydeland & Geman (1999).  More exotic contracts, many of which are compound forms of basic 
contractual arrangements, are described in a review by Chase Bank (1992).  
The interaction between contracting and spot market behaviour is often cast in a multiple stage 
context in which the contract market is resolved in advance of the spot market (Shanbhag et al., 2011), 
(Ralph & Smeers, 2006) & (Yao, Adler, & Oren, 2008).  Others, including Batstone (2003), consider 
an opposing interaction, where spot market outcomes influence contract prices.  Without a supporting 
explanation of entry deterrence or, alternatively, invoking the basic assumption that entry is restricted 
for some reason, the entry mechanism of perfect competition will apply equally to either market, 
leaving the risk adjusted return from each market equal in equilibrium.  Contracts may be entered 
continuously and/or on a rolling basis, creating a complex information structure in which the contract 
term and information structure is significant along with the ability of the firm to dynamically hedge 
risk operationally.   To simplify, we assume that contracts are entered into for a term equal to a single 
period, and this is done before particular hydrological, or other significant conditions, are realised.   
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Finally, contracts themselves are subject to their own uncertainty and/or risk, and require 
considerable prudential oversight if parties to a contract are to be assured, inasmuch as it is reasonably 
practicable to do so, that the contract can be satisfied.  In what follows we ignore this aspect of 
contracting.   
5.6.2 Forward Contracts 
Introduction 
Although the contracting landscape is rich, we confine ourselves to the analysis of forward contracts, 
these being one of the predominant contract structures in electricity markets (Deng & Oren, 2006). 
Forwards are financial contracts that can be defined in a variety of ways, over a variety of timeframes 
and groupings, enabling a portfolio of forwards to be constructed to reasonably match a certain load 
profile.  We focus on a single simple contract designed to smooth variations in prices for both 
consumers and generators over an annual period, in which each party agrees to transact a quantity, 
FWD, at a price, , both of which we initially assume are fixed.  This represents a strip of forwards 
and is known as a “swap”. It comprises a series of individual forward contracts, for which the reference 
price is the average over the period concerned.  We do not consider discounting as the contract is 
assumed to have zero value in prospect and therefore requires no upfront payment. 
Contract Payout Mechanics 
From the perspective of the generator selling FWD units of the contract in a particular scenario, the 
pay-out in a particular scenario can be expressed as: 
      (5.49) 
Whenever the time weighted average market prices in scenario s exceeds the contract price, generators 
compensate contract purchasers according to the difference.  Therefore, the firm’s loss function in a 
given scenario is:  
  
   
  (5.50) 
Taking expectation across all scenarios we have: 
    
  (5.51) 
Re-arranging (7.46) gives a more intuitive statement of the objective function, defined in terms of 
losses, in the form of capacity costs less the sum of operating and contract trading profits: 
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We draw the attention of the reader to the distinction between , the time weighted average price 
within a scenario and , the time weighted average price across all scenarios and note that in the 
same terms as (7.47), a base-load plant operating all the time at full capacity will earn spot market 
income of .   Therefore, the contract price precisely covers fixed and operating costs.  This 
well-known equivalence between the economics of base-load technologies and the contractual structure 
of a CFD holds only in risk neutral terms as risk adjusted scenario weightings are endogenous. 
Defining CVaR with Contracting 
Given a particular investment plan, a CVaR optimisation calculates the CVaR measure at the required 
level, , effectively defining the worst expectation for that portion of the profit distribution under 
consideration.  Including contracts, the CVaR defined by our optimisation is: 
     (5.53) 
Following the same procedure used earlier, we define CVaR at  level as an alternatively weighted 
profit using the following optimisation. 
                       (5.54) 
Subject to:       (5.55)  
       (5.56) 
The complementarity conditions describing the solution to this optimisation are: 
 
      (5.57) 
         (5.58) 
         (5.59) 
5.6.3 Contract Markets 
Generators 
Typically, optimal contracting or portfolio construction more generally are defined in terms of fixed 
prices for contracts, or financial assets.  The optimisation of the portfolio is therefore based on the 
choice of quantities.  In the spirit of Ralph and Smeers (2011), we consider contracting in a framework 
in which the price and quantity of contracts traded are endogenous.  We consider two broad types of 
risk: quantity risk and price risk.  These could be proxies for underlying risks but suffice for this 
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We begin by reintroducing the risk-neutral generator’s loss function, and consider the contract 
quantity as a variable rather than a constant, although still with a fixed contract price: 
    
   (5.60) 
The complementarity condition governing the equilibrium contract position for the generator is: 
  
       (5.61) 
In the absence of risk aversion, where , the time weighted average price, exceeds the contract 
value price, a generator will not sell any forward contracts.  When the contract price is greater than 
, full contracting will occur.  We consider a risk-averse generator, whose optimal contracting 
condition is:  
  
      (5.62) 
Which can be more conveniently stated as: 
        (5.63) 
Barring any restriction on contracting, risk averse generators will continue to sell forward contracts 
until: 
         (5.64) 
This represents a convex combination of the time-weighted average over all scenarios and those over 
the generators CVaR set. We can state the acceptable (negative) premium for generators selling 
contracts as: 
        (5.65) 
The premium is defined relative to the fair value.  With heterogeneous participants, the premium will 
different for each participant, as each will face the same market price of contracts.  When the CVaR set 
is constant the level of contracts, while lowering CVaR (and VaR) and improving the firms objective 
function, does not alter the marginal benefit of investment.  When these scenario sets do change, the 
marginal benefit also changes.  Starting from the point of zero contracting, increases in the contract 
position eventually lead to reduction in the discount generators are prepared to accept.  Eventually 
higher contract levels reduce the discount generators are willing to offer to zero.  At contracting levels 
beyond this, generators demand a premium for accepting risk. At these contract levels, the contract 
position becomes the dominant position in the portfolio and is effectively hedged by physical capacity 
rather than the other way around.  
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When risk markets are not complete and the contractual form of the contract does not align perfectly 
with the risks faced by the firm the CVaR set will not be stable.  For example, where a firm faces not 
only price risk, but also some quantity risk, and the CVaR set comprises scenarios that include a 
mixture of outcomes associated with these individual risks, then an increase in the contract quantity 
will asymmetrically impact the scenarios and cause a reassessment of the scenarios that comprise the 
CVaR set.  In contrast, where the firm’s risk is entirely price related, the supply curve for contracts will 
only consist of two tranches; one for when under contracted and one for when over-contracted.   
Figure 39 shows the nature of contract supply when the CVaR set is not stable.  The marginal 
benefit of contracting is piecewise constant, so that throughout each contract range in which the CVaR 





Figure 39: Contract Supply 
The generator will be willing to sell contracts at a discount while they are under-contracted and the 
weighted average of spot market prices in the CVaR set is lower than , the expected value of the 
contract.  Conversely, generators will require a premium to fair value if they are to be enticed to sign 
contracts while already over-contracted, as additional contract signings increase, and not decrease, risk.  
The supply curve itself is also parameterised by the degree of risk aversion, and ranges from horizontal 
at fair value when the firm is not risk averse, to staggered and sensitive to CVaR scenarios.  The 
premium or discount to  increases with the degree of their risk aversion, as shown in Figure 40.   
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Figure 40: Risk Aversion and Contract Supply 
Consumers 
As with the previous discussion, we restrict our analysis to the choice to the same single contract, and 
ignore the potential for forming a portfolio of contracts to reflect a particular load profile.  We assume 
the consumer’s basic objective is to minimise the total purchase cost of a fixed energy consumption, 
which is defined by the sum of contract and spot purchase costs: 
 
    (5.66) 
The problem could be made more complex by consideration of the Load Weighted Average Price 
(LWAP) for each demand side participant, but this is just a different weighted cost and does not affect 
the analysis, other than creating a numerical difference, and providing potential justification for 
demand-side participants having different risk profiles.  The complementarity conditions describing the 
consumer’s optimal contracting policy are: 
  
      (5.67) 
Recognising the summation expression is  we have:  
  
      (5.68) 
In the absence of risk aversion, where the contract price exceeds , the time weighted average 
price, a consumer will not demand any forward contracts.  When the contract price is less than , 
full contracting will occur.  We now consider the case where the consumer, being risk averse, also 
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      (5.69) 
Here  is determined in conjunction with , using the approach discussed in Section 5.4.1.  The 
consumer’s objective is: 
  
     (5.70) 
Where:  
       (5.71) 
The consumer’s optimal contracting condition is governed by: 
  
      (5.72) 
Which can be more conveniently stated as: 
        (5.73) 
Risk-averse consumers will purchase forward contracts until: 
        (5.74) 
This represents a convex combination of the time-weighted average over all scenarios and those over 
the worst scenarios as adjudged by the consumers CVaR optimisation.  We can state the acceptable 
premium as: 
       (5.75) 
The consumer will be willing to pay a risk premium while they are under-contracted and the time-
weighted average price in the CVaR scenarios is higher than , the expected value of the contract.  
Conversely consumers will require a discount if they are to be enticed to sign contracts while already 
over-contracted, as additional contract signings increase, and not decrease, risk.  The premium or 
discount to  naturally increases with the degree of their risk aversion.    
Contract Market Clearance 
The clearance of the contract market is governed by the following complementarity condition: 
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The simplest case to consider is that in which all participants are risk neutral.  In this case, as shown in 
Figure 40, generator supply curves for contracts are perfectly elastic at the price .  From Figure 
40, the same result holds for demand-side participants.  The equilibrium is not unique in terms of 
quantity, but it is in terms of price, as while any contract quantity could be traded, trades will only 
occur at .  At that price, all participants are also indifferent as to whether they trade contracts or 
not.  Where individual participants are not all risk neutral, the situation becomes significantly more 
complex.  Aggregate demand and supply in the contract market are shaped by many factors, including 
the actual risks being faced, the degree of risk aversion, and the completeness or otherwise of the risk 
market.  We begin by considering risk aversion while maintaining the completeness assumption.   
Where participants are risk averse the demand function for contracts is decreasing, albeit not 
monotonically, and in the same fashion, the supply of contracts is increasing.  As we assume market 
completeness, and the only contract available addresses price risk, we implicitly assume that price risk 
is the only risk in the market.  Under those conditions, alteration of the contract quantity will only 
adjust the CVaR set once, at the balanced level where the contract and physical portfolio swap 
dominance from one to the other.  Each individual demand and supply function has only two tranches.  
One corresponds to the contract levels below the contact quantity that would balance the portfolio, 
while the other applies to contract levels above the contract quantity that would balance the portfolio.  
The degree to which each tranche deviates from  is determined by the level of risk 
aversion, as shown in Figure 40.  If we aggregate the demand for, or supply of, contracts, we get a 
piecewise constant function, for which the number of tranches is double the number of unique risk 
aversion levels among the participants involved.  Following the supply-side, we know that for each 
generator, g, the contract price that corresponds to the level of risk aversion they experience is: 
  
     (5.77) 
At the contract quantity that balances their portfolio, the CVaR changes sign, and the acceptable 
contract price reflects a premium to fair value rather than a discount.  The supply curve for contracts is 
vertical at this quantity.  The same is true for the demand-side.  The level at which supply and demand 
are balanced in aggregate is the same as expected total supply and demand in the underlying energy 
market are also equal in equilibrium.  The vertical sections corresponding to a contract level equal to 
the expected quantity cleared in the energy market is defined by the contract price ranges in which the 
participant would achieve a balanced portfolio:   
  
  (5.78) 
Outside of this price ranges the demand or supply for contracts would be higher or lower.  In the case 
of generators, at prices above the maximum of the range they will willingly supply an unlimited 
number of contracts, whereas below the minimum of the range, they will supply zero.   To achieve 
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market, that implies the price must fall within the range defined by the least risk averse or, more 
generally, most risk neutral, participant.  This example is in agreement with the more general result in 
Smeers & Ralph (2011).  Accordingly, the risk premium/discount finally paid is set by the most risk-
neutral participant, which is suggestive of the benefits of having properly functioning financial risk 
markets.  We can further confirm this by re-arranging (5.78), for any pairwise comparison of 
participants: 
        (5.79) 
Where  and  are the equilibrium risk premiums for the generator and consumer respectively.  
From the perspective of the generator and the consumer we also have: 
       (5.80) 
The implication of (5.80) is to confirm that all participants pay equal post-contracting risk premiums in 
equilibrium, as we would expect with a unique price determination, and by virtue of contracting to the 
point where that price reflects the marginal benefit of contracting, they face the same marginal risk as 
the most risk neutral participant (Ralph & Smeers, 2011).  The result is considerably narrower than that 
of Ralph & Smeers (2011) in that in this example all participants have precisely the same risk set, and 
there is only a single risk. 
Third Parties 
As forwards are financial contracts it is theoretically, and practically, possible for any institution 
capable of satisfying the market’s prudential requirements to enter.   Participants that are large and 
have significant diversification can operate with close to zero correlation so that in the limit they are 
almost entirely diversified.  Where third parties are fully diversified, arbitrage will eliminate any 
differential between the contract price and the average spot market price. If a participant is risk neutral 
and without budget constraint, then the risk premium in equilibrium would be zero, as the risk neutral 
participants demand or supply for contracts is perfectly elastic at fair value and they would enter as 
many contracts as were made available by other participants at a suitable price.  In general, risk 
markets do not necessarily deliver complete contracting, but the determination of risk pricing by the 
most risk neutral player shows the importance of having a risk neutral participant, such as a third party, 
who can trade risk premiums as close to zero as possible. 
5.6.4 Contract Market Incompleteness 
Contract markets are markets for trading risk that cannot be more cheaply controlled with internal risk 
management policies.  Effective contract markets, are by definition, unlikely to develop where the 
distribution of stochastic variability is difficult to accurately quantify.  In our framework those forms of 
variability are better treated as uncertainty, and not risk.  However, even when the risks are well 
defined there is no guarantee that the risk markets available to investors are complete, and offer the 
opportunity to hedge all risk types and forms.  A similar perspective is adopted in Boucher & Smeers 
(2012), in which the incompleteness of contract markets deprives the market of efficient outcomes.  
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Forward markets are too narrow in scope and duration to provide firms with the ability to 
hedge all risks.  Additional contractual forms that address different needs and timeframes would 
advance the collective of risk markets towards completeness, but inevitably the transaction costs 
associated with contract formation and valuation necessitates that contract structures will be a 
compromise of a finite number of different needs, and risk markets will be destined to be incomplete to 
one degree or another in the face of many different risks.  Market incompleteness can result from a 
number of issues. 
Contract Duration 
A very significant issue is the divergence between the time structure of risk and the time structure of 
contracts.  Standardised contracts such as forwards leave investors exposed to risks of duration longer 
than the contract.  Where contracts are signed for a duration that is smaller than that of the risk being 
contemplated, contracts will be continually re-valued against the backdrop of new information.  
Because a contract signed in the face of a particular risk will only provide a hedge for the duration of 
the contract, investors will remain uncontracted and concerned about long-term variability or 
permanent changes that might impact their profitability over the economic life of their investment. 
Uncontracted Income streams 
Alternative income streams are available in energy markets, such as for the provision of ancillary 
services for example.  Contracts to manage the risk of this income stream may or may not be available. 
The effect on the firm is that a portion of profit variability remains uncovered by contracts. Where 
there is a bias between technologies, for example, in terms of their income generating activity, 
investment will be skewed away from those technologies that recover a higher proportion of their costs 
from alternative sources.  
Risk Market Distortions 
Just as in the spot market there are a number of strategic issues that can arise.  For example, we have 
not considered in detail the possibility that generators may attempt to actively manipulate the risk 
measure of consumers, as suggested in Batstone (2000) in order to drive the risk premium paid by 
consumers higher.  Instead, as with the spot market, we assume that in the long term the economics of 
entry will incentivise entry into either or both the contract market wherever risk adjusted returns justify 
investment.  To assume otherwise would necessarily require discussion and rationalisation of a set of 
entry barriers that would protect such rent-seeking behaviour from competitive forces.  While that is a 
worthwhile avenue of investigation and the subject of further ongoing research, it is beyond the scope 
of this work. 
 
Given that markets are incomplete, the consequence for the analysis above is that, aside from 
coincidental outcomes, the most risk neutral participant will no longer necessarily define the price of 
risk.  The contracting price range for each participant is defined as before but there is no longer a direct 
translation between the level of risk aversion and the price range as defined.  For example, quantity 
risks are different for each participant and so the contract level at which each participant is balanced is 
different from their expected equilibrium spot market position.  The market clearance, and associated 
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risk premium, are now defined by the participant with the lowest risk premium as defined by their 
supply or demand curve, which is dependent upon their underlying level of risk aversion and their 
unhedged position with respect to risks that are not addressed in the contract market, in this case non-
price risk.  Ralph & Smeers (2011) makes clear that the reason for this is not the consideration of the 
second type of risk per se, it is that the second type of risk is not traded.  Were it traded, there would 
emerge a system risk agent who would assume the most risk neutral role, and set the price of risk in 
both markets for all participants. 
 
5.7 Uncertainty 
We began by discussing capital recovery without risk aversion.  In this case, capital recovery is based 
on earnings that match the amortised cost of capacity, which incorporates the interest costs of the firm, 
at a rate presumably assessed by a bank or financier.  However, those interest costs reflect the banks 
assessment of their own risk, and not the risk faced by the firm.  The introduction of risk aversion 
requires the firm to take account of the risks they take, and by valuing that risk, adjust decision making 
to achieve an optimal balance between risk and return, so that the extra profits earned in expectation 
cover the risks being taken.  We progress a step further and consider uncertainty, so that the recovery 
of capital consists of its capital cost, a premium for the risks taken, and a premium for the uncertainty 
assumed by the firm. 
Uncertainty may be unstructured and apply indiscriminately to the entire industry, or it may be 
structured in some way.  We approach uncertainty from the perspective that all forms of variability can 
be at least partially explained by a probability distribution and that this information is valuable because 
ultimately we implicitly assume a distribution and/or determine the relevance of everything that is 
included, or not included, in our model (Farrar, 1964). So, uncertainty could refer to the residual doubt 
an investor has about a parameter estimate or a distribution, but it also encompasses the possibility of 
model misspecification through to the consideration of “black swan” events, which by definition are 
not predictable, and not modelled.  
5.7.1 Formulating Uncertainty 
One approach to addressing uncertainty is expanding the scenario tree to include modelling of the 
distribution of distributions, or even forming alternative scenario trees that might represent entirely 
different hypotheses about the underling structure of the market.  But it is not simply a question of 
considering potential empirical inaccuracies in the modelled distribution of variability.  Expansion of 
the formal modelling structure would do little to elucidate the position in terms that are readily 
understood or meaningful to investment equilibrium decisions as they are made in practice.    
 
“The economist as such does not advocate criteria of optimality.  He may 
invent them …..the ultimate choice is made by the procedures of decision 
making inherent in the institutions, laws and customs of society” 
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  Tjalling Koopmans, Nobel Memorial Lecture, December 1975 
 
In the long-term we would anticipate that the attitude of firms might equilibrate but the application of 
rational expectations with uncertainty may be rather fraught, particularly in the short-term, and requires 
further research.  
To be logically consistent, equilibrium modelling must either assume uncertainty does not 
exist, and therefore no adjustment is required, or if it does exist, compensate for it.  The former seems 
implausible, and the latter is the subject of little research, although uncertainty may have significant 
implications for the equilibrium plant mix, and the flow on metrics of pricing and generation adequacy 
by which the system judges itself.  In fact, addressing uncertainty in an authoritative way is impossible 
as by definition it is that portion of the variability beyond that which we cannot explain with 
distributions.  Nevertheless, investors and firms operate in an uncertain world and deal with uncertainty 
on a continuous basis, and the implication is that they do so on an ad hoc basis.  Accordingly, we can 
either ignore the issue, or consider an analysis which is not geared towards advising a better strategy or 
containment mechanism, but which will improve understanding of the implications of uncertainty for 
market equilibrium, based on whichever conjectures that describe investor attitudes to uncertainty.   
We do not investigate the parameters or settings that may be applicable in a specific market, or even 
how to assess these, but we do consider some logical implications that the market structure might have 
on the form of the uncertainty adjustments made by firms.   
When analysing risk we were able to attach penalties to the scenarios corresponding to the 
worst outcomes and as a result were able to construct a risk adjusted probability measure that amounted 
to skewing higher weightings to those scenarios corresponding to worse outcomes at the expense of de-
weighting the scenarios corresponding to more favourable outcomes.  Uncertainty provides no such 
basis for that form of adjustment, as it is not clear which scenarios will be affected more or less than 
others, and there is no way to be prescriptive with such unknowns.   We conjecture that investors 
require some form of premium over and above the certainty equivalent that accounts for risk to account 
for unknown variability that defies specification, but in their experience has influenced outcomes in the 
past.  We could think of this as a contingency premium. 
The equilibrium investment condition can be re-arranged as follows: 
   
   (5.81) 
Investment based on this condition will recover enough additional profit in expectation to cover the 
imputed cost of the risk adjustment.  Risk-averse investors will equate the certainty equivalent, and not 
the expected value, with the fixed costs of investing.  The difference between the certainty equivalent 
and the expected return is referred to as a risk premium and, ceteris paribus, the premium is greater the 
more risk averse the investor is. We now consider a manager who desires a premium of r as a 
contingency in addition to the bare cost and risk premium recovery afforded by (5.81).   
In itself this orientation is different to risk.  Risk is assessed endogenously, with the actual 
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modelled and the risk aversion of the investor.  In contrast, uncertainty is defined in terms of outcomes, 
requiring a certain premium as part of the definition of the equilibrium.  Accordingly, with an 
uncertainty premium r, expressed as an additional rate of return requirement, the new equilibrium 
investment condition is: 
   
    (5.82) 
Manipulation of (5.82) shows the burden of the risk premium is linear in fixed costs and therefore 
higher for plants with higher fixed costs.  In standard complementarity form we have: 
   
    (5.83) 
Being a simple rate of return requirement, it might be thought that it can be incorporated like a risk 
adjustment to the discount rate used in determining the amortised equivalent of fixed costs.  
Unfortunately, as explained in Robichek & Myers (1966), the use of risk-adjusted discount rates would 
conflate the influence of uncertainty with adjustments in the time value of money.  Another alternative 
is to express this as an adjustment to the risk neutral probabilities: 
   
    (5.84) 
Where: 
   
     (5.85) 
Whereas the risk-neutral probabilities developed in Section 5.5.2 were a probability measure, when 
adjusting for uncertainty, the new weightings no longer sum to unity.  Unlike risk, the effect of 
uncertainty is not to reapportion the emphasis placed on individual scenarios, but to degrade the 
influence of all scenarios.  Accordingly, uncertainty produces a non-additive probability measure (Dow 
& Ribeiro da Costa Werlang, 2003).  As shown in (5.85), de-weighting the scenarios associated with 
the CVaR measure might seem counter-intuitive as these are a measure of system risk, but uncertainty 
also de-weights other outcomes so that overall, given average profits exceed CVaR profits the value of 
the firms objective, or the investors return, is reduced by uncertainty.  That reduction takes the form of 
scaling by , and will flow through to investment and contracting decisions. 
5.7.2 Utilisation Factors and Optimal Plant Mix 
The impact of uncertainty of this form on the optimal plant, and on optimal trade-offs is clear. As the 
marginal profitability of a technology falls, capacity must be reduced to increase returns until parity 
between fixed costs and the uncertainty, and risk adjusted, returns is achieved.  As shown in Figure 41, 








≤1+ r ⊥  CAPi ≥ 0  ∀i > 0
 





























Figure 41: Investment & Standard Business Uncertainty 
In relative terms, the technology mix is skewed away from high fixed cost technologies towards low 
fixed cost technologies, including the notional shortage technology.  We can verify that by comparing 
the standard optimal trade-off definition and the optimal trade-off definition with an uncertainty 
adjustment: 
         (5.86) 
5.7.3 Structured Uncertainty 
We have developed a formulation that incorporates and highlights two distinct approaches for dealing 
with risk and uncertainty.  We have assumed uncertainty requires a premium to justify investment, and 
that this premium is assessed on the profits of the firm, affecting all parts of the firm equally.  This can 
be interpreted as a sectoral uncertainty premium.  We now assume that the firm adopts a more 
sophisticated and structured view of the required premium.  On an ex-ante basis, placing a structure on 
uncertainty might be thought contradictory to the definition of uncertainty.  But investors may have a 
relative lack of confidence in one or other aspect of the modelled results that leads them to discount 
certain aspects more than others.  
Uncertainty & Technology Type 
The unstructured approach to uncertainty suggests it is pervasive across the entire market, and the 
premium required can be summarised by a single constant parameter.  But the investor may hold 
certain beliefs pertaining to specific technologies and apply a different premium to each.  For example, 

































the required rate of return on nuclear technologies may be higher given the potential for accidents and 
the regulatory response to them that might cause interruption of their usage in the future.   
   
   (5.87) 
Naturally, the effect of this form of uncertainty is to bias the plant mix away from technologies 
investors think have a higher degree of uncertainty attached to them. 
Uncertainty & Utilisation Factors 
The approach of the previous section potentially conflates the uncertainty associated with each 
technology and the uncertainty associated with its role.  Following from Read (2005), entry economics 
dictate the equilibrium technology choice and the equilibrium utilisation level for that technology are 
connected, and it is therefore natural to confuse the equilibrium risk associated with a particular 
technology and the risk associated with its role in the plant mix.  The same misunderstanding could 
apply with uncertainty.  For example, an investor who might have experienced an unforeseen event that 
reduced peaking plant profitability could develop an uncertainty premium and attach that to the 
peaking technology, and not the peaking role.  The two may well be the same in equilibrium, but 
penalising technologies for that which is not inherent in the technology, can potentially result in a 
technology with an assessed lower exposure to uncertainty being enlisted to perform the role of a 
technology with a supposedly higher exposure when that perception was rooted in the role they each 
typically performed. 
   
    (5.88) 
By way of example, we conjecture that investors assess the exposure to uncertainty of a peaking role as 
being higher than that of a base load role.   
This may be based on observance of the pattern of optimal cost recovery, which requires 
significant proportions of revenue be generated at relatively uncommon times of shortage, leaving 
technologies with lower utilisation factors proportionally more exposed to system shocks.  This 
uncertainty may be based in doubts as to whether a regulator will allow windfall profits in the event of 
a crisis, even when those windfall profits are actually required to fund infrequently operated plants.  
Boucher & Smeers (2012) develops an example where this might be the case, in the context of 
security of supply issues in Europe.  Without formally relating the issue to the strict interpretation of 
uncertainty, they suggest that contracts for low probability and high cost events will not come to 
fruition.  They also note that even when arrangements do evolve to fund these sorts of costs, investors 
may harbour doubt about the ability of the government to confront politicisation of the issue without 
succumbing to market intervention.  In either scenario, the investor might well be justified in treating 
the situation as “uncertain”, and accordingly discounting the associated revenue further.  
We adopt the following function to reflect a hypothetical uncertainty adjustment across the 
utilisation range: 
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     (5.89) 
This functional form has some desirable properties for illustrative purposes, but many other forms, 
including a linear or piecewise linear form could be used.  We choose m to define the uncertainty 
premium of the role of ultimate peaker relative to the base-load role, whose uncertainty premium is 
given by .  For, example if m=2, we would apply double the uncertainty premium to operations 
with a very low utilisation factor than would be applied to base load generation roles.   We can define 
the optimal trade-off between technologies as follows: 
        (5.90) 
Uncertainty of this form brings an increase in shortage frequency as the breakeven points between each 
technology all increase when uncertainty premiums are applied.  Further, the relative size of the 
movement implied by each type of uncertainty adjustment at each utilisation level is different as the 
uncertainty adjustment is decreasing in utilisation.   
The application of a sector wide uncertainty adjustment has little impact on technologies with 
low capital costs so, for example, the change in shortage frequency is relatively small because OCGT 
capital costs are small.  At the opposite end of the plant spectrum, that form of adjustment results in a 
large absolute increase in annualised capital costs and large reductions in the optimal capacity of the 
plant involved.  Penalising by utilisation factor does not discriminate between technologies, so while 
the shortage frequency and breakeven points move right under both approaches, a utilisation based 
adjustment subjects those technologies in peaking roles to a far greater risk adjustment than those 
technologies filling a base load role.  Accordingly, the implication is that we observe relatively greater 
increases in shortage frequency, and larger decreases in utilisation of peaking plant than if we simply 
applied a sector wide uncertainty factor. 
In separating technological and utilisation-based uncertainty, we have not denied existence of 
the former.  There are likely to be differences between technologies that extend beyond those that are 
associated with the equilibrium utilisation of the technology.  A general form of expression could be 
defined as: 
   
   (5.91) 
Where: 
   
     (5.92) 
This formulation allows individual base uncertainty adjustments and progressions for each technology. 
The framework presented in the rest of this thesis would adapt to uncertainty expressed in this 
fashion by simply replacing the equilibrium investment constraint with whichever variant of 
uncertainty adjustment is desired.  The adjustment of optimal trade-offs is expressed in terms of a 
single period model, and identifies those utilisation levels where the trade-offs between various 
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technologies exist.  However, the definition of optimal trade-offs in the multi-period framework is 
based on sub-period profitability and so the definition of optimal trade-offs in our model need not be 
altered. 
The inclusion of uncertainty in a conventional optimisation with fixed exogenous utilisation levels will 
only further cloud the determination of spot market pricing.  In those models, spot market prices would 
be directly disciplined by uncertainty as this wold be accounted for in cost recovery price setting.  The 
approach taken in this thesis limits the influence of uncertainty, and risk for that matter, to the influence 
that is transmitted through capacity choices.  That a uncertainty surrounding a sunk investment can 
influence spot market prices is extremely inconsistent. 
 
5.8 Summary and Conclusions 
In this chapter, we have implemented a CVaR risk measure to consider risk.  The conditional 
probability distribution that defines CVaR is not based on the dual of a standard optimisation, and is 
found by direct maximisation of the worst case amongst the risk set of the investor. The KKT 
conditions of that optimisation form part of the model.  Accordingly, unlike many implementations of 
CVaR that focus on a broader range of the distribution and measure all but the most favourable 
outcomes, our definition of CVaR is direct and addresses the risky set of the investor directly.  Whereas 
the former approach involves the optimisation of CVaR alone, our approach is designed to be 
combined with expected outcomes.  The combination of expected returns and a risk measure avoids the 
need to maintain an irrational preference structure in which investors are assumed to be indifferent to 
all scenarios not included in the calculation of CVaR.   
Having formed the objective function as a convex combination of expected profits and CVaR, 
in Section 5.5.3 we generalise this approach to include multiple CVaR definitions.  This enables 
sculpting of the return distribution, and the application of different weightings to areas of the 
distribution that might have different real world implications for the investor.  This approach requires 
the construction of a separate optimisation, and therefore a separate set of complementarity conditions, 
for each CVaR measure.  Although not necessarily the case, the interpretation of CVaR in this case 
lends itself to consideration of multiple agents, servicing different aspects of the risk profile faced by 
the investor. 
Section 5.5.4 examines the equilibration of the system utilising different examples.  The 
combined expected profit and risk measure can be viewed as the convex combination of two PDC’s, 
one with risk neutral probabilities, the other corresponding to the risk set that defines CVaR.  We 
observe that as capacity is added each PDC adjusts, and as the PDC defines the marginal benefit of 
investment, so does the slope of that function.  We also note that when the risk set changes, there will 
be a discrete change in the corresponding PDC, and the slope of the marginal benefit will also change. 
We introduce contracting in Section 5.6.  While significantly simplified, our approach is 
aligned with that taken in Ralph & Smeers (2011,2015).  Ours is a complete market with endogenous 
pricing of risk, in which participants play a risk averse Nash game.  We derive the form of the demand 
and supply curve and find the most risk neutral participant is price setting, and by extension all other 
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participants observe the same price of risk.  This is in alignment with the result in the paper above.  We 
finish our discussion of contracting by considering incomplete markets, in which the above result no 
longer holds, and the reason for markets being incomplete. 
Finally we discuss uncertainty, as a distinct concept from risk.  In the literature, these terms 
are used interchangeably.  Our objective is illustrate a distinction between the terms that is based on 
whether the distribution for some stochastic variability is known or unknown.  We argue that there is a 
significant difference between investor responses in each case.  In the case where the distribution of 
future events is known, this is risk, and based on the knowledge of that distribution it is likely that risk 
markets can form and operate and that risk can be hedged to some degree or other.  When the 
distribution of future scenarios, or even the scenarios themselves are not known, we have uncertainty.  
Our approach to modelling the impact of uncertainty focuses on the investment equilibrium condition.   
We begin with a fixed uncertainty premium, representative of an investor believing that they 
need an additional premium above the hedged return distribution they believe they will receive, to 
account for anything unconsidered, or misunderstood in the model.   The implications are higher 
returns are required and a bias against high fixed cost technologies in the plant mix.  We then consider 
a more nuanced approach, in which the investor perceives uncertainty does not exist uniformly across 
the system.  First we consider the case where uncertainty is greatest at higher utilisation levels, perhaps 
because of the potential for unspecified strategic intervention in times of high price.  In this case, the 
adjustment we propose an adjustment function that makes the risk adjustment a function of the 
utilisation of a particular technology. The subtlety in this adjustment lies in the fact that often risk 
penalties are assessed on technologies based on the typical role they play, whereas in this case we 
assess the same penalty on all technologies in a given role, and let equilibration determine what the 
ultimate return profile of the technology is. Nevertheless, there is also good reason for assessing 
uncertainty on the basis of technology, and we do this, allowing a different function for each 
technology.   
Throughout this chapter, the implications of integration with our framework are discussed.  
The integration of risk aversion requires wholesale adjustment to the equilibrium investment condition.  
The method of determining optimal trade-offs remains unaffected as these are based on imputed values, 
although the values themselves will naturally change.  The calculation of at least one, and potentially 
more, CVaR measures requires the addition of a set of complementarity conditions for each.  Contract 
market clearance also requires a further set of constraints, and depending on the nature of demand-side 
modelling, this could generate another set of complementarity constraints corresponding to the 
optimisation problem faced by consumers.  Finally, the introduction of uncertainty merely involves 
adjustment of the investment equilibrium constraint. 
The definition of CVaR is direct and we are unaware of this form in any investment model.  
The model itself uses a convex combination of expected profits and risk and is a contribution itself, 
following an avenue of further research suggested in Ehrenmann & Smeers (2011).   As far as we are 
aware, the consideration of multiple CVaR measures in a single investment model is also novel.  Our 
contribution in terms of contracting is limited to confirming for our highly simplified example that the 
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general result in Ralph & Smeers (2011) holds, and that contracting can be integrated into our 
framework.   
Insofar as uncertainty is concerned, much of the literature has focussed on dealing with 
uncertainty through the use of sensitivity analysis, but this does not address the unforeseen, or 
unforeseeable, and perhaps more importantly, it is not an equilibrium concept.   Our contribution is 
very preliminary, but we have shown how uncertainty adjustments could be integrated into the general 
framework, so that endogenous uncertainty, or strategic uncertainty could rightfully be considered as 








6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS  
At its commencement, the goal of this research was to investigate a number of interactions in the 
electricity market with a view to understanding investment and the equilibration of the market.  This 
process began by considering the type of framework that would be suitable for such an enterprise and 
primarily for the benefit of future research, it was decided that complementarity models would be the 
vehicle for this.  As the framework developed, we became concerned at the discrepancy between 
conventional optimisation formulations, and screening curve analysis, in which the latter seemed more 
accurate, and the former more adaptable.  As a result, the resolution of these issues and the 
development of the framework consumed the available space in this thesis.  Nevertheless, the thesis has 
made contributions in a number of areas and provides a basis for further research in the areas initially 
identified as its focus. 
The research contained herein can typically be viewed as relating to one of the following over-
arching themes through present in this thesis.  Broadly speaking they are: 
• The economic relationships and equilibration processes in electricity markets, understood at a 
fundamental level. 
• The use of complementarity as an analytical framework, capable of uniting many 
mathematical methods. 
The analysis began with a review of investment fundamentals and, in particular, optimisation models 
and screening curve analysis.  Screening curve analysis, while conceptually strong is computationally 
limited.  As a result, practitioners migrated to mathematical programming to analyse the investment 
and generation problem.  That the conventional optimisation formulations they developed are not 
consistent with the logic of screening curves is problematic and requires investigation, and resolution. 
The thesis provides that resolution, but not before coming to terms with the root cause of the 
inconsistency.  An initial concern was the staging of the model.  Ostensibly, conventional optimisation 
formulations treat investment and generation activities as being simultaneous.  That issue proved not to 
be central to the problem observed.  In Chapter 1 we demonstrate this by presenting a two stage 
formulation of the problem, which can be readily restated as a single stage formulation, on account of 
the second stage being a sub-gradient of the first stage.   The single stage version of those formulations 
matches the problem at hand, whereas we show by example that conventional optimisation 
formulations related to the general formulation do not in a number of ways.  The distinguishing feature 
of these formulations is that they are specialisations of the general formulation, that rely on a definition 
of the LDC and specification of the functional form of generation functions.  We provide formal 
models with piecewise constant, piecewise linear, and higher order LDC forms, each of which have 
advantages and disadvantages in their own right.  The common feature they all have though, is that in a 
conventional optimisation, the break points of the generation functions in those models are restricted to 
the breakpoints used in the definition of the LDC.  This can be thought of as an arbitrary restriction on 
generation functions, or the optimal utilisation levels of each technology. 
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The consequence of this anomaly is that even when the LDC specification is absolutely 
precise, the solution of the conventional formulation is sub-optimal and not a competitive equilibrium.  
We show this by example, and through demonstration of its Pareto-inefficiency.  We also show that the 
PDC defined is inconsistent with the capacity prescribed by the model solution.  Of practical 
importance, the extent of the inaccuracy in the primal capacity decision can be significantly greater 
than the error in the objective function, which may provide a false sense of security.  The mathematical 
requirement of cost recovery is achieved in the conventional optimisation by including uplift 
components in pricing.   In general, these are not available through the spot market clearing process.  
Aside from the impact of arbitrary restrictions on generation functions and utilisation levels, we noted a 
particular case where the economic structure itself, implicitly imposes the same restrictions.  This is the 
case when the LDC is piecewise constant, and results in ambiguous pricing over a subset of load 
classes, with no particular price level having precedence over another. 
The resolution of the problem comes from integrating the logic of screening curves with 
optimisation.  Broadly speaking we add the utilisation corresponding to optimal technological trade-
offs to the LDC definition.  This task becomes endogenous in more complex models so our approach 
must address both the identification of optimal trade-offs, and the integration of these amongst other 
utilisation levels included for the purpose of LDC definition.  We rely on option pricing principles to 
define endogenous capacity values to ensure utilisation and the PDC are consistently represented when 
global technological trade-offs do not apply, as in sub-periods for example.  Use of endogenous dual 
values throughout the thesis allows a consistent specification of optimal trade-offs, even while the 
trade-offs themselves may be changing. 
In Chapters 3 we demonstrated adaptations of our framework designed to consider issues that 
may be of relevance in electricity markets today.  From the perspective of investment analysis, the 
emphasis in each chapter was to capture the flavour of particular extensions at a level which an investor 
might be interested.  We considered technological generalisations such as non-constant cost structures, 
capacity limits, and energy limits with a few to demonstrating the integration of relatively standard 
features in our framework.  The introduction of configurable technologies was a significantly more 
complex exercise, and lead to the development of discrete marginal operating ranges for each 
technology, generalising the traditional single optimal trade-off in screening curve analysis.   
In Chapter 4 we investigated issues that involve the endogenous determination of the LDC.  
Our approach sought to define short and long term demand response separately.  This distinction is 
important, and as short term demand response is capable of being price setting, while long term 
demand response is not, we remove the possibility that the latter can be marginal in the spot market. 
Our examination of reliability followed the conventional approach by augmenting load by expected 
outages and assuming perfect reliability thereafter.  To complete the system, returns had to be scaled by 
the reliability of the technology concerned.  Unsurprisingly, unreliability leads to additional capacity 
and cost, although the implications for individual technologies depend on their relative reliability.  In 
both of the preceding cases, the modelling was simplified by the monotonic relationship between load 
and price, and load and outages, respectively.  This simplification is not available when considering 
intermittent generation.  To accurately capture the earnings of intermittent technologies we must 
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consider the correlation of intermittent generation with net load.  On the basis that intermittent 
generation may have a daily pattern, we specified that correlation chronologically, on the basis of daily 
chronological load.  Total intermittent generation is endogenous and determined by intermittent 
capacity levels.  Net chronological load, accounting for the possibility of spillage, is then available by 
deduction for the chronological load profile.  Finally the net LDC is created by re-ordering the 
chronological profile, and applying a scale factor that represents the additional variability in the LDC 
that is not present in chronological load, which is a point estimate.   The net LDC is serviced by 
conventional technologies that define the PDC.   
Finally, we turn to risk, which is a significant issue in investment.  While CVaR optimisations 
are available, we elected to define CVaR directly by forming the dual of the traditional formulation, 
and treating conditional probabilities as variables.  This enables the combination of the CVaR risk 
measure with expected profits, and we take advantage of that possibility by promoting the possibility of 
sculpting the return distribution with multiple CVaR measures assessed at different significance levels, 
or with narrower focus in the scenario tree.  When considering contracting, our approach was limited to 
showing that this could be done in the framework.  Nevertheless, there are a number of ways to include 
contracting, but ultimately we followed the path of Ralph & Smeers (2011), defining the risk market 
clearance endogenously.  Stochastic endogenous equilibria provide the most desirable basis for future 
research.  Insofar as our narrow implementation can, it reinforced one of the key results form that 
paper, that with complete risk markets the price of risk is defined by the most risk-neutral participant.  
We also introduce uncertainty in this chapter.  The purpose is to create a distinction with risk.  We 
consider several forms of uncertainty adjustment, clarifying the difference between technologies and 
their typical use.  We reiterate that uncertainty adjusted scenario weightings do not sum to one, as 
uncertainty amounts to a penalty on the whole, rather than a reallocation between the parts. 
The preceding discussion primarily relates to the first theme of the thesis: the development of 
fundamental economic features of electricity markets in our framework.  In each case that we discussed 
in Chapters 3,4, and 5, we identified the necessary changes in our framework to accommodate the 
feature under discussion.  The flexible definition of optimal trade-offs established earlier meant that the 
form of this complementarity condition changed little throughout the thesis.  As far as the basic 
investment problem was concerned, more attention was required to ensure that the investment 
condition was updated.   In each of those cases, conventional optimisation formulations could not solve 
the problems presented for the same reason that they fail to solve the simplest case as in each case, and 
each sub-period or scenario, the optimal solution requires correct specification of optimal trade-offs 
and a correct assessment of the PDC, both of which elude conventional optimisation formulations as 
we have shown.   While the determination of utilisation levels and the representation of the PDC are 
essential from the perspective of the basic framework and are what enables a problem to be solved 
where it could not with conventional optimisation formulations, the most significant adjustment 
required in each case was the addition of considerable numbers of complementarity conditions to 
provide the infrastructure necessary to represent the issue of concern.   
At this point, we address the second major theme of the thesis: the use of complementarity 
models as an analytical framework.   In economic problems, conditions in complementarity problems 
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typically arise from the KKT conditions of optimisations.  This can be seen in our framework as KKT 
conditions from investment optimisation and spot market clearing problems define the basis for this.  
As we discovered, complementarity models are significantly more flexible than this.   Perhaps the first 
distinction worthy of note is the inclusion of optimisations that do not relate to a market participant.  
Examples include the ranking optimisation that combines endogenous and exogenous utilisation levels, 
the scale factor determination for the LDC in the section on intermittent generation, or the definition of 
CVaR, although the latter is readily identifiable as some form of actual agent if desired.  The KKT 
conditions corresponding to these optimisation sit as equals amongst those that arise from actual 
participants and agents.  These problems can also be nested with complementarity conditions and this 
was done to achieve the minimal set of critical utilisation levels, in which each step is an optimisation 
defined whose starting point is defined by the solution to the previous optimisation. 
Complementarity conditions also can be expressed directly, and represent logic.  The 
definition of optimal utilisation levels is an example of a set of conditions that defines and bounds an 
endogenous variable.  These bounds can also be used creatively to filter solutions.  In the case of 
configurable technologies, the difference of two quadratics is naturally quadratic, although it may have 
no real roots, implying no intersection.  By carefully constructing proxies for the various components 
of the quadratic equation, we were able to modify complex solutions into solutions that were real, and 
with the help of a scaling factor, large, so that they would be ignored by the rest of the formulation. For 
the ultimate purpose of integrating intermittent generation, a similar approach was used to effectively 
toggle the denominator and numerator for the expression defining utilisation within a chronological 
segment, so that we avoided division by zero and the definition was suitable when load was increasing 
and decreasing.  In combination, the thesis demonstrates the power of complementarity theory to 
represent multiple optimisation objectives, nested problems, logical constructs and, in combination, 
algorithmic approaches to identifying solutions. 
The specific contributions are generally noted throughout the thesis but the following 
highlights some specific contributions that, to our knowledge, are original: 
• Endogenous definition of utilisation levels in an investment model 
• Development of (multiple) methods for pruning optimal trade-offs 
• Endogenous definition of capacity values in individual scenarios and sub-periods 
• Modelling an endogenously determined range of continuously configured 
technologies, including the determination of multiple pairwise technological trade-
offs 
• Endogenous modelling of intermittent generation using both chronological and 
duration load forms, with dynamic construction the net LDC based on investment 
decisions. 
• Modelling of a weighted expected value and CVaR objective function in electricity 
market investment model (inspired by Ehrenmann & Smeers 2011) including the use 
of a direct optimisation of CVaR. 
• Sculpting of the return distribution with multiple CVaR constraints in an electricity 
investment model 
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Opportunities for further research abound.  There are significant technological changes causing re-
assessment of investment decision making in electricity markets.  Firms, regulators and governments 
each face strategic decisions beyond those typically modelled, yet potentially as important.  
Furthermore, relative to risk, the impact of uncertainty is not well understood, and the source of 
uncertainty, and the endogenous creation or dissipation of uncertainty should be considered.  Lastly, 
aside from advancing directly to the consideration of the sort of interactions envisaged at the 
beginning, there is the over-riding question of determining the most appropriate means to solve these 





7.1 Example Implementation of the Conventional Approach 
7.1.1 Problem Description 
The objective of the problem is to minimise the total costs of servicing load.  The total costs include 
capital as well as variable costs. 
7.1.2 Problem Solution 





Notional Shortage 0 696 
OCGT 12000 11637 
CCGT 0 4333 
Coal 20000 10333 
Geothermal 58000 63000 
 
The total cost of capacity and generation using the conventional approach is 78.35M.  Using the thesis 
approach that total cost is lower at 77.43M. 
7.1.3 Solution Methodology 
The conventional optimisation formulation was solved using the included optimisation tools supplied 
with Microsoft Excel. 
The actual optimal solution was found using the methodology of Chapter 2.  In 2.3.6, we 
define the necessary sets of conditions to state this approach more generally, in a form that can be 
expanded as additional complexity arises.  Re-capping, the approach requires: 
• Definition of optimal trade-offs (2.4) 
• Definition of critical optimal trade-offs (2.5).  These are the ones that are important in 
practice, that apply between adjacent technologies. 
• Integrated ordering of both the optimal trade-offs and those points necessary for LDC 
definition (2.6.1) 
• Determination of load levels for utilisation levels corresponding to optimal trade-offs (2.6.2) 
 
From Section 2.4.1, the optimal utilisation levels are automatically defined.  These are then processed 
further to create a minimal set of optimal trade-offs: 
 
Technology Optimal Trade-Off 






These can then be ordered amongst the utilisation levels included for the purpose of defining the LDC.  
Together with the load interpolations that correspond to the utilisation levels above, and in addition to 





90000 89304 82000 78000 77667 73333 63000 58000 50000 
Utilisation 0.000 0.0043 0.050 0.100 0.1133 0.2867 0.7000 0.900 1.000 
 
The remainder of the problem is a complementarity formulation that in this simple case is equivalent to 
the conventional optimisation formulation, with the addition of the necessary utilisation levels so that 
the generation functions, while restricted, are restricted to a set of breakpoints that includes the optimal 
breakpoints.  This optimised version of the problem was solved as a linear program using Microsoft 




7.2 Solution Ambiguity 
The nested optimisations in the algorithm from Section 2.5.2 determine the screening curve envelope.  
For each technology i in sub-period t, the utilisation level at which that technology becomes active in 
that algorithm is given by: 
Conventional	Optimisation	Formulation
Cost	Structure LDC	Definition 1 2 3 4 5 6
Technology Fixed	Cost Var	Cost Load 90000 82000 78000 78000 58000 50000
Notional	Shortage 0 15000 Utilisation 0 0.05 0.1 0.1 0.9 1
OCGT 50 3500 Energy	Content	by	Load	Class
CCGT 220 2000 Load	Classes 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
Coal 650 500 Constant 82000 78000 78000 58000 50000 4300 4000 0 54400 5400
Geothermal 1000 0 Duration 0.05 0.05 0 0.8 0.1
Gradient 160000 80000 25000 80000
Generation	at	Each	Point Energy	by	Load	Class
Technology Capacity Cost Technology 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 Total Cost
Notional	Shortage 0 0 Notional	Shortage 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OCGT 12000 600000 OCGT 12000 4000 0 0 0 0 400 100 0 0 0 500 1750000
CCGT 0 0 CCGT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Coal 20000 13000000 Coal 20000 20000 20000 20000 0 0 1000 1000 0 8000 0 10000 5000000
Geothermal 58000 58000000 Geothermal 58000 58000 58000 58000 58000 50000 2900 2900 0 46400 5400 57600 0
71600000 Total 90000 82000 78000 78000 58000 50000 4300 4000 0 54400 5400 68100 6750000 78350000
Thesis	Approach
Successive	Trade-Offs LDC Capacity LDC	Definiton 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Notional	Shortage 0.0043 89304.35 695.65 Load 90000 89304 82000 78000 78000 77667 73333 63000 58000 50000
OCGT 0.1133 77666.67 11637.68 Utilisation 0 0.0043 0.05 0.1 0.1 0.1133 0.2867 0.7000 0.9 1
CCGT 0.2867 73333.33 4333.33
Coal 0.7000 63000.00 10333.33 Load	Classes 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Geothermal 1.0000 50000.00 63000.00 Constant 89304 82000 78000 78000 77667 73333 63000 58000 50000
Duration 0.0043 0.0457 0.0500 0.0000 0.0133 0.1733 0.4133 0.2000 0.1000
Generation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Notional	Shortage 696 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OCGT 11638 11638 4333 333 333 0 0 0 0 0
CCGT 4333 4333 4333 4333 4333 4333 0 0 0 0
Coal 10333 10333 10333 10333 10333 10333 10333 0 0 0
Geothermal 63000 63000 63000 63000 63000 63000 63000 63000 58000 50000
90000 89304 82000 78000 78000 77667 73333 63000 58000 50000
Energy	Content 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Total Cost Capacity	Cost
Notional	Shortage 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 22684 0
OCGT 51 365 117 0 2 0 0 0 0 534 1869151 581884.058
CCGT 19 198 217 0 58 376 0 0 0 867 1733333 953333.333
Coal 45 472 517 0 138 1791 2136 0 0 5098 2548889 6716666.67
Geothermal 274 2876 3150 0 840 10920 26040 12100 5400 61600 0 63000000









∑        ∀i,t    (7.1) 
As the algorithm progresses from low utilisation levels to high utilisation levels, this utilisation level 
corresponds to the utilisation level below which the technology becomes inframarginal, as opposed to 
marginal. Were there no exogenous utilisation levels we could generate a restriction using this 
utilisation level, in the knowledge that the next utilisation level encountered would also be 
endogenously chosen and therefore the one at which technology i first enters the dispatch.  
Unfortunately, there are exogenous utilisation levels to be considered, so it is not the case that the next 
utilisation level corresponds to the point at which the technology becomes marginal in terms of 









∑        ∀i,t    (7.2) 
To resolve the ambiguity problem in a fashion consistent with screening curve analysis, we require 
 
GENi,r ,t = 0  at all  
ur ,t ≥ un,t
* .  For the technologies involved in each optimal trade-off, satisfaction of 
this restriction requires the technology with the lowest marginal cost must supply capacity and generate 
the incremental load, 
 














≥ 0  ⊥  
 
ai,r ,t




1 +GENi,r ,t ≥ 0  ⊥   
ai,r ,t
0 ≥ 0     ∀i,r,t   (7.4) 
If 
 
ur ,t ≥ un,t
* , then 
 
ur+1,t ≥ un,t
* .  The latter holds as a strict inequality, except when 
 
ur+1,t = ur ,t , in which 
case the incremental load 
 
Lr ,t − Lr+1,t = 0 , and from the standard market clearing constraint we have
 
GENi,r ,t = 0 .   Where  
ur+1,t > un,t
* , the bracketed term in (7.3) is negative, implying 
 
ai,r ,t
0 > 0  to ensure 
feasibility of (7.3).  From (7.4), and with 
 
ai,r ,t
1 ≥ 0  and  
GENi,r ,t ≥ 0  it must be the case that we must 
have 
 
GENi,r ,t = ai,r ,t
1 = 0 .   So when 
 
ur ,t ≥ un,t
*  we have 
 
GENi,r ,t = 0  as desired.  Taking the counter-
case, we have 
 
ur ,t < un,t
* .  In this case the bracketed term in (7.3) is non-negative as either 
 
ur+1,t < un,t
*  or 
 
ur+1,t = un,t
* .   Where the bracketed term is non-negative there are enough degrees of freedom to allow 
 
ai,r ,t
0 ≥ 0  and by extension 
 
ai,r ,t
1 ≥ 0  and 
 
GENi,r ,t ≥ 0 , although not all combinations of these restrictions 
can be achieved simultaneously.  Where 
 
ur ,t < un,t
* , the market clearing conditions optimally require 
generation by technology I, so that generation by technology i is feasible, unlike the case where 
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ur ,t ≥ un,t
*  in which generation by technology i is restricted to zero to enforce the logic of the screening 
curve and thereby remove all ambiguity. 
7.3 Stochastic Energy Limits 
The problem of stochastic energy limits is essentially one of stochastic reservoir management, which is 
applicable to many fields of research, not the least of which is the wider energy and resource field. 
Within the research of electricity systems, reservoir management has received considerable focus on 
account of the significance of hydroelectric generation in many systems.  The optimal management of 
reservoirs has been addressed with linear programming, but primarily with dynamic programming in a 
variety of forms (Read & Hindsberger, 2010), (Lino, Barroso, Pereira, Kelman, & Fampa, 2003; 
Pereira & Campodónico, 1999).  The defining features of stochastic reservoir management that align it 
with dynamic programming are the stochastic nature of inflows, and the storage or reservoir which 
provides the opportunity to redistribute inflows across time.  By their very nature, and our choice of 
terminology, stochastic inflows are generally associated with hydro systems, although future energy 
storage options may make this discussion appropriate for other natural energy sources.  Ours is a 
necessarily modest foray into this area, based on the complementarity form developed here.  The 
purpose of such a model in an investment equilibrium framework is to capture the difference between 
deterministic and stochastic decision making in a market with significant reliance on this generation, 
not to develop a detailed model of reservoir management. 
We begin by introducing the stochastic inflow pattern.  In each of the t-sub-periods there is a 
distribution of H(t) possible inflows quantities, 
 
INFt,h(t) , occurring with probability  
pt,h(t)
inf .  The storage 
at the beginning of period t is represented by a distribution of L(t) potential storage levels, 
 
STORt ,l (t ) , 




which is dependent on the stochastic inflow pattern up to that sub-period.   We have not considered 
inflow correlation as contemplated by Yang (1999) in a dynamic programming context, but this could 
be included by defining 
 
pt,h(t),l(t)
inf  so that the probability of each inflow h(t) is a function of past inflows.  
In each sub-period the index of possible beginning of period storage is defined as 
 
l(t) =1.....L(t), where L(t) = H( j)
j=1
t
∏ .  It is clear from the geometric progression of the size of the state 
space that this approach is not suitable for granular modelling when either the number of sub-periods is 
high, or the number of possible inflow options in each sub-period is high.   A Markov decision process 
is a viable modelling alternative for larger problems provided that the state space, which is at least two 
dimensional, can be efficiently discretised without also falling prey to the curse of dimensionality.  For 
small problems or conceptual analysis, this basic approach, which ignores the specific equilibration of 
opening and closing storage distributions, has the advantage of not requiring discretisation of the space, 
while being able to deliver a relatively rich inflow and storage structure, should this feature be an 
important aspect of a particular market. 
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We define the relationship between beginning of period storage and end of period storage by 
adapting (3.72) to account for multiple inflows and end of (previous) period storage levels: 
  
STORi,t−1,l (t−1) + INFi,t,h(t) − RELi,t ,l (t−1) − STORi,t ,h(t ),l (t−1) = 0 ⊥   
γ i,t ,h(t ),l (t−1) free    
   ∀i > 0,t > 0,l(t −1) = 1...L(t −1),h(t) = 1...H (t)      (7.5) 
For each storage level 
 
STORi,t−1,l (t−1) , of which there are L(t-1) for each technology at the end of the 
previous sub-period, a single release decision, 
 
RELi,t ,l (t−1) , must be chosen before inflows are realised.  
There are H(t) possible inflow realisations, creating H(t)L(t-1) possible end of period storage levels for 
a given release decision.  This creates expansion of the dimensionality of storage so we take the 
opportunity to flatten this dimension to provide clarity:  
   
STORi,t ,h(t ),l (t−1) − STORi,t ,L(t-1)( l (t-1)-1)+h(t ) = 0  ⊥   
γ i,t ,l (t ) free
 
   
   ∀i > 0,t > 0,l(t) = l(t −1)× h(t)      (7.6) 
In turn this implies: 
   
γ i,t ,h(t ),l (t−1) −γ i,t ,l (t ) = 0  ⊥   
STORi,t ,l (t ) free   
∀i > 0,t,l(t)  (7.7) 
The indexing is flattened from a two-dimensional index to a single dimension index l(t)=1…L(t) using 
the expression in (7.6).  From (7.5) and (7.6), 
 
γ i,t ,h(t ),l (t−1) = γ i,t ,l (t )  and continues to represent the 
marginal value of stored fuel at the end of sub-period t. 
Having defined the basic inflow structure, the principles guiding the management of storage 
and fuel releases are unchanged by stochasticity.  The owner of the resource still seeks to maximise the 
value of the resource, while negotiating storage limits and stochastic inflow patterns. In the 
deterministic case the perfect allocation would equalise the marginal value of storage across all sub-
periods, although that is not always possible when storage is finite.   In the stochastic case the marginal 
value of stored fuel is determined recursively.  Beginning with an end condition that we discuss later, 
the marginal value of stored fuel is recursively defined by marginal stored fuel values working 
backwards from the end of the period.  The operator has a choice between releasing fuel in the current 
period or storing it for future use, and achieving the expected marginal value of stored fuel: 
   
pi,t,h(t)
inf γ i,t ,h(t ),l (t−1)
h(t )=1
H (t )
∑ −ε i,t ,l (t−1) ≥ 0  ⊥   RELi,t ,l (t−1) ≥ 0   ∀i > 0,t,l(t −1)  (7.8) 
The expectation and release terms are parameterised by the system state l(t) and expectations are taken 
over the possible inflow sequences, h(t), to arrive at the expected marginal value of stored fuel as 
understood by the system operator under nonanticipativity.  In equilibrium, where the expected 
marginal value of stored fuel exceeds the marginal value of releasing fuel, the release of fuel for 
generation in the current period is zero.   Conversely when the marginal value of release exceeds the 
expected marginal value of stored fuel, there is an incentive to increase releases until parity is achieved. 
 246 
Storage at the end of each sub-period must also be feasible.  Where inflows disappoint, 
minimum storage levels must still be respected, and similarly where inflows are high, maximum 
storage limits must be respected.  Accordingly, the storage bounds (4.70) and (4.71) must apply to all 
possible combinations of opening storage levels and inflow eventualities, as indexed by l(t): 
   
STORi,t ,l (t ) −STORi,t
− ≥ 0  ⊥
 
γ i,t ,l (t )
− ≥ 0
   
∀i > 0,t  (7.9) 
   
STORi,t
+ − STORi,t ,l (t ) ≥ 0  ⊥  
γ i,t ,l (t )
+ ≥ 0    ∀i > 0,t  (7.10) 
We can describe the inter-temporal linkages between optimal marginal stored fuel values with the 
following condition:  
   
γ i,t ,l (t ) − pi,t+1,h(t+1)
inf
h(t )
∑ γ i,t+1,h(t+1),l (t ) + γ i,t ,l (t )+ −γ i,t ,l (t )− = 0  ⊥  STORi,t ,l (t ) free   ∀i > 0,t,l(t)  (7.11) 
The operator decides on a fuel release strategy at the beginning of each sub-period, before inflows are 
known.  Inflows occur with a given probability and, along with the release decision, generate a 
probability distribution for the value of end of sub-period storage, which carries forward to the next 
sub-period.  The goal of the risk neutral operators is to equate the beginning of period marginal value 
of stored fuel with the expected end of period marginal value of stored fuel as much as is possible 
while respecting storage limits.  Where storage limits are not binding, then for each end of sub-period 
storage level, 
 
STORi,t ,l (t ) , the marginal value of stored fuel at the end of sub-period t is equal to the 
expected marginal value of stored fuel at the end of sub-period t+1.   
Where the operator is risk averse, the nature of the risk adjustment is dependent on the nature 
of their risk aversion, or put another way, the specific constraints that might be placed on the 
operational decisions of the reservoir manager.   It is possible that the reservoir manager wishes to 
consider the distribution of returns alluded to in (7.11), rather than just the average return.  In this case, 
a risk management structure would need to be introduced to resolve the manager’s view of a given 
distribution of returns.  While possible, we consider it more likely that the distribution of annual profits 
is a more natural concern of the firm.  From one perspective, the risk-neutral losses will be augmented 
by penalties and therefore higher. Accordingly, the future value of the resource will be elevated in 
those scenarios, and this incentivises increased retention of fuel for future usage.  From another 
perspective, the effective weighting attached to undesirable scenarios is increased, affording the value 
of fuel in those scenarios a greater role, and encouraging reservoir management policies to place 
greater emphasis on managing those scenarios.  In each case, the effect of the risk management policy 
is introduced implicitly to (7.11), in one approach through adjustments to future fuel values, while in 
the other the adjustment is through changing probabilities.    
In the final sub-period, we have a set of outcomes with an associated probability distribution. 




stor = pi,t,l(t -1)
stor pi,t,h(t -1)
inf       ∀i > 0,t,l(t)  (7.12) 
The expected marginal value of stored fuel at the end of the period is: 
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pi,T,l(T)
stor γ i,T ,L(T )
l (T )
∑          ∀i > 0   (7.13) 
As in the deterministic case, we need to ensure that the process of fuel consumption is sustainable, and 
we accomplish this by using the function 
 
Vi
/ STORi,t ,l (t )( )  as the marginal value function: 
  
γ i,t ,l (t ) − pi,t+1,h(t+1)
inf
h(t )





∑ Vi / STORi,t ,l (t )( )
t=T
+ γ i,t ,l (t )





STORi,t ,l (t ) free      
∀i > 0,t,l(t)  (7.14)
 
As in the deterministic case, the progression of the marginal value of stored fuel through sub-periods is 
based on maintaining equivalence between beginning of period marginal values and the expected end 
of period marginal values as in (7.11). Overall discipline is provided by (7.14) which ties the expected 
marginal value of stored fuel to the marginal value of releases in each sub-period.  Extreme inflow 
sequences will be characterised by marginal storage values that will have significantly diverged from 
average levels.  Depending on the direction of the deviation, fuel will either be relatively abundant or 
scarce in these scenarios, and the influence that releases have on the marginal value of stored water in 
these conditions will be greater for that divergence, which will lead to release strategies that promote 
moderation.     
The dimensionality of the problem is significantly expanded if we consider stochastic inflow 
patterns and releases are now defined not just for each sub-period but for each system state, based on a 
given beginning of period storage level of l(t), in sub-period t. 
 
 
RELi,t ,l (t−1) −
1
2





  ⊥    
ε i,t ,l (t ) ≥ 0   
∀i > 0,t,l(t)   (7.15) 
The market clearing is also significantly expanded to account for the dimensionality, so that there is a 
market clearance in each sub-period corresponding to each beginning of period system state, as indexed 
by l(t-1).   Along with the equilibrium investment condition, the conditions determining optimal trade-
offs remains the same, although each are also in higher dimensions. 
 
7.4 Ancillary Services 
7.4.1 Introduction 
Ancillary services are designed to provide system security within the dispatch timeframe.  Section 4.3 
deals with the slightly overlapping issue of reliability, but apart from the actual dispatch period in 
which an unscheduled breakdown or outage occurs, the reliability discussion relates to medium term 
reliability or “firmness”, although we acknowledge that in certain markets, reserve can be called upon 
to prevent shortages.  Our focus here is on how reserve provision specifically relates to the intra-
dispatch timeframe. From an investment point of view, ancillary services have some important 
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implications.  Ancillary service markets provide another source of income for those technologies able 
to provide services, introduce valuation differentials between different plant types based on their 
reserve providing capabilities, and complicate the decision and offer processes of firms who must 
choose between competing uses.  
7.4.2 Formulating Reserve Provision 
Instantaneous Reserve 
Perhaps the most common ancillary service procured is instantaneous reserve.  Instantaneous reserve is 
designed to protect the system and ensure continuance of supply when a unit, plant or transmission line 
fails.  Reserve of this sort is typically available in several classes, based on the technical capabilities of 
each technology, such as their ability to respond, and sustain that response.  Accordingly, in NZ for 
example, there is a six second and sixty second reserve class.  
Depending on the system being studied, the level of instantaneous reserve required will be set 
to ensure at least the largest single outage is covered (N-1 rule), and in some markets the largest two 
outages are covered (N-2 rule).   The reserve requirements for the market are often endogenous to the 
market clearance process itself, but can also be set on an exogenous basis:  
        (7.16) 
Setting reserve requirements on an endogenous basis, involves taking account of specific plant output 
and transmission flows to determine the level of reserve required as a function of the optimal dispatch.  
In NZ, the level of reserve required in each island is determined by the largest of the maximum 
generation from a single plant in each major island, and the net reduction in transfer across the inter-
island HVDC link island, due to pole failure. Others have proposed more elaborate methods for 
determining a dynamic reserve (Mitropoulos, 1984) 
Not all technologies are equally adept at providing instantaneous reserve, and some may not 
be able to at all.  The capacity of each technology available to provide instantaneous reserve is defined 
in (7.16), which demonstrates that capacity must ultimately be allocated to one purpose or another.  In 
addition, there is a maximum amount of reserve that can be provided due to the ability of plant to ramp 
up output in the specified time-frame, which is represented here as a constant, but one which can be 
optimised at the time of plant design, or refurbishment.  That relationship is unlikely to be convex, but 
we approximate the ability of a plant to provide reserve with the following constraints, using them to 
describe the convex approximation of the set of feasible operations.  
        (7.17) 
         (7.18) 
         (7.19) 
If it were technically possible, reserve would be provided by plant that was not in operation, and this 




∑ − RESr ,tup ≥ 0 ⊥  λr ,t
res ≥ 0  ∀r,t
 
τ i
rampGENi,r ,t − RESi,r ,t ≥ 0 ⊥  µi,r ,t
ramp ≥ 0  ∀i,r,t
 
τ i
+CAPi − RESi,r ,t ≥ 0 ⊥  
µi,r ,t
+ ≥ 0  ∀i,r,t
 
CAPi −GENi,r ,t − RESi,r ,t ≥ 0 ⊥  
ϕ i,r ,t
+ ≥ 0  ∀i,r,t
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reserve is typically only available from plants already operating, with capacity for reserve supplied by 
backing off plant, starting at the top of the operating merit order and then progressing down the merit 
order until reserve constraints are satisfied.  This becomes increasingly expensive, in opportunity cost 
terms, as lower marginal cost energy producing technologies earn higher energy market profits.  The 
cost of providing reserve therefore depends on the market equilibrium, as reserve provision is priced 
against the opportunity cost of foregoing production opportunities.   
  
     (7.20) 
When the ramping constraint on reserve provision is inactive, (7.20) collapses to the standard form.  
However, when the ramping constraint is binding an increase in generation also affords an increase in 
reserve provision, effectively subsidising the marginal cost of generation.   The complementarity 
condition corresponding to reserve provision is: 
  
      (7.21) 
If the case where technology i is providing reserve, then from (7.17) we have  so that 
combining (7.20) and (7.21) gives: 
  
   (7.22)  
Re-arranging gives the relationship between energy market and reserve pricing: 
 
  
      (7.23) 
When neither the ramping nor the maximum reserve constraints are binding, the equilibrium reserve 
price reflects the opportunity cost of the devoting capacity to the energy market.  When reserve 
constraints bind, the reserve price is higher than spot market profitability in equilibrium, as we would 
expect incentives remain to swing capacity to the reserve market while the firm is constrained from 
doing so.   The ramping constraint dual reflects the cost of that constraint in the reserve market, but 
also the effective subsidy of marginal cost provided when generation is increased.   
At certain utilisation levels reserve pricing could entice generators to partially exit the spot 
market and divert capacity to the reserve market.  In a perfectly competitive market, the opportunity 
cost of providing reserve is the profitability of the technology, so the reserve price will be equal to the 
profitability of the individual technology supplying reserve at the margin in any case.  As that 
technology must be producing and marginal (partially utilised) to provide reserve, the opportunity cost 
of that technology supplying reserve is lower than the profitability of a fully utilised technology 
entering lower in the merit order. 
The difficulty with determining critical utilisation levels in this case is that the cost functions 
of each technology in the energy market are piecewise linear with the effective discount to 
accommodate the ramping constraint being represented as a reduction in that technologies marginal 
cost.  Were the cost curve piecewise linear, this problem would be easily solved, but the added degree 
of difficulty in this case is a result of the definition of the piecewise linearity being endogenous and a 
 
−λr ,t + MCi,t −τ i
rampµi,r ,t





GENi,r ,t ≥ 0  ∀i,r,t
 
−λr ,t
res + µi,r ,t
ramp + µi





RESi,r ,t ≥ 0  ∀i,r,t
 
GENi,r ,t > 0
 
−λr ,t
res + µi,r ,t
ramp + µi
+ +ϕ i,r ,t
+
i>0
= −λr ,t + MCi,t −τ i
rampµi,r ,t





res = λr ,t − MCi,t −τ i
rampµi,r ,t
ramp( ) + µi,r ,tramp + µi+
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property of the equilibrium.  In some cases it could be possible for the benefit available from supplying 
reserve to exceed the cost of operating at loss in the spot market and could lead to a technology being 
willing to offer below cost in order to be dispatched and collect reserve payments. That would be 
represented by a downward sloping total cost curve at utilisation levels higher than those for which the 
technology would be inframarginal. 
We have also not considered the reserve implications and the implicit requirement for 
flexibility in other technologies, even over multiple dispatch periods, further complicating the 
assessment of the cost of intermittent generation.  There is some concern that the price depressive 
effect of wind and other intermittent generation forms will impact most negatively on those 
technologies that would have the flexibility to assist with its integration (Traber & Kemfert, 2011), (A. 
Wu, 2012). 
7.5 Demand Response as a Configurable Technology 
For each pairwise comparison of technologies there is a load response available between them that is 
based on the price differential between the two technologies.  The quantum of load response available 
depends on the properties of the demand curve and the marginal cost differential between the 
technologies being compared.  The total load response is set by the demand function, and system 
prices, and so jointly contributes to, and is a property of the equilibrium. The actual load response in 
the market is a function of which technologies ultimately define market clearances.  We proceed by 
defining the capacity and functional form of pairwise load response opportunities so that these may be 
selected and define critical utilisation levels, capacities and prices, using an adaptation of the algorithm 
as described in Section 3.5, modified to consider load response. 
Whereas in the case of considering configuration options the orientation used to define the 
quadratic portion of the cost structure was automatically established by the use of known limiting 
technologies, one of which was known to be more capital intensive than the other.  It is not as clear 
with load response, because the value function of a load response opportunity is arrived at by 
comparing the cost structure of two different technologies, and so the direction of comparison is not 
known, and may not even be consistent between sub-periods or scenarios if, for example, energy limits 
are applicable. Fortunately, this is of no import, as the definition of the quadratic cost structure is 
invariant to the orientation of the trade-off specification.    
Under perfect competition without load response, the spot price is determined by the marginal 
cost of the marginal generator.  Load response occurs between those price levels which are defined by 
adjacent generation technologies. If we consider the lower marginal cost technology, then in order to 
preserve the option value of investment in this technology at the level of FC, the utilisation range 
occupied by demand response must be evenly drawn from the marginal operating range of this 
technology and the adjacent higher marginal cost technology.  In order to retain this balance we impose 
constraint (7.24), in terms of 
 
un,t
lr ,− and 
 
un,t
lr ,+  , which describe the optimal utilisation range load response 










= 0      ∀i ∈LR,t  (7.24) 
As the piecewise linear LDC is monotone decreasing in utilisation, progressive extension of the 




lr ,+ , also monotonically increases the capacity corresponding to that 
utilisation range.  Although the utilisation range is symmetrically extended, the same cannot be said for 
capacity, which will vary asymmetrically according to the slope of the LDC at the relevant utilisation 
level.  Resorting to a simple linear demand function we have the following expression for the capacity 
of demand response available between technologies i and j, remembering that, in this instance, the load 




   
CAPn,t
lr = Lt
0 − atλn−1,t( )− Lt0 − atλn,t( )
= at z j ,nMCj
j







    
 ∀n,t   (7.25) 
Here  a t  is the price coefficient in the demand function, which when multiplied by the difference 
between adjacent marginal costs gives the capacity of load response, 
 
CAPn,t
lr .  This is the actual 
quantum of load response available between in this price range and not merely a bound.   The 
utilisation range of the load response opportunity will expand until the capacity as defined by the LDC 
reaches the required level defined in (7.25).  
Demand response technologies are parameterised by the marginal costs of adjacent 
technologies and the total quantum of load response available which is also a function of those 
marginal costs, along with the demand function, and the LDC.  Based on a linear marginal value of 
load response as determined by the demand function, the value of load response is a quadratic 
expression.  From (3.80), we have a definition of the optimised cost of generation with a configurable 
technology with linear fixed and marginal cost adjustment.  We can adapt this to define a LRV (Load 
Response Value) function that is analogous to a total cost function for a generation technology:  
  
 
LRVi,t (u) = FCi,t
0 + fci,t + MCi,t
0( )u − mci,tu2      ∀i ∈LR,t  (7.26) 
We introduce  FCi
0  and  MCi
0  to describe both the intercept and the slope of the load response value 
function at zero utilisation.  In this context, these are parameters and have lost a degree of 
interpretability as a result of no longer also describing the limiting version of a technology.  
 
FCi,t
−  and 
 
FCi,t
−  still define bounds on the value of load response in the range bounded by  MCi
−  and  MCi
+ ,  the 
marginal costs of the two adjacent technologies.  
 
fci,t  and  
mci,t continue to describe the rate of change 
the intercept and slope of the function in linear terms.  Just as with configurable technologies, in which 
there is a continuous spectrum of trade-offs, in this case there is a continuous range of consumer load 
response, with each increment in the price encouraging a slight reduction in demand.   
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The quadratic coefficients are jointly determined by the fixed and marginal costs of adjacent 
technologies,  MCi
−  and  MCi
+ , and utilisation levels which are disciplined by the total available 
capacity.  We begin by expressing 
 
fci,t  and  




























−       ∀i ∈LR,t  (7.28) 
We define the slope of (7.26) as follows: 
   
∂TCi (u)
∂u
= fci + MCi
+ − 2mciu      ∀i ∈LR,t  (7.29) 
It follows that at 
 
ui,t
−  we have: 




+      ∀i ∈LR,t  (7.30) 
Substituting suitably chosen definitions of 
 
fci,t  and  
mci,t : 
































+( )      ∀i ∈LR,t  (7.32) 












−( )      ∀i ∈LR,t  (7.33) 
Re-arranging expressions (7.32) and (7.33) uniquely determines the parameters  FCi
0  and  MCi
0 , that 
complete the definition of 
 




− ≤ u ≤ ui,t
+ .  This information will form part of the criteria for selecting critical utilisation 
levels.   In the case of generation technologies the adjustment rates of both the fixed and marginal cost 
are known, whereas in this case we know only the adjustment rate of the marginal value, and the 
overall capacity available.  In conjunction with the LDC these define an endogenous intercept which 
describes the value of each incremental load response to the system, and which is consistent with the 
total quantum of load response available.  In that sense load response is valued individually in each 
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sub-period or scenario, and its capacity, while not unlimited, will vary according to the prevailing 
prices and technological interactions. 
7.5.1 Critical Utilisation Levels 
Unfortunately the process of selecting critical utilisation levels is significantly more complex.  
Previously we stepped through the lower envelope starting with a notional shortage technology, and 
progressively selecting the minimal optimal trade-offs with the current technology, before moving to 
the implied new technology and repeating the process until it reached a conclusion. 
Where load response is concerned, if we imagine the complementarity conditions in 
algorithmic form, we are unable to simply choose the minimal next optimal trade-off whether that it 
corresponds to a generation technology or a load response option.  If the currently selected technology 
is a generation technology then by definition any transition in marginal cost will create a load response 
opportunity, so we must move from generation technology to load response opportunity.  If the current 
technology is a load response opportunity from between technologies i and j, then this load response 
must intersect next with technology j before any other for it to even be valid.   
To assist in enforcing the alternating pattern we introduce the following complementarity 
constraint: 
   
ALTn + ALTn−1 n>0 −1= 0  ⊥    ALTn−1 free    ∀n   (7.34) 
The primary constraint of the original formulation defined the next critical utilisation level by selecting 
the minimum intersection from all such intersections with other technologies j: 
   
un





∑    :ψ n
0     (7.35) 






1     (7.36) 
As we commence with the notional shortage technology we wish to alternately select a technology 
from the set of load response options and then generation technologies.  Accordingly we modify (7.35) 
so that the minimum value of  un
e  is given by: 
  
un









∑   :ψ n
0     (7.37) 
We can also condense these constraints so that they only apply when required 






1     (7.38)  







1     (7.39) 
To prevent cycling we previously ensured that the marginal cost of the next technology should be no 
higher than the last, and that they should not be repeated.  This approach remains reasonable although 
the actual technologies are separated by load response opportunities.  By ensuring that generation 
technologies are not repeated, the same is implied for load response opportunities. 
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z j ,n-1MCj
j
∑ − z j ,nMCj
j
∑ ≥ 0  ⊥   ψ n
2 ≥ 0     ∀n > 0  (7.40) 
   
− z j ,n-1z j ,n
j
∑ +ψ n5 ≥ 0   ⊥   ψ n
3 ≥ 0     ∀n > 0   (7.41) 




∑ −1≥ 0   ⊥   ψ n
4 ≥ 0     ∀n   (7.42) 
  
 1− un
e ≥ 0   ⊥   ψ n
5 ≥ 0     ∀n   (7.43) 
7.6 Stochastic Dominance 
Stochastic dominance refers to the screening of different investment options to find the most preferred, 
or dominant choice.  As shown in Figure 42, the curve denoted FSD exhibits first order stochastic 
dominance over the base case, as the return is higher in every eventuality.  The curve denoted SSD 
exhibits second order stochastic dominance over the base case.  Although it fails to dominate in every 
eventuality, the expected returns up to any level are greater for this distribution than they are for the 
base distribution.  Mathematically, first order stochastic dominance is defined as: 
         (7.44) 
Second order stochastic dominance is defined as: 
         (7.45) 
In practice, FSD will not effectively screen many options, as real decisions usually involve some form 
of trade-off between two outcomes that are, at least in a pairwise sense, Pareto-efficient in terms of risk 
and return.  If, in addition to accepting the reasonableness of FSD, we are also prepared to accept the 
firm is risk averse we can apply a screening based on second order stochastic dominance (SSD).  If the 
firm exhibits decreasing risk aversion, third degree stochastic dominance will screen out possible 
options based on that criterion.  Going beyond third order stochastic dominance, while possible, is 
difficult to credibly align with underlying economic assumptions. 
Although it is considerably less common than other approaches, the analysis of risk and decision 
making with stochastic dominance has been operationalised in the literature.  Bunn (1984) summarises 
stochastic dominance from a decision analysis practitioners perspective while Sriboonchitta (2010) 
provides a mathematical analysis.  Among others, Noyan (2010) and Dentcheva & Ruszczynski (2006) 
demonstrate how to include stochastic dominance constraints in portfolio optimisation problems.   




∫ ≥ Fj (y)dy
−∞
z
∫ ∀z ∈ y
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Figure 42: Stochastic Dominance 
7.7 Full Models 
Below are the full models from various sections in the thesis. 
7.7.1 Generalised Cost Structures 
Following adaptation to address generalisation the cost structure for each generation technology to 
reflect diminishing efficiency in generation, the optimal trade-off, market clearing and equilibrium 
capacity model is presented below.  By inspection, the system is square with one constraint for each 
variable, and one variable for each constraint.   
 




−λr ,t + MCi(m),t +ϕ i(m),r ,t
+
i>0
≥ 0   ⊥  
 
GENi(m),r ,t ≥ 0   





∑ − Lr ,t = 0   ⊥   λr ,t free     ∀r,t  (7.47) 
  
 
CAPi(m),t −GENi(m),r ,t ≥ 0   ⊥   
ϕ i(m),r ,t




,r,t  (7.48) 
Equilibrium Capacity Choice Conditions 
  
 
χ i(m),t − ϕ i(m),r+1,t
+ ur+1,t − ur ,t( )
r<R
∑ = 0  ⊥   CAPi(m),t free   ∀ i(m) i>0 ,t  (7.49) 
  
 
CAPi(m) −α i(m)CAPi = 0   ⊥   




   
FCi − w t
t




⊥   INVi ≥ 0    ∀i > 0  (7.51) 
Defining Optimal Trade-offs 












χ i(m),t − χ j(m),t − (MCj,t − MCi,t )ui, j ,t
e +ηi, j ,t ≥ 0  ⊥   
ui, j ,t
e ≥ 0
   
∀i(m), j(m) ≠ i(m),t  (7.52) 
  
 
1− ui, j ,t
e ≥ 0   ⊥  
 
ηi, j ,t ≥ 0     ∀i, j ≠ i,t   (7.53) 
Selecting Critical Utilisation Levels 
   
1−ψ n,t
0 ≥ 0   ⊥  
 
un,t





∑ −ψ n,t1 +ψ n,t2 MCj,t +ψ n,t3 z j ,n-1,t + 2ψ n,t4 z j ,n,t ≥ 0   ⊥   z j ,n,t ≥ 0     ∀j,n > 0,t   (7.55) 
   
un,t





∑ ≥ 0  ⊥   ψ n,t
0 ≥ 0     ∀n > 0,t  (7.56) 
   
z j ,n,t
j
∑ ≥1   ⊥   ψ n,t
1 ≥ 0     ∀n > 0,t  (7.57) 
   
z j ,n-1,tMCj,t
j
∑ − z j ,n,tMCj,t
j
∑ ≥ 0  ⊥   ψ n,t
2 ≥ 0     ∀n > 0,t  (7.58) 
   
− z j ,n-1,t z j ,n,t
j
∑ +ψ n,t5 ≥ 0   ⊥   ψ n,t
3 ≥ 0     ∀n > 0,t   (7.59) 




∑ −1≥ 0   ⊥   ψ n,t
4 ≥ 0     ∀n > 0,t   (7.60) 
   
1− un,t
e ≥ 0   ⊥  
 
ψ n,t
5 ≥ 0     ∀n > 0,t   (7.61) 





f ≥ 0   ⊥  
 
xk ,r ,t ≥ 0     
∀k,r,t   (7.62)  








   
∀n,r,t   (7.63) 
  
 
1− xk ,r ,t
k
∑ − xn,r ,te
n
∑ ≥ 0   ⊥   φr ,t
0 ≥ 0     ∀r,t   (7.64)  
  
 
1− xk ,r ,t
r
∑ ≥ 0  ⊥   φk ,t






∑ ≥ 0  ⊥   φn,t
e ≥ 0     ∀n,t   (7.66) 
Defining Variables at Critical Utilisation Levels 
   
ur ,t − xk ,r ,tuk,t
k
∑ + xn,r ,te un,te
n
∑ = 0       ∀r,t   (7.67) 
  
 
Lr ,t − xk ,r ,tLk,t
k
∑ + xn,r ,te Ln,te
n




e − L0,t +
Lk-1,t − Lk,t
uk,t − uk-1,tk







∑ − un,te = 0       ∀n,t   (7.70) 
  
 
uk,t − uk-1,t − uk ,n,t
part ≥ 0  ⊥    uk+1,n,t
part ≥ 0    ∀0 < k < K ,n,t  (7.71) 




e = 0       ∀t   (7.72) 
  
 
z0,0,t = 1        ∀t   (7.73) 
  
 
z0,i,t = 0  
     ∀i > 0,t   (7.74) 
7.7.2 Capacity Inflexibility 
Following adaptation to address retirement and mothballing, the optimal trade-off, market clearing and 
equilibrium capacity model is presented below.  By inspection, the system is square with one constraint 
for each variable, and one variable for each constraint.   
 
Market Equilibrium Conditions 
   
−λr ,t + MCi,t +ϕ i,r ,t
+
i>0
≥ 0   ⊥  
 
GENi,r ,t ≥ 0    





∑ − Lr ,t = 0   ⊥   λr ,t free     ∀r,t  (7.76) 
   
CAPi,t − MBLi + REIi,t −GENi,r ,t ≥ 0
 
⊥   
ϕ i,r ,t
+ ≥ 0     
∀i > 0,r,t  (7.77) 
Mothballing and Reinstatement 
   
a i,t















REIi,t ≥ 0    ∀i > 0,t  (7.79) 
   




MBL ≥ 0    





∑ −π iMBL + χ iMBL ≥ 0  ⊥  MBLi ≥ 0    ∀i > 0  (7.81) 
Capacity Limitations 






− ≥ 0     
∀i > 0  (7.82) 
   
CAPi




+ ≥ 0     
∀i > 0  (7.83) 
Equilibrium Capacity Choice Conditions 
  
 
χ i,t − ϕ i,r+1,t
+ ur+1,t − ur ,t( )
r<R




CAPi −CAPi,t ≥ 0   ⊥   
χ i,t ≥ 0     ∀i > 0,t  (7.85) 
   
w t
t
∑ χ i,t + χ iMBL⎛⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
− FOCi − χ i
+ − χ i
−( ) + χ iRET ≥ 0
 
⊥   RETi ≥ 0    ∀i > 0  (7.86) 
   
FCi − w t
t




+ − χ i
−( ) ≥ 0
 
⊥   INVi ≥ 0    ∀i > 0  (7.87) 
Defining Optimal Trade-offs 
  
 
χ i,t − χ j ,t − (MCj,t − MCi,t )ui, j ,t
e +ηi, j ,t ≥ 0  ⊥   
ui, j ,t
e ≥ 0     ∀i, j ≠ i,t   (7.88) 
  
 
1− ui, j ,t
e ≥ 0   ⊥  
 
ηi, j ,t ≥ 0     ∀i, j ≠ i,t   (7.89) 
Selecting Critical Utilisation Levels 
   
1−ψ n,t
0 ≥ 0   ⊥  
 
un,t





∑ −ψ n,t1 +ψ n,t2 MCj,t +ψ n,t3 z j ,n-1,t + 2ψ n,t4 z j ,n,t ≥ 0   ⊥   z j ,n,t ≥ 0     ∀j,n > 0,t   (7.91) 
   
un,t





∑ ≥ 0  ⊥   ψ n,t
0 ≥ 0     ∀n > 0,t  (7.92) 
   
z j ,n,t
j
∑ ≥1   ⊥   ψ n,t
1 ≥ 0     ∀n > 0,t  (7.93) 
   
z j ,n-1,tMCj,t
j
∑ − z j ,n,tMCj,t
j
∑ ≥ 0  ⊥   ψ n,t
2 ≥ 0     ∀n > 0,t  (7.94) 
   
− z j ,n-1,t z j ,n,t
j
∑ +ψ n,t5 ≥ 0   ⊥   ψ n,t
3 ≥ 0     ∀n > 0,t   (7.95) 




∑ −1≥ 0   ⊥   ψ n,t
4 ≥ 0     ∀n > 0,t   (7.96) 
   
1− un,t
e ≥ 0   ⊥  
 
ψ n,t
5 ≥ 0     ∀n > 0,t   (7.97) 





f ≥ 0   ⊥  
 
xk ,r ,t ≥ 0     
∀k,r,t   (7.98)  








   
∀n,r,t   (7.99) 
  
 
1− xk ,r ,t
k
∑ − xn,r ,te
n
∑ ≥ 0   ⊥   φr ,t
0 ≥ 0     ∀r,t   (7.100)  
  
 
1− xk ,r ,t
r
∑ ≥ 0  ⊥   φk ,t






∑ ≥ 0  ⊥   φn,t
e ≥ 0     ∀n,t   (7.102) 
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Defining Variables at Critical Utilisation Levels 
   
ur ,t − xk ,r ,tuk,t
k
∑ + xn,r ,te un,te
n
∑ = 0       ∀r,t   (7.103) 
  
 
Lr ,t − xk ,r ,tLk,t
k
∑ + xn,r ,te Ln,te
n




e − L0,t +
Lk-1,t − Lk,t
uk,t − uk-1,tk






∑ − un,te = 0       ∀n,t   (7.106) 
  
 
uk,t − uk-1,t − uk ,n,t
part ≥ 0  ⊥    uk+1,n,t
part ≥ 0    ∀0 < k < K ,n,t  (7.107) 




e = 0       ∀t   (7.108) 
  
 
z0,0,t = 1        ∀t   (7.109) 
  
 
z0,i,t = 0  
     ∀i > 0,t   (7.110) 
   
CAPi = CAPi
0 + INVi − RETi
 
     ∀i > 0  (7.111) 
   
π i
MBL = FOCi − FOCi




∑ − FCMBL        ∀i > 0  (7.112) 
7.7.3 Energy Limits 
Following adaptation to incorporate energy limits, the optimal trade-off, market clearing and 
equilibrium capacity model is presented below.  The problem is stated in straight capacity terms, but 
can be adapted to include investment and retirement explicitly.  By inspection, the system is square 
with one constraint for each variable, and one variable for each constraint.   
 




−λr ,t + ε i,t +ϕ i,r ,t
+
i>0
≥ 0   ⊥  
 





∑ − Lr ,t = 0   ⊥   λr ,t free     ∀r,t  (7.114) 
  
 
CAPi,t −GENi,r ,t ≥ 0   ⊥   
ϕ i,r ,t
+ ≥ 0    ∀i > 0,r,t  (7.115) 
Inflow Definition 
   
MCi,t − ε i,t +ηi,t ≥ 0
 
⊥   INFi ≥ 0    ∀i > 0,t   (7.116) 
   
INFi,t
+ − INFi ≥ 0
 
⊥   
ηi,t ≥ 0     ∀i > 0,t   (7.117) 
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Storage Restrictions 
   
STORi,t −STORi,t




    
∀i > 0,t  (7.118) 
   
STORi,t
+ − STORi,t ≥ 0  ⊥   
γ i,t
+ ≥ 0
    
∀i > 0,t  (7.119) 
  
STORi,0 t=1 + STORi,t−1 t>1 + INFi,t − RELi,t − STORi,t = 0  
⊥  
 












⊥   
ε i,t ≥ 0     ∀i > 0,t   (7.121) 
  
 
γ i,t − ε i,t ≥ 0  ⊥   
RELi,t ≥ 0    ∀i > 0,t  (7.122) 
   
γ i,t −γ i,t+1 t<T −Vi
/ STORi,T( ) t=T + γ i,t+ −γ i,t− = 0  ⊥  STORi,t free   ∀i > 0,t  (7.123) 
Equilibrium Capacity Choice Conditions 
  
 
χ i,t − ϕ i,r+1,t
+ ur+1,t − ur ,t( )
r<R
∑ = 0  ⊥   CAPi,t free    ∀i,t  (7.124) 
  
 
CAPi −CAPi,t ≥ 0   ⊥   
χ i,t ≥ 0     ∀i > 0,t  (7.125) 
  
 
FCi − w t
t
∑ χ i,t ≥ 0  ⊥   CAPi ≥ 0    ∀i > 0  (7.126) 
Defining Optimal Trade-offs 
  
 
χ i,t − χ j ,t − (ε j ,t − ε i,t )ui, j ,t
e +ηi, j ,t ≥ 0  ⊥   
ui, j ,t
e ≥ 0     ∀i, j ≠ i,t   (7.127) 
  
 
1− ui, j ,t
e ≥ 0   ⊥  
 
ηi, j ,t ≥ 0     ∀i, j ≠ i,t   (7.128) 
Selecting Critical Utilisation Levels 
   
1−ψ n,t
0 ≥ 0   ⊥  
 
un,t





∑ −ψ n,t1 +ψ n,t2 MCj,t +ψ n,t3 z j ,n-1,t + 2ψ n,t4 z j ,n,t ≥ 0   ⊥   z j ,n,t ≥ 0     ∀j,n > 0,t   (7.130) 
   
un,t





∑ ≥ 0  ⊥   ψ n,t
0 ≥ 0     ∀n > 0,t  (7.131) 
   
z j ,n,t
j
∑ ≥1   ⊥   ψ n,t
1 ≥ 0     ∀n > 0,t  (7.132) 
   
z j ,n-1,tMCj,t
j
∑ − z j ,n,tMCj,t
j
∑ ≥ 0  ⊥   ψ n,t
2 ≥ 0     ∀n > 0,t  (7.133) 
   
− z j ,n-1,t z j ,n,t
j
∑ +ψ n,t5 ≥ 0   ⊥   ψ n,t
3 ≥ 0     ∀n > 0,t   (7.134) 
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∑ −1≥ 0   ⊥   ψ n,t
4 ≥ 0     ∀n > 0,t   (7.135) 
   
1− un,t
e ≥ 0   ⊥  
 
ψ n,t
5 ≥ 0     ∀n > 0,t   (7.136) 





f ≥ 0   ⊥  
 
xk ,r ,t ≥ 0     
∀k,r,t   (7.137)  








   
∀n,r,t   (7.138) 
  
 
1− xk ,r ,t
k
∑ − xn,r ,te
n
∑ ≥ 0   ⊥   φr ,t
0 ≥ 0     ∀r,t   (7.139)  
  
 
1− xk ,r ,t
r
∑ ≥ 0  ⊥   φk ,t






∑ ≥ 0  ⊥   φn,t
e ≥ 0     ∀n,t   (7.141) 
Defining Variables at Critical Utilisation Levels 
   
ur ,t − xk ,r ,tuk,t
k
∑ + xn,r ,te un,te
n
∑ = 0       ∀r,t   (7.142) 
  
 
Lr ,t − xk ,r ,tLk,t
k
∑ + xn,r ,te Ln,te
n




e − L0,t +
Lk-1,t − Lk,t
uk,t − uk-1,tk






∑ − un,te = 0       ∀n,t   (7.145) 
  
 
uk,t − uk-1,t − uk ,n,t
part ≥ 0  ⊥    uk+1,n,t
part ≥ 0    ∀0 < k < K ,n,t  (7.146) 




e = 0       ∀t   (7.147) 
  
 
z0,0,t = 1        ∀t   (7.148) 
  
 
z0,i,t = 0  
     ∀i > 0,t   (7.149) 
7.7.4 Configurable Technologies 
The introduction of configurable technologies involves significant modification to the model. 
Following adaptation, the optimal trade-off, market clearing and equilibrium capacity model is 
presented below.  By inspection, the system is square with one constraint for each variable, and one 
variable for each constraint, but we note for the reader the set of technologies i, is comprised of a set C 
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which indexes conventional technologies and a set i(r), which is an operating range specific index of 
configurable technologies. 
 




































⎟ +ϕ i(r ),r
+ ≥ 0   ⊥   





∑ + GENi(r )
i(r )
∑ − Lr = 0   ⊥   λr ,t free     ∀r,t  (7.152) 
  
 
CAPi −GENi,r ≥ 0   ⊥   
ϕ i,r
+ ≥ 0     ∀i > 0,i ∉C,r  (7.153) 
   
CAPi(r ) −GENi(r ),r ≥ 0   ⊥   
ϕ i(r ),r
+ ≥ 0    ∀i(r),r  (7.154) 
Equilibrium Capacity Choice Conditions 
  
 
χ i,t − ϕ i,r+1,t
+ ur+1,t − ur ,t( )
r<R
∑ = 0  ⊥   CAPi,t free    ∀i,t  (7.155) 
  
 
CAPi −CAPi,t ≥ 0   ⊥   
χ i,t ≥ 0     ∀i > 0,t  (7.156) 
 
 




+ ,ε +ϕ i,r+1













u r +1 − u r( )
r<R
∑ ≥ 0 ⊥   CAPi ≥ 0   ∀i ∉C  (7.157) 
 




+ ,ε +ϕ i(r ),r+1













u r +1 − u r( )
r<R






cfg + a j
cfg
a i
















cfg + a j
cfg
a i

















2 ζ i, j
3 +ζ i, j
4 + 1−
ζ i, j
3 +ζ i, j
4
ζ i, j
3 +ζ i, j












































+η i, j ,v ≥ 0   
   ⊥  
 
ui, j ,v
























cfg( )− ui, je ≥ 0   ⊥   ηi, j ≥ 0      ∀i, j ≠ i   (7.160) 
   
ζ i, j
1 − bi, j




1 ≥ 0      ∀i, j ≠ i   (7.161) 
   
bi, j
2 − 4ai, jci, j −ζ i, j






2 ≥ 0      ∀i, j ≠ i   (7.162) 
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ζ i, j




3 ≥ 0      ∀i, j ≠ i   (7.163) 
   
ai, j −ζ i, j






4 ≥ 0      ∀i, j ≠ i   (7.164) 
Selecting Critical Utilisation Levels 
   
1−ψ n,t
0 ≥ 0   ⊥  
 
un,t





∑ −ψ n,t1 +ψ n,t2 MCj,t +ψ n,t3 z j ,n-1,t + 2ψ n,t4 z j ,n,t ≥ 0   ⊥   z j ,n,t ≥ 0     ∀j,n > 0,t   (7.166) 
   
un





∑ = 0    :ψ n
0     ∀n > 0  (7.167) 
   
z j ,n,v
j ,v
∑ −1≥ 0     :ψ n
1     ∀n  (7.168) 
   
z j ,n-1,tMCj,t
j
∑ − z j ,n,tMCj,t
j
∑ ≥ 0  ⊥   ψ n,t
2 ≥ 0     ∀n > 0,t  (7.169) 
   
− z j ,n-1,t z j ,n,t
j
∑ +ψ n,t5 ≥ 0   ⊥   ψ n,t
3 ≥ 0     ∀n > 0,t   (7.170) 




∑ −1≥ 0     :ψ n
5     ∀n   (7.171) 
   
1− un,t
e ≥ 0   ⊥  
 
ψ n,t
5 ≥ 0     ∀n > 0,t   (7.172) 





f ≥ 0   ⊥  
 
xk ,r ,t ≥ 0     
∀k,r,t   (7.173)  








   
∀n,r,t   (7.174) 
  
 
1− xk ,r ,t
k
∑ − xn,r ,te
n
∑ ≥ 0   ⊥   φr ,t
0 ≥ 0     ∀r,t   (7.175)  
  
 
1− xk ,r ,t
r
∑ ≥ 0  ⊥   φk ,t






∑ ≥ 0  ⊥   φn,t
e ≥ 0     ∀n,t   (7.177) 
Defining Variables at Critical Utilisation Levels 
   
ur ,t − xk ,r ,tuk,t
k
∑ + xn,r ,te un,te
n
∑ = 0       ∀r,t   (7.178) 
  
 
Lr ,t − xk ,r ,tLk,t
k
∑ + xn,r ,te Ln,te
n




e − L0,t +
Lk-1,t − Lk,t
uk,t − uk-1,tk







∑ − un,te = 0       ∀n,t   (7.181) 
  
 
uk,t − uk-1,t − uk ,n,t
part ≥ 0  ⊥    uk+1,n,t
part ≥ 0    ∀0 < k < K ,n,t  (7.182) 




e = 0       ∀t   (7.183) 
  
 
z0,0,t = 1        ∀t   (7.184) 
  
 
z0,i,t = 0  
     ∀i > 0,t   (7.185) 



















2       ∀i  (7.186) 
7.7.5 Long Term Demand Response 
Following adaptation to account for load response the optimal trade-off, market clearing and 
equilibrium capacity model is presented below.  By inspection, the system is square with one constraint 
for each variable, and one variable for each constraint, but we draw the reader’s attention to the 
indexation of the capacity constraints.  In particular, the investment constraint does not include the 
demand response technology, whose capacity level is defined directly.  
 
Market Equilibrium Conditions: 
  
 
−λr ,t + MCi,t +ϕ i,r ,t
+
i>0
≥ 0   ⊥  
 
GENi,r ,t ≥ 0    





∑ − Lr ,t = 0   ⊥   λr ,t free     ∀r,t  (7.188) 
  
 
CAPi,t −GENi,r ,t ≥ 0   ⊥   
ϕ i,r ,t
+ ≥ 0    ∀0 < i,r,t  (7.189) 
Optimal Capacity Conditions 
   
χ i,t − ϕ i,r+1,t
+ ur+1,t − ur ,t( )
r<R
∑ = 0  ⊥   CAPi,t free    ∀i,t  (7.190) 
  
 
CAPi −CAPi,t ≥ 0   ⊥   
χ i,t ≥ 0     ∀0 < i,t  (7.191) 
  
 
FCi − w t
t
∑ χ i,t ≥ 0  ⊥   CAPi ≥ 0    ∀0 < i < I +1  (7.192) 
Defining Optimal Trade-offs 
  
 
χ i,t − χ j ,t − (MCj,t − MCi,t )ui, j ,t
e +ηi, j ,t ≥ 0  ⊥   
ui, j ,t
e ≥ 0     ∀i, j ≠ i,t   (7.193) 
  
 
1− ui, j ,t
e ≥ 0   ⊥  
 
ηi, j ,t ≥ 0     ∀i, j ≠ i,t   (7.194) 
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1−ψ n,t
0 ≥ 0   ⊥  
 
un,t





∑ −ψ n,t1 +ψ n,t2 MCj,t +ψ n,t3 z j ,n-1,t + 2ψ n,t4 z j ,n,t ≥ 0   ⊥   z j ,n,t ≥ 0     ∀j,n > 0,t   (7.196) 
   
un,t





∑ ≥ 0  ⊥   ψ n,t
0 ≥ 0     ∀n > 0,t  (7.197) 
   
z j ,n,t
j
∑ ≥1   ⊥   ψ n,t
1 ≥ 0     ∀n > 0,t  (7.198) 
   
z j ,n-1,tMCj,t
j
∑ − z j ,n,tMCj,t
j
∑ ≥ 0  ⊥   ψ n,t
2 ≥ 0     ∀n > 0,t  (7.199) 
   
− z j ,n-1,t z j ,n,t
j
∑ +ψ n,t5 ≥ 0   ⊥   ψ n,t
3 ≥ 0     ∀n > 0,t   (7.200) 




∑ −1≥ 0   ⊥   ψ n,t
4 ≥ 0     ∀n > 0,t   (7.201) 
   
1− un,t
e ≥ 0   ⊥  
 
ψ n,t
5 ≥ 0     ∀n > 0,t   (7.202) 





f ≥ 0   ⊥  
 
xk ,r ,t ≥ 0     
∀k,r,t   (7.203)  








   
∀n,r,t   (7.204) 
  
 
1− xk ,r ,t
k
∑ − xn,r ,te
n
∑ ≥ 0   ⊥   φr ,t
0 ≥ 0     ∀r,t   (7.205)  
  
 
1− xk ,r ,t
r
∑ ≥ 0  ⊥   φk ,t






∑ ≥ 0  ⊥   φn,t
e ≥ 0     ∀n,t   (7.207) 
Defining Variables at Critical Utilisation Levels 
   
ur ,t − xk ,r ,tuk,t
k
∑ + xn,r ,te un,te
n
∑ = 0       ∀r,t   (7.208) 
  
 
Lr ,t − xk ,r ,tLk,t
k
∑ + xn,r ,te Ln,te
n




e − L0,t +
Lk-1,t − Lk,t
uk,t − uk-1,tk






∑ − un,te = 0       ∀n,t   (7.211) 
  
 
uk,t − uk-1,t − uk ,n,t
part ≥ 0  ⊥    uk+1,n,t















≥ 0  ⊥  
 
ai,r ,t




1 +GENi,r ,t ≥ 0  ⊥   
ai,r ,t
0 ≥ 0     ∀i,r,t   (7.214) 




e = 0       ∀t   (7.215) 
  
 
z0,0,t = 1        ∀t   (7.216) 
  
 
z0,i,t = 0  
     ∀i > 0,t   (7.217) 
   
CAPI+1,r ,t − at
shiftλr ,t − at
cont − at
shift( )





∑ = 0  
    
 ∀r,t  (7.218) 
7.7.6 Reliability Model 
Following adaptation to account for reliability issues, the optimal trade-off, market clearing and 
equilibrium capacity model is presented below.  By inspection, the system is square with one constraint 
for each variable, and one variable for each constraint.  
 
Market Equilibrium Conditions: 
  
 
−λr ,t + MCi,t +ϕ i,r ,t
+
i>0
≥ 0   ⊥  
 
GENi,r ,t ≥ 0    





∑ − Lr ,t +OUTr ,t( ) = 0   ⊥   λr ,t free     ∀r,t  (7.220) 
  
 
CAPi,t −GENi,r ,t ≥ 0   ⊥   
ϕ i,r ,t
+ ≥ 0    ∀i > 0,r,t  (7.221) 
   
OUTi,r ,t + ρiCAPi −GENi,r ,t ≥ 0  ⊥   
OUTi,r ,t ≥ 0    ∀i,r,t   (7.222) 
Optimal Capacity Conditions 
   
χ i,t − ϕ i,r+1,t
+ ur+1,t − ur ,t( )
r<R
∑ = 0  ⊥   CAPi,t free    ∀i,t  (7.223) 
  
 
CAPi −CAPi,t ≥ 0   ⊥   
χ i,t ≥ 0     ∀i > 0,t  (7.224) 
  
 
FCi − ρi w t
t
∑ χ i,t ≥ 0  ⊥   CAPi ≥ 0    ∀i > 0  (7.225) 
Defining Optimal Trade-offs 
  
 
χ i,t − χ j ,t − (MCj,t − MCi,t )ui, j ,t
e +ηi, j ,t ≥ 0  ⊥   
ui, j ,t




1− ui, j ,t
e ≥ 0   ⊥  
 
ηi, j ,t ≥ 0     ∀i, j ≠ i,t   (7.227) 
Selecting Critical Utilisation Levels 
   
1−ψ n,t
0 ≥ 0   ⊥  
 
un,t





∑ −ψ n,t1 +ψ n,t2 MCj,t +ψ n,t3 z j ,n-1,t + 2ψ n,t4 z j ,n,t ≥ 0   ⊥   z j ,n,t ≥ 0     ∀j,n > 0,t   (7.229) 
   
un,t





∑ ≥ 0  ⊥   ψ n,t
0 ≥ 0     ∀n > 0,t  (7.230) 
   
z j ,n,t
j
∑ ≥1   ⊥   ψ n,t
1 ≥ 0     ∀n > 0,t  (7.231) 
   
z j ,n-1,tMCj,t
j
∑ − z j ,n,tMCj,t
j
∑ ≥ 0  ⊥   ψ n,t
2 ≥ 0     ∀n > 0,t  (7.232) 
   
− z j ,n-1,t z j ,n,t
j
∑ +ψ n,t5 ≥ 0   ⊥   ψ n,t
3 ≥ 0     ∀n > 0,t   (7.233) 




∑ −1≥ 0   ⊥   ψ n,t
4 ≥ 0     ∀n > 0,t   (7.234) 
   
1− un,t
e ≥ 0   ⊥  
 
ψ n,t
5 ≥ 0     ∀n > 0,t   (7.235) 





f ≥ 0   ⊥  
 
xk ,r ,t ≥ 0     
∀k,r,t   (7.236)  








   
∀n,r,t   (7.237) 
  
 
1− xk ,r ,t
k
∑ − xn,r ,te
n
∑ ≥ 0   ⊥   φr ,t
0 ≥ 0     ∀r,t   (7.238)  
  
 
1− xk ,r ,t
r
∑ ≥ 0  ⊥   φk ,t






∑ ≥ 0  ⊥   φn,t
e ≥ 0     ∀n,t   (7.240) 
Defining Variables at Critical Utilisation Levels 
   
ur ,t − xk ,r ,tuk,t
k
∑ + xn,r ,te un,te
n
∑ = 0       ∀r,t   (7.241) 
  
 
Lr ,t − xk ,r ,tLk,t
k
∑ + xn,r ,te Ln,te
n




e − L0,t +
Lk-1,t − Lk,t
uk,t − uk-1,tk










uk,t − uk-1,t − uk ,n,t
part ≥ 0  ⊥    uk+1,n,t
part ≥ 0    ∀0 < k < K ,n,t  (7.245) 




e = 0       ∀t   (7.246) 
  
 
z0,0,t = 1        ∀t   (7.247) 
  
 
z0,i,t = 0  
     ∀i > 0,t   (7.248) 
   
OUTr ,t = OUTi,r ,t
i
∑       ∀r,t   (7.249) 
7.7.7 Intermittent Generation Model 
Following adaptation to account for intermittent generation, the optimal trade-off, market clearing and 
equilibrium capacity model is presented below.  By inspection, the system is square with one constraint 
for each variable, and one variable for each constraint.   We draw the reader’s attention to the 
significant number of definitions.  These are included only to ensure that the expressions in the rest of 
the model are readily interpretable. 
 
Market Equilibrium Conditions: 
  
 
−λr + MCi +ϕ i,r
+
i>0
≥ 0   ⊥  
 
GENi,r ≥ 0    





∑ − NLr − SPLr = 0    ⊥   λr free      ∀r  (7.251) 
   λr ≥ 0  ⊥  SPLr ≥ 0     ∀r  (7.252) 
  
 
CAPi −GENi,r ≥ 0   ⊥   
ϕ i,r
+ ≥ 0     ∀i > 0,i ∉INT ,r (7.253) 
Constructing the Net LDC 
   NLh − NLh−1 + γ h
1 ≥ 0  ⊥   γ h
1 ≥ 0     
!h > 0  (7.254) 
   NLh−1 − NLh + γ h
2 ≥ 0  ⊥   γ h
2 ≥ 0     





























1 + γ h
2 th − th−1( ) + γ h*,h3 ≥ 0 ⊥  uh*,h
CLP ≥ 0
 
        
!h*,h > 0  (7.256) 
  
 
th − th−1 − uh*,h
CLP ≥ 0  ⊥  
 
γ h*,h
3 ≥ 0     ∀h*,h > 0  (7.257) 
Optimal Capacity Conditions 
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χ i,t − ϕ i,r+1,t
+ ur+1,t − ur ,t( )
r<R
∑ = 0  ⊥   CAPi,t free    ∀i,t  (7.258) 
  
 
CAPi −CAPi,t ≥ 0   ⊥   






∑ ≥ 0  ⊥   CAPi ≥ 0    ∀i ∈INT  (7.260) 
Defining Optimal Trade-offs 
  
 
χ i,t − χ j ,t − (MCj,t − MCi,t )ui, j ,t
e +ηi, j ,t ≥ 0  ⊥   
ui, j ,t
e ≥ 0     ∀i, j ≠ i,t   (7.261) 
  
 
1− ui, j ,t
e ≥ 0   ⊥  
 
ηi, j ,t ≥ 0     ∀i, j ≠ i,t   (7.262) 
Selecting Critical Utilisation Levels 
   
1−ψ n,t
0 ≥ 0   ⊥  
 
un,t





∑ −ψ n,t1 +ψ n,t2 MCj,t +ψ n,t3 z j ,n-1,t + 2ψ n,t4 z j ,n,t ≥ 0   ⊥   z j ,n,t ≥ 0     ∀j,n > 0,t   (7.264) 
   
un,t





∑ ≥ 0  ⊥   ψ n,t
0 ≥ 0     ∀n > 0,t  (7.265) 
   
z j ,n,t
j
∑ ≥1   ⊥   ψ n,t
1 ≥ 0     ∀n > 0,t  (7.266) 
   
z j ,n-1,tMCj,t
j
∑ − z j ,n,tMCj,t
j
∑ ≥ 0  ⊥   ψ n,t
2 ≥ 0     ∀n > 0,t  (7.267) 
   
− z j ,n-1,t z j ,n,t
j
∑ +ψ n,t5 ≥ 0   ⊥   ψ n,t
3 ≥ 0     ∀n > 0,t   (7.268) 




∑ −1≥ 0   ⊥   ψ n,t
4 ≥ 0     ∀n > 0,t   (7.269) 
   
1− un,t
e ≥ 0   ⊥  
 
ψ n,t
5 ≥ 0     ∀n > 0,t   (7.270) 
Ordering Utilisation Levels 
   −r.uh*
CLP +φr
0 +φh*




    
∀h*,r   (7.271)  
   −r.un
e +φr
0 +φn




    








∑ ≥ 0   ⊥   φr






∑ ≥ 0  ⊥   φh*






∑ ≥ 0  ⊥   φn
e ≥ 0     ∀n   (7.275) 
Defining Variables at Critical Utilisation Levels 
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∑ + xn,re une
n






∑ + xn,re NLne
n






















part ≥ 0  ⊥    uk+1,n,t





e = 0       ∀t   (7.281) 
  
 
z0,0,t = 1        ∀t   (7.282) 
  
 
z0,i,t = 0  
     ∀i > 0,t   (7.283) 











∑       ∀h  (7.285) 






∑       !h*  (7.286) 
   
NLh* = NLh*
CLPS uh*
CLP( )       ∀h*  (7.287) 




∑       ∀h*   (7.288) 




∑       ∀h*   (7.289) 
   







t − th*( )       ∀h*   (7.290) 
   







t − th*( )       ∀i ∈INT ,h*   (7.291) 
 

























⎟   ∀i ∈INT ,h*   (7.292) 





th*+1∫       ∀i ∈INT ,h*   (7.293)  
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